Columbia  ^^nitier^ttp 

THE  LIBRARIES 


LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 


VOLUME     III. 


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LIFE 

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rOT.COI^L 


NAPOLEON- 


By     baron     JOMINI, 

gen-erai,-1n-cuikp  and  aid-de-ca.mp  to  the  empebok  of  russia. 


■'Je  fus  ambitieux;  tout  liomme  l'est,  sans  doute; 
Mais  jamais  voi,  pontife,  ou  chef,  ou  citoyon, 
Ne  conçut  un  projet  aussi  grand  que  le  ndcn." 

Voi.TAiEE.  Jfd/wmet. 


TRANSLATED    FROM    THE    FRENCH. 


-WITH     ISrOTES, 

By   H.  W.  IIALLECK,  LL.D., 

MAJOE-GENEP.  AL        UNITED        STATES       A  P.  MY; 

iUTUOP.    OF    "ELEMENTS    OF    MILITAUY    AP.T    AND     KCIENrK.  ;"    •' IXTEP.NATIONAI.    I,AW, 

AND    THE    LAWS    OF    WAP.,"    AC,    Ai". 


IN   FOUR  VOLUMES.— WITH   AN   ATLAS. 

VOL.   III. 


NEW  YORK  : 
D.   VAN   NOSTRAND,  192   BROADWAY. 

LONDON:    TRUBNER    &     CO. 
1  8  G  4. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1SG4,  by 

D.    VAN    NOSTKAND, 

In  the  Clerk's  OfEce  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Southern 
District  of  New   York. 


Electrotyped  by  Smith  &  McDougal,  82  &  84  Beeiiiuaii-street 
Printed  by  C.  A.  Alvosd,  15  Vandewater-street. 


C  0  K  T  E  î\"  T  S 
VOL.    III. 


C  H  A  P  T  I']  li     XIV. 
CAMPAIGN  OP  1809  IX  AUSTRIA. 

FROM   THE   DECLARATION    OP    WAR   BY   AUSTRIA   TO   THE    TREATY   OP   VIENNA. 


Austrian  Policy— Character  of  the  Times— Military  Preparations  of  Aus- 
tria—She excites  Insurrection  in  Germany— Secret  Societies— The  State 
of  Westphalia— Situation  of  Prussia,  and  of  the  other  European  Powers 
—Insurrectionary  States  of  the  Tyrol— Austria  takes  the  Initiative  in 
the  War— Her  Plan  of  Operations— Position  and  Number  of  her  Forces 
—The  French  Army— Relative  Numbers  of  the  opposing  Forces— Ber- 
thier  sent  to  rally  the  French  Army- Advance  of  the  Austrians— Faults 
of  Berthier— Napoleon  arrives  at  Ingolstadt— DifQculty  of  forming  a 
Junction  with  Davoust— Advance  of  the  Austrian  Right  toward  Ratis- 
bon— New  Movements  of  Davoust-Battle  of  Thann— Junction  with 
Davoust  effected— Dispositions  against  the  Austrian  Centre— Affiiir  of 
Abensberg— Movement  of  Davoust— Hiller  defeated  at  Landshut— Da- 
voust attacks  the  Austrian  Centre— Advance  of  Napoleon— Battle  of 
Eckmuhl— Retreat  of  the  Archduke— Remarks— Napoleon  marches  on 
Vienna— Operations  in  Italy— Continuation  of  Napoleon's  March— Tardy 
Projects  of  Prince  Charles  to  save  his  Capital— Napoleon's  second  En- 
trance into  Vienna— Dispositions  for  the  Passage  of  the  Danube— Motives 
of  this  Undertaking— Difficulties  of  its  Execution— Preparations  for 
effecting  the  Passage— Kolowrath's  Attack  on  Lintz— Massena  crosses  to 
the  left  Bank  of  the  Danube— The  Archduke  attacks  the  French— Bat- 
tle of  Essling— Council  of  War,  and  new  Projects  of  Napoleon— Death 
of  Lannes— Remarks  on  the  new  Position  of  the  French— Reply  to  Rog- 
niafs  Criticisms  on  the  Battle  of  Esshng— General  Remarks  on  the  Tac- 
tics of  Battles— Military  Operations  in  Italy— Battle  of  the  Piave— Eu- 


13962 


1  CONTENTS. 

gene  pursues  the  Austrians — Retreat  of  the  Archduke  John  on  Gratz — 
Junction  of  the  Armies  of  Napoleon  and  Eugene — Insurrection  of  West- 
l^halia  and  Prussia — Affairs  of  the  Tyrol — Operations  in  Poland — Situa- 
tion of  Affairs  in  Germany — Affairs  of  Rome — The  Pope  transferred  to 
Savona — Measures  of  Napoleon  for  repairing  the  Check  received  at  Ess- 
ling — Eugene  marches  against  the  Archduke  John — Battle  of  Raab — 
Results  of  this  Battle,  and  Siege  of  Raab — The  Archduke  John  disobeys 
the  Orders  of  the  Generalissimo — Bombardment  of  Presburg — Mai-- 
raont's  March — Operations  of  Guilay — Combat  of  Gratz — General  Situa- 
tion of  Military  Affairs — New  Passage  of  the  Danube — Operations  on 
the  Morning  of  the  fifth  (July) — Position  of  the  opposing  Forces — Pre- 
liminary Attack  of  the  French — Battle  of  Wagram — Defeat  of  the  Aus- 
trians— Remarks  on  the  Battle — Retreat  of  the  Archduke,  and  Pursuit 
of  the  French — Battle  of  Znaim — Armistice — Its  Conditions — Motives  of 
-\ustria  in  ratifying  it — Situation  of  Affairs  in  the  North  of  Europe — 
Operations  in  Tyrol — Negotiations  with  Austria  and  renewed  Hostilities 
— Maritime  Expedition  of  the  English  against  Rochefort,  Naples  and 
Antwerp — Change  of  the  British  Ministry — Stabs'  attempt  to  assassinate 
Napoleon — Austria  finally  decides  to  make  Peace — Treaty  of  Vienna — 
Positive  Results  of  the  Peace — Sensation  it  produces  in  Russia — The 
French  destroy  the  Fortifications  of  Vienna — Expedition  for  the  Subju- 
gation of  the  Tyrol — Remarks  on  the  Campaign 13 


CHAPTER     X  A'  . 

CAMPAIGN  OF  1809  IN  SPAIN. 

FROM    THE    ASSAULT    OF   Ol'OKTO   TO   THE    SIEGE   OF    GERONA. 

State  of  Affairs  in  the  Peninsula — First  Operations  of  Soult — Combats  of 
Chaves  and  Braga — Assault  of  Oporto — Soult  takes  the  left  Bank  of  the 
Minho — ^Victories  of  Medellin  and  Ciudad-Real — DiiBeult  Position  of 
Soult — Combat  of  Amarante — New  Descent  of  Wellington  into  Portugal 
— He  attacks  Soult  at  Oporto — Soult's  Retreat — Ney's  Operations  in  the 
Asturias — Misunderstanding  between  Soult  and  Ney,  and  the  consequent 
Evacuation  of  Galicia — WeUington's  Advance  on  Madrid — Joseph  col- 
lects his  Forces  for  an  Attack — Ilis  Dispositions  for  Battle — "Wellington's 
System  of  Battles — Battle  of  Talavera — Operations  of  Soult,  Ney,  and 
Mortier — Retreat  of  the  Allies — Battle  of  Almonacid — Ney  defeats  Wilson 
— Remarks  oa  these  Operations — Soult  succeeds  Jourdan  as  Joseph's 
Chief  of  Staff— Combats  of  Tamames  and  Alba  do  Termes— Arrizaga 
beaten  at  Ocana — Inaction  of  Wellington — Intrenched  Camp  of  Torres 
Vedras — Romana  quarrels  with  the  Junta  of  Seville — Blake's  Efforts  to 
deliver  Aragon — Operations  of  Suchet — Combat  of  Santa  Maria — Combat 
of  Belchite — St  Cyr's  Operations  in  Catalonia — Siege  of  Gerona — General 
Remarks  on  the  Operations  of  this  ('ampaign — Operations  of  the  Rus- 
sians against  Sweden — War  between  Russia  and  Turkey 1-12 


CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER     XVI. 

CAMPAIGN  OF  18ip  IN  SPAIN. 

FROM  THE  SIEGE  OF  GERONA  TO  THE  LINES  OF  TORRES  VEDRAS. 


Napoleon's  Marriage  with  an  Austrian  Princess — He  again  offers  Peace  to 
England — Preparations  for  a  new  Campaign  in  Spain — Napoleon's  Plan 
of  Oi>erations — Soult's  Plan — Division  of  the  Army — Invasion  of  Anda- 
lusia— Joseph's  fatal  Delay — Capture  of  Seville — Sebastian!  takes  Gre- 
nada and  Malaga — Remarks  on  Joseph's  Operations — His  Return  to 
Madrid — Internal  Dissensions  in  Spain — The  English  Faction  triumphs — 
ililitary  Organization  of  the  Provinces  of  the  North — Soult  neglects  to 
take  Badajos — Inaction  of  WeUington — Soult  invests  Cadiz — His  Occu- 
pation of  Andalusia — Operations  in  the  North — Chances  of  Napoleon's 
Success — Massena'a  Expedition  against  Portugal — Sieges  of  Ciudad- 
Rodrigo  and  Almeida — Position  of  Wellington — Third  Invasion  of  Por- 
tugal— Battle  of  Busaco — Massena  turns  the  Position— Devastating  Sys- 
tem of  the  English  General — Lines  of  Torres- Vcdras — Massena's  Position 
— Sufferings  of  his  Army — Junction  with  Drouet — Remarks — Suchet's 
Success  in  Catalonia — Combat  of  Margalef— Sieges  of  Lerida  and  Me- 
quinenza — Operations  of  Augereau — Siege  of  Tortosa — General  Remarks 
on  the  War — Bernadette  elected  Prince-Royal  of  Sweden — Reunion 
of  Holland  —  Consequent  Negotiations  with  England  —  Annexation 
of  the  Mouths  of  the  Ems,  the  Elbe,  and  the  Weser — Napoleon's  Tour 
in  Holland — Senatus-consultum  on  the  Reunion  of  Rome — Council  of 
Paris — Religious  Fanaticism — Continuation  of  the  War  between  Russia 
and  Turkey 10-' 


CHAPTER     XVII. 

CAMPAIGN  OF  1811  IN  SPAIN. 

FROM   soult's   CAPTURE   OF   BADAJOZ    TO   ITS   RECAPTURE   BY    WELLINGTON. 

General  Review  of  the  Foreign  Relations  of  France — Faulty  Relations  with 
Prussia — Proposed  Alliance — New  Difficulties  with  Russia— Prospects 
of  closing  the  War  in  Spain — Dissensions  between  Joseph  and  my  Gen- 
erals— New  Cortes  to  be  assembled  at  ]\radrid — Critical  Situation  of  Mas- 
sena— Soult  marches  on  Badajoz  and  Olivenza — Siege  of  Badajoz — 
Remarks  on   the  Operations  of  Soult — Attempt  to  raise  the  Siege  of 


VUl  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Cadiz — ASair  of  Chiclana — Retreat  of  the  Allies — Soult  marches  to 
the  Support  of  Victor — Massena  evacuates  Portugal — Battle  of  Fuente 
di  Honore — Massena  retires  to  Salamanca — Remarks  on  Massena's  Re- 
treat— Beresford  threatens  Badajoz — He  captures  Olivenza  and  lays 
Siege  to  Badajoz — Soult  marches  to  its  Succor — Battle  of  Albuera — Na- 
poleon directs  the  Junction  of  Soult  and  Marmont — Wellington  renews 
the  Siege  of  Badajoz — He  is  again  forced  to  retire  into  Portugal — Opera- 
tions of  the  Spaniards  in  Andalusia — They  are  defeated  by  Soult — "Wel- 
lington and  Marmont  near  Ciudad-Rodrigo — Hill  surprises  Girard — 
Suchet  on  the  Ebro — Figueras  surprised  by  the  Catalans — Suchet  pre- 
pares to  attack  Tarragona — Memorable  Siege  of  that  City — Further 
Operations  of  Suchet — He  prepares  to  attack  Valencia — Siege  of  Sagun- 
tum — Battle  of  Saguntum — Investment  of  Valencia — Siege  of  that  Place 
— Reduction  of  Peniscola  and  Gandia — Remarks  on  Soult's  Operations 
in  the  South — Winter  Campaign  of  Wellington  in  Estremadura — He  cap- 
tures Ciudad-Rodrigo  and  Badajos — Remarks  on  these  Operations — 
Insurrection  in  Spanish  America — General  State  of  Affairs  in  Spain — 
Continuation  of  the  War  between  Russia  and  Turkey 257 


CHAPTER     XVIII. 
CAMPAIGN    OF    1812    IN    RUSSIA. 

PART   I. — ADVANCE   TO    MOSCOW. 

Causes  of  the  War  with  Russia — Opinions  of  Napoleon's  Counselors — Mili- 
tary Chances  of  Success — Negotiations  with  Russia — Fruits  of  the  Con- 
tinental System — Occupation  of  Swedish  Pomerania — Alliance  with 
Prussia — Pacific  Proposals  to  the  Emperor  Alexander — Offensive  and 
Defensive  Alliance  with  Austria— Result  of  the  Negotiations  with  Russia 
— Proposals  of  Peace  to  England — Ultimatum  of  Russia — Napoleon 
repairs  to  Dresden — Return  of  Narbonne — Pradt's  Mission  to  Warsaw 
— Ligneul's  Mission  to  Sweden — Preparations  for  opening  the  Cam- 
paign— Diversion  of  the  Turks — Dispositions  of  the  Russian  Army — Its 
Organization — French  and  AlUed  Army — Plans  of  Napoleon — Passage 
of  the  Niémen — The  Russians  retreat  on  Drissa — Napoleon's  Delay  at 
Wilna — Mission  of  Balaschof — Reply  of  Napoleon — Poland — War  be- 
tween England  and  the  United  States — Operations  against  Bagration — 
Napoleon  advances  on  Polotsk — Camp  of  Drissa — Alexander  retires  to 
St.  Petersburg — Operations  of  Barclay — Combats  of  Ostrowno — Opera- 
tions of  Bagration — Affair  of  Mohilew — Halt  at  Witepsk — Operations 
of  Napoleon's  Wings — Tormassof  defeats  the  Saxons — Operations  of 
Oudinot— Turkey.  Sweden  and  England — Council  of  War — Barclay 
takes  the  Offensive — Napoleon's  March  on  Smolensko — Battles  of  Smo- 
lensko — Retreat  of  Barclay — Results  of  the  Campaign — Ney  passes  the 


CONTENTS.  IX 

PAGE 

Dnieper — Hazardous  irarch  of  Barclay — Pursuit  of  Ney  and  Murât — 
Battle  of  Valoutina — Retreat  of  the  Russians — Position  of  Napoleon — 
Battle  of  Gorodeczna — Affairs  of  Polotsk — Napoleon  resolves  to  advance 
— Character  of  the  Country — New  Generalissimo  of  the  Russian  Armies 
— Preparations  for  Battle — Position  of  the  Enemy — Plan  of  Attack — 
Battle  of  Borodino  or  tlie  Moscowa — Remarks  on  this  Battle — Napoleon 
enters  Moscow — The  Russians  burn  the  City — New  Projects  of  Napo- 
leon— The  Russians  march  on  Taroutina — Embarrassing  Position  of  the 
French 314 


LIST    OF    MAPS 


TO   ILLUSTEATE 


JOMlNrS    LIFE    OF    NAPOLEOiN 

VOL.     III. 

23.  MAP  OF  THE  VALLEY  OF  THE  DANUBE,  FROM    RATISBOxY  TO 

PRESBTJRG,  to  illustrate  the  Campaigns  of  1808  and  1809. 
2-1.  BATTLE  OF  ABENSBERG,  20th  April,  1809. 

25.  BATTLE  OF  ECKMUHL,  22(1  April,  1809. 

26.  BATTLE  OF  ESSLING,  21st  and  22d  May,  1809.     (Sheet  1.) 

27.  BATTLE  OP  ESSLING,  21st  and  22d  May,  1809.     (Sheet  2.) 

28.  BATFLE  OP  WAGRAM,  5th  and  6th  July,  1809.     (Sheet  1,  5th  July.\ 

29.  BATTLE  OF  WAGRAM,  5th  and  6th  July,  1809.     (Sheet  2,  6th  July.) 

30.  MAP  OF  PART  OF  PORTUGAL,  to  illustrate  the  Defense  of  Lisbou,  by 
the  lines  of  Torres  Vedras,  October  and  November,  1810. 

31.  MAP  QF  PART  OF  RUSSIA,  to  illustrate  the  Campaigns  of  1812. 

32.  BATTLES  OF  SMOLENSKO  AND  YALTELTNA.    17th,    ]Sth  and  19th 
August,  1812. 

33.  BATTLE  OF  BORODINO,  7th  September,  1812. 


CHAPTER    XIV. 

WAR  OF  1S09  IX  GERMANT,  OR  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  WAGRAM. 

Austrian  Policy — Character  of  the  Times — Military  Preparations  of  Austria — 
She  excites  Iiisurrectiou  in  Germany — Secret  Societies — The  State  of  West- 
phalia— Situation  of  Prussia,  and  of  the  other  P]uropean  Powers — Insurrec- 
tionary State  of  the  Tyrol — Austria  takes  the  Initiative  in  the  War — Her 
Plan  of  Operations — Position  and  Number  of  her  Forces — The  French  Army 
— Relative  Numbers  of  the  opposing  Fo.  ces — Berthier  sent  to  rally  the  French 
Army — Advance  of  the  Austrians — Faults  of  Berthier — Napoleon  arrives  at 
Ingolstadt — Difficulty  of  forming  a  Junction  with  Davoust — Advance  of  the 
Austrian  Right  toward  Ratisbon — New  Movements  of  Davoust — Battle  of 
Tliaun— Junction  with  Davoust  effected — Dispositions  against  the  Austrian 
Centre — Affair  of  Abensberg — Movement  of  Davoust — Hiller  defeated  at 
Landshut — Davoust  attacks  the  Austrian  Centre — Advance  of  Napoleon — 
Battle  of  Eckmuhl — Retreat  of  the  Archduke — Remarks — Napoleon  marchea 
on  Vienna — Operations  in  Italy — Continuation  of  Napoleon's  Marcii — Tardy 
Projects  of  Prince  Charles  to  save  his  Capital — Napoleon's  second  Entranc3 
into  Vienna — Dispositions  for  the  Pass: i go  of  the  Danube — Motives  of  this 
Undertaking— Difficulties  of  its  Execution — Preparations  for  effecting  the 
Passage — Kolovvrath's  attack  on  Lintz — Massena  crosses  the  left  Bank  of 
the  Danube— The  Archduke  attacks  the  French — Battle  of  Essling — Counc  I 
of  War,  and  new  Projects  of  Napoleon — Death  of  Lannes — Remarks  on  the 
new  Position  of  the  French — Reply  to  Rogniat's  Criticisms  on  the  Battle  of 
Essling— General  Remarks  on  the  Tactics  of  Battles— Military  Operations  in 
Italy — Battle  of  tlie  Piave — Eugene  pursues  the  Austrians — Retreat  of 
the  Archduke  Jolm  on  Gratz — Junction  of  the  Armies  of  Napoleon  and 
Eugene — Insurrection  of  Westphalia  and  Prussia — Affairs  of  the  Tyro! — 
Operations  in  Poland — Situation  of  Affliirs  in  Germany — Affairs  of  Rome — 
The  Pope  transferred  to  Savona — Measures  of  Napoleon  for  repairing  the 
Check  received  at  Essling — Eugene  marches  against  the  Archduke  John — 
Battle  of  Raab — Results  of  this  Battle,  and  Sietre  of  Raab — The  Archduke 
John  disobeys  the  Orders  of  the  Generalissimo — Bombardment  of  Presbourg — 
Marmont's  March— Operations  of  Giulay — Combat  of  Gratz — General  Situa- 
tion of  Military  Affliirs — New  Passage  of  the  Danube — Operations  on  the 
morning  of  the  fifth  (July) — Position  of  the  opposing  Forces — Preliminary 
Attack  of  the  French — Battle  of  Wagram — Defeat  of  the  Austrians— Remarks 
on  the  Battle — Retrent  of  the  Archduke,  and  Pursuit  of  the  French — Battle 
of  Znaim — Armistice— Its  Conditions — Motives  of  Austria  in  ratifying  it — 


14  L  I  F  E      O  F      N  A  P  O  L  E  O  X  .  [Cii    XIV. 

Situation  of  Affairs  in  the  Nortli  of  Europe — Operations  in  Tyrol— Nego- 
tiations with  Austria  and  renewed  Hostilities — Maritime  Expedition  of  the 
English  against  Rocliefort,  Naples  and  Antwerp — Cnange  of  the  British 
Ministn/ — Stabs'  attempt  to  assassiiiite  Napoleon — Austria  finally  decides 
to  make  Peace — Treaty  of  Vienna — Positive  Results  of  the  Peace— Sensation 
it  produces  in  Russia — The  French  destroy  the  Fortifications  of  Vienna — 
Expedition  for  the  Subjugation  of  the  Tyrol — Remarks  on  the  Campaign. 

Austrian  Policy. — I  had  hoped  that  the  conference  of  Er- 
furth  and  our  success  in  Spain,  would  induce  Austria  to  give 
up  her  idea  of  engaging  ahine  in  a  contest  against  France  ; 
hut  in  this  I  was  mistaken.  The  court  of  Vienna  pursues  a 
tenacious  policy,  yielding  only  when  necessary  to  gather 
strength  to  renew  its  old  purposes.  Some  have  absm'dly 
attributed  this  perseverance  to  the  oligarchic  form  of  its 
government  ;  in  reality,  nothing  is  less  oligarchic  than  the 
cabinet  of  Vienna  ;  the  prime  ministers,  who  are  changed 
with  the  external  policy  of  thj  government,  are  very  fre- 
quently plebeians  by  birth,  or  nobles  from  parts  of  the  empire 
other  than  the  hereditary  states.  Some  of  the  emperors 
have  left  the  government  to  be  carried  on  by  their  council- 
lors ;  l)ut  such  was  not  the  case  with  Maria  Theresa,  or 
with  Joseph  II.  The  government  of  Austria,  instead  of 
being  an  oligarchy  is  a  mixed  monarchy  ;  in  Austria  and 
Bohemia  it  is  absolute,  but  limited  in  Hungary,  and  almost 
republican  in  the  Tyrol. 

The  decisions  of  a  government  are,  undoubtedly,  very  much 
influenced  by  the  large  landed  proprietors  and  the  principal 
nobility  of  the  state  ;  but  a  government  which,  in  this 
nineteenth  century,  acts  only  for  the  interest  of  a  few  fami- 
lies, will  soon  be  overthrown.  In  a  republic  of  dema- 
gogues, where  the  rulers  are  changed  every  year,  there  can  be 
no  permanent  state  policy;  but  all  other  forms  of  govern- 
ment are  susceptible  of  pursuing  a  permanent  course,  for 
there  are  always  precedents  in  the  diplomatic  archives  of  the 
state,  which  serve  as  guides  to  the  chief  of  that  department, 


Cil.  XIY.]      THE     WAR     OF     1809     IN     GERMANY.  15 

both  in  peace  and  war.  There  are  always  j^ermancnt  as  well 
as  temporary  views  of  state  policy.  It  is  always  an  object 
for  a  state  to  have  more  real  strength  than  its  neighbors,  as 
this  is  the  best  means  of  preventing  an  attack.  The  strength 
of  a  state  may  be  either  positive  or  federative  ;  it  may  be 
strong  in  its  own  positive  power,  or  by  its  alliances.  Where 
a  single  state  becomes  so  great,  in  its  own  positive  strength, 
as  to  endanger  the  safety  of  others,  its  neighbors  resort  to 
these  federative  means,  either  for  self-protection,  or  for  ag- 
gression against  the  single  positive  power.  At  one  time 
France  was  near  overthrowing  the  federative  power  of  the 
European  sovereigns  ;  at  another,  the  latter  triumphed  over 
all  my  efforts.  My  age  loould  never  understand  tJie  neces- 
sity of  uniting  loiih  me  to  establish  an  eqidlihrium  against 
England.  The  slavery  of  the  Continent  results  from  the  toant 
of  such  an  equilihrium.  Political  preponderance  is  gained 
either  by  conquest  or  by  family  alliance.  The  results  are 
not  absolutely  the  same,  but  the  real  difference  is  not  im- 
portant. From  Henry  IV.  to  Louis  XV.,  the  Bourbons,  who 
are  not  an  oligarchy,  have  pursued  a  permanent  course  of 
policy  ;  the  means  have  necessarily  varied  with  the  change 
of  events. 

The  policy  of  Austria  differs,  therefore,  in  no  way  from 
that  of  other  states.  If  the  monarchy  of  Francis  II.  has 
been  able  to  resist  violent  shocks,  it  is  because  it  has  a  war- 
like people,  and  a  good  system  of  recruiting  its  forces  ;  be- 
cause its  geographical  position  is  singularly  favorable  for 
defense,  and  lastly,  because,  in  great  danger,  it  is  rescued  from 
shipwreck  by  Russia  or  England. 

The  position  of  Austria  towards  us  was  a  false  one  ;  this 
was  made  so,  first,  by  the  revolution,  which  produced  the 
first  coalition  ;  second,  by  the  invasion  of  Switzerland,  which 
produced  the  second  coalition  ;  and  third,  by  the  annexa- 
tions of  Italy  to  France,  which  caused  the  third  coalition. 


16  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

After  the  second  coalition,  Austria  was  constantly  in  fear 
of  our  jîreponderance  ;  she  seized  every  occasion  to  oppose 
this  preponderance  ;  in  1809  she  did  well  in  seeking  to  profit 
by  this  opposition.  There  certainly  was  nothing  of  an  oli- 
garchic character  in  this  opposition.  Nor  is  it  necessary  in 
this  jilace  to  attempt  to  reconcile  the  abstractions  of  writers 
who  have  exhibited  talents,  but  very  little  knowledge  of 
national  affairs.     We  will  now  return  to  our  narrative. 

Character  of  the  Timesi — The  cabinet  of  Vienna  thought 
that  however  successful  we  might  be  in  Spain,  it  would  re- 
quire two  hundred  thousand  men  to  occupy  a  country  whose 
entire  subjugation  I  had  projected.  The  Austrian  govern- 
ment, therefore,  resolved  to  profit  by  this  occasion  to  regain 
the  sceptre  of  Italy  and  Germany  ;  her  armaments  were 
doubled.  England  had,  this  time,  no  diSiculty  in  concocting 
a  new  coalition  ;  the  imperial  cabinet  even  anticipated  the 
wishes  of  the  court  of  London  ;  and  it  must  be  confessed, 
that  war,  at  this  crisis,  seemed  in  accordance  with  the  wishes 
and  interest  of  the  nation.  The  Austrian  army  burned  to 
repair  the  defeat  of  Ulm,  and  the  people  to  regain  their 
former  rank  among  nations.  Moreover,  Austria  received  a 
subsidy  of  at  least  one  hundred  millions  from  the  cabinet  of 
London. 

They  were  not  ignorant  at  Vienna  that  Prussia  was  ex- 
asperated ;  that  Westphalia  was  complaining  of  grievances  ; 
that  Hanover  and  the  Hanseatic  towns,  deprived  of  their 
commerce,  detested  a  Continental  system  which  was  not 
likely  to  be  for  their  immediate  benefit  ;  that  Tyrol,  dis- 
pleased with  the  Bavarian  rule,  was  ready  to  rise.  They 
thought  that  the  north  of  Germany  would  declare  against 
us  the  moment  the  Austrian  troops,  falling  in  considerable 
numbers  on  Bavaria,  should  compel  the  French  array  to  con- 
centrate its  forces.  The  Austrian  envoy  at  Koenigsberg 
announced  that  Prussia  desired  war,  and  would  vei-y  soon 


Cil.  XIV.]       THE     W  A  K    OF    1809     IN     G  E  K  M  A  N  Y  .  17 

increase  her  forces  to  one  hundred  thousand,  men  ;  the  lienor 
and  interest  of  Prussia  were  too  much  involved  to  doubt  the 
sincerity  of  her  promises.  Dalmatia,  Italy,  the  Tyrol,  the 
Valteline,  Piedmont,  Naples,  and  even  Sicily,  became  the 
theatre  of  Austrian  intrigue  s.  Never  did  a  storm  seem  more 
threatening. 

My  armies  at  this  time  were  scattered  from  Naples  to 
Madrid,  from  Hamburg  to  the  gates  of  Lisbon  ;  I,  myself, 
was  in  Spain.  Under  these  circumstances  it  was  ])robabI^ 
that  the  Austrians  would,  in  the  beginning,  be  successful, 
and  that  these  early  victories  would  insure  others  ;  they 
might  rouse  Germany,  tempt  Russia,  revive  the  sinking 
courage  of  the  Spaniards,  and  restore  to  the  English  ministry 
a  popularity  lost  by  the  defeat  of  Moore,  thus  stimulating, 
through  British  resources,  the  Peninsula  to  further  re- 
sistance. 

Military  Preparation  of  Austria. — Austria  made  every  ef- 
fort to  raise  a  formidable  military  force.  Her  active  army 
was  to  be  increased  to  three  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  ; 
one  hundred  and  fifty  battalions  of  militia  Qandivehr)  were 
jirepared  for  reenforcing  it  in  case  of  need,  and  suitable  re- 
sources were  intended  to  keep  up  the  regular  army  to  its 
complement.  Th(y  imitated  our  organization  by  dividin'j 
their  forces  into  corps-d\irinée.  Six  corps  of  about  twenty- 
five  thousand  each,  besides  the  reserve,  were  assembled  in 
Bohemia  to  inundate  Bavaria.  Fifty  thousand  regulars,  and 
twenty-five  thousand  militia,  £M-ming  the  eighth  and  ninth 
corps,  were  destined  for  the  ar^^  of  Italy,  under  the  Arch- 
duke John.  Finally,  an  array  of  forty  thousand  men,  under 
the  Archduke  Ferdinand,  was  to  invade  the  Duchy  of  War- 
saw. This  division  offerees  has  been  deemed  objectionable  ; 
it  is  said  that  Poland  and  Italy  were  to  be  conquered  in 
Germany,  for  any  success  on  these  two  points  would  bo 
useless,  should  I  become  victorious  on  the  Danube.     But  it 

VAT,.    IIT. — 2. 


18  LIFEOF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XIV. 

cannot  "be  concealed  that  Austria  had  to  apprehend  an  in- 
surrection in  Galicia,  in  case  Poniatowski  appeared  there 
with  forces  superior  to  theirs  ;  and  this  motive  alone,  with- 
out any  other  political  considerations,  might  have  justified 
a  conaiderable  secondary  detachment  in  that  direction. 

This  Power  incites  Insurrection  in  Germany.— The  cabinet 
of  Vienna,  not  trusting  alone  to  this  great  development  of  its 
forces,  thought  to  add  the  revolutionary  measures  which  had 
already  been  so  effective  in  Spain.  Forgetting  the  just  com- 
plaints which  it  had  made  against  the  system  of  propagan- 
dism  of  the  French  Directory,  it  scattered  through  all  Ger- 
many, an  appeal  to  the  people  to  rise  against  their  existing 
governments,  that  is,  against  us  ;  a  measure  useful,  perhaps, 
for  the  success  of  the  Austrian  projects,  but  contrary  to  its 
own  rules  of  jwlitical  morality — rules,  on  which,  only  a  few 
years  before,  this  same  power  had  based  its  coni plaints 
against  the  French  Eepublic.  Bavaria,  Saxony,  Westphalia, 
and  the  Tyrol,  were  inundated  with  these  appeals  which 
were  posted  up  in  every  place  where  the  Austrian  column 
passed.  The  Archduke  John  did  the  same  thing  in  Italy  ; 
thus  seeking  to  make  the  war  national  and  universal.  They 
sought  to  again  incite  the  people  to  war,  instead  of  subject- 
ing the  points  of  difficulty  to  the  results  of  military  and 
political  combinations  ;  they  sought  to  transform  Europe 
into  one  vast  field  of  battle,  where  they  could  assail  us  on  all 
sides,  because  we  had,  as  conquerors,  required  temporary 
sacrifices  in  order  to  counteract  the  preponderating  force  of 
EngHsh  influence.  A  government  has  a  right  to  arm  all  its 
own  citizens  for  national  defense  ;  but  I  leave  it  to  j^rofessors 
of  public  law,  to  decide  whether  such  appeals  can  properly 
be  made  to  the  people  of  another  government,  and  whether 
insurrection  can  be  made  the  basis  of  a  political  system.  1 1 
appeared  simjih^  and  natural  for  the  king  of  Prussia  to  appeal 
to  the  Prussians,  and  the  king  of  Saxony  to  the  Saxons  ; 


Ch.  Xiy.]  THE     WAR     OF     1809     IN     GERMANY.        19 

but,  I  repeat,  the  frontier  of  the  state  is  the  line  of  demar- 
cation of  such  right.  If,  in  1805,  I  had  wished  to  incite  the 
Hungarians,  I  had  only  to  give  the  word  ;  but  I  have  never 
sought  to  produce  insurrection,  not  even  in  Poland. 

Secret  Societies  in  Germany. — Independent  of  these  mea- 
sures of  Austria,  a  vast  conspiracy  was  extending  itself 
through  all  Germany.  Secret  and  mystical  societies,  under 
the  title  oi  féderés-de-Ia-vcrtu  were  first  established  in  every 
part  of  Prussia  and  afterwards  throughout  all  Germany,  in 
order  to  rally  all  my  enemies  on  one  common  centre  of 
action.  Many  different  passions  combined  to  increase  these 
societies,  in  which  were  collected,  through  the  common  senti- 
ment of  hatred  to  us,  men  of  the  most  antagonistic  princi- 
ples. The  equestrian  nobility  of  Germany,  deprived  of  their 
privileges  ;  the  learned  metaphysicians  of  the  university,  who 
discoursed  about  the  principles  of  liberty  and  equality  which 
fill  the  glowing  pages  of  Demosthenes  and  Cicero  ;  the  soldier, 
humiliated  by  the  reverses  of  the  national  arms  ;  the  bour- 
geois, vexed  by  the  expense  of  the  military  cantonments  and 
the  stagnation  of  trade  and  manufactures — all  were  impatient 
of  our  occupation.  In  a  word,  the  German  aristocrats,  dema- 
gogues, idealogists,  soldiers,  patriots,  all  united  in  desiring, 
not  the  return  of  the  old  Roman  Empire,  but  the  emancipa- 
tion of  Germany,  its  absolute  independence,  the  reëstablish- 
ment  of  its  maritime  relations.  It  would  be  imjust  to  attri- 
bute crime  to  sentiments  so  natural.  But  it  may  be  said 
that  these  brave  men  understood  neither  my  position  nor  my 
intentions  ;  they  jirecipitated  themselves  into  an  opposition 
of  which  they  did  not  appreciate  all  the  consequences.  They 
were  made  the  blind  instruments  of  my  fall,  from  which  they 
derived  no  advantage  whatever. 

Notwithstanding  their  immense  ramifications,  these  socie- 
ties were  a  long  time  enveloped  in  the  most  profound  mys- 
tery ;  a  fortuitous  circumstance  revealed  to  me  at  the  same 


20  LIFEOF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIT. 

time  their  existence  and  their  danger.  The  two  chiefs  of 
this  political  association  were  then  in  Austria  ;  one  at 
Vienna,  and  the  other  (the  duke  of  Bruuswick-Oels),  was 
raising  a  corjîs  in  Bohemia. 

State  of  Westphalia. — Westphalia  was  to  be  the  focus  of 
the  explosion.  Here  England  had  preserved  most  of  her 
adherents,  and  here  my  own  partisans  were  the  least  nu- 
merous. Hanover  suffered  from  the  loss  of  her  maritime 
communications  ;  moreover,  this  country  had  formerly  en- 
joyed a  kind  of  paternal  administration  ;  her  princes,  devoted 
to  the  throne  of  opulent  Albion,  were  relieved  from  the 
necessity  of  taxing  their  own  people  in  order  to  sustain  the 
luxury  of  their  palaces,  and  to  support  a  military  force 
so  disproportionate  to  the  resources  of  the  country  ;  moi-e- 
over,  much  English  money  was  distributed  in  Hanover  by 
way  of  subsidies  and  pensions.  Under  our  administration, 
on  the  contrary,  it  was  subject  to  the  heavy  imposts  incident 
to  conquest. 

Hesse  was  still  more  unfortunate.  Since  the  accession  of 
the  house  of  Hanover  to  the  throne  of  England  had  placed 
this  power  in  more  intimate  relations  with  the  petty  princes 
who  surrounded  this  electorate,  the  Hessians  had  always 
furnished  numerous  contingents  under  English  pay  ;  in  the 
wars  of  Spanish  succession,  in  that  of  the  Seven  Years,  in  the 
American  revolution,  in  the  coalition  of  1793,  they  were  seen 
fiorhtin<r  under  the  banners  of  Great  Britain.  Bv  this  order 
of  things  the  Prince  gained  guineas  ;  the  officers  and  soldiers 
pensions  ;  and  the  country,  which  had  no  foreign  relations 
or  honor  at  stake,  thus  acquired  a  more  abundant  circulation 
of  money.  This  country,  little  given  to  industrial  pursuits, 
was  poor  ;  its  administration  was  neglected,  but  not  op- 
pressive. 

Since  I  had  transformed  this  country  into  the  kingdom 
of  Westphalia,  it  had  contributed  to  the  support  of  a  nu- 


Ch.  XIV.]      THE     WAR     OF     1809     IN     GERMANY.  21 

raerous  army,  a  more  sumptuous  court,  and  a  more  com- 
])licated  administration  ;  what  was  still  worse,  the  sum  of 
twenty  millions  of  dotations,  annually  assigned  to  my  gen- 
erals, was  imposed  on  these  unfortunate  i^rovinccs— a  wound 
the  more  incurable,  as  most  of  this  money  was  expended  in 
France.    It  was  evident  that  if  this  system  continued  twenty- 
five  years,  Westphalia  would  be  taxed  to  the  amount  of  five 
hundred  millions   of   francs,  a  sum    equal   to  the  intrinsic 
value  of  the  soil.     On  the  other  hand,  in  the  same  length  of 
time,  the  English  subsidies  would  amount  to  between  fifty 
and  sixty  millions.     If  to  this  there  be  added  the  enormous 
expenses  occasioned  by  the  passage  through  the  country  of 
three  large    armies,  it  must  be   confessed  that  there  were 
motives  for  the  spirit  of  insurrection  which  was  manifesting 
itself.     I  was  not;  ignorant  of  the  enormous  impositions  laid 
on  Westphalia.     They  were  made  in  conformity  to  system, 
but  not  intended  to  be  permanent.     In  case  these  provinces 
were  restored  to  England  on  a  maritime  peace,  they  would 
be  exhausted   and  incapable  of  injuring  me,  while  France 
would  be  enriched  at  their  expense.     If  retained  by  France, 
it  was  for  my  interest  to  offer  them  an  incorporation  into  my 
empire  as  a  recompense  for  the  evils  they  had  suffered  during 
this  state  of  transition. 

Situation  of  Prussia.-Prussia,  from  very  different  motives, 
was  in  much  the  same  situation  as  Westphalia  ;  she  was 
neither  my  ally,  nor  a  province  of  my  empire,  but  my  sworn 
enemy.  Three  years  of  military  occupation,  of  extraordinary 
contributions  and  humiliations,  the  loss  of  her  most  wealthy 
provinces,  were  more  than  sufiicient  to  exasperate  her. 

Kings,  called  by  Providence  to  the  office  of  governincr  a 
people,  should  do  all  in  their  power  to  promote  the  national 
glory  and  prosperity  ;  their  duties  towards  other  nations  are. 
of  a  more  limited  and  different  character.  If  I  was  right  in 
doing  all  in  my  power  to  promote  the  glory  and  prosperity 


22  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

of  France,  it  Avas  no  less  the  duty  of  Frederick- William  to 
do  the  same  in  order  to  restore  Prussia  to  the  ranks  from 
which  she  had  fallen.  Unskilful  panegyrists  have  repre- 
sented me  as  the  most  dcbonnaire  of  princes,  my  projects  as 
the  most  philanthropic,  and  all  those  who  opposed  me  as 
blind  men  and  as  traitors.  This  is  absurd  ;  history  should 
not  be  written  thus.  It  is  natural  that  a  Frenchman  should 
regret  the  failure  of  projects  calculated  to  secure  the  su- 
premacy of  the  French  empire  ;  but  he  ought  not  to  take  it 
ill  that  the  Prussian  exerted  all  his  energies  for  the  restora- 
tion of  his  humiliated  country  ;  such  conduct  would  indicate 
the  want  of  impartiality,  justice,  and  good  faith.  Interest 
and  honor  are  the  general  motives  which  influence  the  conduct 
of  men  ;  interest  and  honor  called  to  arms  the  Prussians, 
Westphalians,  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  Hanseatic  cities. 

Of  the  other  European  Powers. — But  with  the  other  in- 
habitants of  Germany  and  Italy  under  my  influence  the 
question  was  very  different  ;  they  had  not  the  same  griev- 
ances of  which  to  complain.  If  Rome,  Florence,  Venice, 
and  Genoa  could  complain  of  the  temporary  decline  of  their 
prosperity,  they  had  at  least  the  expectation  of  a  future,  rich 
in  glory  and  hope,  which  was  not  the  case  with  the  north  of 
Germany. 

Posterity,  which  will  judge  better  than  my  cotemporariec, 
the  importance  of  my  contest  with  England,  and  the  future 
results  of  her  overwhelming  maritime  power,  will  find  that 
I  employed  the  only  honorable  means  for  reducing  it,  and 
that  I  was  obliged  to  sacifice  some  evident  but  partial  in- 
terests to  secure  the  accomplishment  of  my  immense  under- 
taking. These  interests,  in  being  armed  against  me,  obeyed 
only  the  law  of  nature.  For  this  they  can  hardly  be  blamed. 
But  those  are  most  blameable  for  whose  advantage  and 
interest  I  sought  a  continental  supremacy  and  the  humilia- 
tion of  England,  and  who,  nevertheless,  have  been    my  cal- 


Ch.  XIY.]         T  he     war    of     J  s  -fO     IN-     G  E  R  M  ANY.  23 

umniaturs.  If  Hannibal,  ruining  for  half  a  centurv  tlie 
prosjjerity  of  Sicily  and  Spain,  in  order  more  effectually  to 
oppose  Rome,  had  at  last  given  the  empire  of  the  world  to 
Carthage,  would  they  have  dared  to  accuse  him  of  beinc»-  a 
despot  and  a  barbarian,  trampling  under  foot  the  interests 
of  the  people  ?  Had  he  succeeded,  the  Carthaginians  would 
have  paid  the  highest  honor  to  his  name. 

It  was  on  Prussia  and  Westphalia,  that  Austria  and  the 
great  German  conspiracy  based  their  hopes.  The  duke  of 
Brunsvvick-Oels,  having  been  deprived  of  his  hereditarv 
rank  and  power,  and  being,  therefore,  more  interested  than 
others  in  the  success  of  the  project,  was  to  give  the  si<^nal 
by  debouching  from  Bohemia,  with  a  legion  of  Prussian 
deserters  which  he  had  there  organized.  In  West2)halia, 
Colonel  Dornberg,  of  Jerome's  guard,  deeming  himself,  like 
Marlborough,  authorized  to  leave  the  service  of  a  master 
imposed  by  conquest  and  rejected  by  public  opinion  of  the 
Westphalians,  was  to  secure  the  person  of  this  prince  as  a 
hostage,  and  establish  a  regency.  Major  Schill,  who  had 
distinguished  himself  as  a  partisan  about  Colbcrg,  was  to 
leave  Berlin  with  his  regiment  of  hussars  and  all  insurrec- 
tionary Prussians,  surprise  Wittenberg  and  Magdebourg, 
then  act  in  concert  with  the  duke  of  Brunswick  in  Saxony. 
That  the  Prussian  army  established  in  Silesia  would  follow 
this  movement,  was  so  much  the  more  probable,  as  the  Prus- 
sian court  of  Konigsberg,  would  not  have  time  to  prevent 
it  ;  it  is  even  said  that  Scharnhorst,  the  minister  of  war,  was 
privy  to  the  plan  and  secretly  favored  it.  The  court  of 
Vienna  left  no  means  untried  to  obtain  the  formal  accession 
of  Prussia  ;  not  only  were  negotiations  carried  on  by  tht; 
Baron  of  Wessenberg  at  Konigsberg,  but  General  Steigen- 
tesch  was  sent  there  as  a  commissioner  to  arrange  a  plan  of 
operations  on  the  probable  hypothesis  of  concluding  an 
alliance. 


24  L  I  F  E     0  F     N  A  P  O  L  E  O  N  .  [On.  XIV- 

Insurrectionary  State  ©f  the  Tyrol.— But  if  Austria 
counted  much  on  a  jiowerful  support  in  the  north  of  Ger- 
many, she  had  no  less  to  hope  from  the  insurrectionary  spirit 
of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Tyrol.  New  Guebres,  these  moun- 
taineers joined  to  their  natural  spirit  of  independence  a 
decided  aversion  to  the  Bavarians,  and  a  kind  of  attachment 
to  the  house  of  Austria,  whose  government,  paternal  toward 
them,  had  avoided  interfering  with  their  customs  and  ini- 
nmnities.  Greatly  resembling  the  smaller  Swiss  cantons  in 
many  respects,  they  were  not  inferior  to  the  sons  of  WilUam 
Tell,  in  bravery  and  skill  of  arms  ;  and,  like  them  were 
organized  in  comjianies  oî  franc-tireurs  or  carahmiers,  or  in 
battalions  of  militia.  The  hatred  of  the  Tyrolese  toward 
the  Bavarians  extended  back  for  ages,  and  resulted  as  mucli 
from  old  quarrels  of  the  fuedal  seigneurs,  as  from  more 
recent  local  disputes,  or  clashing  commercial  interests.  The 
king  did  all  in  his  power  to  change  this  state  of  things  ;  but 
the  expenses  incurred  by  Bavaria  in  1800  and  1805,  and  for 
the  support  of  her  military  estidolishment,  rendered  it  neces- 
sary for  the  ministers  of  Maximilian  Joseph,  to  treat  the 
Tyrol  the  same  as  the  older  Bavarian  provinces,  and  to  cur- 
tail some  of  the  immunities  which  had  been  enjoyed  under 
the  Austrian  rule.  Feelings  were  exasperated  at  these  inno- 
vations ;  Austria  perfectly  understood  the  state  of  things 
here,  and  still  retained  in  this  country  a  multitude  of  agents 
who  were  making  every  preparation  for  a  general  insurrec- 
tion, when  the  proper  time  should  arrive.  The  marquis  of 
Chasteler,  who  had  commanded  in  that  country  in  1800,  was 
at  the  lu'ad  of  the  corps  which  bordered  on  the  frontiers  uf 
the  Tyrol,  and,  in  concert  with  Councillor  Hormeyer,  held 
all  the  threads  of  the  conspiracy. 

Chasteler  was  a  French  subject,  of  Belgian  origin  ;  which 
circumstance  irritated  me  against  him.  He,  on  his  side,  ex- 
hibited  ;i  bitter  animosity  against  me,  which  caused  me  to 


Ch.   XIV.]         THE     WAR    OF     1809    IN     GERMANY.  25 

make  severe  reprisals  ;  if  he  had  treated  me  more  justly,  I 
should  have  taken  pride  in  being  generous  to  him,  for  I 
always  regarded  him  as  a  man  of  talent.  Being  chief  of 
staff  to  Kray  and  Suwarrow  in  1799,  he  contributed  no  less 
to  the  success  of  the  allies  in  Italy,  than  he  had,  at  Mayence 
in  1795,  to  the  success  of  Clairfayt  against  Pichegru.  The 
proper  position  of  a  man  of  his  stamp  was  not  at  the  head 
of  an  insurrection  of  peasants. 

The  priests  and  aubergistes  (inn-keepers),  exercise  great 
influence  in  these  countries  ;  the  former  address  themselves 
to  the  religious  feelings  of  the  people,  while  the  latter  direct 
their  temporal  interests.  A  rich  aubergiste  in  the  Swiss 
cantons  and  in  the  Tyrol  has  numerous  dependents  ;  he  in- 
fluences those  of  his  own  class  by  the  superiority  of  his  edu- 
cation ;  he  usually  traffics  in  all  the  products  of  the  country, 
and  thus  becomes  the  j)rincipal  medium  of  trade  ;  this  con- 
stitutes him  a  man  of  authority.  One  of  these  tavern- 
keepers,  named  Hofer,  was  distinguished  by  his  great  stature, 
his  wild  and  uncultivated  character,  and  the  superiority 
which  he  derived  from  his  physical  advantages  and  his  busi- 
ness capacity.  Stimulated  by  the  priests  and  Austiian 
agents,  and  placed  afterward  at  the  head  of  the  popular 
risings,  Hofer  became  a  party  leader,  whom  some  have  praised 
to  the  skies,  and  others  decried  to  the  lowest  degree  ;  he  was 
a  man  of  heart,  but  without  decision  of  character  ;  ho  was 
the  mere  scape-goat  of  the  ignorant  flock,  an  instrument  in 
the  hands  of  men  more  adroit  than  himself.  He  had  per- 
sonal bravery,  but,  in  such  a  case,  this  is  one  of  the  least 
essential  of  the  several  qualifications  of  a  party-leader.  The 
Capuchin  Haspinger,  also  had  great  influence  with  the 
people. 

Austria  takes  the  Initiative.— But  Austria  could  hope 
nothing  from  these  elements  of  discord,  till  she  herself  took 
the  initiative.     The  signal,  so  long  expected,  was  finally  given 


26  LIFEOFNAPOLEON.  [Oh.  XIV. 

about  the  first  of  April.  Certain  of  being  immediately  sus- 
tained by  Austria,  the  Tyiolese  determined  to  set  the  exam- 
ple. In  an  instant,  a  thousand  beacon  fires,  lighted  on  the 
tops  of  the  highest  mountains,  gave  the  signal  in  every  direc- 
tion for  the  general  rising.  Each  valley  formed  its  insurgent 
forces  into  a  battalion,  veteran  soldiers  forming  its  skeleton, 
or  at  least  acting  as  its  principal  otlicers.  Masses  of 
peasants,  thus  armed  and  organized,  oversjiread  the  country 
in  every  direction,  surprised  and  massacred  or  took  prisoners 
the  three  or  four  thousand  Bavarians,  who  were  posted  in 
different  parts  of  the  country  ;  a  column  of  two  thousand 
French,  coming  from  the  depots,  under  the  orders  of  General 
Bisson,  met  the  same  fate.  This  insurrection  gradually 
spread  even  into  the  Voralberg,  and  large  parties  extended 
themselves  to  the  vicinity  of  Kempsen,  threatening  Wur- 
temberg. 

Her  Plan  of  Operations.— Simultaneously  with  this  the 
Archduke  Charles  passed  the  Inn,  on  the  tenth  of  April, 
directing  his  march  on  Munich  and  Batisbon,  where  he  was 
to  assemble  an  army  of  one  hundred  and  eighty  thousand 
combatants.  To  this  tardy  commencement  of  operations 
they  added  another  fault  no  less  grave.  The  imperial  army, 
at  first  assembled  in  Bohemia  toward  Pilsen,  had  only  five 
or  six  days'  march  to  make,  in  order  to  fall  on  Ratisbon,  or 
upon  Wurtzbourg,  in  the  very  centre  of  my  scattered  corps. 
An  order  from  superior  authority  directed  this  army  on  the 
Inn,  to  debouch  by  the  Iser  and  Munich  in  Bavaria  ;  this 
line  of  march  was  triple  the  length  of  the  other.  But 
instead  of  making  this  détour  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  the 
decisive  point,  it  w^as  intended  to  move  directly  away  from  it. 
This  blunder  secured  the  safety  of  my  army.  The  fault  has 
by  some  been  attributed  to  General  Grune,  and  by  others  to 
General  Meyer,  but  the  Archduke  Charles  was  made  to  sufier 
by  it,  and  in  the  popular  estimation,  the  responsibility  was 


Cu.  XIV.]         T  II  li     WAR    OF     1809     IN     GERMA  N  Y  .  27 

thrown   on  him,  though  in  reaUty  he  disapproved  the  pro- 
ject. 

Position  and  IVumbcrs  of  the  Austrian  Forces. — Had    it 

not  l)een  for  this  strange  march,  the  army,  of  whicli  the 
Archduke  Chark's  was  made  generalissimo,  might  have  hegun 
operations  in  March.  But  in  consequence  of  these  new  dis- 
positions, it  couhl  not  begin  till  April,  and  even  then  was 
divided  into  two  masses,  separated  from  each  other  by  the 
Danube.  The  two  corps  remaining  in  Bohemia,  were  to 
debouch  by  the  left  bank  on  Katisbon  ;  the  centre  and 
reserve,  forming  three  corps,  advanced  by  Schaerding  ;  the 
left,  composed  of  the  corps  of  the  Archduke  Louis  and 
General  Hiller,  marched  by  Munich  and  Landshut.  In 
addition  to  this  force  of  one  hundred  and  seventy  thou- 
sand combatants,  there  were  the  extraordinary  levies,  which 
would  soon  be  disposable  ;  Amende's  division  which  w<as  to 
debouch  in  Saxony  ;  Jellachich's  division,  flanking  the  left 
at  Salsbourg  ;  General  Chasteler's  forces,  acting  in  the 
Tyrol  ;  the  army  of  the  Archduke  John  on  the  Tarvis  ;  a 
detachment  at  Grachatz,  to  cover  Croatia  against  Marmont  ; 
and  a  large  body  of  landwehrs  (militia)  organizing  in  the 
Carinthia,  as  a  reënforcement. 

The  French  Army. — Not  yet  knowing  what  direction  the 
enemy  would  give  to  his  forces,  I  was  not  without  anxiety 
respecting  the  course  which  he  might  pursue.  My  jjosition 
was  not  dangerous,  provided  I  could  concentrate  my  forces 
before  the  Austrians  should  undertake  operations  sufficiently 
serious  to  prevent  this  junction.  I  had  still  at  my  disposal 
a  force  sufficiently  respectable  to  cause  the  cabinet  of  Vienna 
to  fear  they  would  not  gain  so  easy  a  victory  as  they  had 
represented  to  the  emperor.  Their  only  chance  was  to  fight 
us  before  I  could  collect  my  scattered  troops.  DavousCs 
array  of  occupation  had  just  been  dissolved.  This  marshal, 
after  leaving  good  garrisons  in  the  fortifications  of  the  north. 


28  LIFEOF     NAPOLEON.  [C3.  XIV. 

marched  from  Erfurth  with  about  forty-five  thousand  men, 
and  directed  himself  by  Bamberg  on  Katisbon.  Oudinot, 
who  commanded  the  reserve  at  Frankfort,  marched  toward 
Augsbourg  with  his  corps  of  grenadiers.  Massena,  who,  at 
the  head  of  tliirty  thousand  men,  Avas  marching  by  Lyons 
toward  Spain,  returned  in  all  haste  from  Strasbourg  on  Ulm. 
Bernadotte,  whose  corps  had  been  dissolved  after  the  flight 
of  the  troops  of  Eomana,  received  orders  to  take  command 
of  the  Saxons.  A  part  of  his  forces  were  to  guard  the 
Hanseatic  cities,  v/hile  the  division  of  Dupas  reënforced 
Oudinot. 

The  reserve  of  cavalry,  wdnch  had  dispersed  on  numerous 
points,  marched  in  different  directions  toward  the  Danube  ; 
thirty  thousand  Bavarians,  under  Marshal  Lefebvre,  cantoned 
on  the  Iser,  with  their  light  troops  on  the  Inn.  The  troops 
of  Wurtemberg,  assembled  at  Heidenheim.  All  the  other 
contingents  of  the  Confederation,  were  organizing  to  re- 
enforce  the  different  corps-cV armée  and  to  cover  oUr  com- 
munications. I  had  also  eighteen  thousand  Poles,  and  about 
the  same  number  of  Saxons,  Westjihalians,  and  Dutch. 
But  these  allies  had  sufiScient  to  occupy  them  at  home,  to 
hold  Prussia  in  check,  and  guard  Hanover  and  the  north 
of  Germany,  against  the  great  naval  expedition  threatened 
by  the  English.  To  impose  on  the  cabinets  of  London  and 
Berlin,  I  announced  the  formation  of  an  army  of  the  north 
under  Bernadotte,  numbering  eighty  thousand  men  ;  whereas, 
I  had  in  reality,  directed  him  to  march  with  two  Saxon  divi- 
sions along  the  frontiers  of  Bohemia  on  the  Danube,  leaving 
all  the  other  contingents  to  guard  their  own  countries.  My 
army  in  Italy,  which  numbered  less  than  forty-five  thousand 
men,  under  the  Viceroy,  I  hastened  to  reënforce  with  all 
my  disj)osable  troops  in  the  Peninsula, 

Orîçanization  and  relative  IViimbers  of  the  Opposing  Forces. 
— The  Austrian  forces  numbered  over  three  hundred  thou- 


Cil  XIY.l         THE     WAR     OF     1809     IN     GERMANY.  29 

sand  men,  and  one  hundred  thousand  landioehrs  (nnlitia), 
and  seven  hundred  pieces  of  cannon,  as  follows  : 

1st.  Under  tho  Archduke  Ferdinand,  in  Poland 40,000 

2d.  General  Amende's  division  in  Saxony l.'i.OOO 

3d  and  4th.  The  two  corps  in  Bohemia  (50,000),  and  the  centre  and  k-ft 

under  tiie  Archduke  Charles  (125,000) 175,000 

5th,  The  Austrian   divisions  of  the  Tyrol  (10,000),  and    Cliasteler's 

Tyrolese  (20,000) 30,  OCO 

6th.  The  army  of  Italy,  under  the  Archduke  John 55,000 

Total 313,000 

7th.  Of  the  Landwohr  or  Militia,  25,000  were  organized  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  campaign,  but  they  were  afterward  increased  to 
100,000,  making  a  grand  total  of  over  400,000  men. 


The  French  and  allied  forces,  numbered  only  a  little  more  than 
300,000  in  all,  with  5G0  pieces  of  cannon,  as  follows: 

1st.  Poles    (18,000),  and  the  Russian  army  which  did  not  arrive  till 

afterward  (35,000) 53,000 

2d.  Saxons,  under  Bernadotte,  Dutch,  under  Gratien  (20,000),  and  the 
Westphahans,  under  Jerome  (15,000).  These  remained  in  tho 
north   35,000 

3d.  Main  army,  2d  corps,  under  Lannes  and  Oudinot  (25,000),  3d 
corps,  under  Davoust  (45,000),  4th  corps,  under  Massena  (30,000), 
7th  Bavarians  (30,000),  and   8th  Wurtembergers  (12,000),  in  aW''    142,000 

4th.  Badois,  Hessians,  of  Nassau,  troops  of  the  Confederation,  etc..  ..      12,000 

5th.  Army  of  the  Viceroy  and  Macdonald  (45,000),  division  of  the  in- 
terior, (15,000) 60,000 

6th.  Corps  of  Dalmatia,  under  Marmont 15,000 

Total 317,000 

*  At  the  beginning  of  this  canipaign,  the  king  of  Bavaria  wished  to  piaco 
the  Bavarian  troops  under  the  command  of  his  own  son,  a  young  man  of  char- 
acter, but  entirely  without  military  experience.  Napoleon  would  not  give  liis 
consent.  "Your  army,"  he  wrote  to  tlie  king,  "must  fight  in  earnest  in  this 
campaign.  It  concerns  the  conservation  and  extension  of  the  aggrandize- 
ments which  Bavaria  has  received.  Your  son  may  be  able  to  commiind,  wlien 
he  shall  have  made  six  or  seven  campaigns  with  us.  Meanwlnle,  kt  him  come 
to  my  head-quarters.  He  will  be  received  there  with  all  the  consideration  duo 
to  him,  and  he  will  learn  our  tradey  The  king-  of  Wurtemberg,  also  wished  to 
appoint  a  general  to  command  the  "Wurtemberg  contingent,  and  objected  to  tho 
appointment  of  Vandamme.  Napoleon  also  refused  this  request,  and  placed 
Vandamme  in  the  command. 

It  was  by  this  firm  resistance  of  all  outside  pressure  in  the  selection  of  officers 
for  particular  commands,  that  Napoleon  succeeded  in  almost  always  having  the 
riglit  man  in  the  right  place.     No  amount  of  political  influence  or  personal 


3J  LIFEOF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XIV. 

Berthicr  is  scat  to  rally  the  French  Army.— I  dis- 
patched Berthier  to  collect  my  forces  in  Germany,  at  Ratis- 
bon,  if  hostilities  had  not  commenced,  and  between  Dona- 
werth  and  Augsbourg,  if  the  Austrians  had  taken  the  initiative. 
He  had  been  at  his  head-quarters  but  a  few  days,  when, 
thanks  to  the  wise  precaution  which  I  had  taken,  to  establish 
a  telegraph  in  Germany,  I  learned  at  Paris,  on  the  twelfth 
of  April,  in  less  than  forty  hours,  the  passage  of  the  Inn, 
which  had  taken  place  on  the  tenth.  Every  thing  being 
prepared  beforehand,  I  instantly  set  out  lor  the  theatre  of 
war,  and  after  an  interview,  on  the  fifteenth,  with  the  king 
of  Wurtemberg  at  Louisbourg,  and  with  the  king  of  Bavaria 
at  Dilliagen,  I  reached  my  head-quarters  at  Donawerth,  on 
the  seventeenth.  Those  who  love  comparisons  Avill  search  in 
vain,  in  ancient  and  modern  history,  for  an  example  of 
celerity  and  admirable  precision  equal  to  that  which  charac- 
terized the  beginning  of  this  campaign. 

Advance  of  the  Austrians. — I  was  much  disquieted  about 
the  state  in  which  I  found  affairs.  Berthier  had  brought 
my  army  to  the  very  brink  of  ruin.  But,  fortunately,  the 
Austrians  were  six  days  in  marching  fifty  miles,  from  Bran- 
nau  to  Landshut  on  the  Iser.  This  gave  us  time  to  look 
about  us. 

On  the  sixteenth,  they  attacked  the  bridge  of  Landshut, 
which  was  defended  by  the  Bavarian  division  under  Deroi, 
who  fought  in  retreat,  to  save  himself  from  being  cut  oif  by 
the  enemy's  columns  that  passed  the  Iser  above  and  below 

solicitation  could  induce  lum  to  risk  the  lives  of  his  men  and  the  success  of  lus 
campaigns,  by  placing  inferior  men  in  command.  In  tliis  case,  he  resisted  the 
solicitations  of  two  crowned  heads,  Ins  allies,  on  whose  good  will  much  de- 
pended. But  he  knew  that  much  more  depended  upon  his  military  success,  and 
he  was  not  weak  enough  to  endanger  that  success  m  order  to  gratify  the  wishes 
even  of  kings.  Had  he  yielded,  the  results  of  this  war  might  have  been  very 
different.  Happy  the  country,  whose  ruler  has  the  firmness  to  do  what  ho 
believes  to  be  right,  regardless  of  the  political  and  personal  influences  by  which 
he  may  be  surrounded. 


Cir,  XIV.]        THE     WAR    OF     1809     IX     GERMANY.  31 

that  city.  Although  Wrede  was  at  Straubing,  and  the 
Prince  Eoyal  at  Munich,  the  Bavarians  succeeded  in  efft-ct- 
ing  a  junction  at  Neustadt,  which  would  have  been  impossible 
if  the  enemy  had  pushed  them  lively.  The  Archduke  could 
have  been  at  Ratisbon  on  the  fifteenth,  and  united  all  his 
corps  at  that  place  to  successfully  destroy  our  divided  forces. 
It  was  not  till  the  seventeenth  that  one-half  of  my  forces  had 
advanced  as  far  as  the  Little  Label",  by  the  three  roads  which 
lead  from  Landshut  to  Eatisbon,  Keilheim,  and  Neustadf. 
Hiller  inarched  on  Mosbourg  ;  Jellachich  had  entered  Mu- 
nich ;  the  two  corps  of  Bobemia  had  penetrated  into  the 
upper  Palatinate,  and  were  leisurely  moving  on  Batisbon. 
These  last  turned  toward  Araberg  on  the  division  of  Priant 
of  Davoust's  corps,  which  flanked  its  march  in  coming  from 
the  Thuringia.  It  will  thus  be  seen  that  if  the  enemy  had 
arrived  there  two  or  three  days  sooner,  he  would  have  ren- 
dered the  concentration  of  my  army  very  difficult. 

Faults  of  Berthier. — My  arrival  at  the  theatre  of  war  was 
exceedingly  fortunate.  Berthier  was  committing  fault  after 
fault.  My  instructions  to  him  were  precise  :  he  was  di- 
rected, as  I  have  already  said,  to  rally  the  army  at  Ratis- 
bon, if  hostilities  were  not  already  begun,  but,  if  the  enemy 
had  taken  the  initiative,  to  concentrate  it  at  Augsbourg  and 
at  Donaw^erth.  Even  had  I  directed  him  to  concentrate  at 
Ratisbon,  unconditionally,  he  ought  to  have  seen  that  what 
had  been  admissible  Avhen  he  left  Paris,  was  no  longer  j)Os- 
sible  under  the  existing  circumstances.  But  in  his  whole 
twenty  campaigns  he  had  not  been  able  to  learn  the  first 
idea  of  strategy  ;  he  not  only  acted  contrary  to  my  instruc- 
tions, but  he  did  what  I  had  most  to  fear.  Davoust,  ap- 
preciating the  danger  of  a  march  on  Ratisbon,  moved  by 
Hemau  on  Ingolstadt;  this  was  wise;  Berthier,  on  the 
contrary,  directed  him  to  return  by  the  left  bank  to  Ratis- 
bon.    He  even  ventured  to  order  Lefebvre  to  retake  Land- 


32  L  I  F  E      O  F      N  A  P  O  L  E  O  N  .  [Ch.   XIV. 

shut.  This  was  exposing  both  to  destruction,  by  an  eccentric 
movement  which  nothing  could  justify. 

Napoleon  arrives  at  Ingolstadt. — I  arrived  at  Ingolstadt 
on  the  eighteenth.  My  first  care  was  to  send  two  officers  to 
Davoust  to  direct  him  to  leave  Ratisbon  in  all  haste,  in  order 
to  meet  us  on  the  Abens.  Sa  vary  was  one  of  those  charged 
with  this  dangerous  mission,  j^enetrating,  with  a  hundred 
Bavarian  horse,  between  the  Austrians  and  the  Danube. 

DiJIicnlty  of  foriaiug  a  Junction  with  Davoust* — It  was 
indispensable  to  maintain  our  position  in  front  of  îseustadt, 
for  if  the  enemy  should  be  able  to  reach  that  point,  Davoust 
would  be  inevitably  cut  off.  1  united  in  the  position  of  the 
Abens  all  the  forces  I  had  at  my  disposal.  These  Avere  the 
Bavarians,  Wurtembergers,  and  a  division  of  cuirassiers, 
forming,  in  all,  about  forty  thousand  men.  The  enemy  was 
marching  on  the  Abens  with  one  hundred  thousand  :  if  he 
had  j)ushed  forward  with  resolution,  it  would  have  been  all 
over  with  us  ;  we  should  have  been  driven  into  the  Danube 
before  the  return  of  Davoust,  and  before  the  arrival  of  Oudi- 
not  and  Massena,  to  whom  I  had  sent  orders  to  join  mc 
immediately.  These  last  two  would,  in  that  case,  have 
considered  themselves  exceedingly  fortunate  in  falling  back 
behind  the  Lech,  leaving  Davoust  to  his  unfortunate  fate. 
J\Iy  only  hope  of  safety  was  in  the  dilatory  movements  of  the 
Austrians,  or  in  their  misconception  of  my  j)Osition  and  my 
jjrojects. 

The  Archduke  moves  to  the  right,  toward  Ratisbon. — 
The  Austrian  army  had  already,  on  the  eighteenth,  begun 
their  movements  on  the  Abens.  The  Archduke  suddenly 
suspended  this  march.  lie  had  just  learned  that  Davoust 
Avas  moving  toward  Fiatisbon  ;  this  was  an  additional  reason 
why  the  Austrians  should  have  established  themselves  at 
Abensberg  without  delay,  on  his  line  of  retreat  ;  but  Prince 
Charles  drew  a  different  conclusion.     lie  left  General  lilller. 


Ch.  XlV.j  THE     WAR     OF     1  8  U  9     IN     G  E  i;  M  A  N  Y  .  33 

with  two  corps  of  about  fifty  thousand  men,  to  observe  us 
OQ  the  Abens,  while  he  himself,  with  the  three  other  corps 
of  about  sixty-five  thousand  combatants,  established  him- 
self on  Rohr  with  the  intention  of  moving  against  Davoust 
the  next  day.  Hiller's  forces  consisted  of  his  own  cor])?, 
which  was  at  this  time  at  Mainbourg,  the  corps  of  the  Arch- 
duke Louis,  near  Siegenbourg,  and  a  reserve  of  some  seven 
or  eight  thousand  men. 

IVew  Movements  of  Davoust.  —  At  break  of  day,  on  the 
nineteenth.  Marshal  Davoust  left  R;itisb(»n  fur  Abensbero- 
The  great  road  runs  along  the  Danube  in  a  coupe-gorge 
formed  by  the  woody  heights  between  Abbach  and  Post- 
Saal.  The  artillery  and  the  cuirassiers  were  to  slip  along 
mto  this  mouse-trap,  while  the  four  divisions  of  inftmtry 
flanked  this  march  by  moving  along  the  heights  v»'here 
two  small  roads  had  been  discovered  ;  the  one  on  Peising, 
and  the  other  on  Saalhaupt  and  Tengen.  The  divisions 
of  Gudin  and  Morand  took  the  first  of  these  roads  to  the 
right  ;  St.  Hilaire  and  Priant  followed  the  one  at  the  left. 
Montbrun,  v.ith  the  light  cavalry,  flanked  the  march,  and 
ibrmed  the  rear  guard  by  occupying  Abbach.  One  regiment 
only  was  left  at  Ratisbon  to  retard  the  march  of  fifty  thou- 
sand Austrians  coming  from  Bohemia  by  the  left  of  tlie 
Danube.  In  order  to  second  the  arrival  of  Davoust,  I 
directed  Lefebvre  to  debouch  from  Abensberg  on  Arnhofen 
with  tiie  left  of  the  Bavarians. 

The  Archduke  Charles  at  the  same  time  fell  back  from 
Rohr  on  Ratisbon.  This  prince  acted  on  the  supposition 
that  Davoust  had  not  yet  left  that  city,  but  had  remained 
there  impassible.  It  was  well  to  move  toward  Ratisbon,  but 
this  movement  should  have  been  made  by  Post-Saal,  that  is, 
along  the  only  road  by  which  Davoust  could  effect  a  junction 
with  me.  The  Austrians  advanced  in  three  columns  ;  the 
right,  consisting  of  twenty-three  thousand  men,  on  Eglof- 

VuL.    III. — 3. 


34  LIFE      OF     NAPOLEON,  [Ch.  XIV. 

sheim  ;  the  centre,  of  about  twenty-five  thousand  men,  on 
Dintsling  ;  and  the  left,  of  fifteen  thousand  men,  on  Tengen. 
A  corps  of  about  six  thousand  men,  under  the  orders  of  Gen- 
eial  Thierry,  was  left  in  the  direction  of  Abensberg  to  main- 
tain the  communication  between  General  Hiller's  corps  and 
the  corps-de-hataiUe. 

These  dispositions  were  evidently  faulty.  The  Gordian 
knot  was  to  be  cut  at  Abensberg  or  at  Post-Saal,  by  throw- 
ing there  the  corjjs  of  Hohenzollern,  of  Rosenberg,  and  of 
the  Archduke  Louis.  Abensberg  being  the  nearest  to  the 
Austrian  corps  at  Rohr,  and  most  distant  from  the  head- 
quarters of  Davoust's  column,  it  was  probable  they  would 
arrive  there  in  time.  Post-Saal,  on  the  other  hand,  closed 
the  door  of  the  Caudine  forlcs,  through  which  the  French 
corps  would  be  obliged  to  defile.  These  two  points  might 
easily  have  been  occupied  by  throwing  on  Abensberg  the 
Archduke  Louis,  reënforced  by  the  two  corps  of  reserve,  and 
by  pushing  forward  the  corps  of  Hohenzollern  and  Rosen- 
berg on  Post-Saal,  en  potence  upon  the  heights  of  Hansen. 
A  hundred  thousand  combatants  massed  in  this  way  on 
important  points  would  have  decided  the  campaign  and  the 
fate  of  Divoust. 

Battle  of  Thann.— Notwithstanding  the  faults  committed 
by  our  adversaries,  and  the  precision  of  my  manœuvres, 
which  formed  in  this  respect  so  strong  a  contrast  with  theirs, 
we  barely  escaped  from  our  great  peril.  No  sooner  had  St. 
Hilaire  and  Fi'iant  arrived  on  the  heights  between  Saal- 
haupt  and  Tengen,  to  protect  the  march  of  Davoust  in  the 
bottom  of  the  defile,  than  they  were  assailed  by  Hohenzol- 
lern. But  as  the  latter  was  isolated,  the  forces  at  this 
point  were  equal  ;  and  while  the  right  of  the  archduke  was 
moving  in  such  a  direction  as  to  meet  none  of  our  forces,  the 
French  repelled  the  attack  of  his  lieutenant.  The  combat 
was  severe  ;   twenty  tiiousand  of  my  veterans  were  not  dis- 


Ch.  XIV.]         THE     WAR    OF     1809     INGERMANY.  35 

posed  to  yield  to  an  equal  number  of  Austrians.  The  prince 
of  Hohenz(jllern  was  unable  t)  maintain  his  position  ;  near 
six  o'clock,  P.M.,  he  was  driven  behind  Hausen,  with  a  loss 
of  four  thousand  men. 

Davoust  effects  his  Junction  with  Napoleon.  —  Taking 
advantage  of  this  success,  the  right  of  Davoust  had  tranquilly 
continued  its  march  on  Abensberg,  where  it  formed  a  junction 
with  the  Bavarians  On  reaching  Arnhofen,  it  encountered 
the  little  Austrian  column  of  Thierry,  charged  with  covering 
the  interval  between  the  Archduke  Charles  and  his  brother. 
For  the  better  accomplishment  of  this  object,  it  had  advanced 
toward  Arnhofen  with  the  intention  of  checking  the  march 
of  the  Bavarians,  whom  Marshal  Lefebvre  was  moving  from 
Abensberg  on  the  road  to  Ratisbon,  in  order  to  connect  him- 
self with  Davoust.  The  detachment  of  the  enemy,  attacked 
in  front  by  the  division  of  Morand,  and  in  rear  by  the  Ba- 
varians, was  driven  with  loss  on  Offenstetten,  fortunate  in 
not  being  all  taken  prisoners. 

IVapoIeon's  Dispositions  against  the  Austrian  Centre. — 
The  events  of  the  nineteenth  had  entirely  changed  the  face 
of  affairs.  The  junction  of  Davoust  with  my  army  not  only 
relieved  all  my  anxiety,  but  placed  me  in  a  position  threat- 
ening to  the  enemy.  By  his  untimely  extension  of  his  right, 
the  archduke  had  not  preserved  a  connection  sufficiently  inti- 
mate with  the  corps  which  he  had  left  on  the  Abens.  We 
were  established  opposite  the  interval  which  separated  the 
two  parts  of  the  Austrian  army,  so  that  we  could  throw  our- 
selves, in  mass,  between  these  parts,  prevent  their  junction, 
and  beat  them  in  detail.  The  only  way  for  the  enemy  to 
avoid  this  misfortune  was  to  execute,  in  all  haste,  a  con- 
centric retreat  on  Landshut.  To  prevent  him  from  under- 
taking this  movement,  I  resolved  to  take  the  offensive 
instantly,  directing  the  attack  upon  the  enemy's  left.  I 
directed  the  first  blows  here,  because  I  expected   tliat  the 


36  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XIT. 

operations  against  this  wing  would  be  powerfully  assisted  by 
the  grenadiers  of  Oudinot,  or  the  corps  of  Massena.  The 
former  had  arrived  on  the  nineteenth  at  PfefiPenhausen,  and 
the  latter  was  to  reach  there  the  next  day.  They  were  also  to 
menace  the  left  of  Hiller  and  his  line  of  retreat  on  Landshut. 

Affair  of  Abensbcrg.  — •  I  immediately  made  my  disposi- 
tions. Davoust  was  left  with  twenty-five  thousand  men 
near  Thann  and  Hansen,  to  keep  in  check  the  enemy's  right. 
With  the  remaining  sixty  thousand  men  I  advanced  against 
the  Archduke  Louis.  As  it  was  important  for  me  to  j:)revent 
the  Archduke  Charles  from  sustaining  his  brother,  Lannes 
was  to  throw  himself  with  the  other  two  divisions  of  Da- 
voust and  the  cuirassiers  of  Nansouty  on  Rohr,  in  order  to 
get  possession  of  the  road  from  Keilheim  to  Landshut,  and  to 
intercept  all  communication  between  the  two  wings. 

After  having  harangued  the  Bavarians  and  Wurtem- 
bergers,  I  left  the  division  of  Wrede  at  the  bridge  of  Siegen- 
bourg  to  hold  in  check  the  Archduke  Louis,  and  to  attack 
him  afterwards  when  the  proper  moment  should  arrive.  I 
threw  myself  on  the  right  of  the  prince  with  the  Wurtera- 
bergers  and  the  two  Bavarian  divisions  of  Lefebvre  ;  the  first 
by  Offenstetten  on  Rhor,  and  the  second  by  Kirchdorf,  Lannes 
was  to  assist  and  cover  this  movement  ;  on  arriving  at  Rohr, 
he  was  to  reconnoitre  Adelshausen  and  the  valley  of  the 
Laber,  in  order  to  drive  back  any  forces  which  the  Archduke 
Charles  might  send  in  this  direction,  and  thus  effectually 
sever  the  enemy's  centre. 

Fortunately  for  us,  the  Austrian  left  was  much  scattered. 
Hiller,  with  twenty-two  thousand  men,  was  on  the  march 
from  Mainbourg  to  Pfeffenhausen  ;  the  Archduke  Louis,  with 
ten  thousand,  was  in  position  at  Siegenbourg  ;  the  Prince  of 
Reuss,  with  fifteen  thousand,  at  Kirchdorf,  and  General 
Thierry,  with  five  thousand,  at  Offenstetten.  The  latter,  too 
feeble  to  resist  the  superior  forces  which  were  advancing  on 


Ch.  XIV.]  THE     WAR    OF     1809    IN     GERMANY.  37 

all  sides,  fell  back  on  Rolir,  and  came  in  contact  with  the 
columns  of  Lannes.  He  was  overthrown  and  driven  back  as 
far  as  Rottenbourg,  where  he  was  reënforced  with  fourteen 
thousand  men,  whom  Hiller  had  marched  in  hasti?  from  Pfef- 
fenhausen.  But  these  reënforcements  did  not  arrive  in  time 
to  secure  the  passage  of  the  Laber;  Lannes  impetuously 
crossed  the  bridge,  pell-meil  with  the  baggage  and  fugitives 
of  the  enemy. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  prince  of  Reuss  and  Bianchi,  at- 
tacked in  front  by  Lefebvre,  and  in  flank  by  the  Wurtem- 
bergers,  were  obliged  to  fall  back  on  PfefFenhau-cn.  The  Arch- 
duke Louis,  pressed  in  front  by  Wrede,  and  threatened  to  be 
turned  on  his  right  by  the  other  columns,  also  put  himself  in 
retreat  on  the  same  point.  My  allies,  who  under  the  French 
colors,  had  learned  to  rival  us  in  vigor  and  courage,  pursued 
the  enemy  lively,  as  far  as  that  place.  The  Austrians  this 
day  lost  more  than  seven  thousand  men. 

Davoust  observes  the  Arcliduke.— Davoust  found  no  dif- 
ficulty in  executing  the  order  which  I  had  given  him,  to 
hold  the  Archduke  Charles  in  check.  This  prince,  who  with 
any  other  adversary  would  have  been  the  first  general  of  his 
age,  permitted  himself  to  be  overawed  by  the  ascendency 
which  I  had  gained  over  him.  Instead  of  operating  against 
Davoust,  he  put  himself  on  the  defensive.  For  this  purpose 
he  refused  his  left,  ordering  Count  Hohenzollern,  to  recross 
to  the  right  of  the  Gross-Laber  at  Neider-Leuerndorf.  The 
column  of  the  right,  on  the  contrary,  received  orders  to 
extend  itself  still  further  from  Eglofsheim  on  Ratisbon. 
The  regiment  of  infantry,  which  Davoust  had  left  in  this 
city,  was  now  invested  on  the  right  of  the  Danube  by  this 
column,  and  on  the  left,  by  one  of  the  corps  from  Bohemia, 
which  had  marched  on  Stadt-am-Hof.  This  regiment  sur- 
rendered. For  twenty-four  hours  it  had  occupied  fifty  thou- 
sand Austrians  ;  it  had  accomplished  its  task.     The  other 


38  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XIV. 

corps  from  Bohemia  was  engaged,  we  kuow  not  why,  in  the 
direction  from  Amberg  to  Ingolstadt. 

This  battle  affords  a  striking  example  of  different  combina- 
tions for  the  employment  of  masses.  One  hundred  thousand 
Austrians  of  the  first,  second,  third,  and  fourth  corps,  found 
themselves  occupied  by  twenty  thousand  men  under  Davoust  ; 
while  twenty-five  thousand  Austrians  of  the  fifth  corps  were 
crushed  by  sixty-five  thousand  French  and  their  allies.  Not- 
withstanding the  derangement  of  his  first  calculations,  the 
Archduke  Charles  thought  he  ought  still  to  maintain  himself 
between  the  Danube  and  the  Gross-Laber,  in  order  to  give 
Hiller  the  means  of  rallying  on  his  left.  But  how  could  he 
suspect  me  of  being  so  foolish  as  to  allow  his  lieutenant  to 
tranquilly  make  a  lateral  movement  which  it  was  so  easy  for 
us  to  intercept  ? 

Defeat  of  Hiller  at  Landshnt. — On  the  twenty-first,  Hiller, 
wishing  to  avoid  the  fote  of  Prince  Louis,  fell  back  on  Land- 
shut.  I  followed  him  with  the  division  of  Wrede,  the  Wur- 
tembergers,  and  the  corjDs  of  Lannes  ;  that  of  Oudinot  had 
orders  to  descend  on  the  same  point  after  passing  the  Iser  at 
Mosbourg  ;  the  same  ojDeration  was  prescribed  to  the  fourth 
corps  (Massena).  I  directed  Lefebvre  to  descend  the  Laber 
with  the  two  remaining  Bavarian  divisions.  General  Demont's 
division,  and  a  brigade  of  cuirassiers,  in  order  to  form  a  con- 
nection with  Davoust,  and  to  lighten  his  duties.  The  roads 
were  obstructed  with  the  immense  baggage- train  s  of  the 
Austrians,  which  fell  into  our  hands.  Hiller  attempted  to 
defend  the  passage  of  the  Iser  at  Landshut  ;  but  this  was 
near  costing  him  dearly.  Warmly  attacked  by  the  division 
of  Morand,  in  front  of  the  city  and  in  the  faubourgs,  he 
might  have  been  cut  off  by  the  division  of  Claparede,  which 
was  approaching  from  Mosbourg  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Iser  ;  but  this  general  imprudently  halted  his  troops  to  await 
the  arrival  of  Massena,  who  had  remained  at  Mosbourg  in 


Cu.  XIV.J  THE     WAR     OF     1809     IN     GERMANY.         39 

order  to  hasten  the  march  of  his  corjjs.  It  was  important 
for  me  to  disable  Hiller,  so  that  he  could  not  renew  the 
attack  while  I  turned  my  efforts  against  the  Archduke 
Charles.  I  ordered  an  immediate  attack  ;  General  Mouton, 
whose  courage  knew  no  obstacles,  forced  the  bridge  by  one 
of  the  most  vigorous  attacks  in  that  war.  The  routed 
enemy  fled  in  the  direction  of  Oeting,  where  he  passed  tlui 
Inn  the  next  day,  leaving  twenty-five  cannon,  and  near  ten 
thousand  men  hors-de-combat. 

Davoust  attacks  the  Austrian  Centre.— I  had  recnforccd 
Davoust  because  I  feared  that  the  archduke  might  attack 
him  while  I  was  occupied  with  Hiller.  But  the  archduke 
resolved  to  wait  until  he  received  some  news  of  Hiller,  and 
to  draw  in  the  corps  of  Kolowrath  from  the  left  of  the  Danube. 
Bellegardc's  corps,  being  more  distant,  could  not  arrive  in 
time  to  take  part  in  the  battle  ;  it  was,  therefore,  merely 
drawn  in  from  Stadt-am-Hof. 

Davoust  correctly  judged  that  the  best  means  of  occup}-- 
ing  the  enemy  in  his  perplexity,  and  of  deceiving  liim  re- 
specting the  strength  of  the  opposing  corps,  was  to  attack 
him  at  once.  After  eifecting  a  junction  at  Leuernsdorf  with 
Lefebvre,  he  advanced  along  the  left  bank  of  the  Gross- 
Laber.  Near  Unter-Leuchling  he  encountered  the  centre  of 
the  enemy's  forces,  which  the  archduke  had  moved  to  that 
place  from  Duitzling.  The  engagement  was  warm  and  con- 
tinu.'d  from  eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning  till  night.  Count 
Hohenzollern,  who  had  moved  along  the  left  bank  of  the 
Gross-Laber,  passed  the  river  at  Eckmuhl  and  reënforced  the 
prince  of  Rosenberg,  who  was  fighting  at  Unter-Leuchling. 
The  enemy  maintained  his  position  ;  but  Davoust  accom- 
plished the  object  he  had  proposed.  Profiting  with  address 
by  the  broken  character  of  the  ground,  he  extended  his  troops 
in  such  a  way  as  to  make  them  appear  double  their  real 
numbers,  and  so  well  imposed  on  the  archduke  that  he  gave 


40  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XIV. 

up  all  idea  of  acting  on  the  ofFousive.  The  loss  on  both  sides 
m  this  contest  was  about  three  thousand  meu  hors-de- 
co7nhat. 

Napoleon  adrances  to  the  Centre. — Having  completed  the 
defeat  of  Hillei-,  1  sent  in  pursuit  Marshal  Bessiéres,  with  the 
divisions  (;f  Wrede  and  Molitor,  of  the  corps  of  Massena,  and 
three  regiments  of  cavalry.  Oudinot  was  left  in  reserve  at 
Landshut,  I  directed  myself  against  the  Archduke  Charles 
with  Nansouty's  division  of  cuirassiers,  the  corps  of  Lannts, 
the  Wurtembergers,  and  the  mass  of  Massena's  troops.  The 
archduke,  leaving  the  corps  of  Bellegarde  at  Stadt-am-Hof 
on  the  left  of  the  Danube,  had  withdrawn  Kolowrath's 
corps,  which  had  passed  the  river  on  the  night  of  the  twenty- 
first.  Being  thus  reënforced  to  seventy-five  thousand  com- 
batants, it  was  to  be  supposed  that  this  prince  would  not 
suffer  himself  to  be  any  longer  held  in  check  by  Davoust. 

Battle  of  Eckmuhl. — I  left  Landshut  on  the  morning  of 
the  twenty-second,  directing  myself  on  Eckmuhl.  The  enemy 
had  the  same  day  combined  an  offensive  movement.  But 
the  manner  of  its  execution  merely  favored  my  projects. 
Instead  of  falling  on  Davoust  in  the  morning,  with  all  his 
forces,  he  directed  his  principal  efl"orts  toward  Abbach,  where 
we  had  only  some  light  troops,  and  suspended  the  attack 
until  afternoon  to  await  the  corps  of  Kolowrath,  Avhich 
could  not  sooner  reach  Abbach.  The  corps  of  Kosenberg, 
which  had  fought  the  previous  day,  received  direction  to 
maintain  its  position  in  order  to  serve  as  a  pivot  for  the 
contemplated  movement  of  the  Austrian  army.  It  followed, 
therefore,  that  we  were  opposed  only  by  this  single  corps, 
which  was  reënforced  with  a  reserve  of  eight  thousand  men. 

Toward  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  I  debouched  from 
Eckmuhl  against  the  centre  of  Rosenberg  with  the  Wurtem- 
bergers.  Lannes,  who  now  commanded  the  divisions  of  St. 
Ililairo  and  Gudiii,  attacked  and   turned  the  enemy's   left 


Ca.  XIV.J         THE     WAR     OF     18  09     IN     GERMANY.  41 

with  the  latter  division.  The  right  was  at  the  same  time 
assailed  by  Davoust,  with  the  divisions  of  Morand  and 
Friant,  and  one  of  Lefebvre's  Bavarian  divisions.  For  three 
hours  the  Austrians  sustained  this  unequal  contest.  Rosen- 
berg, though  surrounded  by  our  eight  divisions,  still  hoped 
to  be  sustained,  and  fought  with  the  most  heroic  courage. 
There  are  few  instances  where  Austrian  troops  have  fought 
so  well. 

The  archduke,  disconcerted  by  this  attack  on  his  left, 
stopped  the  advance  of  his  right,  and  sought  only  to  cover 
his  retreat.  This  retreat  was  effected  about  six  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon,  before  Masse na,  who  formed  the  rear  of  my 
column,  could  advance  far  enough  to  take  part  in  the  fight. 
I  threw  all  my  cavalry  in  pursuit  of  the  flying  forces.  The 
enemy's  cavalry,  which  sought  to  protect  the  retreat  on 
Ratisbon  by  defending  Eglofsheim,  \v,is  overthrown  in  the 
evening  ;  our  troops  drove  them  back,  fighting,  as  far  as 
Koffering  ;  it  drew  on  the  inflintry  in  the  rout.  The  cuiras- 
siers of  Nansouty  and  Saint-Sulpice,  charge  and  sabre  the 
broken  battalions  ;— all  fly  in  disorder  toward  Ratisbon. 
The  Archduke  Charles  rallies  with  the  reserve  of  John  of 
Lichtenstein,  and  succeeds  in  arresting  the  pursuit,  which 
had  been  favored  by  a  bright  moonlight. 

A  part  of  my  troops  came  from  Landshut,  and  were  greatly 
fatigued.  I  also  feared  the  disorder  of  a  night  pursuit.  If 
I  had  pursued,  as  the  Prussians  did  at  Waterloo,  the  enemy's 
army  shut  in  by  the  Danube  would  have  been  greatly  cut  to 
pieces  ;  but  our  success  was  already  sufficiently  brilliant,  and 
I  was  unwilling  to  expose  it  unnecessarily.  Fifteen  stand 
of  colors,  a  great  number  of  prisoners,  and  numerous  cannon, 
remained  with  us  as  trophies  of  the  battle  of  Eckmuhl,  in 
which  the  enemy  lost  at  least  ten  tliousand  men. 

The  Archduke  returns  into  Bohemia. —  The  Austrian 
army,  in  the  vicinity  of  Ritisbon,  still  numbered  more  than 


42  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XIT. 

eighty  thousand  combatants,  including  the  corps  of  Belle- 
garde.  My  forces  were  not  as  numerous  ;  nevertheless,  Prince 
Charles  did  not  venture  to  risk  a  new  battle,  with  the  Danube 
in  his  rear  ;  and  instead  of  calling  in  the  corps  of  Bellegardc, 
he  determined  to  join  it.  Not  daring  to  concentrate  all  his 
forces  on  the  single  bridge  of  Ratisbon,  he  constructed  one 
of  jiontons  below,  and  the  passage  was  effected  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  twenty-third,  under  the  fire  of  our  batteries. 
Several  charges,  which  were  made  to  cut  off  the  retreating 
columns,  were  not  attended  with  all  the  success  desired.  A 
rear  guard  had  remained  in  Ratisbon  to  cover  the  retreat  ; 
I  directed  it  to  be  attacked.  A  wall  and  ditch  could  not 
arrest  the  impetuosity  of  our  troops  ;  finding  an  opening, 
they  penetrated  the  city  with  the  bayonet,  and  captured  a 
part  of  the  six  battalions  which  still  remained.  The  enemy 
burnt  the  wooden  bridges  in  his  rear,  and  barricaded  the 
great  stone  bridge  of  Ratisbon. 

The  emperor  of  Austria,  who  had  repaired,  with  his  court, 
to  Schaerding  in  the  hope  of  participating  in  the  triumph  of 
his  armies,  and  also  to  be  ready  for  negotiations  with  the 
German  princes,  was  informed,  on  the  night  of  the  twenty- 
third,  of  the  defeat  of  his  troops,  and  immediately  de2:)arted 
for  his  capital. 

Remarks. — Never  had  my  success  been  more  brilliant  or 
decisive,  and  never  was  it  better  deserved.  The  combat  of 
Thann  against  the  Archduke's  centre  ;  the  battle  of  Abens- 
berg,  which  isolated  his  left  ;  the  aflair  of  Landshut,  which 
completed  his  defeat  ;  the  battle  of  Eckmuhl,  a  second  time 
against  the  centre  ;  and  finally,  the  combat  of  Ratisbon, 
completing  the  overthrow  of  his  army,  form  a  series  of 
events  without  a  parallel  in  history.  On  the  twelfth  of 
April,  I  was  in  Paris  ;  ten  days  after,  I  had  gained  two  great 
battles  and  decided  the  campaign  in  the  heart  of  Germany. 


Cn.  XIV.]  THE     WAR     OF     1809     IN     GERMANY.  43 

I  might  have  suit!,  with  still  greater  reason  than  Ctesar, 
veni,  vidi,  vici. 

Napoleon  marches  to  Vienna. — As  soon  as  the  Archduke 
had  put  the  Danube  between  his  army  and  mine,  he  fell  back 
on  Cham,  where  he  arrived  on  the  twenty-fifth,  after  having 
been  joined  by  the  second  corps  of  Bohemia.  I  did  not  care 
to  follow  him  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river  ;  leaving  Davoust 
at  Ratisbon  with  orders  to  observe  him,  and  to  follow  me  as 
soon  as  he  ascertained  positively  that  the  enemy's  army  had 
departed  for  Bohemia,  I  directed  the  main  body  of  my 
forces  to  Vienna  by  the  right  bank,  with  the  resolution  to 
crush  the  corps  of  Hiller,  if  ho  should  have  the  temerity  to 
dispute  my  entrance  into  the  capital. 

Some  have  blamed  me  for  not  having,  on  the  contrary, 
pursued  the  then  scattered  army  of  the  Archduke  Charles. 
I  was  deterred  from  doing  this  by  several  reasons  ;  first,  the 
woody  chain  of  the  Bohmervald  mountains  offered  to  the 
enemy  defensive  positions  of  great  advantage  ;  secondly,  the 
Archduke  Charles  had  wri.tten  me  a  letter  showing  a  desire 
on  his  part  to  treat.  By  pursuing  Hiller,  I  might  comjîlete 
his  ruin,  and  dictate  a  more  advantageous  peace  in  Vienna. 
On  the  other  hand,  by  attacking  the  enemy  in  the  mountains 
of  Bohemia,  Hiller,  with  the  Archduke  John  and  Chasteler, 
coming  from  Italy  and  Tyrol,  might  collect  eighty  thousand 
fresh  troops  on  the  Danube,  at  the  instant  when  tlie  Arch- 
duke Charles,  reenforced  by  the  landwehrs  of  Bohemia, 
would  charge  me  in  front. 

But  let  us  return  to  the  operations  of  Hiller  whom  we 
left  in  full  retreat  on  the  Inn.  This  general,  seeing  that  he 
was  not  pursued  across  this  river,  concluded  that  I  had 
turned  my  efforts  against  the  principal  army,  and  determined 
to  effect  a  diversion.  On  the  twenty-seventh  of  A])ril,  he 
repassed  the  Inn  with  the  thirty-five  thousand  men  which  he 
had  left,  and  attacked  Wrede's  division  at  Neumark.     The 


44  LIFEOF      NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XIV. 

Bavarian  general  was  in  some  degree  surprised,  and  found 
himself  engaged  in  an  unequal  combat  ;  he  would  have  been 
lost  had  it  not  been  for  the  devotion  of  Molitor,  who  disen- 
gaged him  and  covered  his  retreat  on  Wilsbibourtr.  This 
affair,  which  cost  us  fifteen  hundred  men,  led  to  no  result. 
In  the  night  of  the  twenty-fourtli  and  twenty-fifth,  Hiller 
received  information  of  our  victories  over  the  2:)rinci2ial  army, 
and  made  all  haste  to  recross  the  Inn. 

Operations  in  Italy. — At  the  moment  when  the  Archduke 
Charles  appeared  in  the  plains  of  Ratisbon,  his  brother,  the 
Archduke  John,  descended  the  mountains  of  Carniola  on  the 
Frioul,  at  the  head  of  fifty  thousand  men.  Eugene  covered 
Italy  with  a  combined  army,  whose  force  did  not  exceed 
forty-five  thousand  combatants.  He  had  to  assist  him, 
Generals  Grenier  and  Macdonald.  Still  young  and  inex- 
pei'ienced,  Eugene  soon  exhibited  all  the  aplomb  of  an  old 
warrior.  Brave,  calm,  and  capable  of  understanding  military 
operations,  he  always  knew  how  to  profit  by  the  counsels  of 
able  men — a  talent  often  more  successful  than  the  inspira- 
tions of  superior  genius. 

He,  nevertheless,  committed  an  error  at  the  outset.  He 
had  just  concentrated  the  mass  of  his  forces  in  front  of  Sacila, 
but  was  still  waiting  for  a  division  of  infantry  and  the 
reserve  of  cavalry  from  Yerona.  The  irruption  of  the  enemy 
was  sudden  ;  the  brigade  of  Sahuc, established  as  an  advanced 
guard  at  Pordenona,  was  surjirised,  and  the  35th  regiment, 
was,  in  part,  captured.  Eugene,  fearing  the  moral  effect 
which  a  retreat  might  produce  on  the  vacillating  spirits  of 
the  Italians,  deemed  it  best  to  assume  the  offensive,  think- 
ing that  he  had  to  contend  only  with  the  eighth  corps  of  the 
enemy.  He  marched  on  the  sixteenth  of  April,  and  attacked 
the  enemy  Ijetween  Sacila  and  Pordenona,  making  his  effort 
on  the  right,  which  was  not  the  true  strategic  direction.  The 
enemy,  supported  by  the  reserve,  warmly  disputed  the  village 


Ch.  XIV.]         THE     WAR    OF     1809     IN    GERMANY.  45 

of  Porcia.  But  soon  the  ninth  Austrian  corps  arrives  on 
the  ground  and  the  Archduke  John,  throwing  it  on  our  hft, 
turns  that  wing  and  forces  Eugene  to  retreat,  notwithstand- 
ino-  the  resistance  opposed  by  Broussier  against  forces  double 
his  own.  The  defile  of  the  Livenza,  whose  waters  were  swol- 
len, caused  disorder  in  our  centre  and  right  ;  all  crowded  to 
the  passage  of  the  Brugnera  ;  fortunately,  the  enemy  did  not 
push  his  success,  and  Eugene,  reënforced  on  the  Piave,  by  the 
aiTival  of  troops  which  he  was  expecting  from  Verona,  suc- 
ceeded in  rallying  his  brok<>n  battalions,  and  brought  back 
the  army  in  good  order  to  the  Adige,  after  having  thrown 
two  brigades  into  Venice  and  Palmanova.  Chasteler  who 
had  sw-ept  the  Tyrol,  and  was  now  to  act  in  concert  with  the 
Archduke  John  on  the  Adige,  was  about  to  triumph  at 
Innspruck,  and  lost  the  opportunity  to  anticipate  us  at 
Rivoli. 

The  archduke,  satisfied  with  his  present  success,  and 
obliged  to  detach  three  divisions  for  observing  Venice,  Pal- 
manova, and  the  operations  of  Marmont  in  Dalmatia,  occu- 
pied the  well-known  position  of  Caldiero,  with  the  intention 
of  waiting  to  hear  the  results  of  movements  to  be  made  in 
the  south  of  Italy,  or  the  success  of  his  brother  in  Germany  ; 
but,  in  respect  to  this  last  hope  he  was  soon  undeceived,  and 
the  news  of  the  events  of  Ratisbon  reached  Italy  very  oppor- 
tunely, to  restore  confidence  to  my  partisans  and  to  the  camp 
of  Eugene,  at  the  same  time  that  it  destroyed  the  hopes  of 
my  enemies. 

Napoleon  continues  his  March  on  Vienna.— The  retreat 
of  our  army  in  Italy,  instead  of  checking  my  march,  was  only 
an  additional  motive  for  my  advance  on  Vienna."'-'     On  the 

*  On  passing  the  monldoring  towers  of  the  castle  of  Diernstein,  in  which 
Richard,  the  Lion-hearted  of  England,  was  so  long  and  cruelly  imprisoned, 
Napoleon  reined  in  his  horse,  and  said  to  Berthier  and  Lannes  : 

'■  Richard,  also,  was  a  warrior  in  Syria  and  Palestine.  He  was  more  fortu- 
nate than  we  were  at  St.  Jean  d'Acre.     But  the  Lion-hearted  was  not  more 


46  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

twenty-seventh,  I  moved  my  headquarters  to  Mnhldorf. 
Lefebvre,  with  the  Bavarians,  was  directt^d  on  the  Tyrol,  where 
the  insurrection,  more  serious  than  we  anticipated,  was 
threatening  to  extend  into  Bavaria  and  cut  off  our  com- 
munications. Massena,  Lannes,  and  Bessières  marclied  on 
Vienna  ;  Davoust  and  Vandamme  followed  them  in  echelons  ; 
Bernadotte,  with  his  Saxons,  moved  on  Ratisbon  by  turning 
Bohemia.  Hiller  had  abandoned  the  Inn  without  resistance  ; 
but  he  resolved  to  defend  the  passage  of  the  Traun,  in  the 
formidable  position  of  Ebersberg.  A  wooden  bridge,  a  hun- 
dred toises  in  length,  presented  an  obstacle  still  more  formi- 
dable than  that  of  Lodi,  since  it  terminated  in  a  fortified 
town,  commanded  by  a  castle,  and  crowned  by  heights  very 
difficult  of  access.  To  effect  a  passage  here  against  thirty 
thousand  men  and  eighty  pieces  of  cannon,  was  not  very 
easy.  Massena  was  not  ignorant  that  I  expected  to  turn  this 
impregnable  post  by  Lambach  ;  but  the  impetuous  valor  of 
General  Cohorn  drew  him  on  to  a  bloody  fight.  Three 
Austrian  battalions,  left  imprudently  in  advance  of  the 
bridge,  were  overthrown,  and  driven  at  the  point  of  the 
sword  to  the  gates,  which  were  closed.     Cohorn  forced  the 

valiant  than  you,  my  brave  Lannes.  He  beat  the  great  Saladin.  Yet  hardly 
had  he  returned  to  Europe  than  he  fell  into  the  hands  of  persons  who  were 
certainly  of  very  different  calibre.  He  was  sold  bj'  a  duke  of  Austria  to  an 
emperor  of  Germany,  who,  by  that  act  only,  has  been  rescued  from  oblivion. 

"  These  were  barbarous  times,  which  they  have  the  folly  to  represent  to  us 
as  heroic,  when  the  father  sacrificed  his  children,  the  wife  her  husband,  the 
subject  his  sovereign,  the  soldier  his  general,  and  all  without  shame  or  dis- 
guise !  How  much  are  times  changed  now  !  You  have  seen  emperors  and 
kings  in  my  power,  as  well  as  the  capitals  of  their  states,  and  I  exacted  from 
them  neither  ransom  nor  sacrifice  of  honor.  The  world  has  seen  how  I  treated 
the  emperor  of  Austria,  whom  I  might  have  imprisoned;  and  that  successor 
of  Leopold  (the  duke),  and  Henry  (tlie  emperor),  who  is  already  more  than  lialf 
in  our  power,  will  not  be  worse  treated  on  this  occasion  than  before,  notwith- 
standing he  has  attacked  us  with  so  much  perfidy." 

"When  making  these  remarks,  little  did  Napoleon  imagine  his  own  fate  in  St. 
Helena  !  If  the  English  had  good  cause  to  complain  of  the  captivity  of  King 
Richard  in  Diernstein,  liow  much  greater  their  own  disgrace  for  their  long  and 
cruel  confinement  of  Xapoleon  on  a  solitary  rock  in  the  ocean  I 


Cil.  XIV  j  THE    WAR     OF     1809     IN     GERMANY.  47 

gates,  and  penetrated  into  the  great  street.  Masscna  deemeJ 
it  best  to  sustain  him — first,  by  the  remainder  of  Claparede's 
division,  and  afterward,  by  that  of  Legrand.  The  fight  was 
fiercely  waged  from  street  to  street,  and  from  house  to  house. 

Claparcde  had  just  gained  possession  of  the  castle,  when 
Hiller  threw  on  the  city  four  new  columns,  which  penetrated 
at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  It  was  a  horrible  butchery  : 
the  houses,  'filled  with  the  combatants  and  the  wounded, 
were  set  on  fire  ;  the  encumbered  state  of  the  streets  pre- 
vented any  egress  ;  never  did  war  present  a  more  awful  scene. 
At  length  the  Austrians,  wearied  with  the  carnage,  yielded 
Ebersberg,  and  our  troops  advanced  against  the  heights, 
where  a  combat  still  more  unequal  was  waged.  The  arrival 
of  Durosnel's  division  of  cavalry  by  the  right  bank,  and  the 
certainty  that  ho  would  be  turned  and  surrounded  by  Lannes, 
at  length  decided  him  to  retire,  in  all  haste,  on  Enns. 

Lannes  having  debouched  the  same  day  from  Lambach  on 
Steyer,  all  this  butchery  was  utterly  useless.  I  expressed  to 
Massena  great  dissatisf\iction  at  his  useless  sacrifice  of  his 
Tnen  ;  but  I  afterward  excused  him,  for  I  learned  that 
Killer's  obstinate  defense  of  his  position  in  front  of  the 
bridge  across  the  Danube  at  Mauthausen,  had  induced  Mes- 
sena  to  believe  that  the  Archduke  Charles,  coming  from 
Budweis,  had  the  intention  of  crossing  to  the  right  bank  of 
the  Danube  at  that  point,  so  as  to  unite  with  Hiller  and 
cover  Vienna.  The  bold  and  obstinate  attack  of  Massena 
rendered  this  movement  impossible,  and  the  success  was  the 
more  honorable  to  our  troops,  as  a  part  of  them  fought  here 
for  the  first  time.  It  cost  Hiller  six  or  seven  thousand,  and 
we  lost  four  or  five  thousand  brave  men,  a  part  of  whom 
were  destroyed  in  the  flames. 

Tardy  Projects  of  Prince  Charles  to  save  Vienna.— The 
Archduke  Charles,  reaching  Horasdiowitz,  the  first  of  May, 
thought  himself  pursued  by  my  whole  army  ;  while  in  reality, 


48  LIFEOF     NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XIY. 

even  Davoust,  after  having  made  a  simple  demonstration, 
fell  back  on  StrauLing  so  as  to  follow  me  in  echelons  in  the 
valley  of  the  Danube,  and  Bernadette,  who  had  relieved  him 
in  the  direction  of  Ratisbon,  also  follovrcd.  the  same  route. 
Supposing  us  caught  in  a  cul-de-sac  between  Straubing  and 
the  mountains  of  Bohemia,  the  archduke  thought  that 
Hiller  would  be  able  to  defend  the  Inn  lonsj  enou<:rh  to  allow 
him  to  march  by  Budweis.  The  Aulic  council  flattered 
themselves  with  the  same  project,  and  directed  the  Archduke 
John  not  to  renounce  rashly  the  political  advantages  which 
his  success  promised  in  Italy,  but  if  forced  to  retire,  to  fall 
back  on  the  interior  of  Austria.  The  Archduke  Charles, 
cruelly  undeceived  by  the  news  of  the  passage  of  the  Inn, 
the  capture  of  Lintz  and  of  the  combat  of  Ebersberg^ 
remained  at  Budweis  from  the  fourth  to  the  seventh  of  May. 
This  delay  will  always  appear  an  enigma  in  the  military  life 
of  this  j)rince,  as  also  the  still  longer  delay  at  Schaffausen 
and  Zurich  in  1799.  Nothing  can  justify  such  delays  but 
the  necessity  of  giving  repose  to  the  troops,  and  of  reestab- 
lishing order,  discipline  and  confidence,  by  a  slow  and  delib- 
erate march.  But  such  considerations  should  have  been 
made  subordinate  to  the  necessity  of  covering  Vienna,  either 
by  preceding  me  to  Krems,  or  anticipating  my  arrival  in  the 
capital.  From  Budweis  to  Vienna  is  six  days'  march  ;  and 
the  archduke  might  have  arrived  there  on  the  tenth,  and 
Hiller  on  the  ninth.  The  former  at  last  put  himself  in 
motion  toward.  Zwetel  with  the  intention,  undoubtedly,  of 
reaching  Krems  ;  but  hearing  that  we  had  already  passed 
Molck,  he  felt  that  all  hopes  of  covering  Vienna  were  useless, 
and  that  he  must  now  devise  means  for  defending  that  capi- 
tal. Hiller  received  orders  to  cross  the  Danube  at  Stein, 
destroy  the  bridge,  and  by  forced  marches,  descend  the  left 
bank  of  the  river  so  as  to  reach  Vienna  and  occupy  the 
Islands.     If  it  had  been  merely  to  rescue  the  troojjs  of  Hiller, 


Ch.  XIV.]  THE    WAR     OF     1809     IN    GERMANY.  49 

nearly  surrounded  by  Lannes  and  M'.sscna,  the  resolution 
would  have  been  a  very  proper  one  ;  but  if,  for  the  salvation 
of  the  Austrian  monarchy,  it  was  necessary  to  save  the  capi- 
tal, it  would  have  been  preferable,  to  direct  Hiller  to  gain, 
by  a  forced  march,  the  defile  of  Siegartskirch  ;  to  defend 
there  for  twenty-four  hours  the  access  to  Vienna,  then  to 
encamp  under  the  walls  of  that  place,  and  await  the  arch- 
duke, who  might  have  reached  there  about  the  eleventh  of 
May. 

At  any  rate,  the  first  care  of  the  archduke  should  have 
been,  if  he  could  not  cover  Vienna,  at  least  to  effect  its 
rescue  by  debouching  from  that  city,  as  I  did  from  Dresden 
in  1813,  and  by  making  strong  demonstrations  on  our  com- 
munications. General  Kolowrath,  directed  on  Lintz  with 
twenty-five  thous;ind  men,  would  take  possession  of  the 
bridges  and  the  city.  The  Archduke  John,  forming  a  junc- 
tion with  the  corps  of  the  Tyrol  and  Jellachich's  division, 
which  still  remained  at  the  sources  of  the  Enns  in  the  valley 
of  Kotenmann,  would  then  advance  on  Lintz  at  the  head  of 
fifty  or  sixty  thousand  men  to  join  Kolowrath.  They 
vainly  flattered  themselves  that  the  presence  of  seventy  thou- 
sand men  on  my  direct  communication,  would  change  the 
face  of  affiiirs  ;  but  we  shall  soon  see  that  this  plan  was  not 
carried  into  execution. 

Napoleon's  second  Entry  into  Vienna.— The  disappearance 
of  Hiller's  corps,  permitted  us  to  advance  with  redoubled 
celerity,  and,  on  the  tenth  of  May,  we  reached  the  walls  of 
the  capital.  This  was  just  one  month  after  the  Austrians 
had  invaded  Bavaria,  and  twenty-seven  days'  after  the  news 
of  that  invasion  had  reached  me  at  Paris. 

In  order  to  secure  our  position,  it  was  important  for  us  to 
seize  upon  Vienna  ;  but  this  did  not  seem  so  easy  a  .jatter 
as  in  1805.  Instead  of  sending  out  to  invite  us  into  the 
city,  the  government  directed  the  Archduke  Maximilian  to 

VOL.    III. — 4. 


50  LIFEOFNAPOLH  ON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

prepare  means  for  defense.  This  prince  was  to  have  a  corps 
of  fifteen  thousand  men,  composed  of  veterans  and  militia  ; 
the  right  division  of  Nordman  was  also  to  reënforce  him  ; 
moreover,  a  part  of  the  citizens  took  up  arms,  so  that,  if 
reports  be  true,  the  prince  had  at  his  disposal  at  least  twenty 
thousand  men. 

In  order  to  incite  the  troops  and  citizens,  they  were 
reminded  of  the  resistance  which  Vienna  had  opposed  to  the 
Visir  Kiuperli,  and  of  the  defense  of  Saragossa  by  the 
Spaniards  ;  but  we  were  not  Turks,  and  the  good  people  of 
Vienna  are  not  AragOnese.  The  lines  of  defense  surround- 
ing the  city  were  not  in  a  condition  to  resist  us  ;  the  Arch- 
duke Maximilian  abandoned  the  rich  faubourgs,  in  order  to 
concentrate  his  forces  in  the  old  enciente,  which  was  regularly 
bastioned,  but  imperfectly  armed.  The  Aulic  Council  hud 
made  better  preparations  for  besieging  Mayence  than  for 
defending  their  own  capital.  Nevertheless,  the  archduke, 
with  so  considerable  a  body  of  men,  was  capable  of  greatly 
embarrassing  my  operations.  I  understood  the  value  of  time 
much  better  than  my  adversaries,  and  I  was  not  disposed  to 
lose  a  second.  I  tried  the  effect  of  some  shells  thrown  into 
the  city,  and  they  replied  by  a  heavy  fire  from  the  ramparts, 
without  sparing  the  faubourgs.  I  took  pity  on  these  poor 
inhabitants,  and  renounced  ray  plan  of  bombarding  the  city, 
and  resorted  to  other  and  still  more  effectual  means.  I 
caused  the  communications  of  the  archduke  with  the  great 
bridge  of  the  Danube,  to  be  attacked  on  both  flanks,  directing 
Massena  toward  Simering,  so  that  he  could  penetrate  into  the 
island  of  the  Prater.  A  similar  attack  was  directed  from 
Dobling,  on  the  island  of  Jagerhans,  further  up  the  river. 
If  we  were  now  to  anticipate  the  enemy  in  our  arrival  at  the 
great  bridge  of  Tabor,  which  they  had  neglected  to  connect 
with  the  place  by  fortifications,  the  archduke  would  be  made 
prisoner,  with  his  fifteen  thousand  men.     The  fear  of  this 


Ch.  XIV.]         THE     WAR     OF     1809     IN     GERMANY,  51 

induced  the  prince  to  evacuate  the  city  and  destroy  the 
bridge  of  Tabor,  leaving  General  Oreilly,  with  six  hundred 
men,  to  perform  the  ungrateful  task  of  signing  the  caj)itu- 
lation,  which  was  done  the  next  day,  the  thirteenth  of  May. 
At  the  moment  when  the  Archduke  Maximilian  was  evacu- 
ating Vienna,  General  Hiller  arrived  at  his  destination,  and 
united  with  the  retreating  troops  near  Spitz.  He  caused  the 
islands  to  be  occupied,  but  it  was  too  late  to  save  the  capital  : 
the  bridge  of  Tabor  was  destroyed.""' 

Dispositions  for  tlic  Passage  of  tlie  Danube  — I  now 
directed  all  my  attention  to  the  means  of  passing  the  Danube. 
While  separated  from  the  enemy  by  so  large  a  river,  it  would 
be  difficult  to  understand  his  operations.  Moreover,  we 
had  been  fifteen  days  separated  from  the  army  of  the  arch- 
duke by  the  mountains  of  Bohemia,  and  had  lost  track  of  it. 

*  "Wliile  at  Vienna,  an  incident  occurred  characteristic  of  Napoleon 
and  of  his  manner  of  enforcing  disciphne.  One  of  the  chief  surgeons  of 
his  array  was  quartered  in  the  house  of  an  aged  canoness.  While  under  the 
influence  of  wine,  the  surgeon  wrote  her  an  insulting  letter.  She  appealed  to 
General  Andreossy  for  protection,  and  the  general  took  the  letter  to  the 
emperor,  who  ordered  the  surgeon  to  appear  on  parade  the  next  morning. 
Napoleon  attended  the  parade,  and,  advancing  in  front  of  the  ranks,  called  for 
the  surgeon  to  step  forward.  Presenting  the  letter,  he  asked  hiiu  if  he  had 
written  it. 

"  Pardon,  sire,"  said  the  surgeon,  "  I  was  intoxicated  at  the  time,  and  did  not 
know  what  I  was  doing." 

"Miserable  man,"  exclaimed  Napoleen,  "to  outrage  a  canoness  worthy  of 
respect,  and  bowed  down  by  the  calamities  of  war.  I  do  not  admit  your  ex- 
cuse. I  degrade  you  from  the  Legion  of  Honor.  You  are  unworthy  to  wear 
that  vener.ited  symbol.  General  Dersonne,  see  that  this  order  is  executed. 
Insult  an  aged  woman  !     I  respect  an  aged  woman  as  if  she  were  my  mother." 

Another  characteristic  incident  is  related  of  Napoleon  while  occupying  the 
island  of  Lobau,  after  the  battle  of  Essling  Passing  a  company  of  grenadiers, 
seated  at  their  dinner,  he  remarked  to  them,  "  Well,  my  friends,  I  hope  you 
find  the  wine  good."  "  It  will  not  make  us  drunk,"  replied  one  of  their 
number,  " there  is  our  wine-cellar,  '  pointing  to  the  Danube.  Napoleon  v/as 
surprised  at  this  answer,  as  he  had  ordered  the  distribution  of  a  bottle  of  wine 
to  each  man.  On  investigation,  it  was  found  that  forty  thousand  bottles,  which 
he  had  sent  to  the  army  a  few  days  before,  had  been  purloined  and  sold  by  tho 
commissaries.  They  were  immediately  brought  to  trial,  and  condemned  to 
be  shot. 


52  LIFEOFNAPOLEON.  [Cu   XIV. 

We  had  every  reason,  however,  to  believe  that  if  it  had  not 
already  arrived,  it  would  do  so  very  soon.  My  army  was  not 
yet  united  ;  but  we  had  no  time  to  lose.  Vandamme  and 
the  Wurtembergers  had  been  left  at  Lintz  to  cover  the  great 
central  débouche  of  Bohemia,  and  to  secure  the  bridge,  with 
the  fortifications  which  had  been  laid  out  for  its  defense. 
Bernadette,  coming  from  Passau,  with  the  Saxons,  was  to 
relieve  him.  Davoust  was  marching  from  San-Pol  ten  on 
Vienna.  I  had  about  this  city  the  corps  of  Massena,  and 
that  of  Lannes,  the  guard,  and  the  cavahy  of  Bessières. 

The  Motives  for  this  Undertaking.— I  was  uncertain  of 
the  position  and  plans  of  the  archduke  ;  but  I  deemed  it 
best,  at  any  rate,  to  go  forth  and  meet  him.  Natural  as  was 
this  resolution,  it  has  nevertheless  been  censured  by  those 
who  judge  by  the  result,  rather  than  by  the  motives  which 
influenced  my  determination.  They  say,  that,  master  of  the 
capital  and  of  one  half  of  the  Austrian  monarchy,  I  might 
have  waited  in  security  the  arrival  of  the  army  of  Italy, 
without  seeking  to  render  my  position  more  extended,  more 
complicated,  and,  at  the  same  time,  more  hazardous.  Those 
who  made  these  criticisms  forgot  the  relative  situation  of 
the  two  armies  after  the  memorable  victories  of  Ratisbon. 
Counting  on  the  ascendency  which  these  victories  were  calcu- 
lated to  procure  me  over  the  enemy,  it  was  desirable  to  have 
a  débouche  beyond  the  Danube,  in  order  to  continue  offensive 
operations.  If  I  should  leave  the  archduke  quiet  possession 
of  Bohemia,  Moravia,  and  Hungary,  he  might  be  able  to 
concentrate  his  troops,  and  reënforce  them  by  the  whole 
militia  which  they  had  begun  to  organize  ;  the  contest  would 
then  have  been  doubtful.  If  I  should  attack  him  in  the 
condition  of  despondency,  caused  by  the  defeat  of  Ratisbon, 
I  might  expect  to  beat  him,  and  end  the  war.  In  case  I 
were  reduced  to  the  defensive,  it  would  be  of  still  greater 
advantage  to  me  to  possess  both  banks  of  the  river,  were  it 


C..XIY.]         THE    WAR    OF    1809    IN    GERMANY.  53 

only  to  enable  me  operate  on  the  left  side  in  case  the  enemy 
ollected  large  forces  on  the  right.    Without  this  advantZ 
I  would  possess  only  a  hazardous  line  of  operations   exten'd' 
mg  from  Straubing  to  a  narrow  gorge  parallel  with  Bohemia 
where  the  enemy  seemed  to  have  established  the  theatre  of 
his  resistance.     The  archduke,  based  on  Prague,  had  only  to 
effect  the  concentration  of  the  Austrian  forces  at  Lintz  to 
place  me  in  a  difficult  situation.     But,  with  a  bridge  across 
the  Danube,  I  might  accept  battle  on  either  side,  bein^  cer 
tain,  m  case  of  reverse,  of  finding  the  means  of  retreat  to  the 
opposite  bank,  for  the  archduke  could  not  operate  with  forces 
sufficient  to  give  battle  on  both  sides  of  the  river 

When  I  determined  upon  the  passage,  the  enemy  had  not 
yet  shown  himself  in  the  environs  of  Vienna,  and  could  not 
then  oppose  the  passage.     But  it  was  possible  for  him  in  . 
few  days  to  occupy  and  fortify  such  positions  as  would  ren- 
der It  very  difficult.     I  made  haste  to  profit  by  an  occasion 
which   might   not  again    occur,    and,    notwithstandino-   the 
reverse   which   followed,   I   in  a   measure  succeeded    for  I 
crossed  three-quarters  of  the  river,  and  gained  an  advanta- 
geous place  of  arms,  which  enabled  me  afterward  to  cross  the 
remaining  arm   of   the   Danube.     My   resolution    and    the 
motives  of  it,  have  not  been  appreciated  by  my  censors,  but 
that  IS  not  astonishing,  for  they  attempt  to  measure  me  by 
themselves.  ■^ 

Difficulties  of  the  Passac:e.-Of  all  the  operations  of  war 
there  is  none  more  hazardous  and  difficult,  than  the  passac^e 
of  a  large  river  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy.  Every  one  has 
heard -of  the  celebrated  passage  of  the  Rhine,  at  Tolhuis 
and  at  Kehl  ;  but  at  Tolhuis,  Louis  XIV.  was  opposed  by 
only  seven  or  eight  thousand  Dutch,  and  at  Kehl  Moreau 
encountered  only  a  single  brigade  of  the  Circles.  The  two 
passages  of  the  Danube  which  we  effected  at  Lobau  will 
probably  remain  the  most  celebrated  in  the  military  history 


54  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

of  an  age  prolific  in  great  events.  If  we  take  into  consider- 
ation the  great  care  and  precautions  that  are  requisite,  the 
immense  amount  of  materials  employed  in  such  an  operation, 
the  concurrence  of  circumstances  necessary  to  secure  success, 
and  the  difficulties  which  may  be  occasioned  by  the  slightest 
derangement  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  it  is  really  surprising 
that  an  operation  of  this  kind  ever  succeeds.  Nevertheless, 
wonderful  as  it  may  seem,  the  most  difficult  military  enter- 
prises are  commonly  the  most  successful,  from  the  simple 
fact,  that  greater  care  and  precautions  are  employed  in  their 
execution. 

From  Schaerding  to  within  two  leagues  of  Vienna,  the 
Danube  flows  through  a  narrow  gorge  between  the  mountains 
of  Bohemia  and  Bavaria,  but  after  passing  the  village  of 
Nussdorf,  its  waters,  as  if  in  revenge  for  their  former  con- 
straint, spread  out  over  a  wide  surface  forming  a  multitude 
of  islands,  that  of  Lobau  being  one  of  the  largest.  There 
are  many  points  of  jjassage  in  the  vicinity  of  Vienna,  but  a 
practised  eye  will  perceive,  by  a  single  glance  at  the  map,  that 
the  point  higher  up  the  stream  near  the  village  of  Nussdorf, 
is,  of  all  others,  the  most  advantageous  for  an  army  on  the 
right  bank,  inasmuch  as  it  here  commands  the  left  bank  ; 
the  great  Thalweg"--"  being  here  only  about  one  hundred  and 
eighty  toises  in  width,  sweeps  past  a  considerable  island,  cap- 
able of  serving  as  a  tHe-du-pont  for  the  first  bridge^  and  a 
point-d'appui  for  the  troops  charged  with  opening  or  pro- 
tecting the  passage.  An  arm  of  about  fifty  toises  in  width, 
and  a  very  gentle  current,  separates  this  island  from  the 
opposite  shore  ;  its  passage  would  require  no  very  extraor- 
dinary operation.  The  celebrated  island  of  Lobau  is  situa- 
ted about  two  leagues  below  Vienna  ;  this  island  is  about  a 
league  in  length  and  three-quarters  of  a  league  in  width  ;  it 
is  separated  from  the  right  bank,  first,  by  another  island  of 
*  The  term  Thalweg  is  here  used  for  the  main  channel. 


Ch.  XIV.]       THE     WAR     OF     1809     IK     GERMANY.  55 

about  three  thousand  toises  in  circumference,  and  then  by 
the  main  stream  in  which  are  five  or  six  other  small  islands. 
This  division  of  the  waters  of  the  Danube  rendered  them 
less  deep  and  less  rapid.  The  first  arm,  which  separates 
Ebersdorf  from  the  first  island,  is  not  less  than  two  hundred 
and  forty  toises  in  width  ;  the  second,  opposite  Lobau,  t.bout 
one  hundred  and  sixty;  finally,  a  third  arm  separates  this 
great  island  from  the  Marschfeld  shore,  and  forms,  as  it  were, 
a  kind  of  ditch  to  the  great  central  citadel  ;  it  is  about 
seventy  toises  in  width,  but  is  divided  in  different  ])laces  by 
islands.  At  Nussdorf,  the  main  body  of  the  Danube  is  only 
one  hundred  and  eighty  toises  wide,  and  the  small  arm  sixty  ; 
a  passage  at  this  place  would,  therefore,  have  the  duuble 
advantage  of  being  commanded  by  the  high  ground  on  the 
right  bank,  and  requiring  only  one  half  the  number  of  boats  ; 
moreover,  it  was  directly  opposite  the  Bisemberg,  a  mountain 
of  difficult  access,  situated  in  a  commanding  position  between 
the  roads  to  Moravia  and  Bohemia.  The  i)OSsession  of  this 
mountain  by  us  before  the  arrival  of  the  archduke,  would 
have  been  a  matter  of  great  interest,  but  after  he  had 
efiected  a  junction  with  Hiller,  the  occupation  of  the  Bisem- 
berg not  only  became  more  difficult,  but  would  actually 
facilitate  the  operations  of  the  enemy  against  us.  Under 
this  point  of  view,  the  passage  at  the  island  of  Lobau  was 
the  most  advantageous  ;  moreover,  we  would  be  able  to  float 
down  to  this  point  all  the  boats  above  Vienna,  and  in  the 
small  arm  of  the  Prater.  And  lastly,  the  great  extent  of 
the  island  would  afibrd  shelter  to  the  troops  effecting  the 
passage,  in  case  the  enemy  appeared  in  superior  force  on  the 
opposite  side. 

Preparations  for  its  Execution. — No  sooner  had  I  reached 
Vienna  than  I  directed  my  attention  to  the  means  of  crossing 
the  Danube.  Lannes,  who  was  stationed  further  up  the 
river,  was  directed  to    make   preparations   for    throwing    a 


56  LIFEOr    NAPOLEON.  [  Jn.  XIV. 

bridge  across  at  Nussdorf,  and  St,  Hilaire  was  directed  to 
gain  possession  of  the  great  island  of  Schwarze-Lake.  Mas- 
sena,  who  was  encamped  between  Simering  and  Ebersdorf, 
was,  on  the  contrary,  directed  to  prepare  to  pass  to  the 
island  of  Lobaii.  These  double  preparations,  at  ])oints  some 
four  leagues  apart,  divided  the  attentimi  of  the  enemy,  and 
enabled  us  to  select  the  least  difficult  point  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  bridge.  St.  Hilaire  sent  two  battalions  of, 
voltigeurs  in  boats  to  make  a  lodgement  on  the  island  of 
Schwarze-Lake  ;  but,  receiving  no  timely  support,  these 
detachments  were  surrounded  by  General  Nordmann,  and, 
after  a  brave  defense,  forced  to  surrender.  The  zeal  and 
skill  of  our  pontoniers  enabled  them  to  overcome  obstacles 
Avhich  any  other  troops  would  have  regarded  as  insuperable. 
On  the  nineteenth  of  May  they  succeeded  in  throwing  a 
bridge  of  fifty-four  great  boats  across  the  two  arms  opposite 
Ebersdorf,  under  the  protection  of  battalions  of  tirailleurs, 
who  drove  the  enemy's  troops  from  Lobau.  This  operation 
was  now  the  more  difficult,  as  the  melting  of  the  snow  in 
the  Germanic  and  Tyrolese  Alps  had  so  much  swollen  the 
waters  of  the  Danube  as  to  render  the  current  frightfully 
rapid,  at  the  very  moment  that  we  were  attempting  the 
passage.  Notwithstanding  all  our  care,  we  did  not  find  a 
sufficient  number  of  anchors  to  moor  so  many  boats  ;  but 
the  pontoniers  and  artillery  supplied  the  deficiency  by  large 
boxes  of  balls.  Not  having  pontons  enough  for  the  bridge, 
we  were  obliged  to  resort,  in  part,  to  trestles.  On  the  night 
of  the  twentieth  the  bridge  was  thrown  from  Lobau  to  the 
left  bank,  and  the  corps  of  Massena  commenced  the  passage. 
That  of  Lannes,  which  came  from  Vienna,  was  immediately 
to  follow  ;  but  it  was  directed  not  to  leave  the  capital  till 
the  last  moment,  lest  the  enemy  should  take  the  alarm. 

The   waters   of  the  Danube  were  rising  rapidly  ;    every 
moment,  we  were  obliged  to  interrupt  the  passage  of  the 


Cu.  XIV.]  THE    WAR    OF     18  09     IN     GERMANY.  57 

troops,  in  order  to  adjust  the  bridges,  which,  being  con- 
structed of  bocats  of  different  sizes,  instead  of  regular  pon- 
tons, were  continually  thrown  out  of  place, 

Kolowrath's  Attack  oa  Lintz.  —  While  we  were  thus 
engaged  on  the  bridge  from  Lobau,  I  learned  that  the 
Austrians  had  made  a  serious  attack  on  the  tMe-du-pont  of 
Lintz  on  the  17th  of  May.  This  attack  was  made  by  the 
entire  corps  of  Kolowrath,  twenty-five  thousand  strong.  The 
Wurtem bergers  were  nearly  forced  to  yield  to  this  vast 
superiority  of  numbers,  when  Bernadotte  arrived  with  the 
Saxons  and  restored  the  equilibrium  ;  the  enemy  was  forced 
to  renounce  a  work  so  well  defended.  This  circumstance, 
instead  of  arresting  our  operations  at  Lobau,  only  induced 
me  to  redouble  our  ardor,  for  the  archduke  had  evidently 
either  divided  his  forces  or  had  remained  with  the  mass  of 
his  army  at  Lintz.  Keassured  by  the  arrival  of  Bernadotte, 
I  directed  Vandamme  to  approach  as  far  as  Mautern  ; 
Davoust,  disposed  in  echelons  between  Molk  and  Vienna,  was 
to  assemble  his  forces,  in  all  haste,  under  the  walls  of  the 
capital. 

Massena  crosses  to  the  left  Bank  of  the  Danube.  —  On 
the  morning  of  the  twenty-first,  I  pressed  forward  the  pas- 
sage with  ardor,  and  disposed  the  troops  of  Massena  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  be  prepared  for  any  event.  Opposite  the 
island  of  Lobau  is  Marchfeld,  an  immense  plain,  cut  only  by 
the  little  stream  which  is  formed  near  Wagram  by  the 
embankmg  of  the  Russback  ;  the  north  side  of  the  island  is 
formed  into  a  strong  reentering  curve  by  the  small  arm  of 
the  river,  but  the  east  side  is  quite  straight  ;  on  the  bank  of 
this  branch  of  the  Danube  are  the  villages  of  Aspern  and 
Essling,  about  half  a  league  apart  ;  being  built  of  stone,  and 
composed  of  a  single  street,  these  villages  served  as  a  kind 
of  natural  rampart.  The  cemetery  of  Aspern  formed  a  real 
redoubt  ;  at  Essling,  a  large  grain  magazine  played  the  same 


58  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

part  ;  to  the  south-east  is  the  town  of  Enzersdorf,  a  post 
also  susceptible  of  a  good  defense. 

Our  bridges  had  naturally  been  thrown  to  the  north  oppo- 
site the  reentering  point  between  Aspern  and  Essling  ;  I 
placed  the  division  of  Molitor  (of  Massena's  corps),  in  the 
first  of  these  villages,  and  Boudct's  division  in  the  second. 
The  other  two  divisions,  as  they  arrived,  were  to  form  the 
reserve  ;  the  cavalry  of  Bessières  was  placed  at  the  centre 
between  these  two  bastions.  The  passage  was  interrupted 
almost  every  moment.  The  reports  of  the  advanced  guard 
greatly  differed  ;  some  said  that  only  the  advanced  guard  of 
the  enemy  was  before  us,  while  others  thought  his  whole 
army  was  present.  A  large  body  of  cavalry  formed  a  mask 
which  we  could  not  penetrate.  But  this  uncertainty  did  not 
continue  long. 

The  Archduke  attacks  the  French.— The  archduke  heard, 
between  Horn  and  Meissau,  of  the  fall  of  Vienna,  and  reached 
Bisemberg  on  the  fifteenth.  His  army  rej)osed  there  till  the 
nineteenth.  From  the  top  of  this  mountain  the  enemy  had 
observed  all  our  movements,  and  by  the  nineteenth,  had 
learned  the  construction  of  the  bridge  of  Lobau.  Previous 
to  the  fourteenth,  the  archduke  had  hoped  to  debouch  from 
Vienna,  as  I  did  from  Dresden  in  1813  ;  but  he  then  saw 
that  he  had  only  to  remain  in  observation  where  he  was,  and 
embrace  the  first  opportunity  to  give  battle  when  I  should 
attempt  to  cross  the  Danube.  Perhaps  his  waiting  was  in 
part  induced  by  a  desire  to  learn  the  issue  of  Kolo wrath's 
attempt  on  Lintz.  But  he  learned  on  the  nineteenth,  not 
only  Kolowrath's  defeat,  but  also  that  the  Archduke  John 
had  not  operated  in  that  direction.  On  the  twentieth,  the 
Austrian  generalissimo  came  at  the  head  of  Klénau's  ad- 
vanced guard,  to  examine  the  state  of  affairs  opposite  the 
island,  and  gave  orders  to  his  army  to  be  ready  to  march  the 
following  day. 


Ch.  XIV]         the     war    of     1809    IN     GERMANY.  59 

At  nine  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-first,  the 
archduke,  discovering  from  the  top  of  the  Biseuiberg,  the 
corps  of  Davoust  on  the  march  by  the  right  bank  of  the 
Danube,  thought  that  by  falling  on  these  troops  which  had 
already  crossed  the  river,  he  would  have  to  fight  only  one 
half  of  my  forces.  His  army  began  their  march  about  noon  ; 
the  three  corps  of  Hiller,  Bellegarde,  and  Hohenzollern,  were 
directed  concentrically  on  Aspern,  followed  in  reserve  by  the 
corps  of  grenadiers  ;  Rosenberg's  corps  was  to  extend  to  the 
right  and  left  of  Enzersdorf,  and  then  direct  themselves  on 
Essling.  The  reserve  of  cavalry  was  to  march  between  these 
two  principal  masses.  The  prince  of  Reuss  was  to  remain 
at  the  Bisemberg,  to  cover  that  point  and  threaten  Davoust 
in  the  direction  of  Korncubourg.  Eighty  thousand  men 
with  three  hundred  pieces  of  cannon,  were  thus  to  fall  upon 
the  single  corps  of  Massena,  sustained  only  by  the  cavalry 
of  Bessieres.  Nothing  ever  equaled  the  valor  displayed  by 
our  troops  in  this  critical  situation.  Molitor,  jiosted  alone  in 
Aspern,  receives  the  assault  of  the  masses  of  Hiller  and 
Bellegarde  ;  Massena  seeks  to  sustain  that  point,  and  the 
village  is  alternately  in  the  hands  of  the  opposing  forces. 
The  cemetery  forms  a  kind  of  fort  where  the  hero  of  Genoa 
and  Zurich  fights  like  a  lion.  Lannes,  whose  corps-d'armée 
is  detained  by  the  rupture  of  the  bridge,  takes  command  of 
Boudet's  division,  and  defends  Essling  from  the  attacks  of 
Rosenberg. 

The  enemy  had  crowded  the  greater  part  of  his  infantry 
around  Aspern,  where  they  had  not  room  to  move.  The 
cavalry  held  the  centre  and  protected  the  numerous  batteries 
arranged  to  fire  obliquely  on  the  villages  which  cost  so  many 
brave  men.  This  artillery  fire  even  reached  to  our  thin 
reserves.  I  ordered  Bessieres  to  charge  it  ;  the  light  cavalry 
failed  in  the  attempt  ;  but  our  cuirassiers,  led  by  D'Espagne, 
charged  in  turn,  and  forced  the  enemy  to  withdraw   their 


60  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XIV. 

pieces.  At  this  moment  the  infantry  of  Hohenzollcrn,  pro- 
longed toward  the  centre,  and  our  intrepid  squadrons,  led  by 
Bess'ères,  D'Esj^agne  and  Lassalle,  dashed  against  it  Avithout 
the  least  hesitation  ;  hut  all  the  Austrian  battalions,  formed 
by  a  recent  order  of  the  archduke,  in  columns  of  attack  by 
battalions,  presented  small  masses  which  nothing  could  break. 
The  cavalry  of  Lichtenstein  went  to  their  assistance  ;  ours,  in 
its  turn,  fell  back,  and,  after  a  triple  charge,  yielding  to 
superior  numbers  and  a  murderous  artillery,  proudly  resumed 
its  place  in  the  line.  In  this  unequal  contest  the  bravo 
D'Espagne  met  a  glorious  death. 

Dispirited  by  the  repeated  assaults  on  Aspern,  the  Arch- 
duke Charles  hoped  to  meet  with  less  resistance  at  Essling, 
where  he  had  gone  in  person.  Eosenberg,  after  a  long  cir- 
cuit, had  finally  united  his  two  columns,  and  made,  in  vain, 
two  attacks  on  Lannes  and  Boudet.  These  assaults  were 
repeated  till  evening,  and  the  village  burned,  but  Lannes, 
surrounded  by  flames  and  buried  in  projectiles,  opposed  them 
with  intrepidity.  Night  here  suspends  the  ardor  of  the  com- 
batants, but  at  Aspern  their  fuiy  is  redoubled  ;  the  archduke 
directs  Hiller  and  Bellegarde  to  carry  the  place  at  all  hazards. 
Massena,  at  the  head  of  four  regiments  considerably 
weakened  by  the  successive  losses  of  the  com'bat,  opposes  a 
barrier  of  iron  against  these  two  corps-d' armée  of  the  enemy. 
In  the  midst  of  a  storm  of  projectiles  which  burned  a  part 
of  the  village,  he  defends  every  house,  alley  and  garden,  with 
the  most  brilliant  courage  ;  the  division  of  Molitor,  having 
lost  one-half  of  its  number,  is  finally  forced  to  give  way, 
about  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening.  Massena  flies  to  the  divi- 
sion of  Legrand,  dashes  at  its  head,  into  the  village,  and 
recaptures  part  of  it  ;  but  the  enemy  remains  master  of  the 
cemetery  which  has  cost  so  much  blood.  Never  was  a  dr^-- 
more  glorious  for  the  French  troops  than  this  ;  less  than 
thirty  thousand  troops  had  bravely  fought  against  eighty 


Cil.  X!V.]         THE     WAK     OF     18  09     IN     GEUMANY.  Gl 

thousand  under  the  concentric  fire  of  an  immense  artillery. 
It  was  a  miraculous  defense. 

The  bridges,  which  had  been  many  times  carried  away, 
and  as  often  restored,  at  last  were  made  sufficiently  secure  to 
enable  the  troops  of  Lannes  and  Oudinot  to  cross  over  during 
the  night,  and  the  guard  and  cuirassiers  of  Nansouty,  at  the 
break  of  day. 

Battle  of  Esslinj^. — On  the  morning  of  th.e  twenty-second, 
our  army  being  about  iifty-five  thousand  strong,  required  a 
little  more  development.  If  Davoust  had  been  present,  I 
should  have  j^ivoted  on  the  left,  supporting  that  flank  on  the 
Danube,  and  making  the  principal  attack  by  the  right,  but 
that  operation  required  the  presence  of  a  third  corps,  and 
the  necessary  space  for  forming  the  troops  and  effecting  a 
change  of  front  without  unmasking  the  bridges.  The  enemy 
intended  to  anticipate  us.  At  two  o'clock  in  the  morning 
the  attack  was  renewed  on  Aspern  ;  and  a  little  afterward 
it  extended  as  far  as  Essling  ;  this  was  directed  by  the 
archduke  in  person.  Lannes  was  forced  to  abandon  the 
place,  except  the  granary,  which  formed  a  kind  of  redoubt  ; 
but  being  soon  afterward  reënforced  by  St.  Hilairc,  who  had 
just  arrived,  he,  in  turn,  routed  the  enemy.  In  Aspern,  the 
combat  was  waged  with  the  same  obstinacy,  and  with  the 
same  results.  Legrand's  division,  reënforced  by  that  of  Cara 
St.-Cyr,  at  first  disputed  the  place  with  the  Austrians,  then 
captured  General  Weber  and  some  hundreds  of  prisoners, 
and  again  established  themselves  in  the  cemetery. 

It  was  time  to  think  of  extricating  ourselves  from  this 
couye-gorgc.  Davoust  informed  me  that  his  corps  had  begun 
to  pass,  and,  in  fact,  the  division  of  Demont  debouched  from 
the  bridges.  I  then  determined  to  act  offensively.  The 
direction  of  the  concave  line  of  the  enemy  naturally  indi- 
cated the  i^oint  v.here  we  must  begin  our  attack.  Davoust 
was  to  debouch  by  Essling  ;  Massena  was  to  maintain  liis 


62  LIFKOFNAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

position  ill  Aspern  ;  Oudinot  and  Lannes,  forming  the  centre 
•with  tho  cavalry,  were  to  pierce  the  enemy's  centi-e,  and, 
seconded  by  Davoust's  left,  crush  the  archduke's  corps-de- 
hataiUe,  and  throw  it  back  on  the  upper  Danube,  Oudinot, 
Avith  his  grenadiers,  advances  with  impetuosity  ;  Lannes  has 
drawn  up  his  corps  in  echelons  ;  ho  throws  forward  the 
division  of  St,  Hilaire,  while  the  remainder  of  his  forces 
sustains  it  and  forms  a  second  line.  Our  troops  advance 
with  audacity,  and  overthrow  everything  before  them  ;  soon 
the  first  line  of  the  enemy  is  penetrated.  The  Austrian  artil- 
lery causes  great  ravages  in  the  troops  of  Oudinot  and 
Lannes,  who  are  drawn  up  in  a  rather  deep  order  of  attack  ; 
I,  therefore,  advise  Lannes  to  deploy  his  forces  as  he  gains 
ground.  Marbot  carries  this  order  to  St,  Hilaire,  who  begins 
its  execution,  Claparède  forms  in  this  way  Oudinot's  corps 
of  grenadiers,  deploying  his  brigade,  by  the  right,  en  potence, 
in  order  to  oppose  Kosenberg. 

The  archduke  has  too  practiced  an  eye  not  to  perceive  the 
importance  of  the  movement  of  my  centre,  and  of  the  retreat 
of  his  first  line  ;  he  prolongs  his  corps  on  Breitenlée,  where 
his  headquarters  are,  and  debouches  with  all  his  reserves  on 
the  same  point.  Lannes  and  Bessières  sustain  Oudinot  ; 
the  combat  becomes  fierce,  both  parties  displaying  the  most 
admirable  valor.  Bessières  passes  through  the  intervals  of 
our  infantry,  and,  at  the  head  of  his  squadrons,  dashes  upon 
those  of  the  enemy,  and  then  charges  his  infantry  ;  the 
boldest  j)enetrate  even  to  the  Austrian  headquarters  at 
Breitenlée.  The  archduke  seizes  the  colors  in  his  own  hands, 
and  rallies  the  battalions  which  have  yielded  to  the  audacity 
of  our  troops.  The  battle  is  becoming  hand-to-hand  with 
our  soldiers,  whose  advance  nothing  can  now  arrest.     One 

effort  more,  and  victory  cannot  escape  us But  this 

effort  is  now  impossible  ;  for,  at  this  moment,  the  most 
disastrous  news  destroys  all  our  hopes.     The  great  bridge  of 


Ch.  XIV.]  THE     W  A  11     OF     1809     IN     GERMANY,        G3 

the  Danube  is  broken  by  fire-ships,  rafts,  and  heavy  floating 
bodies  directed  against  it  by  the  enemy,  and  brought  in  con- 
tact with  the  bridge  with  fatal  violence  by  the  swift  current 
of  the  stream  ;  the  bridge,  broken  and  scattered,  floats  far 
down  the  Danube  ;  the  aid-de-camp,  who  brought  me  this 
alarming  news,  could  give  no  definite  information  respecting 
the  present  jiosition  of  the  wreck,  and  I  still  had  some  hope 
of  reestablishing  it  ;  but  this  hope  was  soon  dissipated. 
,    I  could  no  longer  reckon  on  the  four  divisions  of  Davoust, 
or  the  reserve   of  artillery,  for  offensive  operations.     But  it 
was  necessary  to  maintain  our  position  till  night,  and  return 
into  our  citadel  of  Lobau.     The  situation  of  a  part  of  an 
army  which  first  crosses  a  river  in  the  face  of  a  hostile  army 
drawn   up  to  receive  it,  is  always  critical  ;  but  how  much 
more  is  the  position  of  this  fraction  when  deprived  not  only 
of  all  assistance  from  its  own  army  but  also  of  all  hope  of 
retreat.     In  a  forcible  passage,  whatever  may  be  the  advan- 
tage of  the  opposing  army,  the  troops  are  animated  by  the 
certainty  of  being  constantly  reënforced,  and  of  having  the 
chances  of  success  turned  in  their  favor  by  the  new  battalions 
which  are  gradually  brought  into  action.     But  in  the  affair 
of  the  twenty-first,  we  had  not  even  this  advantage,  for  the 
frequent   rupture  of  the  bridges,  and   the  swelling  of  the 
Danube,  whose  waters  overflowed  the  islands  and  avenues  to 
the  bridges,  required  all    the  heroic  devotion  of   Massena, 
Lannes,  and  their  soldiers,  to  maintain  the  advantage  already 
gained.     Notwithstanding  the  reënforcements  received  during 
the  night,  the  situation  of  the  troops  was  still  lamentable, 
when  the  order  for  retreat,  and  the  news  of  the  rupture  of 
the  bridges  which  caused  this  order,  made  all  feel  that  they 
had  now  to  conquer  or  die. 

My  attitude,  both  calm  and  severe  at  the  moment  when  I 
received  this  news,  contributed  to  maintain  the  confidence  of 
our  bravo  soldiers  ;  no  one  knew  that  any  thing  had  hap- 


64  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XIV. 

j)ened,  till  I  had  had  time  to  ascertain  whether  there  were 
any  means  of  reestablishing  the  bridges.  Lannes  w^as  to 
maintain  his  jjosition  till  this  was  fully  ascertained  ;  but 
this  hope  being  soon  destroyed,  the  marshal  was  ordered  to 
return  to  Essling,  and  the  fatal  news,  flying  from  moulh  to 
mouth,  informed  our  soldiers  of  tiio  threatening  danger. 
Instantly  a  sad  silence  succeeded  to  the  shouts  wdiich  usually 
precede  victory  ;  but  even  this  silence,  accompanied  by  per- 
fect calmness,  showed  that  every  one  was  determined  to  do 
his  duty.  At  the  moment  when  Lannes  was  checking  his 
advance  by  my  orders,  the  archduke,  wdio,  better  advised 
than  the  day  before,  had  either  carried  the  mass  of  his  forces 
on  the  centre,  or  had  been  drawn  there  by  the  manoeuvre 
with  which  I  had  threatened  him,  commenced  a  general 
attack  with  all  the  forces  at  his  disposal,  and  under  the  ter- 
rible fire  of  his  batteries.  His  troops,  astonished  to  see  ours 
halt,  acquired  new  audacity,  and  believed  themselves  already 
victorious  ;  when  Lannes  commenced  retreating,  the  enemy's 
ranks  were  filled  with  enthusiasm,  and  they  fell  with  vigor 
upon  St.  Hilaire,  who  formed  the  first  echelon.  This  vetei'an 
of  the  army  of  Italy,  pierced  with  a  bullet,  carried  to  his 
grave  the  regrets  and  admiration  of  all.  His  troops,  for  a 
moment  alarmed  at  his  death,  nevertheless,  continued  their 
movement  in  good  order.  Lannes  hearing  of  the  death  of 
his  companion  in  arms,  flew  to  the  head  of  his  command, 
and  marched  it  boldly  towards  Essling  ;  Oudinot  follow^ed 
him  on  the  left. 

The  enemy,  emboldened  by  his  unusual  success,  at  first 
pressed  hard  on  Lannes'  rear.  Aspern  and  Essling  again 
became  the  centre  of  all  their  efi'orts.  Surrounding  these 
two  villages  with  a  concave  line,  they  pour  in  upon  the 
French  a  most  murderous  fire.  The  battle  continues  without 
further  manoeuvres  ;  it  is  a  horrible  butchery,  hut  indispen- 
sable to  save  the  honor  of  the  army  and   the  lives  of  those 


Ch.  XIV.]         THE    WAR    OF     1809    IK    GERMANY.  G5 

who  remained  exposed,  for,  to  attempt  to  retire,  in  open  day, 
by  a  single  bridge,  in  presence  of  an  enemy  double  our  num- 
bers and  artillery,  is  to  expose  at  least  one  half  of  these 
troops  to  inevitable  destruction.  The  scene  of  the  night 
before  is  renewed  in  these  two  villages,  which  are  taken  and 
retaken  five  or  six  times  by  the  opposing  combatants. 
Toward  noon,  the  enemy  attempts  to  turn  Aspern  by  pene- 
trating by  a  small  woody  island  in  the  direction  of  Stadelau  ; 
he  has  already  gained  ground  and  is  about  to  take  the  village 
in  reverse  and  threaten  the  little  bridges  thrown  across  this 
branch  of  the  stream.  '  Molitor  marches  there  with  his  divi- 
sion now  reduced  to  three  thousand  combatants,  and  gathers 
new  laurels,  which  Massena  also  shares.  "  Sometimes  on 
foot  and  sometimes  mounted,  he  is  seen  in  the  woods, 
on  the  island,  in  the  village,  sword  in  hand,  directing  the 
attack  and  defense."  The  intrepid  Legrand,  of  whom  I 
might  say  with  even  greater  reason  than  of  Gardanne,  "he 
was  a  grenadier  in  stature  as  well  as  courage,"  displayed  no 
less  coolness  and  firmness  in  Aspern.  In  the  mean  time,  the 
jjrince  of  Kosenberg  also  attacks  Essling,  and  is  sustained  by 
the  archduke,  with  a  brigade  of  grenadiers.  Five  times  he 
penetrates  into  the  village,  and  five  times  Boudet,  immovable 
in  his  redoubt,  forces  him  to  retire.  Finally,  at  two  o'clock, 
the  archduke,  having  failed  in  twenty  assaults  against  the 
two  bastions  of  our  line,  decides,  though  late,  to  make  a 
decisive  attack  on  the  centre.  If  this  should  succeed,  the 
troops,  thrown  back  on  the  little  bridges  which  remain,  can 
not  prevent  the  enemy  from  destroying  them,  and  the  divi- 
sions compromised  in  the  villages  will  be  destroyed.  The 
corps  of  Hohenzollern,  sustained  by  twelve  battalions  of 
grenadiei's,  advances  for  this  purpose.  Lannes  opposes  a 
vigorous  resistance  ;  Hohenzollern  is  overthrown,  and  yields 
the  honor  of  the  attack  to  the  grenadiers,  who,  led  by  the 
archduke  in  person,  attack   our  artillery  with  the  bayonet. 

VOL.    III. — 5. 


QQ  LIFEOF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

The  cavalry  at  the  same  time  attempt  to  penetrate  between 
EssHns:  and  the  Danube.  But  these  efforts  are  useless.  The 
archduke,  astonished  at  our  firmness  and  his  own  losses, 
renounces  the  attempt  there,  and  directs  his  attack  on  Essling, 
which  he  finally  carries.  If  he  is  left  master  of  this  place, 
nothing  can  prevent  him  from  debouching  on  the  Danube, 
and  destroying  the  remnants  of  those  brave  troops  who  sacri- 
fice themselves  with  so  much  devotion.  I  throw  against  liira 
the  cool  and  intrepid  Mouton,  (Count  Lobau),  at  the  heal 
of  the  brigade  of  the  fusiliers  of  the  guard.  The  enemy's 
grenadiers  are  every  where  defeated  ;  one  battalion  is  cap- 
tured in  the  granary  and  another  in  the  cemetery.  The  fury 
of  this  attack,  which  surpasses  every  thing,  proves  to  the 
archduke  that  he  can  obtain  no  more  trophies  against  men 
who  have  resolved  to  conquer  or  die.  It  is  near  four  o'clock  ; 
for  thirty  hours  his  troops  have  fought  almost  incessantly  ; 
even  his  reserves  have  been  destroyed  ;  he  is  satisfied  with 
his  successes,  and  this  long  and  cruel  tragedy  degenerates 
into  a  cannonade,  still  well  kept  up  by  the  enemy,  but  very 
inferior  on  oiii'  side  for  want  of  munitions.  This  cannonade, 
though  less  dangerous,  was  still  somewhat  destructive  ;  a 
spent  ball,  thrown  from  Enzersdorf,  struck  Marshal  Lannes, 
the  most  intimate  of  my  companions  in  Italy,  breaking  both 
his  legs.  Capricious  fortune  wished  to  expend  all  her  shafts 
on  me.  This  news  dismayed  me.  It  was  time  to  end  this 
deplorable  contest,  for  our  artillery  horses  were  all  slain,  and 
a  great  part  of  the  pieces  dismounted  ;  as  the  parks  of 
reserve  had  not  been  able  to  cross  over,  the  ammunition  was 
exhausted  ;  it  was  necessary  to  keej)  up  a  supply  by  succes- 
sive passages  in  boats. 

Council  of  War  and  New  Projects  of  Napoleon, — We  had 
now  to  extricate  ourselves  from  this  ditficult  position,  and  to 
secure  our  retreat.  I  had  just  examined  plans  of  the  island 
of  Lobau,  to  ascertain  its  capahility  to  afford  us  a  shelter  for 


Ch.  XIY.]      the    war     of     1809    IN    GERMANY.  67 

two  or  three  days.  I  also  assembled  some  of  my  generals  in 
council.  Some  advised  the  repassing  the  Danube,  but  to  do 
this  required  a  bridge  ;  and  even  had  there  been  a  bridge,  I 
should  not  have  followed  such  advice,  for  I  had  no  idea  of  a 
general  retreat.  Davoust,  who  was  present,  assured  me  that 
he  could  defend  the  right  bank  of  the  river  against  all  the 
enterprises  of  the  enemy,  and  give  us  time  to  reconstruct  the 
bridges.  Massena  said,  that  in  case  of  need,  if  the  enemy 
should  place  himself  on  our  lino  of  retreat,  he  could  cut  his 
way  out  sword  in  hand. 

I  then  addressed  them  in  a  few  words,  reviewing  the 
chances  of  our  position. 

"  A  retreat  can  bo  effected  only  by  boats,  which  is  almost 
impossible  ;  it  would  be  necessary  to  abandon  the  wounded, 
the  artillery,  and  all  the  horses,  and  to  disorganize  the  army  ; 
the  enemy  may  then  cross  at  Krems  or  at  Presburg,  to  fall 
on  the  rear  of  our  scattered  forces,  and  drive  us  from  Ger- 
many, by  raising  against  us  the  inhabitants  of  the  country. 
We  still  possess  great  resources  ;  it  will  require  only  two  or 
three  davs  to  reestablish  our  bridges,  and  secure  the  means 
of  either  resuming  the  offensive  or  of  effecting  our  retreat 
voluntarily  and  in  good  order.  In  a  few  days,  Eugene  must 
descend  from  the  Styrian  Alps  ;  Lefebvre  will  be  called  from 
the  Tyrol,  with  a  half  of  the  Bavarians,  and,  even  should 
the  enemy  by  crossing  the  river  at  Lintz  threaten  our  present 
line  of  retreat,  Eugene  will  open  a  new  and  safe  line  on  Italy, 
and  we  shall  then  bo  able  to  renew  our  operations  with  the 
eight  corps-d^ armée  of  Eugene,  Marmont,  Macdonald,  Le- 
febvre, Bernadette,  Davoust,  Oudinot,  and  Massena,  besides 
the  imperial  guard  and  the  reseiwes.  We  must,  therefore,  re- 
main on  the  island  of  Lobau.  Massena,  you  will  complete  what 
you  have  already  so  gloriously  begun  ;  you  can  remain  here 
alone,  and  impose  upon  the  archduke,  sufficiently  to  retain 
him  before  you  for  the  few  days  which  will  be  required.     The 


68  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

gruund  of  Lobau,  which  I  have  just  examined,  will  be  favor- 
able for  this  object." 

At  these  words,  the  eyes  of  my  generals  flashed  with  new 
fire  ;  each  one  saw  the  extent  of  my  resources,  and  the 
rapidity  of  my  conception  ;  it  was  agreed  that  a  retreat 
should  be  begun  at  night,  and  that  the  last  troops  should  fall 
back  by  two  o'clock  in  the  morning,  preserving,  if  possible, 
the  ponton  bridge  with  a  tête~de-pont,  destroying  only  the 
small  bridges  of  communication  across  the  branch  that 
masked  the  reentering  side  of  the  island. 

Death  of  LanneSi — At  the  moment  when  I  was  arranging 
these  dispositions  they  brought  before  me  the  body  of  Mar- 
shal Lannes  ;  he  lay  stretched  out  on  a  litter,  just  ready  to 
expire.  I  threw  myself  upon  him,  and  clasped  him  in  my 
arms,  addressing  him  by  epithets  the  most  dear.  Those  who 
witnessed  this  affecting  scene  would  hardly  accuse  me  of 
having  a  cold  heart,  inaccessible  to  sentiments  of  affection, 
as  has  so  unjustly  been  alleged  against  me.  In  my  cabinet, 
and  at  the  head  of  military  and  political  affairs,  I  have  gen- 
erally been  able  to  overcome  my  natural  inclinations,  which 
were  far  from  cruelty  and  cold  insensibility  ;  those  capable 
of  judging  me  would  rather  accuse  me  of  yielding  to  bias  of 
friendship.  ■••'•" 

*  For  a  more  full  account  of  tliia  interesting  scene  between  Xapoleon  and 
the  dying  Lannes,  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  work  of  General  Pelet  on  the 
campaign  of  1809.  While  Napoleon  often  blamed  the  faults  of  his  ofiBcers,  and 
sometimes  removed  them  from  commands,  ho  never  treated  them  as  the 
English  did  Admiral  Byng.  This  is  shown  in  his  treatment  of  Baraguay  d'Hil- 
liers  at  Ulm,  of  Bissoa  at  Friedland,  and  Berthier  at  Ratisbon. 

Thiers  says,  that  Napoleon  "perceiving  a  Utter  made  of  some  branches  of 
trees,  on  which  Lannes  lay,  with  his  legs  amputatcl,  ran  to  him,  pressed  him 
in  bis  arms,  spoke  hopefully  of  his  recovery,  and  found  him,  though  heroic  as 
ever,  yet  keenly  affected  at  seeing  himself  so  soon  stopped  in  that  career  of 
glory.  '  Tou  are  going  to  lose,'  said  Lannes,  '  him  who  was  your  best  friend, 
and  your  flvithful  companion-in-arms.     May  you  live  and  save  the  army.'" 

Napoleon,  in  his  dictations  to  Montholon,  at  St.  Helena,  pays  a  merited 
tribute  to  Lannes  and  St.  Ililaire. 


Ch.  XIV.]      THE     WAR    OF    1809     IN     GERMANY.  69 

Remarks  on  the  new  Position  of  the  French. —  But  to 

return  to  my  army.  The  retreat  was  effected  in  the  manner 
fixed  upon,  without  any  obstacle  on  the  part  of  the  enemy, 
who  had  fallen  back  with  the  mass  of  his  forces,  leaving  only 
his  advanced  guards  in  our  presence.  I  established  my 
headquarters  at  Ebersdorf.  The  boats  were  employed  the 
following  days  in  carrying  over  our  provisions  and  military 
munitions,  and  in  bringing  away  the  guards  and  the  wounded. 
Massena  took  the  general  command  of  all  the  forces  on  thé 
island. 

Our  forces  were  now  withdrawn  to  the  island  of  Lobau  ; 
but  our  embarrassment  was  far  from  ended.  Our  communi- 
cation with  the  right  bank  of  the  river  was  not  yet  restored  ; 
and  my  army  was  forty-eight  hours  on  the  island  without 
provisions  or  ammunition.  Fortunately,  the  Austrians  did 
not  trouble  us.  If  they  had  attacked  us  the  next  day,  the 
general  opinion  is,  that  we  would  have  been  unable  to  resist 
the  fire  of  their  three  hundred  pieces  of  artillery,  and  must 
have  been  destroyed.  I,  however,  thought  differently.  The 
island  of  Lobau  formed  a  real  intrenched  camp,  surrounded 
by  a  ditch  of  running  water,  seventy  toises  wide,  which  could 
not  easily  have  been  crossed  by  the  enemy  in  the  2)rcsence 
of  an  army  which  had  no  other  alternative  than  to  conquer 
or  die.  The  Austrian  batteries  were  at  a  great  distance,  and 
they  were  ignorant  of  the  destitute  condition  of  our  caissons. 
Moreover,  these  were  partially  supplied  before  night  by  the 
reception  of  several  boat-loads  of  military  munitions.  Un- 
doubtedly the  enemy  might  have  greatly  annoyed  us  by  his 
projectiles  ;  but,  then,  we  were  partially  covered  by  the 
woods  on  the  middle  of  the  island,  and  my  soldiers,  who  had 
fought  so  bravely  on  the  twenty-second  without  protection, 
were  not  likely  to  jump  into  the  Danube  at  the  approach  of 
a  few  cannon  balls.  If  the  enemy's  infantry  had  j^enetrated 
into  the  island,  wc  should  have  been  on  equal  terms  ;  they 


70  LIFEOF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XIV. 

would  then  have  the  river  behind  them  as  well  as  we,  and  I 
could  have  thrown  myself  upon  them  without  hesitation, 
and  have  driven  them  into  the  Danube,  It  must  be  con- 
fessed, however,  that  an  attack  at  this  time  would  have 
augmented  our  embarrassment.  It  would  not  have  cost  the 
Austrians  much,  for  we  could  not  have  attacked  them,  in 
turn,  on  the  left  bank.  It  is  conceded  that  the  archduke 
did  not  attempt  every  thing  in  his  power  to  annoy  us,  but  it 
by  no  means  follows,  as  some  of  my  enemies  have  endeavored 
to  show,  that  such  an  attack  would  have  effected  our  ruin. 

The  French  army  had  surpassed  itself  ; — in  the  first  day's 
battle,  thirty  thousand  men  had  fought  heroically  against 
forces  triple  in  numbers  and  materials  ;  and,  in  the  second 
day,  fifty  thousand  French  had  resisted  ninety  thousand 
men.  Nevertheless,  the  Austrians,  and  the  Archduke  Charles, 
had  done  wonders  ;  the  most  exacting  could  scarcely  have 
desired  more  bravery  than  they  exhibited  in  their  grand 
attack.  We  did  not  recognise  them  as  the  same  soldiers  who 
had  fought  at  Eatisbon. 

The  twenty-fifth  of  May,  the  bridges  having  been  repaired, 
every  thing  was  restored  to  order  ;  and,  the  next  day,  the 
light  cavalry  put  us  in  communication  with  the  army  of 
Italy. 

Reply  to  Rogniat's  Criticism  on  the  Battle  of  Essling.— 
Such  was  the  bloody  battle  of  Essling,  which  is  to  be  classed, 
like  that  of  Eylau,  among  the  battles  in  which  fortune 
opposed  me,  but  in  which  I,  nevertheless,  succeeded  by  my 
obstinate  jierseverance,  and  my  superior  combinations.  This 
battle  has  not  been  wanting  in  critics,  and,  among  others, 
General  Kogniat  has  not  spared  me.  He  reproaches  me 
with  having  made  the  attack  on  the  twenty-second  care- 
lessly and  without  consideration.  It  may  be  sufficient  to 
remark,  in  reply,  that  eight  divisions,  resting  on  the  river, 
and  to  be  immediately  followed  by  four  others,  may  very 


Ch.  XIV.]  THE    WAR    OF     1809     IN     GERMANY.  71 

\vt41  begiu  a  battle,  in  order  to  gain  ground  sufficient  to 
manœuvre  larger  forces.  If  the  bridge  had  not  been  broken, 
Davoust  would  have  debouched  on  the  right  of  Lannes,  and 
then,  if  this  marshal,  beaten  in  the  centre,  as  were  the 
Romans  at  the  battle  of  Cannœ,  by  the  concave  line  of 
Hannibal,  had  been  obliged  to  fall  back,  Davoust  might  soon 
have  restored  affairs  by  a  change  of  front  on  the  left  of  the 
enemy,  like  that  which  had  been  executed  at  Eylau,  and 
which  he  repeated  a  few  weeks  after  at  Wagram. 

Eogniat,  moreover,  imputes  to  me  the  fault  of  having 
formed  the  troops  of  Lannes  in  too  deep  masses  on  the  centre 
of  the  concave  line  of  the  enemy,  whose  superior  artillery 
poured  in  upon  us  a  concentric  and  decisive  fire.  The  jus- 
tice of  these  reproaches  may,  at  least,  be  contested.  I  never 
was  foolish  enough  to  renew  here  the  too  famous  English 
column  of  Fontenoy,  by  throwing  a  single  deep  mass  against 
the  middle  of  a  line  of  concentric  fires.  The  position  be- 
tween Essling  and  Aspern  was  calculated  to  favor  an  attack 
on  the  centre,  since  our  flanks  were  secured  from  attack  by 
these  two  bastions.  Moreover,  it  should  not  be  forgotten 
that  an  army  crossing  a  river  in  the  face  of  a  superior 
enemy  has  but  few  manœuvres  from  which  to  choose.  Al- 
ways, in  debouching,  it  is  necessary  to  rest  the  two  wings  on 
the  river  ;  otherwise,  you  risk  losing  your  bridges  ;  you  must 
also  have  room  in  rear  of  your  centre  to  form  your  debouch- 
ing troops  ;  this  forces  you  to  form  either  a  semicircle  or  a 
salient  angle  on  the  centre.  There  is  one  exception  to  this 
rule,  i.e.,  when  the  passage  is  made  while  the  enemy  is  at  a 
distance,  or  is  so  situated  as  to  be  unable  to  approach  your 
flanks.  In  that  case,  by  a  change  of  front,  you  may  take  up 
your  position  parallel  to  the  course  of  the  river,  as  Turenne 
and  Moreau  did  on  the  Rhine — the  former  against  Monte- 
cuculli,  and  the  latter  against  Starray.  But  such  was  not 
our  position  at  Essling.     On  the  first  day,  it  was  necessary 


72  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XIV. 

to  retain  the  position  between  the  two  villages  ;  after  getting 
our  forces  ready,  we  ought  to  have  debouched  under  the 
protection  of  these  two  bastions,  by  an  oblique  movement, 
pushing  forward  the  right  wing,  and  refusing  the  left  ; 
which  was  exactly  what  Lannes  and  Massena  were  intending 
to  execute,  if  Davoust  had  been  able  to  reach  them.  The 
only  thing  that  can  be  said  of  this  operation  is,  that,  pos- 
sibly, it  might  have  been  better  to  delay  the  offensive  attack 
until  the  complete  arrival  of  Davoust's  forces,  and  then  to 
direct  it  from  Essling  on  Kuasdorf  It  was  in  this  way  that 
we  afterward  operated  at  the  battle  of  Wagram.  With 
respect  to  the  deep  formation  of  troops,  which,  it  is  alleged, 
LanUes  employed  against  the  enemy,  I  no  more  advised  it 
than  I  do  some  of  the  other  ideas  of  my  critic.  But  had  the 
troops  of  Lannes  been  drawn  up  according  to  the  thin  for- 
mation, there  would  not  have  been  space  for  Davoust  to 
form  on  his  right  ;  this  would  have  delayed  Davoust's  com- 
ing into  action,  and  have  exposed  my  centre,  too  thin  for 
resistance,  to  the  attacks  of  the  enemy,  while  the  third 
corps-d'armée  was  still  moving  into  line.  But3  in  fact,  my 
centre  was  not  entirely  of  the  deep  formation  ;  the  troops 
were  drawn  up  according  to  the  mixed  system.  Claparède 
had  his  three  brigades  deployed,  two  facing  to  the  north,  and 
the  third,  formed  crotchetwise,  to  cover  themselves  against 
Kosenberg  ;  St.  Hilaire  was  also  deployed.  In  fine,  Ko- 
gniat's  criticisms  on  this  battle  j)artake  more  of  the  spirit  of 
general  denunciation  than  of  a  just  and  searching  ana- 
lytical examination. 

General  Remarks  on  the  Tactics  of  Battles.— Strategy 
has  been  almost  a  fixed  science;  it  is  subject  to  rigid  and 
almost  invariable  rules.  But  not  so  with  tactics  of  battles, 
i.e.,  the  manner  of  drawing  up  troops  on  the  field,  and  of 
bringing  them  into  action.  On  this  subject  there  is  not  Ihe 
same  unanimity  of  opinion  among  military  writers.     Indeed, 


Cn.  XIV  ]  THE    "WAR    OF    1809    IN    GERMANY.  73 

there  lias  been  renewed,  in  our  time,  the  okl  controversies  on 
the  respective  advantages  of  thin  and  deej)  formations,  sub- 
jects long  since  supposed  to  be  exhausted. 

There  are  various  modes  of  drawing  up  troo2)s  on  the  field 
of  battle  ;  but  none  of  tliem  can  be  subjected  to  any  thing 
like  invariable  rules.  The  ground,  the  character  of  the 
troops,  and  various  other  circumstances,  govern  each  indi- 
vidual case.  The  thin  formation  of  troops  deployed  has 
'  been  constantly  followed  by  Wellington,  and  some  have 
concluded  that,  since  he  triumphed  over  our  columns,  this 
must  be  the  best.  In  the  rugged  positions  of  Spain  and 
Portugal,  a  defensive  line  ought  to  be  deployed,  and  to  rely 
on  its  fire.  If  Wellington  resisted  our  columns  at  Waterloo 
until  the  arrival  of  the  Prussians,  it  was  because  the  deep 
mud  destroyed  the  impulsion  of  these  columns,  and  prevented 
our  artillery  from  following  them  ;  under  the  circumstances 
they  were  too  deep.  The  principal  merit  of  a  column  is  its 
impulsion  ;  if  the  nature  of  the  ground,  or  its  too  great 
mass,  prevents  it  from  moving  with  facility,  we  experience 
all  the  inconveniences  of  the  formation  without  its  advantasjes. 
The  formation  proj)osed  by  General  Jomini  has  much  merit. 
It  is  simply  a  line  of  battalions,  in  columns  of  attack,  ployed 
on  the  central  division  of  each  battalion.  This  formation 
has  less  depth  and  more  mobility  than  the  column  of 
Folard,  and  has  greater  stability  than  the  thin  or  deployed 
formation.  We  frequently  employed  it  in  our  earlier  cam- 
paigns ;  but  afterwards,  as  our  armies  increased  in  numbers, 
the  desire  of  having  our  troops  more  concentrated  and  dis- 
posable induced  us  sometimes  to  form  them  in  too  deep  and 
heavy  masses.  Instead  of  forming  columns  of  battalions  by 
divisions,  we  formed  heavy  columns  of  grand  divisions  by 
battalion,  each  grand  division  composed  of  twelve  battalions. 
This  formation  was  a  fault  at  Albuera,  Moskwa,  and 
Waterloo,  but  not  at  Essling. 


74  LIFEOF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

It  should  be  observed  that  when  a  deep  column  is  formed, 
or  a  line  of  small  columns  of  attack  by  battalions,  it  is 
indisi^ensable  that  the  flanks  should  be  protected  with  troops 
marching  by  file.  The  greatest  difficulty  with  a  column  is 
in  being  compelled  to  stop  and  repel  an  attack  on  its  flank. 
But  if  each  flank  is  jjrotccted  by  troops  marcliing  by  file, 
these  troojjs  will  cover  it  from  the  enemy's  charges,  while  the 
column  continues  its  offensive  impulsion. 

The  system  of  small  squares  by  battalion,  followed  by  the 
English,  is  not  without  advantages.  A  battalion  of  eight 
companies  may  be  formed  into  oblong  squares,  three  in  front 
and  rear,  and  one  on  each  flank,  these  last  marching  by  file. 
This  mode  of  formation  presents  a  front  greater  by  one 
company  than  the  colunm  of  attack  of  battalions  by  divisions. 
It  has,  however,  much  less  impulsion  than  the  column,  but  it 
is  more  advantageous  when  it  becomes  necessary  to  employ 
the  fire,  inasmuch  as  it  has  one-half  more  fire  and  one-half 
less  mass  exposed  to  the  enemy's  artillery.  It  is  preferable 
to  the  thin  formation  of  dejdoyed  battalions,  because  it  has 
more  strength,  and  may  be  moved  over  ground  of  almost  any 
character. 

The  general  rules  for  the  tactics  of  battle,  may  be  summed 
up  as  follows  : 

1st.  In  a  defensive  battle,  the  mixed  formation  of  the  first 
line  dejjloyed,  and  the  second  line  in  columns  of  attack  of 
battalions  by  divisions,  is  deemed  the  most  perfect. 

2d.  In  an  offensive  battle,  I  prefer  the  formation  in  two 
lines  of  columns  of  attack  of  battalions  by  divisions  on  the 
central  division,  jjlacing  the  columns  of  the  second  line  oppo- 
site to  the  intervals  of  the  first,  so  as  to  present  less  mass  to 
the  enemy's  artillery,  and  to  give  greater  fiicility  for  the 
movement  of  the  columns  in  advancing  and  in  retreat.  The 
intervals  between  the  battalions  may  be  filled  with  sharp- 
shooters or  artillery. 


Cu.  XIV.]         THE     WAR    OF     1809     IN    GERMANY.  75 

Sd.  Where  the  troops  are  habitually  formed  in  two  ranks, 
each  of  these  columns  of  attack  will  be  comjiosed  of  four 
divisions  and,  therefore,  eight  files  in  depth  ;  the  column  in 
this  case  has  less  depth  in  proportion  to  its  front,  and  is  less 
exposed  to  disorder,  than  when  the  troops  are  formed  in 
three  ranks,  or  the  battalion  is  composed  of  more  than  four 
divisions. 

4th.  In  order  to  give  every  possible  advantage  to  the  im- 
pulsive action,  the  command  should  be  divided  in  depth,  i.  e., 
each  brigade  should  have  its  front  and  second  line,  so  that 
every  general  officer  will  have  the  means  at  his  disposal  for 
forming  a  reserve  without  being  obliged  to  seek  it  elsewhere. 

5th.  The  formation  of  squares  by  battalions,  may  be  em- 
ployed with  advantage  on  very  level  ground.  It  has  less 
solidity  and  impulsion  than  columns  of  battalions  ;  but  it 
possesses  some  advantages  against  cavalry  and  musketry. 
The  parallelogram  has  the  inconvenience  of  being  more  nar- 
row and  cramped  on  the  flanks,  but  it  has  more  mobility, 
more  fire  and  greater  front  than  the  perfect  square. 

6th.  The  deep  formation  of  heavy  columns  of  grand- 
divisions  with  battalions  formed  in  rear  of  each  other,  should 
only  be  used  when  the  space  is  too  narrow  for  a  more 
extended  formation.  And  even  then  the  flanks  should  be 
protected  by  troops  marching  by  file  and  also  by  sharp- 
shooters. 

7th.  These  variations  in /or77za^ions,  should  not  be  allowed 
to  influence  the  general  principles  of  grand  tactics  as  ajjplied 
to  the  several  orders  of  battle. 

Military  Operations  in  Italy.— But  enough  on  this  subject. 
Let  us  now  return  from  our  digression,  and  review  the  opera- 
tions of  the  army  of  Italy,  whose  timely  arrival  at  the 
appointed  position  effected  so  happy  a  diversion  in  our  favor. 
In  our  previous  relation  we  left  it  behind  the  Adigc,  after  its 
ill-success  at  the  battle  of  Sacile  ;  it  was  there  rcënforced  by 


76  LIFE      or     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

a  division  from  the  south  of  Italy.  The  Archduke  John, 
forced  to  leave  a  corps  to  carry  on  the  siege  of  Palmanova 
and  observe  Venice,  advanced  to  Caldiero  ;  but  on  hearing 
of  the  battles  of  Abensberg  and  Eckmuhl,  and  of  our  inarch 
on  Vienna,  he  feared  that  he  might  be  cut  off,  and  com- 
menced a  retreat.  The  Aulic  Council,  far  from  expecting 
this,  had  flattered  itself  that  he  would  continue  his  successes 
in  Italy,  and  thus  effect  a  powerful  diversion  to  the  affairs  in 
Germany. 

The  archduke,  however,  thought  differently.  Disquieted 
by  the  situation  of  Venice  and  the  corps  of  Marmont  -who 
■was  guarding  Dalmatia,  and  by  the  attitude  of  the  viceroy 
who  was  receiving  reenforcements,  he  thought  he  might 
expose  himself  to  probable  ruin,  and  that  it  would  be  better 
to  rally  on  the  Archduke  Charles  and  save  the  monarchy. 
Allowing  that  the  circumstauces  of  the  case  justified  this 
retreat,  it  may,  at  least,  be  said,  that  it  might  have  been 
better  conducted. 

Battle  of  the  Piavc. — Having  flillen  back  behind  the  Piave, 
the  archduke  thought  that  he  would  be  able  to  defend  the 
j)assage  of  this  torrent  which,  like  the  Tagliamento,  runs  in  a 
deep  ravine,  fordable  except  in  time  of  the  great  rains  or  the 
melting  of  the  snow.  He  therefore,  halted  behind  this  river, 
which  Eugene  passed  with  his  army  on  the  eighth  of  May  ; 
the  opeiation  was  not  simultaneous  ;  his  two  advanced 
guards  forded  the  stream  a  league  apart.  Desaix  com- 
manded the  one  on  the  left  ;  it  debouched  with  boldness  and 
was  vigorously  charged  by  the  imperial  cavalry  under  the 
orders  of  Wolfskehl.  Eugene  had  not  his  infantry  in  posi- 
tion to  be  disposable  ;  the  water  was  every  moment  rising 
from  the  melting  of  the  snows  ;  it  had  become  necessary  to 
employ  rafts  for  the  passage  of  the  troops.  Wolfskehl  at 
the  head  of  three  thousand  horse,  bravely  charges  the  six 
battalions  of  Desaix  formed  in  squares  ;  the  Archduke  John 


Oh.  XIV.]         THE    WAK    OF    18o9    IN     GilRMANY,  77 

advances  with  the  infantry  to  sustain  him  ;  his  columns 
move  slowly,  and  Desaix  opposes  an  immovable  barrier 
against  the  cavalry.  Eugene,  seeing  the  danger,  flies  to  the 
menaced  point,  harangues  the  dragoons  of  Sahuc  and  Pully, 
and  hurls  them  against  the  enemy.  A  bloody  combat  ensues  ; 
Wolfskehl  is  slain  and  his  artillery  captured.  Our  brave 
dragoons,  notwithstanding  their  inferiority  in  numbers,  drive 
the  enemy's  squadrons  back  upon  the  infantry  of  CoUoredo, 
which  has  advanced  into  the  plain,  and  throw  it  into  disorder. 
This  expluit  gains  time,  and  enables  Macdonald  to  debouch 
with  the  division  of  Lamarque  ;  Grenier  follows  with  the 
divisions  of  Abbé.  The  archduke,  who  has  lost  the  favora- 
ble cj^portunity,  prepares  for  the  main  attack,  at  the  moment 
when  Eugene  has  united  thirty-eight  battalions  of  infantry, 
and  fuur  thousand  horse.,  Eugene  directs  his  attack  by  the 
right  ;  Grenier  executes  it  with  the  assistance  of  Macdonald  ; 
the  enemy  is  every  where  vigorously  pushed  ;  but  the  country 
being  cut  up  with  dikes  and  canals,  we  are  not  able  to  profit 
by  our  success.  The  archduke  attempts  to  pass  the  night 
behind  a  canal  ;  the  dragoons  of  Grouchy  and  Pully  close,  at 
eight  o'clock,  by  a  brilliant  charge,  the  operations  of  the  day. 
The  archduke  falls  back  on  Conegliano,  after  having  uselessly 
sacrificed  seven  or  eight  thousand  men,  in  a  battle  which  he 
should  never  have  fought,  or  which,  if  fought  at  all,  should 
have  been  conducted  offensively  at  the  moment  when  the 
Erench  were  acting  under  the  disadvantage  of  a  difficult 
passage  of  the  river,  conducted  by  successive  embarkations. 
The  result  of  this  contest  caused  him  to  relinquish  the  idea 
of  making  a  stand  behind  the  Tagliamento,  and  he,  in  all 
haste,  regained  the  Norie  Alps,  by  the  valley  of  Fella. 

Eugene  pursues  the  Austrians.— The  viceroy,  in  imitation 
of  my  march  in  1797,  detached  Macdonald  with  two  divi- 
sions by  the  road  to  Lay  bach,  in  order  to  connect  with  Mar- 
mont  ;  Serras  took  the  central  route  to  Predel  ;  Eugene  and 


78  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV, 

Grenier  marched  to  the  left  on  Malborghetto  and  Tarvis. 
The  Archduke  John  hoped  to  effect  his  retreat  without 
molestation,  under  protection  of  the  intrenchments  or  forts 
with  which  he  crowned  the  defiles  of  Malliorghetto,  Tarvis 
and  Predel,  on  the  two  roads  that  lead  to  Villach,  and  of 
Prevald  on  the  road  to  Laybach.  He  left  small  detachments 
in  each  of  these  places  and  retired  twenty  leagues  to  near 
Villach. 

Eugene,  who  circumspectly  followed  in  pursuit,  on  the 
seventeenth  of  May,  captured  the  fort  of  Malborghetto, 
after  a  vigorous  assault,  not  less  honorable  to  the  assailants 
than  to  the  little  Austrian  garrison,  most  of  whom  died 
fighting. 

Flitsch  and  Tarvis  are  carried  in  the  same  way,  and  Serras 
is  equally  successful  at  Predel,  against  a  no  less  vigorous 
resistance.  The  troops  of  Macdonald  easily  gain  possession 
of  the  intrenched  camp  of  Laybach  and  the  fort  of  Prevald. 
The  commandants  and  militia-garrisons  of  these  jîosts,  sur- 
rendered after  little  or  no  opposition.  We  here  took  five 
thousand  prisoners.  Schilt  made  a  sortie  with  the  garrison 
of  Palmanova,  captured  Trieste  without  opposition,  and 
made  several  rich  prizes  there.  These  operations  had  the 
double  advantage  of  isolating  the  Austriansfrom  the  English, 
by  closing  to  the  latter  the  ports  of  the  Adriatic,  and  of 
facilitating  the  junction  of  Marmont.  The  previous  retreat 
of  Eugene  behind  the  Mincio,  had  left  this  corjjs  in  Dalmatia 
in  a  dangerous  position.  General  Stoischwitz  had  at  first 
observed  Marmont  with  eight  thousand  men  ;  Knesewich, 
at  the  head  of  the  Croat  militia  which  had  been  assembled 
at  Agram,  was  to  assist  Stoischwitz  ;  and  Zach,  governor  of 
Istria  and  Trieste,  gaining  possession  of  Capo-d'Istria  in 
concert  with  the  English  cruisers,  was  to  completely  cut  off 
his  communications.  Marmont,  after  the  battle  of  Sacile, 
was  summoned  to  surrender,  and  as  he  could  do  no  better  he 


Ch.  XIV.]        THE    WAR    OF     1809    IN    GERMANY.  79 

refused  to  answer,  and  retired  to  the  mountains  to  await  the 
result.  Numerous  unimportant  contests  took  place  between 
this  and  the  middle  of  May,  Avhen  hearing  of  the- retreat  of 
the  Austrians,  he  marched  toward  Carniole  to  effect  a 
junction. 

Retreat  of  the  Archduke  John  on  Gratz. — The  Archduke 
John  who  had  allowed  his  advanced  guards  to  be  crushed 
twenty  leagues  distant  from  himself,  received  at  Villach,  on 
the  nineteenth  of  May,  the  letter  of  the  Archduke  Charles, 
directing  him  to  mai-ch  on  Lintz.  Although  this  movement 
was  tardy,  still  it  was  possible  of  execution  ;  the  prince, 
however,  deemed  it  dangerous  to  throw  himself  in  the  midst 
of  my  army,  with  the  viceroy  in  hot  pursuit,  and  directed 
his  march  on  Gratz.  The  division  of  Jellachich,  which  had 
operated  in  the  Alps  of  Salsbourg,  in  order  to  connect  Hiller 
with  the  Archduke  John,  being  hemmed  in  on  the  right  and 
left  by  our  columns,  received  orders  to  march  likewise  from 
Rottenmann  on  Gratz,  by  the  valley  of  the  Muhr.  It  is 
overtaken  at  St.  Michel,  on  the  twenty-tifth  of  May,  by  the 
divisions  of  Serras  and  Durutte.  Jellachich  received  battle 
between  the  Muhr  and  the  rocks  which  inclose  the  valley. 
He  was  turned  by  the  heights  and  pierced  in  front  by  the 
cavalry,  and,  out  of  seven  thousand  men,  escaped  to  Leoben 
with  scarcely  three  thousand. 

The  Archduke  John,  instead  of  being  reënforced  at  Gratz 
by  the  troops  of  Jellachich  as  he  had  expected,  found  merely 
the  wrecks  of  this  division  ;  and  fearing  lest  he  might  be 
hemmed  in  between  my  army  and  that  of  Eugene,  he  took 
the  road  to  Kormond,  on  the  twenty-sixth,  still  ignorant,  it 
is  said,  of  the  result  of  the  battle  of  Essling,  of  which  he 
heard  the  news  on  the  twenty-seventh.  This  prince  has 
been  reproved  for  not  executing  the  orders  of  his  brother  ; 
some  have  even  gone  so  far  as  to  calculate  the  favorable 
results  for  the  Austrian  monarchy,  which  would  have  been 


80  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

produced  by  a  march  on  Lintz.  Without  pretending  to 
deny  the  momentary  embarrassment  which  sixty  thousand 
men  well  conducted  might  have  caused  us,  it  must,  neverthe- 
less, be  remembered  that  I  had  in  part  provided  for  this 
danger  by  the  position,  in  echelons,  of  my  troops.  Berna- 
dotte  had  just  uirived  at  Lintz  ;  the  Bavarians  had  just  en- 
tered Innspruck  victorious,  and  they  still  retained  Salsbourg  ; 
forty  thousand  Saxons  and  Bavarians  would  be  found  on  the 
line  of  the  Inn  or  the  Traun,  after  they  had  destroyed  the 
bridge  at  Lintz,  in  order  to  prevent  the  junction  of  Kolowrath 
and  the  Archduke  John.  The  viceroy  would  have  followed 
on  the  heels  of  the  latter,  and  put  himself  in  communication 
with  the  Bavarians  on  the  one  side  and  with  me  on  the 
other.  It  is  not  difficult  to  imagine  which,  under  these  cir- 
cumstances, would  have  been  most  embarrassed,  myself  or 
the  Archduke  John.  After  effecting  my  junction  with 
Eugene,  I  would  have  turned  upon  the  Archduke  and  made 
him  experience  the  fate  of  Lusignan,  of  Provera,  and  of  the 
other  corps  with  which  the  Austrians  have  often  attempted 
to  surround  me. 

Junction  of  the  Armies  of  Napoleon  and  Eugene- 
Eugene,  finding  no  obstacle  on  the  road  to  Vienna,  after  the 
departure  of  his  adversary  for  Kormond,  pushed  forward  his 
van-guard  to  the  mountain  of  Sommering,  where  they  formed 
a  junction  with  the  light  troops  which  Davoust  had  sent 
from  Neustadt.  This  junction  caused  the  greatest  joy  on 
both  sides — a  joy  which  was  still  further  increased  by  the 
report  that  the  bridges  were  restored  ;  this  completed  the 
restoration  of  confidence.  Eugene  hastened  to  collect  all  his 
disposable  forces  to  cross  the  chain  of  the  Sommering,  while 
the  little  division  of  Rusca  guarded  the  Carinthia,  and 
observed  the  Tyrol,  and  the  division  of  Broussier  besieged 
the  castle  of  Gratz,  guarded  Styria,  and  observed  the  valley 
of  the  Linn. 


Ca  XIV.]         THE    WAR    OF     1809    IN    GERMANY.  81 

Insurrection  in  Westphalia  and  Prussia.— The  rapidity 
of  my  march  on  Vienna,  and  the  importance  of  the  opera- 
tions that  ensued,  have  forced  me  to  omit  all  account  of  what 
was  passing  at  this  moment  in  Poland  and  the  norUi  of 
Germany,  where  a  general  insurrection  was  about  to  break 
out  from  the  conspiracies  of  which  I  have  already  spoken. 
The  plans  of  the  duke  of  Brunswick-Oels,  of  Dornbcrg,  and 
Schill,  failed  for  want  of  concert  in  the  execution. 

According  to  the  best  accounts  that  can  be  obtained,  the 
early  part  of  May  was  fixed  upon  for  this  insurrection. 
Many  accidents  tended  to  derange  a  plan  so  complicated. 
Incited  by  the  early  successes  of  the  Austrians  in  Bavaria, 
certain  insurgents  had  assembled  at  Wolfshagen  by  the 
twenty-third  of  April.  Jerome,  informed  of  this  event, 
directed  Dornberg  to  march  against  the  insurgents.  Think- 
ing his  project  discovered,  and  himself  an  outlaw,  he  fled  and 
joined  the  rebels.  Jerome  was  at  first  amazed  at  this  news  ; 
then,  presenting  himself  to  his  guards,  he  declared  to  them 
that  he  intrusted  his  person  to  their  honor  and  loyalty. 
This  generous  appeal  was  addressed  to  brave  men  who  knew 
how  to  appreciate  it  ;  and  even  those  who  were  little  dis- 
posed in   his  favor,  swore  that  they  would  not  abandon  him. 

Jerome's  minister-of-war  was  a  man  well  known  for  his 
cool  judgment  and  decision  of  character.  So  well  had  he  made 
his  dispositions  that  his  troops,  from  Wcsel  and  Mayence  to 
Cassel,  all  moved  at  once  ;  and  Dornberg,  pursued,  beaten, 
and  dispersed  by  Rewbell,  escaped  with  a  mere  handful  of 
officers  to  join  the  duke  of  Brunswick  in  Saxony. 

Schill,  exposed  by  the  seizure  of  Dornberg's  papers, 
determined  not  to  await  his  arrest.  Leaving  Berlin  on  the 
twenty-ninth  of  April,  at  the  head  of  his  regiment  of  hus- 
sars, he  found  the  Saxon  troops  at  Wittenberg  not  disposed 
to  join  his  projects.  He  marched  to  Magdebourg  on  the 
seventh    of  May,  where   the  Westphalian   battalions   weie 

VOL.   III. — 6. 


82  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.   XIV. 

prevented  fr/)ni  joining  him  by  the  firmn  s-;  of  General 
Michaud  and  Colonel  Wouthier.  He  now  threw  himself  on 
the  lower  Elbe,  expecting  aid  from  the  English,  who  had 
announced  a  considerable  armament  for  the  Baltic,  and  who 
had,  in  fact,  made  demonstrations  with  several  vessels  toward 
Stade.  General  Gratien,  who  commanded  a  Dutch  brigade 
at  Erfurth,  started  in  pursuit,  while  General  Eblé  caused 
him  to  be  followed  on  the  other  side  by  the  Westphalians. 

The  Prussian  cabinet  at  Konigsberg  hearing,  at  the  same 
time,  the  illegal  operations  of  Schill  and  our  victories, 
hastened  with  great  zeal  to  disavow  what  it  had  probably 
never  authorized.  Schill  was  condemned  ;  if  we  had  been 
beaten  at  Eatisbon,  he  would  have  been  declared  a  hero  ! 
Nevertheless,  it  would  be  absurd  to  suppose  that  his  opera- 
tion was  directed  by  the  cabinet  itself,  with  the  intention  of 
declarino;  either  for  or  against  him  accordino:  to  the  turn  of 
affairs.  Such  a  pi-oject  would  have  been  unworthy  of  the 
character  of  Frederick  William. 

Having  collected  only  about  twelve  or  fifteen  hundred 
men,  and  being  hotly  pursued  by  the  "VVestjihalians,  Dutch, 
and  a  brigade  of  Danes,  he  took  refuge  in  the  dismantled 
fortress  of  Stralsund.  He  was  attacked  here  on  the  thirty- 
first  of  May,  and  completely  defeated  ;  being  reduced  to 
despair,  he  determined  to  sell  his  life  as  dearly  as  possible  ; 
but  at  last,  covered  with  wounds,  he  fell  lifeless  upon  the 
dead  bodies  of  his  enemies,  which  he  had  formed  into  a  kind 
of  rampart  around  him. ■•■'•■ 

The  duke  of  Brunswick,  left  Bohemia,  the  fourteenth 
of  May,  with  his  legion  of  Death  ;f  but  not  finding  in 
Saxony  the  support  which  he  expected,  he  returned  again  to 
Bohemia.     In  fine,  the  victories  of  Abensberg,  Eckmuhl,  and 

*  Some  say  that  he  fell  by  the  hands  of  his  own  conspirators. 

f  So  called  from  their  uniform  which  was  all  of  black,  with  a  death's  head 
embroidered  on  their  shakos,  emblem  of  the  eternal  hatred  which  this  prince 
and  his  soldiers  had  declared  against  the  French. 


Cil.  XIV.]         THE    WAR     OF     1809     IN     QRRMANT.  83 

Ratisbon,  had  spread  terror  throughout  Germany,  and   held 
in  check  nil  who  were  disposed  to  join  the  conspirators. 

Affairs  of  the  Tyrol.— In  the  mean  time  the  Tyrol  had 
become  the  theatre  of  important  events.  Chasteler,  hearing 
of  my  victories  in  Bavaria,  left  Roveredo  to  return  to  the 
north.  Marshal  Lefebvre,  after  having  driven  Jellachich 
from  Salzburg  toward  Rastadt,  ascended  the  valley  of  the 
Inn  on  Kufstein  ;  he  defeated  the  advanced  guard  of  Chas- 
teler and  the  insurgents,  in  the  defiles  of  Lomer,  St.  Johann, 
Feursingcr,  and  finally  at  Grattenberg.  The  Bavarians,  still 
full  of  enthusiasm  from  their  successes  at  Abensberg,  and 
indignant  at  the  excesses  committed  by  their  comrades,  pre- 
cipitated themselves  like  mad-men  into  the  narrow  defiles, 
and  overthrew  every  thing  before  them.  The  main  body  of 
Chasteler's  forces,  completely  defeated  at  Worgel  and  at 
Schwatz,  fell  back  on  the  Brenner,  where  he  received  orders 
from  the  Archduke  John  to  retire  to  the  Carinthia.  Chas- 
teler now  proposed  a  treaty  of  evacuation  and  an  armistice  ; 
Wrede  replied  by  sending  him  a  decree  offering  a  reward  for 
his  head  !  This  insurrection  had  exasperated  me  against 
him  ;  I  stood  on  the  brink  of  a  volcano  ;  his  native  country 
being  now  united  to  France,  if  he  was  resolved  to  still  fight 
against  me,  he  ought  to  have  done  so  in  legitimate  warfare, 
and  not  in  stirring  up  insurrection  against  me  ;  I  treated  him 
as  a  bandit  ;  his  brain  was  affected  by  it. 

The  Tyrolese  now  gave  up  all  idea  of  defense  ;  and 
Lefebvre  entered  Innspruck  on  the  nineteenth  of  May.  The 
insurrectionary  committee  resolved  to  send  to  the  king  of 
Bavaria  promises  of  submission  ;  nevertheless,  a  part  of  the 
country  still  remained  in  arms,  and  the  presence  of  the 
Bavarians  was  scarcely  sufficient  to  restrain  the  exasperated 
inhabitants  of  the  valleys. 

Operations  in  Poland.— In  Poland  our  arms  experienced 
some  reverses.     The   Archduke  Ferdinand,  at  the  head  of 


84  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON,  [Cii.   XIV. 

thirty-six  thousand  men,  had  marched  on  Warsaw.  Ponia- 
towski,  after  having  hravely  fought  against  forces  double  his 
own  at  Razyn,  concluded  a  treaty  of  evacuation  and  fell 
back  on  the  Narew,  under  the  support  of  Modlin.  Th;; 
government  took  refuge  at  Tykoczin.  After  this  fine  begin- 
ning, Ferdinand  extended  his  forces  along  the  Vistula,  threw 
a  bridge  across  the  river  at  Gohra,  and  ordeied  it  to  be 
intrenched  ;  be  then  carried  his  van- guard,  under  Mohr, 
before  Praga,  whose  tétc-de-pont  was  defended  by  the  Pules. 
Poniatowski  profited  by  this  fault,  fell  on  Mohr  and  defeated 
him  at  Grochow  ;  he  afterward  sent  Pelletier  and  Sokolnicki 
to  seize  upon  the  tête-de-pont  which  had  just  been  begun  at 
Golira,  and  the  two  battalions  charged  with  its  construction. 
Ferdinand  flew  to  their  aid,  but  was  too  late  ;  he  then 
decided  to  descend  the  Vistula  and  seize  upon  the  ttte-de- 
pont  of  Thorn. 

In  a  military  point  of  view,  this  eccentric  expedition  into 
Poland  is  entirely  inexcusable  ;  for  even  supposing  that  the 
Archduke  Ferdinand  had  carried  his  successes  to  the  gates  of 
Dantzic,  still  Austria,  defeated  on  the  Danube,  must  have 
fallen.  But  in  a  jjolitical  point  of  view,  this  incursion  was 
not  so  blâmable  ;  for  if  they  had  succeeded  in  dissolving  the 
little  Polish  army  and  gaining  possession  of  t-he  Duchy  and 
Thorn,  they  would  flatter  themselves  that  Prussia  might  be 
induced  to  join  them  by  offering  her  the  restitution  of  the 
provinces  which  were  dismembered  from  her  states  by  the 
treaty  of  Tilsit  ;  but  things  turned  out  very  differently. 

Far  from  despairing  because  of  the  inferiority  of  his  forces, 
Prince  Poniatowski  took,  in  conformity  with  my  orders,  the 
bold  resolution  to  leave  the  enemy  master  of  the  left  bank  of 
the  Vistula,  to  ascend  the  right  and  fall  on  Galicia.  En- 
couraged by  his  successes  at  Grochow  and  Gohra,  he  threw 
himself  on  Lublin  and  Sandomir,  and  captured  the  former  ; 
General  Sokolnicki  took  forcible  possession  of  Sandomir,  and 


Ch.  XIV.]  THE     WAR    OF     1809     IN     GERMANY 


85 


General  Pelletier  carried  Zomosc  by  escalade,  while  Dombrow- 
skr  threw  himself  with  a  single  squadron  into  Posen,  and 
mcited  the  inhabitants  of  Great  Poland,  where  he  had  exer 
cised  great  influence  since  1794.     The  Archduke  Ferdinand 
turned  back  on  his  own  steps  the  more  rapidly  as  a  corps  of 
thirty  thousand  Russians  under  Prince  Gallitsen   were  ad 
vancing  toward  Lemberg,  at  the  same  time  that  Poniatowski 
conso  idated  his  conquests  in  Galicia,  and  threatened  the  Aus- 
^anhneof  retreat.  The  militia  levied  by  Zayonschech  entered 
Warsaw  the  second  of  June.     The  archduke  harassed  in  his 
letreat   by   Zayonschech,    drove    him   back   on   the   Pilica 
teaching  Sandomir  on  the  fifteenth,  with   his  arfillery  of 
reserve  and  hearing  that  this  place  was  occupied  only  by  the 
feeble  brigade  of  Sokolnicki,  Prince  Ferdinand  resolved  to 
seize  It  in  the  night  ;  the  outworks  are  carried,  and  an  Aus 
trian  column  penetrates  even  into   the  body  of  the  place  • 
nevertheless,  after  ten  hours  of  most  noble  defense,  the  Poles 
routed  them  with  a  loss  of  five  hundred  prisoners,  and  a 
thousand  men  hors-de-combat  ;  but,  as  the  garrison  is  desti- 
tute of  almost  every  thing,  Sokolnicki  prefers  to   evacuate 
the  i^lace  rather  than  compromise  his  brave  soldiers  in  a  new 
attack,  and  therefore  rejoined  tiie  army.     The  archduke,  now 
master  of  Sandomir,  marches  on  the  Pilica  toward  Petrikau  • 
Zayonschech  occupies  Gohra  ;   Poniatowski  is  at  Pulawy  and 
Radom.^   A  few  days  after,  the  archduke  again  falls  back  on 
Sandomir  ;    and  finally,  at  the   beginning  of  July,  Ponia- 
owski   reënforced  by  Zayonschech,  compelled  him  to  march 
toward  Cracovia,  which   he  occupied   on  the  ninth       The 
Russians  extend  along  the  San  and  also  approach  Cracovia 
But  they  do  not  desire  to  make  conquests  which  might  tend 
to  strengthen  the  grand-duchy  to  whose  very  existence  they 
are  opposed.     This  fact  accounts  for  the  operations  of  the 
Russians  at  this  time  in  Poland-operations  of  which  his- 
torians have  been  so  much  troubled  to  ascertain  the  motives 


86  LIFEOFNAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XIV. 

Situation  of  Afl'airs  in  Germans  .—It  is  time  to  return  to 
my  army  on  the  Danube.  Although  the  immediate  conse- 
quences of  the  battle  of  Essling  n^ight  induce  my  enemies  to 
think  that  they  had  gained  a  victory,  still,  as  they  allowed 
us  time  to  reestablish  the  great  bridge,  I  was  entirely  satis- 
fied respecting  the  ultimate  consequences  in  a  military  point 
of  view.  But  not  so  in  its  political  results.  All  Germany 
might  be  shaken  by  it  ;  they  everywhere  published  the  news 
of  my  defeat  and  subsequent  retreat,  giving  all  the  details, 
and  predicting  my  speedy  and  total  overthrow.  The  Tyro- 
lese,  ready  to  make  their  submission,  were  again  full  of 
insurrection.  General  Amende  got  possession  of  Dresden, 
and,  uniting  with  the  duke  of  Brunswick-Oels,  marched  on 
Leipsic,  forcing  the  court  of  Saxony  to  seek  i-efuge  in  Frank- 
fort. Another  column,  under  General  Radiwojewich,  leaving 
Egra,  penetrated  to  Bareith  and  Nuremberg,  and  overran 
the  country,  to  incite  the  people  to  insurrection.  Minds, 
which  our  victories  at  Eatisbon  had  cooled  not  a  little,  again 
became  excited,  and  the  chiefs  of  the  secret  association  did 
not  lose  the  occasion  to  stir  up  insurrection.  Nor  did  the 
court  of  Vienna,  on  its  side,  fail  to  magnify  their  success  at 
Essling,  in  order  to  induce  Prussia  to  declare  against  me. 
The  emperor,  himself,  wrote  to  the  king  ;  M.  de  Stadion, 
through  the  prince  of  Orange,  urged  this  monarch  to  declare 
himself  ;  the  ambassador,  Wessemberg,  continued  to  nego- 
tiate. General  Steigentesch,  who  had  been  to  Konigsberg, 
■with  the  hope  of  concerting  plans  of  operation,  returned  to 
Berlin,  where  he  sought  to  incite  not  only  the  Westplialians, 
but  also  the  people  of  Prussia.  The  fear  of  becoming  com- 
promised with  Russia  restrained  Frederick  William  ;  never- 
theless, his  ministers,  opposed  to  the  solicitations  of  Austria 
merely  the  fear  of  a  separate  peace,  which  antecedents  gave 
them  good  reasons  to  apprehend.  This  was  good  proof 
that  but  little  further  success,  on  the  part  of  Austria,  would 


Ch.  XIV.]         THE     WAR    OF     1809     IN    GERMANY.  87 

be  necessary  to  induce  Prussia  to  cleclare  against  me.  The 
advices  which  I  received  from  Enghxnd  informed  me  of  the 
near  departure  of  a  gigantic  maritime  expedition, — a  true 
armada,  greatly  superior  to  that  with  which  Philip  11. 
formerly  menaced  Great  Britain.  Between  forty  and  fiftv 
thousand  men,  with  one  hundred  field  pieces,  and  an  im- 
mense siege  equipage,  were  prepared  for  emLai-kation  ; 
including  the  maritime  forces,  more  than  one  hundred  thou- 
sand men  were  engaged  in  this  armament.  These  troops 
would  probably  act  either  in  the  north  of  Germany  or  in 
Holland.  A  few  successes  in  either  of  these  directions  would 
undoubtedly  decide  Prussia,  whose  faith  was  already  shaken 
by  the  demi-victory  of  Essling.  An  army  of  one  hundred 
thousand  Anglo-Prussians,  which,  by  insm-gents,  Prussian 
militia,  and  Westjjhalians,  would,  in  a  few  months,  be  in- 
creased to  two  hundred  thousand  combatants,  might  shake 
my  power,  and  entirely  change  the  face  of  aifairs.  The 
delays  and  egotism  of  the  English  cabinet,  however,  saved 
me  at  this  crisis. 

Affairs  in  Rome— But  my  affiiirs  were  still  more  compli- 
cated by  what  was  at  this  time  passing  in  the  south  of  Italy. 
The  English  and  Sicilians  threatened  Naples  with  a  great 
expedition  fitted  out  at  Palermo.  The  Pope,  encouraged  by 
the  chances  which  the  war  in  Spain  ofil'red  to  my  enemies. 
had  hurled  many  anathemas  against  me  in  his  consistorial 
allocutions.  After  his  refusal  to  adhere  to  the  Italian  league, 
and  the  loss  of  Ancona  and  Urbin,  which  resulted  from  it,  the 
Holy  See  was  naturally  hostile  to  us  ;— it  entered  the  coa- 
lition against  me.  The  English,  in  order  to  incite  Italy,  and 
favor  their  expedition,  became  more  than  ever  the  auxiliaries 
of  Kome.  The  time  to  execute  my  grand  project  seemed  to 
me  to  have  arrived,  and  I  determined  to  make  an  end  of  it. 
On  my  entry  into  Vienna,  four  days  before  the  battle  of 
Essling,  I  issued  a  decree  uniting  Kome  and  the  States  of  the 


88  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

Church  to  the  French  empire.  The  Pope,  as  the  spiritual 
chief  of  the  Church,  was  to  retain  his  palaces,  and  enjoy  an 
annual  revenue  of  two  millions  of  francs,  which  was  to  be 
made  up  to  him  from  the  imj)erial  treasury.  This  decree, 
which  was  communicated  to  Rome  on  the  tenth  of  June,  was 
followed  the  next  day  by  a  bull  of  excommunication  —  a 
measure,  which  would  have  been  merely  ridiculous  were  it 
not  for  the  war  with  Spain,  but  which,  under  the  circum- 
stances, might  render  that  war  the  more  obstinate.  In  this 
strange  philippic,  Pius  YII.  did  not  hesitate  to  exhibit  the 
l)rinciples  of  the  disciples  of  Loyola,  and  all  the  surly  pride 
of  a  Gregory  VII.,  or  a  Boniface  VIII.  His  bull  contained, 
among  others,  the  following  sentence  :  "Zc^  sovereigns  learn 
once  more  that  they  are  subjected  by  the  laiu  of  Jesus  Christ 
to  our  throne  and  to  our  command  ;  for  ive,  also,  exercise  a- 
sovereignty,  but  a  sovereignty  much  more  noble,  unless  it  be 
said  that  the  soul  is  inferior  to  the  flesh,  and  heavenly  things 
to  those  of  the  earth." 

The  Pope  transferred  to  Savona.— Just  at  this  time  the 
news  of  the  battle  of  Essling  reached  Rome,  the  success  of 
the  Austrians  being  magnified  by  the  usual  Italian  exagge- 
rations ;  every  thing  combined  to  excite  the  populace.  I  had 
withdrawn  from  this  capital  all  the  disposable  troops  to 
reënforce  the  viceroy  ;  and  Murat  had  enough  to  do  to  defend 
his  own  capital  from  the  expedition  that  was  cruising  against 
it.  The  governor  of  Rome,  Miollis,  had  only  a  handful  of 
soldiers.  His  reports  of  the  state  of  things  at  Rome,  and  the 
indications  of  insurrection  there,  alarmed  Murat.  He  charged 
Miollis  to  send  away  the  Pope,  so  as  to  be  more  free  to  act 
in  case  of  an  actual  outbreak  in  the  city.  This  general 
transferred  the  holy  father  to  Tuscany,  within  the  domains 
of  my  sister  Eliza  ;  but  the  latter,  fearing  the  responsibility 
of  such  a  deposit,  caused  him  to  be  conducted  to  Turin.  On 
hearing  of  these  events,  I  had  the  Pope  transferred  to  Savona, 


Cil.  XIY.]  THE    WAR     OF     ]80!J     IN     GERMANY.  89 

where  he  would  be  treated  with  the  respect  due  to  his  rank, 
until  the  favorable  moment  should  arrive  for  executing  my 
project  of  removing  the  chair  of  St.  Peter,  and  establishing 
it  in  France.  The  finuness  of  Miollis,  and  the  resolution  of 
Murat,  saved  the  south  of  Italy  ;  but  the  responsibility  of 
the  removal  of  the  Pope  I  am  willing  to  take,  if  need  be  ; 
for,  although  I  did  not  direct  this  removal,  I  had  projected 
it  two  years  before. 

Mcasnarcs  of  Napoleon  for  lepairhui?  the  Cfcicck  received 
at  Essling'. — The  storm  which  threatened  the  north,  still 
more  serious  than  that  which  troubled  Italy,  was  tardy  in  its 
approach,  and  my  adversaries  thus  gave  me  time  to  repair 
all  my  losses.  In  the  accomplishment  of  this  task  I  exerted 
all  the  vigor  and  rapidity  of  which  I  Avas  capable.  I  had 
already  given  the  prelude  to  these  measures,  by  directing 
the  construction  of  solid  bridges,  and  the  concentration  of  my 
forces  about  Vienna.  The  viceroy  descended  the  mountains 
of  Styria  on  Neustadt.  Leaving  to  the  Tyrolese  a  momen- 
tary success,  Lefebvre  and  Wrede,  at  the  head  of  the  Ba- 
varian troojis,  received  orders  to  fall  back  from  Innspruck  on 
Lintz  ;  Bernadotte  was  to  echelon  on  the  Danube  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  join  me  in  forty-eight  hours. 

As  soon  as  our  communications  were  reestablished,  I 
directed  Davoust  to  jilace  his  divisions  in  echelons  on  Pres- 
burg,  to  oppose  the  preparations  which  the  enemy  was 
making  to  establish  a  passage  there.  The  Archduke  Charles, 
instead  of  marching  there  with  his  entire  army,  had  merely 
detached  the  division  of  Bianchi,  with  orders  to  prepare  a 
bridge,  and  to  secure  it  by  intrenchments,  on  an  island 
separated  from  the  right  bank  by  a  very  small  arm  of  the 
river.  Davoust  found  the  enemy  occupied  in  throwing  up 
these  works,  and  caused  him  to  be  attacked.  But  as  Davoust 
had  no  means  of  crossing  this  arm,  of  twenty  toises,  which 
separated  him  from  the  Austrians,  he  was  unable   to  dis- 


90  LIFEOF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

lodge  them,  but  he  paralyzed  all  the  advantages  of  their 
position  by  strongly  occupying  the  village  of  Engereau,  which 
almost  entirely  barred  the  reentering  angle  formed  by  the 
Danube,  opposite  to  the  position  occupied  by  the  enemy's 
bridge. 

On  the  Main,  Junot  assembled  a  corjjs-d'arjnce  of  con- 
tingents and  provisional  regiments,  formed  of  French  con- 
scripts, in  order  to  cover  Saxony  and  Westphalia  in  concert 
with  my  brother  Jerome.  Augsbourg,  now  the  centre  of  our 
depots,  was  placed  in  a  state  of  defense,  and  secured  by  a 
strong  division  organized  by  General  Lagrange.  I  urged 
forward  the  reparation  and  increase  of  the  defenses  of  Passau. 
Our  parks  soon  repaired  the  losses  of  the  campaign. 

In  order  not  to  awaken  the  attention  of  the  enemy,  I  left 
my  camp  at  Ebersdorf  to  return  to  the  palace  of  Schon- 
brunn,  where  they  imagined  I  was  dosing  beneath  its  gilded 
canopies.  All  the  month  of  June  was  employed  in  arrang- 
ing the  means  and  measures  for  restoring  victory.  Fortun- 
ately for  us,  England  and  Prussia  interfered  with  these 
measures  only  by  hatching  new  plots  and  stujDid  conspiracies, 
or  by  the  partial  organization  of  legions  of  adventurers. 

Eugene  marches  against  the  Archduke  John.— This  forced 
silence  was,  nevertheless,  broken  by  a  few  military  opera- 
tions ;  the  most  important  were  those  of  the  viceroy  against 
the  army  of  the  Archduke  John.  This  prince  in  retiring  on 
Hungary  had  added  still  more  to  his  eccentric  direction,  by 
carrying  the  corps  of  Giulay  into  the  Illyrian  provinces, 
either  because  he  feared  that  Marmont  might  invade  these 
provinces,  or  because  he  wished  to  cover  every  thing  in  his 
retreat  after  the  manner  of  Bulow.-'-"  On  the  other  hand  he 
expected  to  be  reënforccd  in  the  direction  of  Kormond  by 
the   troops   of  the   Hungarian  insurrection.     Situated  as  he 

*  Bulow  recommends  an  army  in  retreat  to  follow  eccentric  lines — the 
surest  possible  mode  of  securing  its  own.  total  destruction  1 


Ch.  XIV.J         THE    "WAR    OF     1809     IN     GERMANY.  91 

was,  with  both  my  army  and  the  Danube  between  him  and 
the  Archduke  Charles,  I  could  detach  against  him  as  many 
troops  as  I  might  deem  proper. 

It  was  now  important  for  us  to  enlarge  our  theatre  of 
action  about  Vienna,  and  to  get  rid  of  this  troublesome 
neighbor.  I  directed  Eugene  to  march  ogainst  bim,  and  to 
get  possession  of  Raab,  a  place  strengthened  by  an  old  bas- 
tioned  enciente  with  some  counter-guards  and  demilunes  ;  in 
fine,  to  push  the  archduke  away  so  far  as  to  enable  the  army 
of  Italy  to  return  to  me  when  I  should  wish  to  begin  opera- 
tions.    Eugene  perfectly  accomplished  his  task. 

Battle  of  Raa^i. — The  Austrian  generalissimo  had,  in  the 
mean  time,  dispatched  orders  to  the  Archduke  John  to  march 
toward  Presburg,  and  had  detached  ten  thousand  men  in  tbat 
direction  to  secure  the  junction,  construct  a  bridgi^',  and 
intrench  the  large  island  which  would  give  to  the  Aus- 
trians  the  same  advantages  as  were  secured  to  us  by  Lobau. 
But  nothing  of  this  was  done  in  time.  Eugene  marched  on 
Kormond  ;  on  his  approach  the  Archduke  John  fell  back  on 
Kaab,  where  his  brother,  the  Archduke  Rainier,  had  organ- 
ized the  Hungarian  insurrection  ;  he  took  a  very  strong  posi- 
tion, connected  by  his  right  to  the  place  and  to  an  intrenched 
camp.  He  numbered  about  twenty-two  thousand  old  soldiers 
and  eighteen  thousand  militia.  Eugene  reached  the  enemy 
on  the  thirteenth,  and  determined  to  attack  him  the  next 
day.  It  was  a  day  of  happy  presage — the  anniversary  of 
Marengo,  and  the  deliverance  of  Italy  !  His  troojxs,  ani- 
mated by  the  recollection  of  these  great  events  and  of  their 
recent  successes,  crossed  the  Pancha,  and  attacked  the  enemy 
with  impetuosity.  Eugene  manoeuvred  to  form  his  line  of 
attack  by  echelons  on  the  right,  but  this  soon  degenerated 
into  a  parallel  order  of  battle.  Grenier  charged  tlie  hft  of 
the  enemy  at  the  farm  of  Kismegger  with  the  division  of 
Serras,   while    the    cavalry    under    Grouchy  and    Montbrun 


92  LIFEOF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XIV. 

sought  to  turn  that  wing.  Durutts  sustained  them  on  the 
centre  ;  on  our  left,  Baraguay-d'Hilliers,  with  the  Italians, 
attacked  the  village  of  Schabadegki,  which  was  several  times 
taken  and  retaken.  Pacthod  formed  the  reserve  until  the 
arrival  of  Macdonald,  who  was  expected  during  the  day. 
The  eneiuN's  reserves  are  now  hrouscht  into  action,  which  for 
a  time  renders  the  contest  doubtful.  The  intrenched  fiirm 
prevents  our  right  from  gaining  any  decided  success.  The 
Italians  and  Durutte  are  driven  back.  Eugene  hastens  to 
place  himself  at  their  head  ;  he  recalls  to  their  minds  the 
victories  they  have  already  won,  and  exhorts  them  to  new 
efforts,  and,  better  still,  advances  the  division  of  Pacthod  to 
their  support.  The  impulse  is  given,  the  right  of  the.  arch- 
duke is  forced  and  separated  from  Raab.  Durutte  and 
Serras  regain  their  lost  ascendency,  and  push  the  centre. 
The  enemy  is  routed  and  retreats  toward  Comorn,  leaving 
four  thousand  prisoners,  and  three  thousand  men  hors-de- 
comhat.  The  Archduke  John  covers  his  retreat  with  his 
grenadiers  and  the  Imidwelirs  of  Styria.  These  last  on  the 
day  of  the  battle  rival  the  conduct  of  the  best  regiment  ;  one 
of  their  battalions  defend  the  farm  of  Kismegger  to  the  death, 
the  few  that  remain  being  sacrificed  by  our  irritated  soldiery. 
This  victory  of  Raab,  the  more  glorious  for  being  gained 
over  vastly  superior  forces,  completed  the  consolidation  of 
our  position.  The  archduke  rallied  his  forces  under  Comorn. 
Results  of  the  Battle  and  Sie^e  of  Raab. — This  success, 
though  important  in  itself,  derived  an  additional  interest 
from  the  character  of  the  epoch  in  which  it  was  gained. 
The  Tyrol  was  then,  more  than  ever,  on  fire.  No  sooner  had 
the  Tyrolese  heard  of  the  result  at  Essling,  related  by  the 
Austrians  with  the  greatest  exaggeration,  than  they  retraced 
the  steps  taken  by  the  committee  for  giving  in  their  submis- 
sion, and  assumed  an  attitude  more  threatening  than  ever. 
The  departure  of  Lefebvre  for  Lintz  with  two  divisions,  left 


Ch.  XIV.]         THE    WAR     OF     1809     IN     GERMANY.  93 

General  Deroi  alone  in  the  centre  of  the  insurgent  country  ; 
surrounded  in  the  narrow  valley  of  the  Inn  by  forces  quin- 
tuple his  own,  he  deemed  himself  exceedingly  fortunate  in 
regaining  Bavaria,  by  Eosenhaim,  on  the  tvventy-eightli  of 
May. 

The  insurgents,  now  masters  of  the  field,  under  the  direc- 
tion of  Hornieyer,  became  intoxicated  with  their  success,  and 
made  numerous  incursions  into  the  adjacent  parts  of  the 
country.  At  the  north,  they  annoyed  Bavaria  ;  in  the  south, 
they  drove  Kusca  from  the  confiiies  of  the  Carinthia  ;  in 
the  west,  they  made  incursions  into  Swabia  in  concert  with 
the  insurgents  of  the  Voralberg,  and  spread  terror  even  to 
the  Rhine.  Chasteler,  who  had  evacuated  this  country, 
leaving  behind  him  only  a  single  brigade  of  Austrians,  under 
General  Buol,  crossed  our  posts  of  Carinthia  and  Styria  to 
connect  himself  with  the  Archduke  John  ;  by  connecting 
himself  with  the  detachments  of  Zacli  and  the  corps  of 
Giulay,  he  might  give  us  trouble  by  debouching  on  our 
communications  in  concert  with  the  Hungarian  insurrection. 
The  operations  of  Eugene,  and  the  victory  of  Raab,  dissi- 
pated these  fears.  It  was  important,  however,  for  us  to 
profit  by  the  present  success  to  gain  possession  of  Raab 
itself.  This  place,  situated  near  the  confluence  of  the  river 
Raab  and  the  Danube,  was  fortified  by  an  old  encientc,  of 
seven  bastions,  constructed  against  the  Turks  ;  between  this 
place  and  the  Danube  was  an  intrenched  camp  of  some  three 
miles  in  circumference  ;  but  none  of  these  works  were  either 
in  good  order  or  well  armed.  The  jiossession  of  Raub  was 
of  great  importance  to  the  enemy,  as  it  gave  him  a  débouche 
on  the  right  of  the  Danube.  I,  therefore,  resolved  to  take 
this  place  cost  what  it  might.  The  Archduke  John  had 
garrisoned  it  by  only  two  thousand  four  hundred  men,  and 
half  of  these  were  militia.  Eugene  sent  Lauriston  to  make 
the  attack,  with  a  park  sent  from  Vienna.    The  place  fell  on 


94  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON  [Ch.  XIV. 

the  twenty-fourth  of  June,  at  the  very  moment  when  the 
Archduke  Charles  was  directing  measures  for  its  succor  ;  but 
they  were  too  late. 

The  Ai'cJîdukc  John's  Dtsobeclience  of  his  Brother's 
Orders. — The  Archduke  Charles  had  much  cause  to  complain 
of  his  brother's  conduct  ;  he  had  neglected  to  execute  the 
march  on  Lintz,  which  had  been  directed,  in  order  to  act  in 
concert  on  my  communications  ;  nor  had  he  so  manoeuvred 
as  to  connect  himself  with  the  grand  army  by  leaving  Kor- 
mond  in  time  to  reach  Kaab  and  Presburij,  and  avoid  giving 
battle  with  his  isolated  corps.  In  fine,  he  had  posted  him- 
self at  Raab  contrary  to  instructions  ;  had  allowed  himself 
to  be  forced  into  an  eccentric  retreat  on  Comorn,  and  had 
made  no  efforts  to  raise  the  siege  of  Raab.  In  truth,  Prince 
John  thought  less  of  ranging  himself  under  the  colors  of  his 
brother,  with  a  portion  of  his  army,  than  of  uniting  in  Styria 
and  Carniola  the  several  corps  in  the  Illyrian  provinces,  under 
Zach,  Chasteler,  and  Giulay.  He  hoped  to  form,  'ti  this 
way,  an  army  of  fifty  thousand  men,  exclusive  of  the  Hun- 
garian levy,  and  to  acquire  glory  on  his  own  account,  by 
acting  against  my  extreme  right  and  my  conmuinications. 
This,  considered  as  an  isolated  plan,  was  not  so  very  objec- 
tionable ;  but,  by  acting  in  this  way  on  his  own  account, 
instead  of  obeying  orders,  he  deranged  the  calculations  of  his 
generalissimo. 

Bociî^ardment  of  Presbourg, — After  having  deferred  for  a 
long  time,  he,  at  last,  repaired  to  Presbourg,  at  the  moment 
■when  I  was  directing  its  bombardment.  It  was  important 
for  me  to  remove  all  fears  of  a  passage  of  the  Danube,  by 
destroying  all  the  materials  collected  by  the  enemy  for  this 
object,  and  all  the  works  that  were  in  any  way  calculated  to 
facilitate  such  an  operation.  It  was  also  essential  to  draw 
the  enemy's  attention  from  the  more  important  to  some 
secondary  point.     Davoust  summoned  the  Austrians  to  sus- 


Cn.  XIV.]         THE     WAR     OF     1809     IN     GERMANY.  95 

pcnd  the  works  on  the  bridge,  or,  otherwise,  he  would  bom- 
bard the  city.      The  emperor,  Francis,  was  passing  there  at 
the  time,  to  visit  tiie  remains  of  the  army  of  Italy  ;   Bianchi 
returned  a  sharp  and  provoking  answer  to  Davoust's  sum- 
mons, and  the  firing  immediately  began.      Our  shells  burned 
one-s.xt.eth  part  of  the  buildings.     The  Archdnke  Charles 
protested  against  it,  and  I  promised  him  to  stop  the  bom- 
bardment, which  had  no  other  object  than  to  fix  the  enemy's 
attention    in   that  direction.     Davoust,  at    the    same   time 
received  confidential  notice  of  the  passage  which  I  meditated' 
and  orders  to  get  possession  of  the  tHe-du-pont  of  Presbouro-' 
or  the  island  of  Stadtaue,  which  flanked  it.    The  latter  place 
was  carried  on  the  thirtieth,  with  great  valor,  by  the  brave 
Colonel  Decouz. 

Marmont's  Warch.-The  grand  epoch  of  the  campaign  was 
approaching.     I   was  now  only  waiting  for   a  considerable 
convoy  of  artillery  and  munitions,  an  augmentation  of  our 
bridge  equipage,  and  the  arrival  of  Marmont's  corps   which 
we  had  left  on  the  frontiers  of  Bosnia,  and  which  was  com- 
ing    rather  slowly,  it  is  true,  to  take  part  in   the  decisive 
battle.     Being  informed   about  the  middle   of  May  of  our 
victories  in  Germany,  and  of  the  Archduke  John's   retreat 
before  Eugene,  Marmont  assembled  his  forces  at  Zara  and 
advanced  on  the  Save,  in  order  to  form  a  junction  with  the 
right  wing  of  the  army  of  Italy.     After  several  pretty  warm 
affairs  on  the  banks  of  the  Lika,   on  the   twenty-first   of 
May,  and  at  Ottochatz,  on  the  twenty-fifth,  he  marched  by 
Fiume  on  Laybach,  which  place  he  did  not  reach  till  the 
third  of  June.     At  this  moment  Chasteler  was  evacuatinc. 
the  Tyrol,  and  endeavoring  to  effect  a  passage  in  rear  of  the 
viceroy  ;    he   threatened  Villach    and    Klagenfurth,  which 
places    Rusca  guarded  with   very  weak    detachments      He 
would  have  been  lost  if  Marmont  had  only  accelerated  the 
march  of  his  corps  ;  as  it  was,  he   effected  his  escape  by 


%  LIFEOFNAPOLEON.  [(^h.  XIV. 

Volkermarck  and  Stein  behind  the  Diave.  Allhough  Mar- 
mont  had  great  obstacles  to  surmount,  in  order  to  reach  the 
Carniola,  marching  in  the  midst  of  three  hostile  coips,  still, 
it  was  not  impossible  for  him  to  have  accelerated  his  march 
a  few  days.  His  greatest  fault,  however,  was  remaining  at 
Lay  bach,  from  the  third  to  the  sixteenth  of  June,  and 
allowing  the  bands  of  Giulay  to  march  on  Maibourg,  and 
again  prevent  him  from  effecting  his  junction. 

Operations  of  Giulay.— The  Archduke  John  on  leaving  the 
Frioul  had  detached  Giulay  to  Croatia,  of  which  he  was  the 
military  chief  or  ban.  This  general  collected  at  Agram  a 
division  of  seven  or  eight  thousand  men  with  a  body  of 
militia.  He  afterward  received  orders  to  march  toward  Mar- 
bourg,  in  order  to  connect  himself  with  the  archduke  in  the 
direction  of  Gratz.  He  was  so  tardy,  however,  in  the  accom- 
plishment of  this,  that  he  did  not  leach  that  city  till  the 
fifteenth  of  June,  after  the  defeat  of  the  archduke  at  Eaab, 
which  was  distant  about  fifty  leagues.  He  then  collected 
the  several  detachments  which  were  scattered  through  these 
provinces  in  consequence  of  the  operations,  and,  finding  him- 
self at  the  head  of  twenty  thousand  men,  he  hoped  to  prevent 
at  least  the  junction  of  Marmont.  For  this  purpose  he 
advanced,  the  twentieth  of  June,  on  Windischfriestritz,  with 
the  corps  of  Zach  and  Knesewich  ;  but  Marmont,  hearing 
at  Gonowitz  of  his  approach,  and  now  moving  with  as  much 
activity  as  he  had  formerly  been  slow  and  circumspect,  he 
passed  the  Drave,  by  a  forced  march,  at  Volkermarck  the 
twenty-second,  and  reached  the  Kaynach  near  Gratz,  on  the 
twenty-fourth.  He  expected  here  to  unite  with  Broussier's 
division,  which  had  remained  at  the  siege  of  the  citadel  of 
Gratz. 

Combat  of  Cratz. — As  Giulay  had  allowed  Marmont  to 
escape,  he  now  determined  to  prevent  his  junction  with 
Broussier,  by  preceding  him  at  Gratz  ;  he  reached  Kulsdorf 


Ch.  XIY.]         the    war    of    1809    IN    GERMANY.  97 

on  the  twenty-fourth,  and  pushed  forward  his  cavalry  to  the 
gates  of  the  city.  Broussier  had  at  first  raised  the  siege  of 
the  castle  in  order  to  fall  back  two  leagues  on  the  road  to 
Vienna  ;  but  on  hearing  that  Marmont  was  about  to  debouch 
from  Liboch  on  Gratz,  he  first  drove  the  enemy  from  Kals- 
doif  and  then  resumed  his  position,  with  the  understanding 
that  he  would  reoccupy  Gratz  with  a  detachment,  and  effect 
a  junction  the  following  day  at  Kalsdorf.  But  the  enemy. 
was  prepared  to  prevent  the  execution  of  this  project,  having 
eighteen  thousand  men  encamped  at  the  gates  of  the  capital 
of  Styria. 

When  the  two  battalions  of  the  eighty-fourth,  presented 
themselves  on  the  twenty-fifth,  Giulay  attacked  them  with 
considerable  forces.  They  threw  themselves  into  a  cemetery 
of  the  faubourgs,  where  they  were  surrounded  and  assailed 
on  all  sides  ;  an  active  and  bloody  fight  ensued.  Broussier, 
on  hearing  the  violence  of  the  fire,  detached  three  battalions 
to  their  assistance.  These  brave  men  cut  their  way  through 
numerous  ^enemies  to  join  the  eighty -fourth  in  the  cemetery. 
The  dead  bodies  with  which  the  ground  was  covered  proved 
the  fierceness  of  the  attack,  and  the  heroism  of  the  resist- 
ance. At  last  the  enemy  yielded,  and  our  brave  men  em- 
braced each  other  ;  but  not  satisfied  with  being  delivered 
themselves,  they  carried  the  faubourg  of  Graben,  took  four 
hundred  prisoners,  and  put  twelve  hundred  men  hors-de- 
comhat. 

This  noble  feat  of  arms,  superior  in  some  respects  to  any 
other  in  this  campaign,  commanded  the  admiration  even  of 
our  enemies,  and  secured  the  junction  of  Marmont  and 
Broussier.* 

Giulay  being  unsuccessful  against  two  battalions,  deemed 

*  For  this  noble  feat  of  arms,  the  eighty-fourth  were  presented  with  a  flag 
with  the  inscription,  un  contre  dix — one  against  ten. 
VOL.    Ill, — 7 


98  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [ChXIV. 

it  useless  to  contend  with  three  divisions,  and  fell  back  on 
Gnass. 

Marmont  continued  his  march  on  the  road  to  Vienna,  and 
received  orders  to  depart  on  the  first  of  July,  for  the  island 
of  Lobau,  where  important  events  would  render  his  presence 
necessary. 

General  situation  of  Aflfairs. — Om-  repose  of  five  weeks  on 
the  island  of  Lobau  had  been,  in  every  sense,  the  sleep  of 
the  lion  ;  I  looked  with  a  cool  and  tranquil  eye  upon  the 
operations  of  the  enemy  by  which  they  flattered  themselves 
they  would  envelope  me  in  their  net.  The  incursion  of 
General  Amende  and  of  the  duke  of  Brunswick  on  Leipsic, 
that  of  another  Austrian  division  on  Barieth  and  Neuvem- 
bero-  exciting  insurrection  as  far  as  Mergentheira  ;  the 
Tyrolese  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  Voralberg,  who  disturbed 
Bavaria  and  spread  even  to  the  frontiers  of  Switzerland — 
were  all  indisputably  embarrassing,  but  of  a  character  calcu-  . 
lated  to  disappear  at  the  first  decisive  blow  which  we  should 
strike  on  the  Danube.  The  firmness  and  activity  of  the 
kino-  of  Wurtembero;  contributed  not  a  little  to  restore  order 
in  Germany  ;  he  marched  in  person  against  the  insurgents 
of  Mergentheim,  and  with  the  assistance  of  General  Beau- 
mont, who  organized  our  reserves  and  depots  at  Augsbourg, 
restrained  the  mountaineers  of  the  Voralberg.  On  the  other 
side  a  new  corps,  formed  in  Franconia  by  Junot,  was  to  act 
in  concert  with  the  king  of  Westphalia,  to  drive  from  Saxony 
the  enemies  who  had  invaded  it. 

New  Passage  of  the  Danube. — It  was,  however,  in  the 
plains  of  the  Moravia  (Marschfeld)  that  the  possession  of 
Germany  was  to  be  decided.  My  army  was  now  increased  to 
one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  ;  my  artillery  numbered 
four  hundred  pieces  ;  my  bridge-equipage  had  been  prepared 
on  Lobau  and  the  smaller  islands,  and  1  now  waited  merely 
for  a  convoy  of  munitions  before  efiecting  the  j-iassage.     This 


Cn.  XIV.]         THE    WAR    OF    18  0  9    IN    GERMANY,  99 

passage  was  begun  on  the  thirtieth  of  June,  at  the  same 
place  where  we  had  crossed  the  river  on  the  twenty- tirst  of 
May.  A  bridge  of  pontons  was  thrown  across  in  an  hour 
and  a  half,  under  the  protection  of  the  artillery  ;  every  thing 
was  now  ready  for  erecting  a  pile-bridge  which  would  be 
secure  from  floating  bodies  sent  down  by  the  enemy  ;  and 
this  bridge  of  timbers  was  prepared  in  even  a  shorter  time 
than  that  formerly  required  for  constructing  a  bridge  of 
boats.  I  caused  a  field  work  to  be  erected  to  cover  this 
bridge,  and  a  regiment  was  found  sufficient  for  its  defense. 

The  Austrian»  had  strongly  intrenched  Aspern,  Essling, 
and  even  Enzersdorf,  believing  that  we  would  again  debouch 
by  these  same  points  ;  but  they  had  neglected  to  fortify  the 
eastern  island  between  Enzersdorf  and  the  Danube.  Some 
have  pretended  that  this  was  left  on  purpose  by  the  arch- 
duke, as  a  snare  for  us,  and  that  he  did  not  intend  to  oppose 
our  passage  a  second  time,  but  to  let  us  begin  it,  and  then 
attack  us  when  it  was  half  executed.  This,  at  least,  is 
certain  ; — in  a  treatise  on  tactics,  written  by  the  archduke 
some  five  years  before,  the  plateau  of  Wagram,  and  of  the 
Russbach,  is  presented  as  a  model  of  positions  for  defending 
the  passage  of  a  river,  and  the  circumstances  of  the  present 
case  were  then  foreseen  and  fully  discussed.  It  would  seem 
that  the  archduke  and  his  council  had  admitted,  as  a  prin- 
ciple, that  they  ought  not  to  prevent  the  beginning  of  a 
passage,  but  to  attack  us  in  the  middle  of  the  operation. 
For  this  purpose  the  army  remained  encamped  about  Wa- 
gram, from  the  Bisemberg  to  Glinzendorf  ;  a  corps  of  twenty 
thousand  men  only,  under  General  Klenau,  was  left  about 
the  island  of  Lobau  to  guard  the  intrenched  posts. 

However  this  may  be,  I  was  ignorant  of  this  project,  and 
adopted  a  plan  deemed,  under  all  circumstances,  best  to 
secure  the  success  of  the  enterprise.  My  first  care  was  to  fix 
the  attention  of  the  Austrians  on  the  point  where  I  had 


100  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XIV. 

passed  on  the  twenty-first  of  May,  and  where  the  erection  of 
field-works  gave  reason  to  suppose  the  enemy  was  waiting  in 
force.  On  the  second  of  July,  Massena  caused  the  island  of 
the  Mill  to  be  taken  by  his  aid-de-camp,  Pelet.  A  second 
bridge  of  boats  was  immediately  thrown  across  the  arm  of 
the  Danube,  not  far  from  the  first  ;  this  bridge,  of  seventy 
toises  in  length,  was  completed  in  two  hours,  so  great  were 
the  dexterity  and  perfection  acquned  by  our  pontoniers  in 
their  duties.  The  enemy  increased  his  opposition  ;  but 
nothing  could  restrain  the  ardor  of  our  brave  men.  While 
this  diversion  was  being  effected,  Eugene,  Davoust,  Wrede,  and 
Bernadotte  received  orders  to  march  rapidly  from  Lobau. 

Having  made  sure  of  the  result  of  these  preliminary 
measures,  it  became  necessary  to  think  of  dispositions  for  the 
grand  enterprise.  I  had  drawn  up  directions  for  this  in  an 
imperial  decree  of  thirty-one  articles,  arranging  everything 
with  the  utmost  precision,  for  the  operation  was  of  so  deli- 
cate a  character  that  the  least  accident  might  destroy  every- 
thing. On  the  evening  of  the  fourth  of  July,  after  several 
movements,  calculated  to  deceive  the  enemy,  our  troops  were 
assembled  on  the  eastern  side  of  Lobau,  where  some  bat- 
talions were  thrown  across  in  boats  to  get  possession  of  the 
island  opposite  Muhlleiten.  In  two  hours  a  bridge  was 
established,  and  Oudinot  passed  over  it  with  celerity.  More 
than  a  hundred  pieces  of  cannon,  in  the  field-batteries  which 
had  been  thrown  up  on  the  side  of  Lobau,  thundered  at  the 
same  moment  along  the  whole  line,  spreading  fear  in  every 
direction,  and  facilitating  the  operation  by  distracting  the 
attention  of  the  enemy,  and  protecting  the  troops  and  works 
on  the  other  side.  The  night  was  dark  and  stormy  ;  the 
wind  blew  with  violence,  and  the  rain  fell  in  torrents.  The 
burning  of  the  city  of  Enzersdorf,  which  was  set  on  fire  by 
our  batteries,  added  to  the  terror  and  majesty  of  the  scene. 
As  soon  as  Oudinot  had  passed  over  to   the  left  bank,  I 


Ch.  XIV.]       THE    WAR    OF     1809    IN    GERMANY.  101 

ordered  the  principal  bridges  to  be  thrown  across  to  the 
island  of  Alexander,  One  of  these  bridges  was  completely 
constructed  in  a  secondary  arm  of  the  river,  and  so  arranged, 
by  being  fastened  to  the  shore  at  the  lower  extremity,  that 
the  current  would  bring  it  round  into  position.  If  this  idea 
was  not  new,  it  was  at  least  the  first  time,  to  my  knowl- 
edge, that  it  was  ever  carried  into  execution.  By  three 
o'clock  in  the  morning,  six  bridges  were  completed,  and  our 
troops  crossed  over  with  a  precision  which  was  only  inter- 
rupted for  a  short  time,  by  a  mistake  which  Berthier  made 
in  distributing  my  orders,  Davoust  was  to  form  the  right 
wing,  and  Oudinot  the  centre  ;  but,  by  Berthier's  mistake, 
Oudinot  passed  over  on  the  right,  and  Davoust  on  the  bridge 
of  rafts,  at  the  centre.  This  fault,  in  the  logistics  of  the 
major-general,  rendered  it  necessary  for  the  columns  to  cross 
each  other  on  the  other  side  to  take  their  assigned  positions 
in  the  line-of-battle.  Notwithstanding  the  tempestuous 
weather,  I  watched  the  operation  with  the  greatest  interest, 
flying  from  bridge  to  bridge,  and  from  battery  to  bat  tery  ; 
everything  was  executed  with  such  extraordinary  precision 
that  all  the  articles  of  my  decree  were  as  punctually  executed 
as  if  it  had  been  a  simple  manœuvre  on  the  field  of  practice,* 

*  In  the  planning  and  constructing  bridges  across  the  Danube,  in  this  cam- 
paign, Napoleon  had  the  able  assistance  of  General  Bertrand,  a  distinguished 
officer  of  engineers,  and,  at  that  time,  an  aid-de-camp  to  the  emperor,  with  tho 
rank  of  brigadier-general. 

Count  Henry  Gratien  Bertrand  was  born  at  Chateauroux,  and  first  entered 
the  military  service  in  1793.  Ho  accompanied  Napoleon  to  Egypt  as  an 
engineer  officer,  and  served  with  him  in  nearly  all  his  subsequent  campaigns. 
After  Duroc's  death,  he  was  appointed  Grand  Marshal  of  the  Palace,  and  com- 
manded an  army  corps  in  1813.  He  served  with  Napoleon  in  the  campaign 
of  1814,  and  accompanied  him  to  Elba;  and  again,  after  the  campaign  of  1815, 
he  became  tho  companion  of  his  long  exile  in  St.  Helena.  Nothing  could 
induce  him  to  leave  his  beloved  emperor  till  he  had  closed  his  eyes  in  death. 
In  May,  1816,  he  was  condemned  to  death  for  contumacy.  On  his  return  to 
France  in  1821,  the  sentence  was  annulled,  and  Bertrand  restored  to  his  rank 
of  lieutenant-general. 

His  long  and  devoted  attachment  to  Napoleon,  and   his  kind  and  amiable 


102  LIFE    OF    NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIY. 

Operations  on  the  Morning  of  the  Fifth.— The  splendid 
day,  which  followed  the  frightful  night,  presented  the  superb 
spectacle  of  an  army  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men, 
with  four  hundred  pieces  of  cannon,  deployed  majestically 
on  the  rich  plains  of  the  Danube.  The  village  of  Muhl- 
leiten,  the  chateau  of  Sachsengang,  the  village  of  Wittau, 
and  the  bourg  of  Enzersdorf,  are  quickly  swt^pt  of  the  small 
Austrian  detachments  charged  with  their  defense.  General 
Kleuau,  who  cuaamands  the  enemy's  advance  guard,  fixes 
all  his  attention  on  Aspern  and  Essling,  where  Legrand's 
division,  and  the  detachment  of  General  Keynier,  threaten 
an  attack.  The  light  division  of  Nordmann  is  the  only  one 
which  disputes  with  us  the  ground  between  Enzersdorf  and. 
the  Danube  ;  it  is  driven  back  on  Rutzendorf,  from  which 
place  he  is  routed  by  General  Oudinot  after  a  sharp  contest. 
Klenau,  his  right  being  turned  by  the  fall  of  Enzersdorf, 
disputes  in  vain  with  Massena,  Eugene,  and  Bernadotte,  for 
the  possession  of  the  intrenchments  of  Essling  and  Aspern  : 
the  enemy  is  everywhere  driven  back  ;  Eosenberg,  who  has 
rallied  on  himself  the  vanguard  of  Nordmann,  is  afterward 
driven  by  Davoust  and  Oudinot  on  Glinzendorf 

The  archduke  had  not  expected  that  our  masses  would  be 
deployed  with  so  much  impetuosity  and  rapidity.  In  fact, 
there  is  no  parallel  in  history.  The  armies  of  the  Rhine,  of 
the  Sambre-et- Meuse,  and  of  the  Danube,  had  made  a  pas- 
sage by  surprise,  at  break  of  day,  and  forcibly  established 
their  bridges  during  the  day,  not  completing  the  establish- 
ment of  their  forces  on  the  opposite  side  before  the  second 
day  ;  here,  however,  a  formidable  army,  with  an  immense 
material,  coming  from  Lintz,  Vienna,  Presbourg,  and  San- 

charaeter,  caused  him  to  be  greatly  beloved  everywhere.  On  his  visit  to  the 
United  States,  in  1844,  the  people  received  him  with  great  enthusiasm  in  all 
the  large  cities  which  he  visited.  He  died  a  few  days  after  his  return  to  his 
home  at  Chateauroux,  and  his  remains  were  placed  near  those  of  Napoleon,  in 
the  chapel  of  the  Hotel  des  Invalides. 


Co.  XIV.]         THE    WAR    OF     1800    IN     GERMANY.  103 

Polten,  to  the  geneml  rendezvous  of  Lobau,  had  established 
six  bridges,  and  crossed  the  Danube  in  a  single  night,  not- 
withstanding the  most  terrible  weather,  and  numerous  defiles 
and  islands,  and  on  the  following  morning  was  drawn  up  and, 
in  every  respect,  ready  to  receive  the  enemy,  if  he  should  ven- 
ture to  make  the  attack.  This  was  a  most  admirable  opera- 
tion, exceeding  all  the  calculations  founded  on  experience, 
and  rendering  our  success  doubly  certain. 

Position  of  the  opposing  Forces.—  So  rapid  and  skillful 
was  this  operation,  that  the  archduke,  instead  of  attacking 
us  the  next  morning  at  the  entrance  to  our  bridges,  was 
obliged  to  receive,  in  the,  evening,  a  defensive  battle.  His 
army  numbered  about  the  same  as  ours  ;  but  the  Archduke 
John  and  the  prince  of  Reuss  were  detached,  so  that  forty 
thousand  men  were  not  yet  on  the  field.  On  the  morning  of 
the  fifth,  the  archduke  had  in  hand  only  Klenau,  Belle- 
garde,  and  Hohenzollern,  Avith  his  reserves  of  grenadiers 
about  Gerasdorf,  Kolowrath  being  still  in  rear  of  the  Bisem- 
berg,  and  Rosenberg  being  to  the  left  of  the  corps-de-hataille. 
He  had  sent  orders  to  the  Archduke  John,  on  the  evening 
of  the  fourth,  directing  him  to  approach  the  main  body  with 
his  twenty  thousand  men,  in  order  to  be  ready  to  give  battle 
the  next  day  with  the  whole  eight  corps  ;  if,  however,  the 
Archduke  John  should  be  engaged  in  the  operation  which 
had  been  prescribed  opposite  Presbourg,  he  might  not  arrive 
before  the  morning  of  the  sixth  ;  but,  at  all  events,  it  was 
presumable  that  he  would  be  ready  to  enter  into  action 
before  ten  o'clock. 

Notwithstanding  the  number  of  our  bridges  and  the  celerity 
of  our  passage,  our  right  and  centre  did  not  reach  Rasdorf 
before  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  This  delay  was  due  to 
the  error  in  logistics,  already  mentioned,  making  the  corps 
of  Davoust  and  Oudinot  cross  in  their  march.  We  thus  lost 
the  favorable  opportunity  of  giving  battle  to  the  half  of  the 


104  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XIV. 

archduke's  army  on  the  fifth.  Nevertheless,  by  six  o'clock 
in  the  evening,  our  line  was  formed  and  the  reserves  in 
position,  Massena  forming  the  left  between  Breitenlée  and 
the  Danube,  Bernadotte  opposite  Aderklaa,  Eugene  between 
Wagram  and  Baumersdorf,  Oudinot  between  this  village 
and  GroshoiFen,  and  Davoust  on  the  right  toward  Glinzen- 
dorf,  flanked  by  Grouchy  with  his  division  of  dragoons. 
The  guard,  Marmont's  corps,  Wrede  with  ten  thousand 
Bavarians,  and  the  heavy  cavalry,  formed  the  reserve  near 
Raasdorf. 

The  Austrians  had  placed  their  left,  composed  of  Rosen- 
berg and  Hoheuzollern,  on  the  plateau  between  Neuseidel 
and  Wagram,  and  along  the  Russbach,  a  deep  rivulet,  very 
muddy  and  difficult  to  cross,  except  by  bridges  ;  the  centre, 
formed  of  the  corps  of  Beliegarde  and  the  grenadiers,  was 
around  Wagram  ;  and  the  right,  composed  of  Klenau  and 
Kolo wrath,  was  near  the  Bisemberg.  The  left  formed  an 
obtuse  and  reëntei-ing  angle  with  the  rest  of  the  line,  which 
extended  from  Wagram  by  Gerasdorf  to  the  base  of  the 
Bisemberg. 

Preliminary  Attack  of  the  French.  —  As  no  forces  were 
left  to  oppose  the  approach  of  the  Archduke  John,  it  was 
natural  to  suppose  that  he  would  arrive  the  next  morning  in 
time  to  take  part  in  the  battle.  I  now  had  five  corps- 
d'armée  opposite  the  Russbach  and  the  plateau  which  over- 
looked the  surrounding  country  ;  it  was,  therefore,  important 
to  profit  by  the  present  occasion.  Notwithstanding  the 
advanced  hour  of  the  day,  I  ordered  an  attack  on  this 
decisive  position.  The  time  required  for  the  transmission 
of  the  orders,  and  the  greater  or  less  skill  of  the  chiefs  in 
executing  them,  made  the  attack  somewhat  disconnected, 
Oudinot  did  not  succeed  in  forcing  the  passage  of  Baumers- 
dorf, which  General  Hardegg  bravely  defended.  Eugene 
debouched  near  Wagram  ;   but  being  in  the  midst  of  the 


Ca.  XIV.]         THE     WAR    OF     1809     IN     GERMANY.        105 

enemy's  reserves,  and  without  the  support  of  Bernadotte, 
who  was  neither  sufficiently  prompt  nor  decisive  in  coming 
into  action,  the  viceroy  was  attacked  in  front  and  flank,  and 
driven  Lack  upon  my  guard.  Notwithstanding  all  the  efforts 
of  Eugene,  Lamarque,  and  Dupas,  Bernadotte  was  also  un- 
able to  maintain  his  })Osition  toward  Wagram,  and  retired  on 
Aderklaa,  which  place  he  also  abandoned  afterward.  Da- 
voust  had  not  had  time  to  enter  seriously  into  action  toward 
Neusiedel.  The  involuntary  delay  of  the  archduke  in  meeting 
us,  had  thus  turned  against  us  in  the  operations  of  this  day  ; 
and  it  now  became  necessary  for  us  to  begin  again  on  the 
following  morning,  with  chances  less  favorable,  inasmuch  as 
the  enemy  might  then  be  reënforced  by  fifty  thousand 
additional  men. 

Battle  of  Wa^rani,  July  6th.— The  dispositions  of  both 
parties  were  completed  during  the  night.  I  gave  orders  to 
my  forces  to  concentrate  more  in  mass  ;  Massena  was  to 
close  up  toward  Aderklaa,  and  Davoust  toward  Groshoffen. 
By  this  means  I  would  have  them  ready  to  strike  in  what- 
ever direction  it  might  be  necessary. 

The  archduke,  on  his  side,  resolved  to  make  an  offensive 
movement.  Bellegarde,  at  the  centre,  was  to  occupy  Ader- 
klaa ;  Kosenberg  was  to  debouch  on  Glinzendorf,  to  facilitate 
the  junction  of  the  Archduke  John  by  Leopoldsdorf  ;  Kolo- 
wrath  and  the  reserves,  descending  from  the  Bisemberg,  were 
to  unite  with  Klenau,  and  push  our  left  so  as  to  force  it 
back  on  the  bridges  to  Lobau.  This  order  was  given  at 
midnight,  and  did  not  reach  all  the  corps  at  the  same  time. 
Rosenberg  began  the  combat  by  marching  on  Glinzendorf  ; 
this  movement  astonished  me  ;  Davoust  attacked  this  corps 
in  front,  while  I  moved  to  the  right,  with  the  guard  and  the 
division  of  cuirassiers  of  the  Duke  of  Padua  and  Nansout''^ 
Rosenberg  was  driven  behind  the  Russbach  with  loss.  In 
the  mean  time,  Bellegarde  has  occupied  Aderklaa  in  force. 


106  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XIV. 

I  profit  by  the  concentration  of  Massena's  troops  to  throw 
them  on  this  village,  before  the  arrival  of  the  Austrian  right, 
which  has  to  descend  from  the  Bisemberg.  The  hero  of 
Aspern,  who  had  fallen  from  his  horse  the  night  before,  is 
obliged  to  ride  in  a  calash  in  this  battle,  where  he  is  to  gather 
new  laurels.  Massena  follows  his  column,  which  he  can  no 
longer  lead  in  person,  in  the  attack  on  the  village  ;  Aderklaa 
is  carried  ;  but,  instead  of  occupying  it  in  force,  the  head  of 
the  column  debouches  in  front.  Bernadotte  advances  to  its 
right  to  assist  it  with  Dupas  and  the  Saxons.  At  this 
moment  the  right  of  the  Austrians  is  seen  toward  Sussen- 
brun,  and  draws  half  of  Massena's  forces  in  that  direction  ; 
while  the  archduke  himself  advances  with  his  grenadiers  on 
Aderklaa,  and  drives  out  Cara  St.-Cyr,  who  falls  back  on  the 
immovable  Molitor.     The  Saxons  are  also  forced  to  retreat. 

The  right  wing  of  the  Austrians  fifty  thousand  strong, 
under  Kolowrath  and  Klenau,  continues  to  advance  on  Brei- 
tenlée  and  Hirchtetten.  Massena  has  not  a  moment  to  lose 
to  form  in  its  front  and  cut  off  its  access  to  Lubau.  He  flies 
along  the  road  to  Aspern,  and  encounters  the  enemy  near 
Neuwirtshaus  ;  he  continues  his  flank  march,  notwithstand- 
ing several  charges  of  the  enemy.  The  fourth  division,  under 
Boudet,  which  had  arrived  at  AsjJern  in  the  morning, 
debouches  from  that  place  ;  it  receives  the  shock  of  the 
entire  corps  of  Klenau  ;  its  right  which  is  without  support, 
is  forced,  and  its  artillery  captured  ;  it  is  compelled  to  fall 
back  within  the  tête-du-pont.  The  enemy  push  forward  to 
Essling,  and  reoccupies  his  intrenchments. 

The  theatre  of  the  principal  scene  is  thus  completely 
changed  ;  my  masses  had  prepared  to  carry  the  position  of 
the  Kussbach,  right  in  front  ;  now  the  main  body  of  the 
enemy's  forces  is  established  crotchetwise  on  my  extreme  left, 
perpendicularly  to  the  Danube,  and  menacing  our  bridges. 
This  attack  on  one  extremity,  which  furnishes  to  General 


Cn.   XIV.]       THE     WAR     OF     1809     IN     GERMANY.  107 

Pelet  the  singular  idea  of  comparing  this  battle  with  that  of 
Lutzen,  from  which  it  differs  in'  almost  every  respect,  is  a 
manoeuvre  in  war  always  skillful  when  it  is  directed  on  that 
extremity  which  is  most  advantageous  and  certain  for  the 
assailant.  But  such  was  not  the  case  here  :  if  it  can  not  be 
doubted  that  it  was  very  advantageous  for  the  Austriaus  to 
direct  their  ])rincipal  effort  on  the  extremity  near  which  lay 
our  line  of  retreat,  it  must,  nevertheless,  be  confessed  that 
it  is  always  very  dangerous  to  make  such  a  movement  by 
gliding  between  a  river  like  the  Danube,  and  an  army  of  one 
hundred  and  forty  thousand  men,  brave  and  warlike  ;  under 
such  circumstances  the  thing  is  not  even  practicable.  Leaving 
Massena  to  hold  this  wing  in  check,  without,  however, 
engaging  himself  too  far  against  unequal  forces,  I  hastened  to 
the  centre  where  the  troops  which  had  assisted  Davoust  had 
just  returned. 

I  had  nuw  but  one  of  two  courses  to  pursue  ;  the  first,  to 
join  Davoust  with  my  reserves  and  the  corps  of  Oudinot,  and 
attack  the  extremity  of  the  enemy  opposite  the  Danube,  in 
order  to  crush  it,  and  take  the  jjlace  which  the  army  of  the 
archduke  had  occupied  in  the  morning,  leaving  the  enemy  to 
try  his  fortune  on  the  Danube,  over  which  I  would  have 
destroyi^d  the  bridges  ;  the  second,  to  throw  myself  on  the 
centre  with  the  forces  of  Eugene,  Bernadotte,  Marmout,  and 
Oudinot.  The  first  plan  was  entirely  the  best  ;  but  it  would 
require  the  delay  of  an  hour,  during  which  the  success  of  the 
enemy  might  become  too  dangerous.  I,  therefore,  determined 
to  adopt  the  second. 

Eugene,  who  had  marched  between  Wagram  and  Baumers- 
dorf,  was  to  change  direction  to  the  left  and  take  the  i)lace 
where  Massena  had  fought;  Marmont  and  the  Bavarians 
were  to  follow.  To  give  time  to  execute  these  dispositions, 
I  ordered  a  charge  of  the  cavalry  of  Bessières  ;  it  advanced 
bravely,  and  its  first  charge  was  most  successful  ;  but  Bes- 


108  LIFE     OS"     NAPOLEON  [Cn.  XIT. 

sières  being  injured  by  the  fall  of  his  horse,  which  was  killed 
under  him,  the  movement  of  the  column  was  indecisive  ; 
Walther  succeeds  to  the  command,  but  does  not  know  the 
object  of  the  charge.  This  incident  cools  the  attack  and 
prevents  its  success  ;  but  it  has  suspended  for  an  instant  the 
progress  of  Kolowrath,  who,  however,  soon  resumes  his 
march.  It  now  becomes  a  matter  of  the  highest  interest  fur 
me  to  gain  time  to  complete  the  movement  which  I  directed 
the  centre  to  make,  in  order  to  defend  the  ground  left  by  our 
left  wing  ;  this  care  is  contined  to  the  brave  Drouot,  who 
advances  in  rear  of  our  cavalry  with  sixty  pieces  of  reserve, 
and  is  soon  left  alone  in  front  of  the  line,  with  his  formid- 
able battery.  He  unmasks  his  pieces  and  pours  into  the 
enemy  a  shower  of  grape  and  ball,  thus  giving  a  prelude  to 
the  great  blow  which  my  centre  is  preparing  to  strike. 

In  the  mean  time,  Davoust  has  received  orders  to  attack 
and  drive  back  the  enemy's  left.  For  this  purpose,  Friant  and 
Morand  pass  the  Kussbach  above  Glinzendorf,  and  debouch 
between  Siebenbrun  and  Murgraf-Neusiedel.  Davoust  attacks 
this  village  with  the  other  two  divisions  ;  Oudinot  has  orders 
to  limit  himself  to  checking  HohenzoUern  toward  Baumers- 
dorf  Kosenberg  is  turned  and  forced  back  forming  an  angle 
with  the  right  in  rear.  Davoust,  Friant,  and  Morand  seek 
to  carry,  by  a  vigorous  blow,  the  tower  of  Neusiedel  at  the 
summit  of  the  salient  formed  by  the  enemy's  left.  Here  the 
most  terrible  combat  is  waged  ;  the  Austrians  make  every 
effort  to  prevent  the  debouch  of  Davoust  ;  their  bravest  men, 
the  emigrant  Nordmann  and  the  Hungarian  Yeczay,  fall 
pierced  with  our  bayonets.  Rosenberg  sends  for  assistance 
to  HohenzoUern,  who  dispatches  a  part  of  his  own  corps  to 
his  aid. 

At  the  same  moment,  Oudinot,  impelled  by  military  ardor 
and  wearied  with  inaction  while  surrounded  by  the  deadly 
fire  of  the  enemy,  determined  to   carry  the  passes  of  the 


Ch.  XIV.]       THE    WAR    OF     1809     IN     GERMANY.  109 

Kussbach  and  ascend  the  plateau.  His  first  brigades  are 
driven  back  ;  he  puts  himself  at  the  head  of  the  third  and 
carries  every  thing  before  him.  Eosenberg,  warmly  pressed 
by  Davoust,  turned  by  Montbrun  and  Morand,  and  threatened 
in  reverse  by  Oudinot,  retreats  in  disorder  on  the  road  to 
Bockflies,  not  being  able  to  form  a  junction  with  Hohenzol- 
lern.  The  firing  is  now  heard  to  extend  beyond  Neusiedel  ; 
this  is  to  me  the  pledge  of  victory.  I  immediately  direct 
Massena  to  resume  the  ojSensive,  and  make  all  my  arrange- 
ments for  striking  the  decisive  blow. 

By  means  of  these  several  attacks  and  the  devotion  of  our 
artillerists,  Eugene  has  been  able  to  complete  his  movement. 
I  now  immediately  form  a  formidable  mass,  placing  Mac- 
donald  at  its  head  ;  eight  battalions  are  deployed,  and  thir- 
teen others  formed  in  close  column  on  their  two  wings  ;  in  rear 
of  these  march  the  troops  of  Wrede  and  Serras  ;  the  light 
cavalry  and  cuirassiers  of  Nansouty  are  to  cover  the  flanks  ; 
Durutte  is  to  assist  them  on  the  left,  and  Pacthod  on  the 
right  between  Aderklaa  and  Wagram  ;  Marmont  and  the 
Saxons  are  to  sustain  the  army  of  Italy,  a  little  to  the  right 
toward  Wagram. 

This  formidable  mass,  deeper  than  that  of  Lannes  at  Ess^ 
ling,  overthrows  every  thing  that  opposes  its  passage  ;  it  leaves 
Aderklaa  on  the  right,  and  precipitates  itself  on  the  point 
of  junction  between  the  corps  of  the  grenadiers  and  that  of 
Kolowi-ath,  to  the  right  of  the  steeple  of  Sussenbrunn.  The 
archduke  is  here  in  person.  Bravery,  coup-d'œil,  activity, 
nothing  is  wanting  to  parry  the  menacing  blow  ;  but  his 
efforts  are  of  no  avail.  Notwithstanding  the  loss  he  sustains, 
Macdonald  drives  every  thing  before  him  as  far  as  Sussen- 
brunn ;  but,  attacked  in  front  and  flank  by  the  grenadiers 
and  Kolowrath,  and  his  forces  reduced  to  two  or  three  thou- 
sand men,  he  is  compelled  to  halt.  I  foresee  this  difficulty 
and  direct  the  cavaliy  of  Nansouty,  to  charge  in  order  to 


110  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ciî.  XIY. 

disengage  the  column  ;  at  the  same  time  Durutte's  division 
advances  to  the  left  and  Pacthod  to  the  right  to  second  it  ; 
the  Bavarians  and  Serras,  also  enter  into  the  line  in  their 
turn,  and  I  advance  the  young  guard  to  replace  them  as  a 
reserve.  Marmont  and  the  Saxons  charge  at  the  same  time 
on  the  corps  of  Bellegarde.  Every  thing  yields  to  this 
vigorous  effort  ;  Macdonald  and  the  corps  that  follow  him 
resume  the  impulsa  of  victory,  and  drive  the  enemy  beyond 
Gerasdorf.  In  the  meantime  Davoust  and  Oudinot,  have 
continued  their  ofil^nsive  march  boyond  the  Russhach  ;  the  lat- 
ter, master  of  Baumersdorf  and  the  plateau,  throws  himself 
on  Wagram,  and  thus,  by  threatening  Bellegarde  in  reverse, 
flxvors  the  operation  of  Marmont  and  Bernadotte.  The 
impulse  is  felt  simultaneously  along  the  entire  line.  Davoust, 
however,  is  drawn  on  by  the  diverging  retreat  of  Rosenberg 
and  Hohenzollern  ;  a  part  of  his  corps  pursues  the  former 
northward,  while  the  remainder  sustains  Oudinot's  attack 
toward  Wagram  ;  it  had  been  better  if  the  entire  corjis  had 
been  directed  on  Wolkersdorf. 

Massena,  on  his  side,  has  reached  Essling,  and  now  carries 
the  works  of  this  place,  in  order  to  effect  his  junction  with 
Boudet.  At  the  same  time,  learning,  from  the  progress  of 
Macdonald's  cannon,  our  success  at  the  centre,  he  deems  the 
favorable  moment  to  have  arrived  for  taking  the  offensive  in 
his  turn  ; — he  makes  a  vigorous  attack  on  Klenau,  and 
drives  him  back  as  far  as  Leopoldau  ;  preceded  by  the  cavalry 
of  Lasalle,  he  pursues  with  ardor.  The  Austrians,  formed  in 
squares  in  the  plain,  face  about  for  a  moment  ;  Lasalle 
charges  them  with  vigor,  but  falls  by  a  ball  which  struck 
him  in  the  forehead  ;  the  enemy,  however,  is  pierced  and 
pursued  even  to  the  base  of  the  Bisemberg. 

Defeat  of  the  Austrians.  —  For  the  last  two  hours  the 
archduke  h;id  seen  the  necessity  of  a  I'etreat,  and  had  given 
orders  accordingly.     Instead  of  being  reënforced  on  the  left 


Cn.  XIV.]         THE    WAR    OF     1809     IN     GERMANY.  Ill 

by  the  Archduke  John,  he  saw  that  wing  overtlirown  by 
Davoust  and  Oudinot,  and  his  centre  jiressed  down  by  an 
irresistible  mass  ;  success  was  no  longer  jwssible,  and  by  per- 
sisting in  maintaining  his  position,  he  might  endang(>r  the 
two  corps-cV anm'e  engaged  between  the  Russbach  and  the 
Danube  ;  he,  therefore,  preferred  to  fall  back  in  good  order, 
and  preserve  his  army  in  a  condition  to  exert  an  important 
influence  in  the  subsequent  negotiations  for  peace.  He  had 
no  motives  for  desperate  acts,  risking  everything  on  the 
result  of  a  single  contest.  In  fact,  the  Archduke  John,  at 
four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  was  not  within  less  than  three 
or  four  leagues  of  the  field  of  battle,  and  could  take  no  im- 
portant part  in  it.  The  couriers  of  his  van-guard  appeared  at 
this  moment  in  the  direction  of  Leopoldsdorf,  and  skirmished 
with  the  flankers  of  our  cavalry  ;  some  of  tlie  latter  were 
wounded,  and  fell  back  spreading  the  most  singular  panic 
through  our  ranks.  We  had  just  established  our  bivouacs, 
the  guards  and  reserves  being  near  Raasdorf,  when  a  general 
cry  was  heard  from  the  right  that  the  enemy  had  turned  our 
flank  and  threatened  the  bridges.  In  an  instant  the  equi- 
pages, wounded,  and  scattered  troops  take  the  road  to  Lobau  ; 
the  alarm  spreads  from  rank  to  rank,  till,  f  n-  a  moment,  the 
conquerors  doubt  their  own  victory.  The  cause  of  the  panic 
is  soon  discovered,  giving  rise  to  jokes  on  the  military  cour- 
tiers who  had  judged  of  our  ojjerations  from  the  middle  of 
the  park  of  equipages  ! 

The  archduke  effected  his  retreat  during  the  night,  leaving 
me  no  other  trophies  than  his  dismounted  artillery  and  some 
thousands  of  wounded  and  prisoners.  His  loss  amounted  to 
about  twenty-five  thousand  men,  and  twelve  generals,  hors- 
de-comhat.  Our  loss  was  nearly  as  great.  The  necessity  of 
sending  a  part  of  our  cavalry  to  the  right  prevented  me 
from  pushing  vigorously  the  enemy  that  night.  The  Arch- 
duke Charles   retired  on  Bohemia  on  the  road   to  Znaim. 


112  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

Rosenberg,  being  separated  from  him,  took  the  road  to  Mo- 
ravia. The  emperor  of  Austria,  who  had  remained  at 
Wolkersdorf  during  the  battle,  on  learning  the  defeat  of 
Rosenberg  and  the  approach  of  Davoust  in  pursuit,  first 
retired  to  Znaim,  and  then  departed  for  Hungary. 

The  army  of  Italy  had  covered  itself  "with  glory  ;  on 
visiting  it,  I  embraced  Macdonald,  who  had  here  crowned 
the  fame  he  had  already  won  at  Hooglcde  and  Trebia,  and 
I  saluted  him  with  the  title  of  Marshal.  The  same  rank 
was  also  conferred  on  Marmont  and  Oudinot.* 

Remarks  on  îhc  Cattle. — In  selecting  liis  field  of  battle 
on  the  Russbach,  to  the  north  of  Vienna,  the  archduke  had 
three  lines  of  retreat  from  which  to  choose  ;  the  first,  to  his 
right  on  Bohemia  ;  the  second,  at  the  centre  on  Olmutz  ; 
and  the  third,  at  the  left  on  Hungary.  The  first  had  the 
advantao;e  of  maintaininor  the  Austrians  in  communication 


*  Thiers  says:  "Marshal  Bernadette,  who,  through  his  own  fault  or  that 
of  his  corps,  liad  been  unable  to  keep  the  post  assigned  to  him  between 
"Wagram  and  Aderklaa.  nevertheless  published  an  order  of  the  day,  addressed 
to  the  Saxons,  in  which  he  thanked  them  for  their  conduct  on  the  fifth  and 
sixth  of  July,  and  attributed  to  them,  as  it  were,  the  winning  of  the  battle. 
This  manner  of  distributing  to  himself  and  his  soldiers  praises  which  he  ought 
to  have  waited  to  receive  from  Napoleon,  greatly  offended  the  latter,  because 
it  offended  the  army  and  its  leaders.  To  punish  it,  Napoleon  wrote  a  most 
severe  order  of  the  day,  which  was  communicated  to  the  marshals  only,  but 
which  was  a  sufficient  reprimand  for  such  an  extravagance  of  vanity  ;  for, 
being  addressed  to  rivals,  it  was  not  probable  that  it  would  remain  secret." 

The  following  is  a  copy  of  this  order:  "His  imperial  majesty  expresses  his 
disapprobation  of  marshal  the  prince  of  Ponte  Corvo's  order,  which  was 
inserted  in  the  public  journals  of  the  seventh  of  July,  As  his  majesty  com- 
mands in  person,  to  him  belongs  the  exclusive  right  of  assigning  to  all  their 
respective  degrees  of  glory.  His  majesty  owes  tlie  success  of  his  arms  to 
French  troops,  and  not  to  others.  The  prince  of  Ponte  Corvo's  order  of  the 
day,  tending  to  give  false  pretensions  to  troops  of  secondary  merit,  is  contrary 
to  truth,  to  discipline,  and  to  national  honor.  To  Marshal  Macdonald  belongs 
the  praise  which  tlie  prince  of  Ponte  Corvo  arrogates  to  himself.  His  majesty 
desires  that  this  testimony  of  his  displeasure  may  operate  as  a  caution  to  evarj 
marshal  not  to  attribute  to  himself  more  glory  than  is  due  to  him.  Tlmt  the 
Saxon  army,  however,  may  not  be  afflicted,  his  majesty  desires  that  this  order 
may  be  kept  secret." 


Cil.  XIV.]      THE     WAK    OF    1809     IN     GERMANY.  113 

with  the  north  of  Germany,  where  they  flattered  themselves 
that  the  appearance  of  the  English  would  finally  induce 
Prussia  and  Westphalia  to  declare  in  their  favor.  In  taking 
this  route,  they  would  base  themselves  on  Prague,  the  city, 
next  after  Vienna,  the  most  important  in  the  emjiire  for  its 
military  establishments  and  resources  ;  but  it  would  expose 
the  army  to  be  cut  off  from  the  heart  of  the  monarchy  by  a 
simple  movement  against  its  left,  and  be  thus  thrown  back 
between  the  Elbe  and  the  Khine,  where  it  would  experience 
the  same  fate  as  the  Prussians  after  the  battle  of  Jena.  The 
line  of  Olmutz  was  no  less  dangerous,  without,  however, 
offering  the  same  advantages  ;  by  eight  days  of  retrograde 
march,  the  imperial  army  would  be  thrown  beyond  its  limits 
on  Silesia  and  the  lower  Oder.  The  retreat  on  Hungary  led 
to  their  natural  base  at  the  centre  of  the  resources  of  the 
monarchy  ;  it  would  secure  a  more  vast  theatre  of  operations, 
and  if  the  army,  by  a  new  campaign,  should  find  itself  forced 
within  the  confines  of  Podolia,  it  would  not  be  impossible  for 
it  to  rally,  by  a  lateral  movement,  on  Olmutz  or  Prague,  as 
a  last  refuge.  In  the  situation  of  affairs  left  by  the  battle 
of  Essling,  Austria  still  hoping  to  act  on  the  offensive,  it 
seemed  that  the  base  on  Bohemia,  though  more  hazardous, 
was  conformable  to  the  political  and  strategic  interests  of  the 
movemcBft  ;  but,  when  the  great  battle  had  been  fought  and 
lost,  then  this  base  became  dangerous  for  a  defeated  army, 
and  the  archduke  should  not  have  manoeuvred  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  be  exposed  to  be  driven  back  upon  it  in  spite 
of  himself.  The  error  which  he  committed  in  directing:  his 
efforts  to  the  right  on  the  Danube,  and  allowing  his  left  to  be 
forced,  was  calculated  to  throw  him  back  on  Bohemia, 
whether  he  wished  or  not.  Undoubtedly,  it  would  still  have 
been  possible  for  him  to  gain  the  road  to  Nicolsburg,  and  after- 
ward tlmt  of  Goding,  so  as  to  throw  himself  into  Hungary  ; 
but  this  would  have  been  acting  on  the  circumference  of  a 
VOL.  i;i. — 8 


114  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON,  [Cii.  XIV. 

circle,  of  wliich  we  held  the  chonl  ;  and,  even  admitting  that 
it  had  succeeded,  we  should  still  have  confined  the  army  in 
the  gorges  of  the  Krapacs,  cutting  it  off  from  the  centre  of 
the  kingdom  ;  this  would  have  rendered  its  destruction  none 
the  less  probable.  If  the  archduke  had  had  superior  forces, 
so  as  to  guard  the  Russbach  sufficiently,  and  still  be  able  to 
turn  our  left  by  Breitenlée  and  Aspern,  it  would  have  been 
w^ell  to  attempt  it  ;  but,  on  the  contrary  hypothesis,  it  would 
have  been  trusting  too  much  to  chance,  and  have  given  us 
the  strategic  and  tactical  key  of  the  field,  which  was  at 
Nieusiedel,  It  was  this  circumstance  which  dictated  all  my 
combinations,  as  soon  as  I  perceived  the  situation  of  the 
enemy's  forces.  Some  have  thought  that  I  would  have  acted 
more  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  the  art,  if  I  had 
directed  my  efforts  between  Aderklaa  and  the  Eussbach,  or 
on  Bauraersdorf,  after  Davoust  had  got  a  footing  beyond  the 
Russbach.  This  would,  in  fact,  have  been  a  repetition  of  the 
manoeuvre  of  Frederick  at  Leuthen  ; — it  would  have  been 
directing  the  decisive  efiort  on  the  most  important  extremity, 
supporting  it  successively  and  obliquely  by  the  whole  line, 
without  troubling  myself  about  the  operations  of  Klenau  and 
Kolowrath,  I  might  have  pursued  this  plan,  if  I  had  had 
the  field  free  around  me  ;  but  having  the  Danube  in  my 
rear,  and  my  bridges  to  preserve  in  case  of  defeat,  I  preferred 
a  manoeuvre  less  brilliant,  but  more  certain. 

Retreat  of  the  Archduke  and  Pursuit  of  the  French. — 
The  archduke,  having  retired  with  his  forces,  at  the  end  of 
the  battle,  between  Wolkersdorf  and  the  Bisemberg,  could 
still  take  either  the  road  to  Moravia,  or  to  Bohemia,  as  he 
might  choose.  The  first,  however,  was  somewhat  menaced 
by  the  cannon  of  Davoust,  Marmont,  and  Oudinot,  who 
were  encamped  between  Wagram  and  Bockflies  ;  and  it 
would  have  been  rather  difficult  for  the  troo})S  to  reach  it 
from  the  Bisemberg  by  a  lateral  movement,  without  running 


Cil.  XIV]         THE    WAR     OF     1809     IN    GERMANY.  115 

the  risk  of  being  anticipated  on  Nicolsburg.  The  main 
body  of  the  army  took  the  road  to  Znaim  ;  Rosenberg  alone 
continued  his  retreat  on  the  road  to  Brunn. 

By  daylight,  on  the  morning  of  the  seventh,  the  rear- 
guard of  the  enemy  was  seen  on  these  two  roads.  From  the 
contradictory  reports  which  I  received,  I  was  uncertain  which 
had  been  taken  by  the  main  body  ;  it  was  possible  that  the 
army  had  been  divided  in  order  to  gain  time,  but  I  had 
reason  to  think  that  the  archduke  would  seek  to  gain  Hun- 
gary by  Nicolsburg,  rather  than  to  throw  himself  eccentri- 
cally on  Bohemia.  Davoust  received  orders  to  march  on 
Nicolsburg  ;  Marmont,  reenforced  by  the  Bavarians,  first 
took  the  same  road,  but  afterward  turned  aside  on  Laas  ; 
Massena  took  the  road  to  Bohemia  by  Hollabrunn.  I 
marched  to  Wolkersdorf  with  my  reserve  and  Oudinot. 
Eugene,  whose  army  had  suffered  severely,  was  destined  to 
observe  the  Archduke  John  and  Hungary,  covering  Vienna, 
our  bridges  and  our  line  of  communication.  I  reenforced 
him  with  the  Saxons,  the  AVurtembergers,  and  a  Bavarian 
division.  These  precautions  were  the  more  necessary,  as,  on 
the  very  day  of  the  battle.  General  Chasteler  and  Giulay, 
who  had  united  their  forces,  after  the  evacuation  of  the 
Tyrol,  reentered  Gratz  and  Leoben,  driving  out  the  little 
corps  of  Rusca  on  Rottenmann  ;  while  the  Archduke  John, 
hearing  the  result  of  the  battle,  had  repassed  the  Morava 
and  halted  at  Marschek. 

Battle  of  Znaim. — Massena,  continuing  to  drive  before 
him  the  main  body  of  the  army  of  the  archduke  on  the  road 
to  Znaim,  sustained  several  important  combats  ;  especially 
at  Hallobrunn  and  Schongraben,  where  the  Austrian  troops 
of  the  prince  of  Reuss,  who  had  not  previously  been  engaged, 
fought  with  great  bravery.  The  march  of  Marmont  on  Laas, 
threatened  to  precede  the  archduke  to  Znaim,  and  hastened 
his  retrograde  movement  to  that  position. 


116  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

This  city,  situated  in  amphitheatre  on  the  slope  of  a  spur 
of  the  Bohemian  chain  Avhich  commands  all  the  environs, 
"while  the  hillocks  in  rear  are  covered  with  vineyards,  may  be 
compared  in  its  position  with  Caldiero.  I  did  not  learn  till 
the  tenth,  at  Wolkersdorf,  the  direction  taken  by  the  main 
body  of  the  enemy.  I  immediately  descended  on  Znaim, 
directing  Oudinot,  the  guard,  and  Davoust,  to  repair  to  the 
same  place.  Marmont  had  advanced  as  far  as  Thesswitz, 
almost  in  the  middle  of  the  Austrian  army,  with  Massena, 
however,  only  a  day's  march  behind,  hotly  pressing  the 
enemy's  rear-guard.  The  archduke,  thinking  that  Marmont 
was  better  sustained,  did  not  venture  to  attack  him.  Arriv- 
ing here  in  person  and  having  examined  the  state  of  affairs, 
I  now  directed  an  attack  to  be  made  by  our  vanguards, 
in  order  to  gain  time  for  the  remainder  of  my  forces  to 
come  up. 

The  imj^etuous  Massena  was  already  hotly  engaged,  and  it 
was  necessary  to  sustain  him.  I  then  directed  Marmont  to 
debouch  from  Thesswdtz,  ascend  to  the  plateau,  and  relieve 
the  fourth  corps  which  was  alone  exposed  to  the  enemy's 
attacks.  Davoust,  coming  from  Nicolsburg,  and  Oudinot 
and  the  reserve,  from  Wolkersdorf,  could  not  arrive  in  time 
to  enter  into  action  before  the  next  day,  and  it  was,  there- 
fore, important  for  me  to  conceal  from  the  enemy  our  present 
inferiority  of  numbers  ;  it  was,  nevertheless,  necessary  to 
keep  him  in  the  vicinity  of  Znaim,  so  that,  on  the  arrival  of 
Davoust  and  the  cavalry,  I  might  cut  him  off  by  Brenditz 
from  the  road  to  Prague. 

Armistice. — The  emperor  of  Austria  had  sent  to  me  the 
prince  of  Lichtenstein  to  propose  an  armistice.  Under  pres- 
ent circumstances  nothing  could  be  more  agreeable  to  me 
than  a  cessation  of  hostilities  ;  every  moment  gained  was 
now  a  decided  advantage  to  me,  and  if  the  suspension  led 
to  peace  I  should  be  delighted.     It  was  with  difficulty  that 


CH.XIT.]        THE    WAE    OF    1809    IN    GERMANY.  117 

the  firing  could  be  stopped,  for  so  fiercely  were  the  troops 
engaged  on  both  sides  that  several  officers  were  wounded  in 
their  endeavors  to  suspend  the  combat.     The  armistice  was 
discussed  during  fbe  night  ;  my  officers  thought  I  now  ouc^ht 
to  complete  the  overthrow  of  a  power  like  Austria,  which 
was  incessantly  interfering  with  all  our  enterprises,  and  which 
was  too  lacerated  ever  to  forgive  the  quadruple  humiliation 
to  which  we  had  subjected  her  arms.     Taking  into  consider- 
ation the  uncertain  state  of  Germany,  the  unfavorable  news 
from  Spam,  and  the  serious  preparations  of  the  En-lish  I 
was  influenced  by  great  national  and  political  interests,°rather 
than  by  the  military  opinions  of  these  brave  generals,  who  could 
not  however,  then  fully  comprehend  the  crisis  of  my  affairs 
I,  therefore,  broke  off  the  discussion,  saying,  tUr,  has  lc,n 
enough  Uood  shed  ;  I  accept  the  armistice 

Its  foilditio»s,-The  negotiator  was  the  same   who  had 
terminated  the  war  of  1805  ;  we  soon  came  to  an  agreement 
on  the  conditions,  the  line  of  demarcation  accorded  to  us  the 
occupation  of  the  Circles  of  Znaim  and  Brnun  ;  it  followed 
the  course  of  the  Morava  to  the  confluence  of  the  Taya  • 
thence  along  the  road  to  Presburg,  including  that  city  ;  thé 
great  Danube  as  far  as  Raab,  then  the  river  of  that  name 
and  the  fronfiers  of  Styria  and   Carniola  as  far  as  Fiume; 
The  citadels  of  Gratz  and  Brunn,  the  fort  of  Sa^enbourg 
the  Tyrol  and  the  Voralberg  were  surrendered  to  us      Thé 
armies  of  Poland  were  to  retain  their  respective  positions. 

The  limit  on  the  north  of  Germany  was  the  line  of  the 
Confederation  of  the  Rhino.  The  surrender  of  Fiume  com- 
pleted the  isolation  of  the  Auslrians  from  England,  so  that 
British  subsidies,  arms,  and  agents  could  no  longer  reach  the 
former  power,  except  clandestinely  ;  we  occupied  with  our 
troops  a  third  of  the  Austrian  monarchy,  being  thus  in  posi- 
tion to  support  war  by  war,  and  to  supply  the  wants  caused 


118  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

by  the  campaign  in  the  several  branches  of  service,  especially 
in  transportation,  clothing,  and  equipments. 

Austrian  Motives  for  ratifying  the  Armistice. — Neverthe- 
less, this  armistice  was  far  from  being  a  sure  guarantee  of 
peace.  The  Emperor  Francis  was  hardly  disposed  to  sub- 
scribe to  all  the  sacrifices  which  I  was  in  condition  to  impose  ; 
he  therefore  made  some  difficulties  in  ratifying  the  armistice. 
They  jiroposed  a  new  system  of  operations  by  reënforcing  the 
Archduke  John  with  the  corps  of  Chasteler  and  Giulay, 
who,  since  the  departure  of  Marmont  had  occupied  Gratz 
and  Leoben,  and  by  taking  advantage  of  my  march  on 
Moravia  to  act  on  my  communications,  and  advance  on 
Vienna.  The  news,  however,  of  my  return  to  Schonbrunn, 
the  march  of  Macdonald  on  Gratz,  and  still  more  the  descrijj- 
tion  of  the  situation  of  my  affairs  in  Moravia,  ^^ resented  to 
him  by  the  Prince  of  Lichtenstein,  finally  induced  him  to 
ratify  the  armistice  on  the  eighteenth.  This,  however,  was 
done,  less  through  pacific  views,  than  for  the  i:)urpose  of 
gaining  time  for  a  general  movement  of  his  armies.  The  court 
and  diplomatic  head-quarters  were  at  Comorn  ;  the  Arch- 
duke John  was  called  there  for  consultation.  He  advised 
renouncing  the  idea  of  basing  themselves  on  Prague,  so  as 
not  to  lose  their  communications  Avith  Hungary  and  exjjose 
themselves  to  be  thrown  between  the  Elbe  and  the  Ehine, 
but  restore  the  theatre  of  the  Avar  to  its  true  base  in  Hungary, 
making  the  grand  army  march  by  Hradisch  on  Comorn  ;  the 
Archduke  John  Avas  to  operate  to  the  left,  with  fifty  thousand 
men  on  Kaab  ;  Avhile  the  corps  of  Croatia  Avas  to  turn  back 
so  as  to  act  more  vigorously  Avith  the  Austrian  detachments, 
Avhich  had  recently  had  some  success  in  gaining  possession  of 
Laybach  and  Zara,  and  menacing  Trieste.  The  Hungarian 
insuiTection  (militia  levies)  Avould  form  the  connecting  link 
between  these  two  armies.  The  Archduke  Charles,  being 
forced    to  retire  in  disgrace,  Avas   to  resign  the  command  to 


Ch.  XIV.j        THE     WAR    OF     1809     IN    GERMANY.  119 

the  emperor  liimself.  This  little  politico-military  revolution, 
which  was  attributed  to  Stadion,  and  was  the  result  of 
strategic  views  more  prudent  than  a  retreat  on  Prague, 
instead  of  an  obstacle  to  the  armislice,  rendered  its  ratifica- 
tion the  more  necessary  for  the  execution  of  the  projected 
movement. 

Operations  in  the  North  of  Europe.-This  armistice  put 
an  end  to  tiie  operations  in  Poland,  where  Poniatowski  had 
just  seized  on  Cracovia,  and  was  preparing  to  connect  him- 
self with  my  right  in  Moravia  by  continuing  to  manoeuvre  in 
that  direction.  The  Archduke  Ferdinand  regained  the  fron- 
tier of  Hungary.  The  Ptussians  occupied  Galicia,  and  ex- 
tended themselves  even  to  the  sources  of  the  Vistula. 

The  cessation  of  hostilities  was  the  more  timely  for  us  in 
the  north    of  Germany,  where  the  Austrians   had  recently 
gained  some  success,  and  where  the  English  had   made   a 
small  debarcation.    My  brother  Jerome  had  collected  a  corps 
of  ten  thousand  men  to  drive  the  enemy  from  Dresden,  by 
acting  in  concert  with  the  few  Saxons  still  remaining  under 
the  orders  of  General  Thielmann.     On  the  other  side,  Junot 
was  coming  for   the  same    purpose   from  Franconia';    they 
were  to  effect  a  junction  in  Voigtland.     The  archduke  had 
sent  General  Keinmayer  into  Saxony  to  give  form  and  object 
to  the  insurrectionary  operations  which  were  attempted  in 
that  country.    This  general,  uniting  with  the  duke  of  Bi-uns- 
wick   and  the  division  of  Amende,  and    acting  in    concert 
with  the  corps  of  Radvojewich,  sought  to  prevent  the  junc- 
tion of  Junot  and  the  king  of  Westphalia.     He  encountered 
the  former  near  Gefrées  on  the  ninth  of  July,  and  drove  him 
back   on   Bareith.     Jerome  fell  back   on    Schleitz,  and,  on 
hearing  the  victory  of  Wagram,  and  the  descent  of  the  Eng- 
lish, decided  to  rally  his  corps  on  Erfurth.     The  Austrian!, 
having  entered  Dresden  on  the  twenty-first,  refused  to  evacu- 
ate the  place,  under   the   pretense   that   the    armistice   was 


120  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XIY. 

applicable  only  to  the  grand  army.  It  required  hostile 
demonstrations  to  induce  them  to  return  to  Bohemia. 

These  events  left  the  duke  of  Brunswick-Oels  in  a  false 
position  on  the  frontiers  of  Bohemia,  with  his  legion  of 
adventurers  in  British  pay  ;  but,  worthy  heir  of  his  name, 
he  took  the  resolution  of  joining  the  English,  who  finally 
effected  a  small  debarcation  on  the  North  Sea.  Expelled 
from  these  countries  for  the  last  three  years,  the  English  had 
still  maintained  a  clandestine  intercourse  with  the  Hanseatic 
towns,  whose  whole  existence  depended  on  their  maritime 
relations.  Masters  of  the  rock  of  Heligoland,  they  had 
transformed  this  arid  island  into  a  vast  depot  of  colonial 
wares  and  all  kinds  of  arms.  It  was  at  the  same  time  an 
arsenal  and  a  vast  bazaar.  The  whole  coast,  from  Amster- 
dam to  the  Sound,  was  full  of  English  agents,  who  spread  in 
all  directions  the  news  of  the  expected  arrival  of  a  con- 
siderable army.     The  agitation  became  general. 

After  having  thus  promised  the  expedition,  which  was  now 
to  descend  at  Antwerp,  they  finally  sent  two  or  three  thou- 
sand men  to  debark  on  the  coast  from  Cuxhaven  to  Bremer- 
lée.  Osnabruck  and  Hanover,  in  conformity  to  their  promises, 
formed  a  partial  insurrection.  If  ten  thousand  men  had 
been  landed  a  month  sooner,  the  results  might  have  been  of 
the  greatest  importance. 

The  duke  of  Brunswick  now  decided  to  leave  Freyberg,  in 
order  to  join  the  English  on  the  coast.  This  plan,  although 
favored  by  the  insurrectionary  state  of  the  country,  and  the 
j)roximity  of  Prussia,  where  the  prince  could  h.ave  found  a 
refuge  for  his  own  person  if  reduced  to  the  last  extremity, 
was  bold,  and  executed  with  energy.  At  the  head  of  three 
thousand  desperate  adventurers,  he  passed  Leipsic  and  took 
the  road  to  Halberstadt.  He  here  found  only  a  regiment  of 
Westphalians  under  the  grand  marshal  of  Jerome's  court,  an 
ex-ofiBcer  of  the   navy,  and  more  brave  than  experienced. 


Cil.  XIV.]         THE    WAR    OF     18  09     IN     GERMANY.  121 

After  an  honorable  resistance,  Meyronet  was  wounded  and 
taken  prisoner,  and  the  remains  of  his  regiment  were  incor- 
porated into  the  ranks  of  the  enemy.  The  main  body  of  the 
Westphahan  and  Dutch  troops  were,  at  this  time,  observing 
the  coast  of  the  north.  General  Eewbel,  on  hearing  of  the 
defeat  of  Meyronet,  marched  in  all  haste  from  Bremen  to 
Brunswick,  with  five  thousand  men.  The  Dutch  general, 
Gratien,  and  the  same  Thielmann  who  played  so  important 
a  part  against  us  three  years  afterward,  pursued  the  duke  on 
Holberstadt.  This  prince  reached  the  ancient  ca])ital  of  his 
father,  on  the  first  of  August,  at  the  very  moment  when 
Rewbel  was  approaching  on  the  other  side.  Having  no  time 
for  hesitation,  he  attacked  this  general,  whose  infantry  im- 
mediately took  to  flight,  and  would,  perhaps,  have  joined 
the  insurgents,  had  not  the  enemy  been  arrested  by  the  bril- 
liant valor  of  the  AVestphalian  cuirassiers  and  the  regiments 
of  Berg.  Being  unable  to  force  a  passage  against  such 
unexpected  resistance,  and  having  already  had  two  horses 
killed  under  him,  the  prince  returned  to  Brunswick  ;  hearing 
here  that  the  English  had  just  left  Cuxhaven,  he  threw 
himself  into  the  country  of  Oldenbourg,  reached  Esfleth, 
embarked  on  the  seventh  of  August  with  his  few  brave  fol- 
lowers, and  established  himself  at  Heligoland,  where  he 
continued  till  1813,  to  form  projects  for  disturbing  the  tran- 
quillity of  the  north  of  Germany. 

Operations  in  the  Tyrol.— Affairs  in  the  Tyrol  had  taken 
a  more  serious  turn.  General  Buol,  whom  Chasteler  had  left 
there  with  three  or  four  thousand  men,  on  learning  the  con- 
dititions  of  the  armistice,  thought  to  comply  Avith  them  by 
returning  into  Styria.  This  news  enraged  the  Tyrolese  to 
the  utnîost  extent  ;  they  threaten  to  oppose  by  force  the 
departure  of  the  Austrians,  and  to  massacre  all  the  French 
prisoners,  so  as  to  render  a  treaty  of  peace  impossible.  The 
Austrians  succeeded,  however,  by  a  little  address,  in  retiring 


122  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIY. 

within  the  line  of  demarcation  laid  down  in  the  armistico, 
having  first  surrendered  Sachsenbourg  to  the  troops  of  Rusca. 
I  directed  Lefebvre,  with  the  Bavarians  and  some  French 
troops,  to  return  on  lunspruck  ;  Rusca  ascended  the  Drave  ; 
and  a  Franco-Italian  division  advanced  by  the  Adige.  The 
Tyrolese,  instead  of  yielding,  seemed  to  acquire  new  energy 
by  the  departure  of  the  Austrians. 

Lefebvre,  after  a  decisive  combat  on  the  eleventh  of 
August,  was  forced  to  retire  into  Bavaria  ;  Eusca  succeeded 
with  difïïculty  in  regaining  the  Corinthia,  but  the  Tyrolese 
ventured  to  follow  him  even  there  ;  and  the  Franco-Italian 
division  was  driven  back  to  the  gates  of  Verona,  I  could 
not,  at  this  moment,  detach  a  force  sufficiently  numerous  for 
the  reduction  of  this  country,  for,  notwithh Lauding  the 
armistice,  peace  was  far  from  being  certain,  and,  instead  of 
weakening  my  army,  it  was  more  important  than  ever  to 
keep  it  in  force.  I,  therefore,  directed  Eusca  to  negotiate 
with  the  insurgents,  and  propose  to  them  to  send  a  deputa- 
tion to  me  to  decide  upon  some  plan  for  the  future  govern- 
ment of  their  country.  He  proposed  to  them,  if  they  disliked 
the  Bavarian  rule,  to  unite  with  the  kingdom  of  Italy,  and 
even  gave  them  some  hoj^e  of  establishing  their  absolute 
independence.     Tliey,  however,  rejected  all  his  propositions. 

Negotiations  with  Austria,  aud  Preparatioiis  for  a  Renewal 
of  Hostilities. — Negotiations  were  opened  at  Altenbourg,  on 
the  seventh  of  August,  between  MM.  Champagny,  Metter- 
nich,  and  Nugent.  But  they  made  very  little  progress.  The 
court  of  Austria,  which  had  now  retired  to  Buda,  was  in  no 
haste  to  terminate  them,  for  the  descent  of  the  English  on 
Belgium,  the  march  of  Wellington  on  Madrid,  the  success 
of  the  Tyrolese,  and  the  new  plan  of  operations  Avhich  had 
been  adopted,  contrary  to  the  advice  of  the  Archduke  Charles 
— all  combined  to  raise  the  hopes  of  the  cabinet  of  Vienna, 
which  now  pretended  to  Ye<j;aYd   the  overtures  cf  Cliampiigny 


Cu.  XIV.]         THE    WAR    OF     1809     IN    GERMANY.  123 

as  excessively  severe.  If  the  English  had  consolidated  their 
operations  in  Castile,  and  had  been  successful  in  their 
descents  on  our  coast,  there  is  no  doubt  that  Austria 
intended  to  renew  hostilities.  She  continued  to  recruit  her 
armies,  to  incite  Prussia  to  declare  against  us,  and  to  mul- 
tiply her  projects  of  future  operations. 

I  employed  these  moments  of  respite  in  my  usual  way,  of 
working  with  still  greater  ardor  than  during  the  war  itself 
It  was  at  this  time  that,  wholly  influenced  by  my  love  for 
the  brave  men  whom  I  commanded,  I  instituted  the  order 
of  the  Trois-Toisons  (Three-Fleeces).  I  thought  to  eclipse 
the  Golden-Fleeces  of  Spain  and  Austria,  and  all  other 
orders  of  modern  chivalry,  by  conferring  this  decoration  on 
thoK  only  who  had  assisted  at  my  three  entries  into  Vienna, 
Berlin  and  Madrid.  My  object  was  to  consecrate  the  recol- 
lection of  these  great  events  ;  but  the  project  would  have 
been  attended  with  injustice,  inasmuch  as  some  of  the  most 
valiant  of  my  generals  would  have  been  excluded  from  this 
order.  The  decree  was,  therefore,  never  carried  into  execu- 
tion. I  also  at  this  time  directed  my  attention  particularly 
to  administrative  matters  for  sui)plying  the  wants  of  my 
armies  and  regulating  the  affairs  of  my  empire.  I  imposed 
on  Austria  a  contribution  of  one  hundred  millions  of  francs, 
to  be  collected  into  the  jaiblic  chests  from  the  ordinary 
revenues  of  the  countries  which  we  occupied. 

I  prepared  the  fortifications  of  Vienna,  the  tetc-du-pont  of 
Spitz,  Kaab,  and  Gratz,  so  as  to  prolong  the  defenses  of 
these  places  if  necessary,  or  to  demolish  the  works  in  case  we 
had  to  evacuate  them. 

I  very  much  increased  my  bridge  equipage,  so  as  to  act  on 
the  lower  Danube  and  in  Hungary,  and  organized  a  consid- 
erable flotilla  to  facilitate  our  transports,  and  protect  our 
operations  on  the  banks  of  the  river. 

The  reserves  of  conscripts,  the  provisional  regiments,  and 


124  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XIV. 

the  contingents  of  the  Confederation,  were  sent  to  the  north  to 
reënforce  the  eighth  corps-d'wmée  under  Junot,  whose  forces 
already  numbered  near  thirty  thousand  men,  exclusive  of  the 
Westphalians,  who  constituted  the  tenth  corjjs-d' armée.  My 
own  army  was  also  augmented  at  this  time  by  some  thirty 
thousand  men,  who  were  discharged  from  the  hospitals,  and 
more  than  six  thousand  from  the  depots. 

Austria,  in  the  meantime,  had  not  neglected  her  levies  ; — 
a  large  number  of  kmdivehrs  (militia)  had  been  organized 
and  united  with  the  troops  of  the  line.  Taking  advantage 
of  the  present  position  of  affairs,  she  now  decided  that  the 
propositions  of  Champagny  were  inadmissible.  The  emperor, 
Francis  I.,  wrote  a  letter  to  me,  by  Count  Bubna,  declaring 
that  the  })roposed  conditions  of  peace  would  dishonor  his 
throne  and  destroy  his  monarchy.  I  directed  the  duke  of 
Bassano  to  confer  with  his  envoy,  in  hopes  that  they  might 
come  to  a  better  understanding  than  the  negotiators  of 
Altenbourg. 

I  had  proposed  to  the  Emperor  Alexander  of  Eussia,  to 
send  a  minister  to  take  part  in  these  negotiations.  He 
declined  the  offer,  but  gave  his  assent  to  whatever  I  should 
do,  recommending  me,  however,  to  not  deal  too  harshly  with 
his  ancient  ally.  There  was  much  tact  and  address  in  this 
refusal,  for  Eussia  did  not  wish  to  see  Austria  too  much 
humbled,  nor  to  assist  in  her  dismemberment.  This  course 
was  the  result  of  good  political  policy  ;  some  writers,  how- 
ever, have  mistaken  its  motives,  and  attributed  it  to  a  pro- 
ject on  the  part  of  Eussia  to  ultimately  abandon  my  alliance. 

I  now  received  the  news  of  the  ftiilure  of  the  English 
expedition  against  Antwerp  and  their  consequent  retreat. 
This  was  certainly  no  reason  why  I  should  abate  my  pre- 
tensions with  Austria  ;  I,  Therefore,  replied  to  the  emperor, 
on  the  fifteenth  of  September,  demanding  the  cession  of  a 
million  and  a  half  of  inhabitants  on  the  Inn  and  in  Illyria, 


Ch.  XIV.]      THE    WAR    OF     1809     IN    GERMANY.  125 

to  reënforce  tlio  kingdom  of  Italy  and  give  a  suitable  frontier 
to  Bavaria.  I  also  required  New  Galicia  for  the  Duchy  of 
Warsaw. 

Maritime  Expeditions  of  the  Enis^Iisli. — The  maritime  ex- 
peditions of  the  English  were  so  intimately  connected  with 
what  was,  at  this  time,  passing  in  Austria,  as  to  justify  a 
brief  account  of  them  in  this  place. 

England  had  done  but  little  more,  on  this  occasion,  in 
favor  of  her  continental  allies,  than  she  had  done  in  1807  for 
the  war  in  Poland.  In  fact,  the  cabinet  of  London,  seeing 
that  this  war  would  occupy  us  at  the  same  time  in  Austria 
and  Spain,  and  oblige  us  to  scatter  our  forces  from  the  Tagus 
to  the  Danube,  made  immense  preparations  to  profit  by  the 
circumstance  ;  but  it  directed  its  views  especially  to  enter- 
prises calculated  to  advance  its  own  private  interests.  If 
this  power  had  not  attempted  so  many  things  at  the  same 
time,  it  might  have  produced  more  important  results  ;  but, 
seeking  to  act  merely  in  a  capacity  of  an  auxiliary,  carrying 
on  its  operations  on  the  territory  of  its  allies,  it  thought  to 
embarrass  us  the  more  by  multiplying  the  number  of  its 
expeditions.  The  danger  with  which  she  was  threatened  by 
the  league  of  Tilsit,  had  induced  England  to  put  forth  all  her 
resources,  and  to  augment  her  troops  by  every  means  in  her 
powei-.  She  was  able  to  send  abroad  one  hundred  thousand 
men  ;  and  a  thousand  millions  of  money  were  employed  in 
preparing  immense  amounts  of  provisions,  artillery,  arms, 
and  military  munitions,  for  numerous  projected  maritime 
descents.  She  spared  neither  gold  nor  iron,  and  the  progress 
of  the  mechanical  arts,  acting  as  an  auxiliary  to  the  manual 
power  of  her  artisans,  had  transformed  England  into  a  vast 
workshop.  Such  forces,  if  well  directed  and  assisted  by  the 
armed  inhabitants  of  Spain,  Portugal,  Holland,  and  all  the 
north  of  Germany,  were  well  calculated  to  effect  a  powerful 
diversion  in  favor  of  Austria. 


126  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XIY 

Our  colonies,  and  those  of  our  allies,  were  not  at  this  time 
sufficiencly  valuable  for  England  even  to  deign  to  covet  them. 
She  could  no  longer  desire  to  possess  either  Cuba  or  Spanish 
America,  for  both  were  now  her  allies.  Cayenne,  Marti- 
nique, Senegal,  and  St.  Domingo,  had  all  fallen,  and  the  Isle- 
of-France,  being  blockaded,  would  also,  sooner  or  later,  be 
compelled  to  surrender.  The  British  East  India  Company 
were  preparing  an  expedition  against  Amboyne  and  Batavia, 
places  Vv^hich  the  Dutch  were  no  longer  in  condition  to  sus- 
tain, since  they  had  lost  Ceylon  and  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope. 
The  garrisons  of  the  Antilles  were  alone  sufficient  for  the 
capture  of  the  few  ports  which  we  still  possessed  there. 
These  colonial  interests,  which,  in  17S3,  had  been  matters 
of  such  high  importance,  were  now  so  comj)letely  eclipsed  by 
the  mighty  continental  conflicts,  that  England  employed  in 
them  only  a  few  secondary  detachments,  and  engaged  in  them 
merely  as  a  pastime. 

The  increase  which  she  had  now  given  to  her  land  forces 
enabled  her  to  plan  more  extensive  enterprises  ;  to  carry  on 
war  in  the  Spanish  Peninsula,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  act 
offensively  on  the  banks  of  the  Scheldt.  By  the  month  of 
April,  an  immense  armament  was  ready  to  act  on  the  first 
favorable  opportunity.  Wellesley,  who  had  returned  from 
Portugal  after  the  affair  of  Vimiera,  was  sent  back  to  the 
Peninsula  with  a  corps  of  twenty  thousand  men,  to  take  the 
command  of  the  English  divisions  and  revenge  the  defeat  of 
General  Moore.  Another  expedition  under  Gambler  and 
Lord  Cochrane,  about  the  middle  of  April,  attempted  to 
burn  our  Rochefort  squadron,  which,  reënforced  by  a  detach- 
ment from  Brest,  lay  at  the  anchorage  in  the  roads  of  the 
Isle-of-Aix.  An  infernal  machine  of  fifteen  hundred  barrels 
of  powder  and  four  hundred  shells,  directed  by  Cochrane 
himself,  exploded  without  producing  the  slightest  effect. 
They  then  made  an  attack  on  the  squadron,  throwing  Con- 


Cil.  XIV.]         THE    WAR     OF     1809    IN    GERMANY.  127 

grève  rockets  into  it.  This  was  the  first  time  these  projectiles 
were  ever  used  against  us.  Four  fine  vessels  were  burnt 
while  laying  at  anchor,  but  the  others,  having  more  skillful 
commanders,  escaped  into  Charente.  Gambier  was  subjected 
to  a  court  of  inquiry  for  not  having  destroyed  our  entire 
squadron,  and  the  ship-yard  of  Rochefort  ;  and,  with  much 
more  justice,  I  had  our  officers  tried  for  having  lost  their 
vessels. 

Ab<nit  the  middle  of  June,  twenty  thousand  Anglo- 
SiciHans,  under  General  Stuart  and  Prince  Leopold,  appeared 
off  the  coast  of  Calabria  near  the  rock  of  Scylla,  whose 
castle  was  taken  and  again  lost.  A  detachment  of  this 
army  was  sent  to  take  possession  of  the  little  Ionian  Islands, 
and  to  cruise  before  Corfu.  Stuart  hoped,  as  in  1805,  to 
surprise  some  point  of  the  coast,  and  land  a  body  of  men  to 
form  a  nucleus  for  the  insurgents.  He  took  possession  of  the 
islands  of  Ischia  and  Procida,  and  showed  himself  with 
great  ostentation  before  Naples,  and  other  points  of  the  coast. 
But  the  inhabitants  every  where  manifested  their  attachment 
to  a  government  which  had  destroyed  the  abuses  of  its  pre- 
decessors, and  driven  out  the  brigands  who  had  previously 
infested  this  beautiful  country.  Murat  was  well  suited  to 
the  Neapolitans,  who  on  this  occasion  proved  their  devotion 
to  his  throne.  Stuart  returned  to  Sicily  without  venturing 
to  land  his  troops. 

A  more  serious  enterprise  was  fitted  out  against  our  superb 
establishment  at  Antwerp  ;  an  immense  fleet  of  thirty-nine 
ships  of  the  line,  and  thirty-six  frigates,  with  smaller  vessels 
and  gunboats,  and  transports  carrying  a  land  force  of  forty 
thousand  men,  was. sent  to  take  possession  of  this  place, 
burn  our  fleet,  destroy  our  ship-yards  and  docks,  and  then 
fill  up  the  channel  of  the  Scheldt  so  as  to  render  it  impassable. 
The  importance  which  England  attached  to  this  ex2)edition, 
is  the  best  possible  proof  of  the  wisdom  of  my  project  of 


128  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIV. 

rendering  this  the  first  port  in  Europe.  The  English,  how- 
ever, before  risking  themselves  on  French  soil,  waited  to 
learn  the  result  of  the  first  operations  of  the  campaign  on 
the  Danube.  Some,  however,  attribute  this  delay  to  a  want 
of  unanimity  in  the  English  ministry  in  the  choice  of  a  com- 
mandant, Wellington  being  then  engaged  in  the  Peninsular 
War.  At  last,  on  hearing  the  news  of  the  battle  of  Wagram, 
they  deemed  it  high  time  to  act  ;  and,  on  the  first  of  August, 
the  fleet  of  Admiral  Strachan  landed  Lord  Chatham's  array 
on  the  island  of  Walcheren.  The  heir  of  this  great  name, 
the  elder  brother  of  Pitt,  proved  that  generations  succeed, 
without  resembling  each  other.  He  committed  innumerable 
faults  in  the  execution  of  this  enterprise,  which,  if  well  con- 
ducted, would  infallibly  have  reached  Antwerp.  The  most 
convenient  route  for  reaching  this  place  from  the  coast,  is 
the  road  leading  from  Blakenberg  by  Bruges  and  Ghent  ;  it 
is  paved  for  the  distance  of  twenty-four  leagues.  The  coast 
at  this  time  was  so  entirely  stripped  of  all  means  of  defense, 
that  there  was  not  the  slightest  obstacle  to  prevent  the  land- 
ing at  this  point  of  thirty  thousand  men,  who  could  have 
reached  Antwerp  on  the  third  day  with  the  whole  train  of 
artillery  with  which  they  were  most  amply  provided.  The 
remainder  of  the  army  and  fleet  might  have  entered  the 
Scheldt  so  as  to  fix  our  attention  on  Flushing  and  the  island 
of  Cassand.  Our  fleet,  taken  unawares,  would  have  found 
retreat  impossible.  Antwerp  was  almost  completely  desti- 
tute of  a  garrison  ;"■■•'  and  the  capture  even  of  the  fort,  called 
the  Tête-de-Flandre,  on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Scheldt, 
would  have  secured  the  success  of  the  enterprise. 

Chatham  took  the  bull  by  the  horns  ;  fearing  to  com- 
promise himself  on  the  main  shore,  he  manoeuvred  with  his 
riffht  before  Breskens  and  the  island  of  Cassand,  which  he 

*  The  garrison  of  this  place  consisted,  at  first,  of  only  about  two  hundred 
invahds  and  recruits. 


Ch.  XIV.]         THE     WAR    OF     1809    IN     GERMANY.  129 

did  not  venture  to  attack,  and,  on   the  thirtieth  of  Julv 
landed  his  forces  on  the  north  side  of  the  island  of  Wal- 
cheren,  and  laid  siege  to  the  city  of  Flushing.     One  of  his 
divisions  afterward  captured  Goes  in  the  island  of  South 
Beveland,  and,   ftivored   by  the   bad   conduct  of  a   Dutch 
general,  succeeded  in  capturing  Fort  Batz,*  which  is  situated 
on  the  point  where  the   Scheklt  is  divided  into  two  arms. 
This  was  a  serious  loss,  but  not  sufficient  to  decide  the  result 
of  the  enterprise,  so  long  as  we  retained  possession  of  Forts 
Lillo,   Frederick    Henry,    Leifenshoeck,    and   the    Tête-de- 
Flandre,   which  are   situated    on    the   l)anks   of   the   great 
Scheldt  between   Batz  and  Antwerp.      General  Rousseau, 
who  had  made  such  excellent  dispositions  at  Cassand,  now 
had   time  to   throw,  on  the  fourth  of  August,  a  reinforce- 
ment of  two  battalions  into  Flushing,  which  was  commanded 
by  General  Monnet  ;  the  English  fleet  had  thought  to  cut 
off  the  communication  between  this  place  and  Breskens. 

The  defenses  of  Flushing  were  ill  constructed  and  in  ill 
condition  ;  they  consisted  of  a  single  enciente  without  any 
covered  way.  General  Monnet,  seeing  the  indefensible  con- 
dition of  the  place,  thought  to  retaixl  the  operations  of  the 
siege  by  strong  sorties.  But,  notwithstanding  the  intre- 
pidity of  General  Osten,  these  sorties  against  intrenched  lines 
and  well-armed  batteries  were  vigorously  repelled,  and  merely 
tended  to  discourage  the  garrison  without  producing  any 
beneficial  results.  On  the  thirteenth  of  Auçrust  the  Endish 
opened  a  heavy  bombardment,  not  only  from  their  land 
batteries,  but  also  from  their  flotilla  of  gunboats.  There 
were  no  bomb-proof  casemates  for  the  protection  of  the 
troops,  and  the  town  was  set  on  fire  in  numerous  places. 
After  three  days  of  heavy  bombardment,  Monnet  capitu- 


*  No  defense  whatever  was  made  of  this  place,  the  commandant  allowing 
himself  to  be  surprised. 

VOL.  III.  9 


130  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIY. 

lated  (the  sixteenth),  surrendering  himself  and  four  thousand 
men  prisoners  of  war. 

As  no  part  of  the  body  of  the  place  had  been  breached  in 
the  slightest  degree,*  Monnet  was  afterward  tried  and  con- 
demned by  a  council  of  war. 

If  he  could  not  remain  exposed  to  such  a  fire  he  ought  to 
have  attempted  to  open  a  passage  from  the  place,  or  to  have 
insisted  on  a  free  sortie  for  his  garrison.  It  is  certain  that 
he  did  not  do  all  in  his  power  to  save  his  command,  but  still 
the  sentence  of  the  court  was  rigorous.f 

In  the  meantime  the  condition  of  Antwerp  had  very  much 
changed.  The  king  of  Holland,  hearing  of  the  approach  of 
the  enemy,  had  marched  there  in  all  haste  with  his  guards 
and  five  thousand  troops,  who  took  post  in  the  environs  on 
the  twelfth  of  August  ;  and  the  commanding  generals  in 
Belgium  and  Picardy  collected  a  force  of  seven  or  eight 
thousand  men. 

Our  fleet  had  ascended  the  Scheldt,  and  taken  refuge 
under  the  guns  of  the  forts.  These  means  were  sufficient  to 
defend  the  place  for  a  considerable  length  of  time,  but  not 
enough  to  protect  it  from  danger.  My  ministers,  seeing  the 
full  extent  of  the  danger,  not  only  sent  to  the  Scheldt  all 


*  Alison  attributes  the  reduction  of  this  place,  in  a  considerable  degree,  to 
the  fire  of  the  shipping,  and  one  or  two  recent  -writers  of  little  autliority,  copy- 
ing from  him,  have  paraded  this  attack  as  a  proof  of  the  superiority  of  guns 
afloat  over  guns  ashore.  Nothing  can  be  more  absurd.  An  English  oflBcer, 
who  was  employed  in  the  siege,  says,  he  "went  along  the  entire  sea-line  the 
very  next  day  after  the  capitulation,  and  found  no  part  of  the  parapet  injured 
so  as  to  be  of  the  slightest  consequence,  and  only  one  solitary  gun  dismounted, 
evidently  by  the  bursting  of  a  shell,  and  which  could  not,  of  course,  have  been 
thrown  from  the  line-of  battle  ships,  but  must  have  been  thrown  from  the  land 
batteries." — {Colonel  Mitchel).  This  account  of  an  eye-witness  is  fully  con- 
firmed by  other  historians  ;  whereas,  the  statements  of  Alison  are  wholly 
without  foundation. 

f  The  surrender  of  this  place  was  influenced  by  the  sufierings  of  the  mhabi- 
tants  of  the  town,  rather  than  to  any  want  of  efficiency  in  the  garrison. 
Monnet  acted  from  sympathy,  rather  than  good  judgment. 


Cn.  XIV.]       THE    WAR    OF     1809     IN     GERMANY  131 

the  men  they  could  collect  from  the  depots  of  the  north,  hut 
also  ordered  a  levy  of  thirty  thousand  national  guards  from 
the  neighboring  departments  ;  this  levy  was  extended  even 
to  Burgundy.  France  responded  to  this  appeal  with  noble 
enthusiasm,  the  single  Department  du  Nord  alone  sending 
ten  thousand  men  ;  and  battalions  were  soon  marshaling 
there  from  all  direction.  Marshal  Moncey  commanded  a  part 
of  them  ;  and  Bernadette,  who  had  left  after  the  battle  of 
Wagram,  was  appointed  commander-in-chief,  and  reached 
his  army  on  the  sixteenth  of  August,  the  very  day  on  which 
Flushing  capitulated.  Within  six  days  he  had  under  his 
command  a  force  of  thirty  thousand  men,  and  although  these 
troops  were  not  of  a  very  military  appearance,  still  they 
were  full  of  zeal  and  ardor. 

After  having  waited  till  the  twenty-sixth  of  August, 
hesitating  whether  he  should  land  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Scheldt  and  march  on  Antwerp,  Chatham,  seeing  his  blow 
parried,  retook  the  road  to  England,  leaving  a  third  of  his 
army  at  Flushing. 

I  had  had  cause  to  complain  of  the  conduct  of  Bernadette 
on  the  Danube,  and  was  surprised  at  his  nomination  ;  I, 
therefore,  caused  him  to  be  replaced  by  Bessières.  This 
officer  repaired  to  the  island  of  South  Beveland,  and  sur- 
rounded Walcheren  with  batteries,  so  as  to  prevent  any  ex- 
cursions of  the  enemy. 

The  damp  climate  and  marshy  grounds  of  Walcheren 
produced  fevers,  which,  in  the  rains  of  autumn,  became  a 
real  pestilence  ;  in  a  week's  time,  the  sick  list  of  the  English 
numbered  nearly  ten  thousand,  exclusive  of  the  sailors  in  the 
rleet,  v/ho  were  also  subject  to  the  contagion.  The  obstinacy 
of  the  English  government  in  retaining  a  post  so  fatal  to  the 
lives  of  its  soldiers,  was  due  either  to  the  intention  of 
renewing  the  enterprise,  if  the  war  with  Austria  continued, 
or  to  a  desire  to  draw  that  power  into  a  rupture  of  the 


132-  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XIV. 

armistice,  by  holding  out  this  proof  of  the  determination  of 
England  to  effect  her  long  announced  diversion  in  favor  of 
her  continental  ally.  But  whatever  was  the  object,  it  com- 
pletely failed  ;  for  Austria  decided  to  make  peace,  and 
England,  after  a  useless  sacrifice  of  her  best  troops  in  the 
hospitals  of  Flushing,  finally  ordered  the  evacuation  of 
Walcheren,  But  before  this  evacuation  took  place,  they 
destroyed  all  the  works  and  naval  basins  at  Flushing,  with 
the  establishments  which  had  been  made  there  for  such  heavy 
shipping  as  could  not  reach  Antwerp,  for  want  of  sufficient 
depth  of  water  in  the  port.  The  destruction  of  this  arsenal 
was  a  misfortune,  but  we  consoled  ourselves  with  the  preser- 
vation of  the  more  important  place  of  Antwerp). 

Change  in  the  British  Ministry.— The  results  of  this  ex- 
pedition, contrasting  so  strongly  with  its  enormous  prepara- 
tions, the  largest,  indeed,  that  England  had  ever  made,  and 
the  total  loss  of  between  eight  and  ten  thousand  men, ■••'•"  fur- 
nished abundant  materials  to  the  enemies  of  the  ministry  for 
opposition  to  their  administration.  This  ministry  had  cer- 
tainly exhibited  sufficient  hatred  to  me,  sufficient  activity  in 
their  attempts  to  injure  me,  and  sufficient  solicitude  for 
extending  the  influence  of  England  ;  but  a  great  want  of 
skill  in  the  employment  of  its  means.  The  very  day  on 
which  this  expedition  landed  at  Flushing,  and  fifteen  thou- 
sand English  were  exhibiting  themselves  on  the  coasts  of 
Naples,  the  army  of  Wellington,  previously  victorious  at 
Oporto  and  Talavera,  was  very  near  being  enveloped  on  the 
Tagus,  and  forced  to  pass  under  the  Caudine  forks.  The 
news  of  these  several  operations  reached  me  during  the  nego- 

*  Toward  the  middle  of  September,  one-half  of  the  garrison  of  Flushing  was 
in  the  hospitals,  and  the  average  number  of  deaths  was  from  two  to  three 
hundred  a  week.  The  actual  number  of  men  lost  in  Belgium,  was  over  seven 
thousand,  and  twelve  thousand  eiglit  hundred  and  sixty-three  of  those  who 
returned  were  reported  sick,  a  large  number  of  them  afterward  dying  from  the 
effects  of  the  disease. 


Ch.   XIV.]         THE     WAR    OF     1809     IN    GERMANY.  133 

tiations  with  Austria.  I  did  not  in  any  respect  change  my 
dispositions  ;  but  I  must  confess  that,  for  a  moment,  I  feared 
the  combined  movements  of  Wellington  on  Madrid,  and 
Chatham  on  Antwerp,  might  induce  Austria  to  continue  the 
war,  and  this  circumstance,  connected  with  the  course*  pur- 
sued by  the  Empei'or  Alexander,  contributed  not  a  little  to 
make  me  desire  a  peace.  But  I  was  soon  relieved  from  this 
perplexity  by  the  double  retreat  from  Talavera  and  Flushing. 

The  ministry  which  had  directed  these  enterprises,  could 
not  satisfy  public  opinion  in  England  on  the  causes  of  their 
failure  ;  Canning  and  Castlereagh  imputed  to  each  other 
the  faults  of  these  exj^editions,  and  terminated  their  rivalry 
in  a  duel,  which  completed  the  dissolution  of  the  cabinet. 
On  the  twenty-second  of  September,  the  marquis  of  Wel- 
lesley,  brother  of  Wellington,  succeeded  Canning  in  the 
department  of  foreign  affairs  ;  Lord  Liverpool  replaced 
Castlereagh  in  the  war  office  ;  Lord  Chatham  yielded  the 
department  of  Ordnance  to  Lord  Mulgrave,  whose  place  in 
the  Board  of  Admiralty  was  filled  by  the  Duke  of  York  ; 
Percival  took  the  post  of  first  Lord  of  the  Treasury  and 
Chancelor  of  the  Exchequer. 

Stabs'  attempt  to  assassinate  Napoleon. — While  my  nego- 
tiators were  disputing  about  the  spoils  of  Austria,  I  remained 
at  Schonbrunn,  employed  in  my  ordinary  occupations  of 
administration.  Spain,  Belgium,  France,  and  our  colonies, 
were  all  objects  of  my  solicitude.  I  took  relaxation  from 
these  occupations  by  daily  parades  in  the  court  of  the  palace, 
and  by  simulacra  of  battles,  executed  by  my  guards  in  the 
plains  of  Penzing.  But  this  kind  of  recreation  was  very 
near  proving  fatal  to  me.  One  of  those  fanatical  Teutons, 
whom  the  scholastic  exaltation  of  the  universities  had  exas- 
perated against  me,  entered  the  circle  of  my  generals  and 
presented  himself  before  me.  Unhabituated  to  the  commis- 
sion  of   crime,   he   hesitated,    muttered   some   words,   and 


134  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIY. 

retired  ;  then  returned  a  second  time.  Rapp,  in  repelling 
this  German  Brutus,  perceived  that  he  carried  concealed  arms, 
and  caused  him  to  he  arrested.  On  his  trial  before  a  military 
commission,  this  visionary  confessed  his  project,  and  paid 
"with  his  life  the  penalty  of  his  crime.  He  was  a  Saxon  by 
birth,  and  his  name  was  Stabs. 

Austria  concludes  to  make  Peace. — The  double  negotia- 
tions between  our  plenipotentiaries  at  Altenbourg,  and 
between  Maret  and  Bubna,  failed  to  reconcile  Austria  to  the 
conditions  which  I  prescribed.  She  continued  to  exaggerate 
her  own  resources  and  our  embarrassments  ;  but  the  news  of 
the  retreat  of  the  English,  and  his  failure  to  draw  Prussia 
into  the  coalition,  and,  especially,  the  address  with  which  the 
Duke  of  Bassano  informed  the  Austrian  envoy  of  the  reën- 
forcements  which  I  had  received,  and  which  I  still  expected, 
finally  decided  the  Emperor  Francis,  to  yield  to  the  force  of 
necessity.  Toward  the  end  of  September,  Bubna  took  to  the 
emperor  Maret's  sme  qua  non,  and  returned  accompanied  by 
the  prince  of  Lichtenstein,  who  had  signed  the  armistice  of 
Austerlitz.  This  prince  was  one  of  the  bravest  officers  of 
cavalry,  and  a  good  citizen,  but  a  mediocre  politician.  He 
now,  however,  had  but  one  course  to  jmrsue,  for  he  was 
oblio-ed  to  submit  to  my  demands.  Prince  John  signed,  on 
the  fourteenth  of  October,  the  treaty  of  Vienna,  but  not 
without  complaining  of  the  heavy  sacrifices  it  imposed. 

Treaty  of  Vienna. — This  treaty,  more  harsh  than  any  of 
the  preceding,  cost  Austria  more  than  three  and  a  half  mil- 
lions of  inhabitants.  I  gave  to  Bavaria  Salzbourg,  the 
Innviertal,  with  Braunau,  and  Hausruch,  an  important  dis- 
trict of  the  sources  of  the  Traun  ;  this  secured  to  that  power 
a  superb,  and  even  ofiensive,  frontier  against  Austria.  I 
united,  under  the  name  of  the  Hlyrian  Provinces,  a  part  of 
Carinthia,  Carniola,  Dalmatia,  and  Croatia,  which  formed  a 
warlike  population  of  a  million  and  a  half  of  inhabitants,  and 


Cil.  XIV.]         THE    WAR    OF     1809     IN     GE II  MANY.  135 

extended   my  frontiers  to  the  Drave.     These    acquisitions, 
more  important  in  their  political  and  military  influence  than 
in  the   mere   increase  of  population,  changed  the  face  of 
Europe  ; — they  carried  my  eagles  from  the  Noric  Alps  to 
within  forty  leagues  of  Vienna  ;  the  capital  of  Austria,  dis- 
mantled hy  my  orders,  was  now  exposed  to  my  i)halanxes  ; 
in  six  days'  march  I  could  even  take  it  in  reverse,  by  debouch- 
ing by  Lake  Flatten  and  separating  it  from  Hungary.     The 
Austrian  monarchy  would  be  a  mere  satellite,  revolving  within 
the  orbit  of  my  empire  ;  ^it  lay  entirely  at  my  disposal.    Nor 
was  this  the  only  advantage.     I  might  eventually  renew  my 
plan  of  the  partition  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  ;  and,  if  so, 
the  acquisition   of  these  provinces,  extending  my  limits  to 
the  contines    of  Greece  and   Bosnia,  would  be   of  immense 
advantage  in  the  execution  of  that  grand  project.     And,  if 
circumstances  should  induce  me  to  renounce  the  dismember- 
ment of  Turkey,  I  would  nevertheless  find,  in  the  possession 
of  Illyria,  the  means  of  building  up  our  fine  maritime  estab- 
lishments at  Venice  and   Corfu.     At  any  rate,  by  gaining 
possession  of  the  coast  countries,  I  would  separate  Austria 
from  British  influence,  and  force  her  to  adopt  the  continental 
system.     Thus  had  I,  in  four  years,  extended  to  the  gates  of 
Vienna   and  the  shores  of  Greece  the  limits  of  France,  to 
whom  Fitt  had  contested  the  possession  of  Belgium.     So  far, 
all  was    well.      But   to    these   conditions  I   had  added  the 
cession  of  western  Galicia  to  the  duchy  of  Warsaw,  contrary 
to  the  treaty  of  Tilsit.     The  secret  articles  of  the  treaty  of 
Vienna  stipulated  for  the  reduction  of  the  Austrian  army  to 
half  its  existing  numbers  ;   the  discharge  of  all  officers  and 
soldiers  belonging  to  the  countries  ceded  to  France  and  her 
allies  ;  and,  finally,  the  payment  of  r.'ghty-five  millions  of 
francs. 

Results  of  this  Peace.— This  peace,  at  first  sight,  secured 
far  more  advantages  than  that  of  Tilsit  ;  but,  if  we  consider 


136  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.    XIY. 

the  article  of  the  treaty,  -which  was  calculated  to  offend 
R'T'^sia,  and  the  family  alliance  which  was  afterward  nego- 
tiated, it  will  not  be  doubted  that  it  was  less  advantageous 
than  it  appeared.  It  was  a  question,  however,  which  was 
decided  in  the  negative  at  Moscow  in  1812,  and  at  Prague 
in  1813.  It  finally  resulted  in  alienating  both  Austria  and 
Russia,  whereas,  I  ought  to  have  attached  to  myself  at  least 
one  of  these  jiowers.  Already,  as  early  as  1805,  the  famous 
Thugut,  then  in  retirement  at  Prcsbourg,  but  still  exercising 
a  poAverful  influence  over  the  mind  of  Francis  I.,  had  indi- 
rectly hinted  on  the  reciprocal  advantages  to  the  two  courts 
of  renewing  the  relations  of  1756,  preceded  by  a  family 
alliance.  The  treaty  of  Presbourg  destroyed  the  effect  of  this 
vague  proposal.  But  the  Emperor  Francis,  in  the  letter 
which  he  wrote  to  me  after  the  battle  of  Znaim,  still  spoke 
of  the  advantage  of  uniting  the  two  powers.  Their  happiest 
days,  said  he,  ivere  those  lohen  they  ivere  most  intimately 
allied!  This  was  enough  to  convince  me  that  it  only  de- 
pended on  myself  to  renew  this  grand  alliance  ;  but  to  make 
it  a  durable  one,  I  ought  not  to  have  begun  by  destroying 
and  humiliating  him  whom  I  wished  to  make  my  friend.  I 
ought  rather  to  have  acted  the  magnanimous,  to  have  entered 
into  the  spirit  of  the  overture  of  the  Emperor  Francis,  pro- 
posing to  him  the  alliance  offensive  and  defensive  of  1756, 
leaving  to  him  his  states,  and,  if  I  still  determined  to  reën- 
force  the  duchy  of  Warsaw,  and  restore,  some  day,  the  king- 
dom of  Poland,  to  secretly  stipulate  indemnities  for  Galicia. 
It  will  be  said  that  this  would  have  abruptly  broken  off  the 
alliance  of  Tilsit,  in  order  to  form  another  less  advantageous. 
Not  so.  A  renewal  of  the  alliance  of  1756  with  Austria 
would  have  been  no  violation  of  the  treaty  of  Tilsit.  To 
reconcile  'the  two,  I  had  only  to  renounce  my  project  of 
restoring  the  kingdom  of  Poland.  Moreover,  if  the  cession 
of  Galicia  to  the  duchy  of  Warsaw  had  not  already  weakened 


Ch.  XIV.]         THE     WAR    OF     1309     IN     GERMANY.  IZt 

the  alliance  of  Tilsit,  it  would  have  been  broken  by  my 
marriage,  six  months  later. 

Reception  of  the  Treaty  by  Russia.— The  secret  articles 
of  the  treaty  of  Tilsit  virtually  forbid  all  aggrandizement  of 
the  duchy  of  Warsaw  ;  and  to  give  it,  notwithstanding,  near 
a  million  of  inhabitants,  was  to  announce  to  Kussia  that  I 
purposed  the  restoration  of  Poland.  I  vainly  flattered  my- 
self that  I  should  be  able  to  pacify  Russia,  by  giving  her  the 
district  of  Tarnopol,  and  assuring  her  that  I  would  not 
attempt  the  reestablishment  of  Poland  ;  but  she  distrusted 
my  promises.  The  Emperor  Alexander,  therefore,  on  receiv- 
ing the  treaty  of  Vienna,  sent  for  Caulaincourt,  and  said  to 
him  plainly,  that  he  saw  my  intentions  ;  that  he  would  not 
become  the  aggressor,  but  would  prepare  himself  for  what- 
ever might  happen,  and  be  ready  in  case  he  were  attacked. 
I  might  very  well  have  justified  the  course  I  had  pursued  by 
alleging  the  conduct  of  the  Russians  during  the  campaign. 
In  reality,  the  Russians  were  individually  dissatisfied  Avith 
the  peace  of  Tilsit,  and  especially  with  that  article  which  cre- 
ated the  duchy  of  Warsaw,  for  they  dreaded  the  restoration  of 
Poland  as  much  as  the  loss  of  their  own  empire,  and  were 
ignorant  of  the  secret  article  which  forbade  its  reestablish- 
ment. It  was  on  this  account  that  they  were  individually 
dissatisfied  with  the  war,  and  ill-disposed  to  fight  against  the 
Austrians,  and  provoke  the  insurrection  and  emancipation  of 
Galicia,  seeing  that  this  event  might  operate  against  them- 
selves. The  Russian  government,  however,  knowing  all  the 
conditions  of  the  treaty,  was  disposed*  to  abide  by  its  stipu- 
lations. I  must,  therefore,  confess  that  in  this  matter  I 
exhibited  more  independence  and  boldness  than  address  and 
foresight.  I  desired  the  restoration  of  Poland,  and  I  was  not 
likely  to  exhibit,  on  this  occasion,  anything  like  a  pusil- 
lanimous regard  for  the  opinions  of  Russia. 

Austria  was  conquered,  and  I  held  her  fast  in  my  talons. 


138  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XIY. 

I  had  seen  the  hostility  which  directed  her  councils,  and  I 
thought  less  of  gaining  her  by  reciprocal  advantages,  than  of 
chaining  her  submissive  to  ray  car  ;  —  fear  often  makes, 
amons:  nations,  more  friends  than  true  interest.  On  the  first 
outset  of  war,  Austria  would  either  be  forced  to  declare  for 
us,  or  I  would  begin  the  war  by  marching  to  her  cajjital  in 
eight  days  and  efiecting  the  dismemberment  of  her  mon- 
archy. The  second  campaign  would  be  against  those  who 
should  attempt  to  interfere  between  me  and  Austria,  with- 
out being  able  to  afford  the  latter  any  assistance  in  time. 
If  the  campaign  of  1812  had  not  taken  an  unfavorable  turn, 
my  project  would  have  been  declared  superb,  and  no  one  would 
ever  have  thought  of  discovering  its  errors.  I  must  confess, 
however,  when  I  reflect  upon  the  situation  of  affairs  of  1809, 
that  the  project  was  bold  and  audacious,  rather  than  wise. 
It  was  in  the  end  unfortunate,  perhaps,  for  Russia  as  well 
as  for  France  and  myself,  that  the  Emperor  Alexander 
declined  my  proposition  to  appoint  some  one  to  assist  in  the 
negotiations  of  Schonbrunn.  In  that  case,  the  difficulties  of 
the  cession  of  Galicia  would  have  been  avoided  ;  for,  on  the 
objection  of  the  Russian  minister,  I  should  either  have 
abandoned  the  project,  or  have  made  some  other  arrange- 
ments satisfactory  to  that  power.  Moreover,  we  might  have 
so  modified  the  conditions  imposed  on  Austria,  as  to  have 
made  us  an  ally  of  the  house  of  Hapsburg. 

But  enough  of  these  hypotheses  ; — let  us  now  return  to  a 
relation  of  fiicts. 

The  treaty  of  Vienna  was  so  ill  calculated  to  favor  any 
ulterior  alliance,  that,  until  the  last  moment,  I  had  doubts 
of  its  ratification,  and  made  preparations  for  a  renewal  of 
hostilities.  But,  notwithstanding  the  opposition  of  both 
Metternich  and  Stadion,  it  was  finally  ratified  on  the  twenty- 
second  of  October. 

Destriictioii  of  the  Fortifications  of  Vienna. — As  soon  as 


Ch.  XIY.]      THE    WAK    OF     1809     IN     GEUMANY.  139 

I  learned  that  Atistria  had  ratified  the  treaty  I  set  out  from 
Munich  for  Paris,  havin<i;  first  diiected  the  demolition  of  the 
fortifications  of  Brunn,  Raab,  Gratz,  Vienna,  and  Spitz,  I 
had  twice  been  made  to  appreciate  the  embarrassment  which 
Vienna  might  have  caused  us  had  it  been  well  defended, 
and  the  great  advantages  which  Ave  derived  from  its  posses- 
sion. Under  our  new  relations,  which  resulted  from  the 
treaty,  this  capital  would  hardly  decide  for  me  con  amove, 
althouii'li  it  mijrht  throu<j;h  fear.  I  had  caused  all  the  bas- 
tions  to  be  mined  during  the  armistice,  and  I  now  directed 
their  explosion.  These  bastions,  which  had  formerly  been 
the  safeguard  of  the  monarchy,  now  formed  the  most  delight- 
ful promenades  of  the  Viennese,  who  were  both  grieved  and 
humiliated  by  their  destruction.  This  measure  affected  the 
pride  of  the  inhabitants  more  sensibly  than  the  loss  of  two 
of  their  best  provinces,  and  made  me  more  enemies  in  Austria 
than  two  disastrous  wars.  On  the  supposition  of  a  i)robable 
alliance,  this  measure  was  impolitic  ;  but,  at  the  time  when 
I  ordered  it,  there  seemed  no  possibility  of  such  an  event, 
for  my  neglect  to  notice  their  two  indirect  appeals  would 
seem  to  cut  off  all  jirobability  of  a  renewal  of  the  subject, 
and  the  present  sentiments  of  the  emj^eror  and  his  cabinet 
were  too  decided  to  hope  for  any  immediate  change. 

Expedition  for  the  Subjugation  of  the  Tyrol.  —  I  now 
directed  against  the  Tyrol  forces  sufficient  for  the  subjuga- 
tion of  the  country.  General  Drouet  (Count  d'Erlon),  with 
the  Bavarians  and  a  French  division,  advanced  by  the  north 
and  the  valley  of  the  Inn,  while  Eugene  directed  some 
columns  of  the  army  of  Italy  by  the  valleys  of  the  Drave 
and  the  Adige.  The  three  divisions,  under  the  orders  of 
Baraguey  d'Hilliers,  were  destined  for  the  same  object,  and 
General  Vial  marched  by  Eoveredo,  in  order  to  assist  them. 
But  the  approach  of  these  seven  divisions  did  not  intimidate 
these  fierce  mountaineers  ; — our  columns  were  concentrated 


140  L  I  F  i:      OF      N  A  1'  U  L  K  O  N  .  [Ch.  ZilY. 

after  suveral  combats  ;  Wrede  reached  the  Brenner,  and 
Baraguey  d'Hilliers,  the  town  of  Brixen.  But  the  columns 
which  attempted  to  penetrate  the  lateral  valleys,  were  assailed 
by  a  fanatical  multitude  ;  two  battalions  were  taken  at  St. 
Leonard,  and  our  posts  were  assailed  at  Silian,  at  Pru- 
necken,  and  at  Brixen,  so  that  Baraguey  d'Hilliers  had 
difficulty  in  saving  them.  It  was  found  necessary  to  call  the 
division  of  Durutte  from  Carinthia.  Yielding,  at  last,  to  the 
evidence  of  their  senses,  these  brave  but  erring  men  sent  in 
their  partial  submission  ; — the  chiefs  of  those  who  provoked 
the  massacre  of  the  Bavarians,  were  tried  and  shot.  Hofer 
still  fouo-ht  for  a  time  with  a  few  hundred  men,  and  at  last 
took  refuge  among  the  rocks  ;  but,  betrayed  and  discovered, 
he  was  an-ested  and  conducted  to  the  prison  of  Mantua, 
where  he,  also,  was  tried  and  condemned  to  death.  If  cour- 
age could  be  any  safeguard  against  such  a  fate,  certainly 
Hofer  had  been  entitled  to  a  i)ardon  ;  but  he  perished,  a 
victim  to  imperious  necessity  and  the  stern  laws  of  war. 

Remarks  on  the  Campaign.  —  This  expedition,  which 
terminated  in  January,  closed  the  campaign  of  1809,  so  new, 
so  extraordinary,  and  so  rich  in  great  lessons.  This  cam- 
paign in  Austria  had  unveiled  to  me  new  dangers,  and  shown 
how  precarious  was  my  position  amidst  the  adventurous 
passions,  and  interests,  and  ambitions  of  all  Europe.  The 
focus  of  resistance  was  not  merely  in  Spain,  Portugal, 
England,  Prussia,  Germany,  Holland,  or  at  Rome  ;  it  had 
also  numerous  ramifications  even  in  France.  The  informa- 
tion which  I  received  proved  to  me  the  dissatisfaction  and 
ambition  of  Talleyrand  and  Touché  ;  the  latter  had  betrayed 
hiniself  in  the  council  during  niy  apparent  embarrassment  in 
the  island  of  Lobau.  He  had  taken  upon  himself  to  raise 
companies  of  the  elite  of  the  national  guards  in  several 
departments,  without  the  authorization  of  the  Council  of  the 
Empire,  (which  was  composed  of  the  ministers  and  grand 


Ch.  XIV.]       THE    WAR    OF     1809    IN     GERMANY.  141 

dignitaries  under  the  presidency  of  Cambacéres),  saying,  that 
if  I  gave  lustre  to  France,  France  should  show  that  my  pres- 
ence was  not  necessary  to  repel  the  enemy,— a  patriotic 
truth,  without  doubt,  but  an  ill-timed  and  useless  expres- 
sion, accompanied  by  an  illegal  and  factious  measure.  But 
it  is  time  to  return  to  the  operations  of  Wellington  in  Spain, 
where  the  war  was  scarcely  less  fertile  in  important  events 
than  on  the  Danube. 


CHAPTER   XV. 

CAMPAIGN   OF   1809   m   THE   SPANISH  PENINSULA. 

State  of  Affairs  in  the  Peninsula — First  Operations  of  Soult — Combats  of 
Chaves  and  Braga — Assault  of  Oporto — Soult  takes  the  left  Bank  of  the 
Minho — Victories  of  Medellin  and  Ciudad-Real — Difficult  Position  of  Soult — 
Combat  of  Amarante — New  Descent  of  Wellington  into  Portugal — He  at- 
tacks Soult  at  Oporto^Soult's  Retreat — Ney's  Operations  in  the  Asturias — 
Misunderstanding  between  Soult  and  Ney,  and  the  consequent  Evacuation 
of  Galicia — Wellington's  Advance  on  Madrid — Joseph  collects  his  Forces  for 
an  Attack — His  Dispositions  for  Battle — Wellington's  System  of  Battles — 
Battle  of  Talavera — Operations  of  Soult,  Ney,  and  Mortier — Retreat  of  the 
Allies — Battle  of  Almonacid — Xey  defeats  Wilson — Remarks  on  these  Opera- 
tions— Soult  succeeds  JourJan  as  Joseph's  Chief  of  Staff^Combats  of 
Tamames  and  Alba  de  Tormes — Arrizaga  beaten  at  Ocana — Inaction  of 
Wellington — Intrenched  C:imp  of  Torres  Vedras — Romana  quarrels  with 
the  Junta  of  Seville' — Blake's  Efforts  to  deliver  Aragon — Operations  of 
Suchet — Combat  of  Santa  Maria — Combat  of  B?lchite — St.-Cyr's  Operations 
in  Catalonia — Siego  of  Gerona — General  Remarks  on  the  Operations  of  this 
Campaign — Operations  of  the  Russians  against  Sweden — War  between  Rus- 
sia and  Turkey. 

State  of  Affairs  in  tlie  Peninsula.— In  turning  from  the 
ensanguined  banks  of  the  Ebro  to  observe  what  was  passing 
on  the  Danube,  we  left  St.-Cyr  at  Tarragona,  nearly  sur- 
rounded by  the  armed  population  of  Catalonia  ;  Juuot, 
amidst  the  ruins  of  Saragossa,  seeking  to  calm  angry  Ara- 
gon ;  Joseph,  with  the  reserve,  at  Madrid  ;  Mortici  's  corps, 
€71  route  from  Saragossa  to  join  the  king  ;  Victor  and  Se- 
bastiani,  guarding  tiie  line  of  the  Tagus  ;  Ney,  occupying 
Galicia  ;  Soult,  marching  on  Portugal  ;  the  division  of 
Lapisse,  at  Salamanca  ;  Kellerman  at  Valladolid  ;  and  the 
other  detache/1  divisions,  occupying  and  organizing  Biscay, 
Navarre,  Castile,  and  Leon,     I  have  already  explained  the 


Cn.XY.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1809    IN     SPAIN.  U3 

motive,s  which  induced  me  to  send  Soult  into  Portugal  after 
the  def.at  of  the  English  army  under  Moore  ;  the  chances  of 
his  success  in  subjugating  this  kingdom,  and  in  aveno-in.  the 
defeat  of  Vimiero  ;  the  strong  measures  taken  by  the  Prince 
Regent  and  his  executive  council  to  oppose  us  ;  and  finally 
the  dispositions  of  the  English,  who  remained  under  the 
orders  of  General  Craddock. 

First  Operations  of  Soult.-After  having  resigned  Galicia 
to  the  troops  of  Marslial   Ncy,  Soult  marched   on  Tuy   in 
order  to  pass  the  Minho  at  that  place.     The  heavy   rains 
^yhlch  fan  in  Galicia  during  half  the  year  had  swollen  this 
nver    and  the  overflowing  of  the  marsh  opposite  this  city 
greatly  increased  its  width  ;  the  want  of  boats,  (all  those  in 
the  vicinity  having  been  removed  by  the  enemy),  and   the 
proximity  of  Valencia,  added  so  much  to  the  difficulty  of 
the  enterprise,  that  Soult  was  forced  to  renounce  his  project 
and,  leaving  the  mass  of  his  materials  at  Tuy,  to  ascend  the 
river  toward  Orense. 

fonibats   of   Chayes   and   Braga.-Romana  had   incited 
these  provinces  to  insurrection,  and  his  corps  seemed  disposed 
to  defend  them.     After  having  defeated  him  at  Ribadavia 
and  Monterey,  Soult  advanced  on  Chaves  and  captured  it 
taking    two    thousand    prisoners.       The    Anglo-Portuo-uese 
generals,  not  less  alarmed  at  the   march   of  Victor  on  the 
Tagus  than  at  the   approach  of  Soult,   had   concentrated 
between  Leyria  and  Abrantes  to  complete  the  organization 
of  the  troops  of  the  line  in  English  pay,  and  of  the  regular 
mihtia  levied  by  Portugal.     The  defense  of  the  mountains 
of  Tras-los-Montes  was  left  to  the  insurgent  masses  under 
General  Friere  and  the  division  of  Silveira.     Amon<^  these 
insurgents  there  figured  a  battalion  of  students  formed  by 
the  bishop  of  Braga.     Frightful   anarchy  reigned  in  these 
assembled  masses  ;  all  accused  the  chiefs  who  had  allowed 
the  French  to  enter  and  take  Chaves  ;  a  crowd  of  peasants 


144  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON,  [Cii.  XV. 

attacked  General  Friere  and  massacred  him,  and  also  his 
aides-de-camp,  the  commanding  officer  of  engineers,  and 
even  the  corregidor  of  Braga,  whom  they  accused  of  luke- 
warmness,  or  of  connivance  with  us.  The  command  of  this 
insurgent  multitude  was  given  to  a  Hanoverian  colonel  who 
was  himself  utterly  astonished  at  the  j^opular  effervescence 
around  him  ;  hut  his  only  course  was  to  submit  to  the 
demands  of  these  fanatics  who  cried  aloud  for  battle.  He 
received  the  attack  of  Soult,  on  the  twentieth  of  March,  on 
the  heights  of  Lanhozo  and  Carvalho-d'Este  in  front  of 
Braga,  where  he  was  defeated  and  put  to  flight.  Our  troojis 
had  the  generosity  to  treat  the  enemy  as  prisoners  of  war, 
notwithstanding  they  had  mutilated  many  of  our  men  with 
the  most  revolting  barbarity.  The  inhabitants  of  the 
beautiful  city  of  Braga,  to  the  number  of  twenty-five  thou- 
sand were  all  put  to  flight. 

Assault  of  Oporto.— On  the  twenty-sixth,  Soult's  army 
advanced  to  Oporto,  where  fifty  thousand  insurgents  had 
assembled  in  arms  under  the  orders  of  the  bishop,  who  had 
two  generals  as  his  lieutenants.  The  environs  of  this  city 
are  composed  of  a  multitude  of  small  hills,  which  give  it  a 
most  agreeable  aspect.  These  heights  had  been  covered  with 
redoubts,  erected  under  the  direction  of  the  English  and 
Portuguese  engineers,  and  their  ramparts  were  armed  with 
two  hundred  pieces  of  artillery.  To  leave  a  city  like  this  in 
his  rear,  would  have  been  feasible  and  proper  only  in  case  he 
were  to  effect  a  junction  with  Victor  on  a  fixed  day,  to  act 
in  concert  against  the  regular  Anglo-Portuguese  army  in  the 
valley  of  the  Tagus.  But  as  nothing  of  this  kind  had  been 
concerted  between  the  generals,  Soult  thought  the  only 
proper  course  for  hira  to  pursue  was  to  assault  Oporto  and 
and  make  himself  master  of  the  place.  So  exasperated  were 
the  militia  and  insurgents,  that  they  tore  in  pieces  one  of 
their  own  chiefs,  and  the  Portuguese  generals  were  obliged 


Cil.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1809     IN     SPAIN.  145 

to  resort  to  subterfuge  iu  order  to  receive  a  flag  of  truce. 
Soult  begged  theru  to  save  the  city  from  the  horrors  insepar- 
able from  an  assault  ;  but  while  they  were  parleying,  they 
captured  by  an  unworthy  stratagem,  General  Foy,  taking 
him  from  the  front  of  his  division.  They  were  forced  to 
place  him  in  j^rison  to  protect  him  from  the  rage  of  the 
populace,  by  whom  he  had  already  been  most  cruelly  treated 
notwithstanding  his  escort. 

Marshal  Soult,  seeing  from  the  rejection  of  his  j)roposi- 
tions   that  force   alone  could    decide    the   question,  on   the 
twenty-ninth  of  March,  ordered  an  assault.     Three  columns 
carry   the  redoubts  on  the  centre  and   two  wings,  while  a 
fourth  drives  back  the  inliabitants  who  have  sallied  out  of 
the  city.     They  fire  upon  our   troops  from  the  houses  and 
traverses  constructed  across  the  streets  ;  but  our  troops  sur- 
mount all  obstacles,  penetrate  even  to  the  superb  bridge  of 
boats  across  the  Douro,  on  which  the  army  of  the  archbishop 
precipitates  itself  pell-mell  with  the  inhabitants.     A  ponton 
is  broken  under  the  weight  of  the  flying  mass,  but  is  again 
repaired  ;  our  troops  throw  themselves  on  the  opposing  bat- 
teries, and  carry  the  convent  of  La  Sena,   while  the  dis- 
persed enemy  flies  to  Coimbra.     We  are,  perhaps,  more  dis- 
posed  to   look   with   pity   on   the   fate   of  these   flinatical 
people,  who  shot  our  soldiers  from  the  roofs  and  windows  of 
their  houses,  than  on  that  of  the  brave  troops  who  were 
exasperated  to  resort  to  severe  but  justifiable  retaliation.     A 
carnage  of  six  hours  was  followed  by  a  moment  of  pillage, 
which  is  but  too  commonly  the  price  of  such  resistance  ;  our 
troops,  however,  showed  moderation  instead  of  exceeding  the 
limits  allowed  by  the  laws  of  war. 

This  feat  of  arms, — one  of  the  finest  in  the  whole  war, — 
procured  us  immense  booty  :  one  hundred  and  ninety-seven 
pieces  of  ordnance,  and  a  large  quantity  of  military  munitions. 
Only  three  hundred  prisoners  were  taken. 
VOL.  r:i.  ]0 


146  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XV. 

Soult  takes  the  left  Bank  of  the  Minho.  —  In  any  other 
country  another  such  victory  would  have  decided  the  fate, 
not  only  of  Lisbon,  hut  of  Portugal  :  here,  however,  one 
success  only  rendered  it  necessary  to  gain  another.  The 
conquerors  were  now  embarrassed  by  want  of  provisions,  and 
actually  ready  to  perish  with  famine  in  the  richest  country 
in  Europe.  Soult  made  every  exertion  in  his  power  to  re- 
store tranquillity  and  reorganize  the  administrative  service  ; 
but  how  could  order  be  expected  in  a  country  given  up  to  all 
the  furies  of  anarchy,  where  a  Portuguese  general  massacres 
a  coiTegidor  for  surrendering  to  the  marshal  ! 

Soult's  first  care  was  to  capture  Valenza  and  relieve  Tuy, 
where  the  brave  General  Lamartinière  had  been  besieged, 
Avith  all  the  material  of  the  army,  by  the  fanatical  bands  of 
the  Abbot  Contho,  and  some  Portuguese  militia.  General 
Heudelet,  assisted  by  the  dragoons  of  Lorges,  had  the  good 
fortune  to  get  possession  of  Valenza  without  opposition.  He 
thus  effected  the  junction,  and  succeeded  in  rescuing  this 
precious  convoy.  Yiana,  and  the  strong  places  on  the  Minho, 
were  surrendered,  and  a  temporary  pacification  of  the  country 
effected. 

Victories  of  Medellin  and  Cuidad-Real.  —  My  departure 
from  Spain  at  first  seemed  to  produce  no  unfavorable  change 
in  our  affairs  in  the  Peninsula  ;  the  very  day  previous  to  the 
triumph  of  Soult  at  Oporto,  Victor  preluded  that  victory  in 
such  a  way  as  to  induce  me  to  hojie  for  the  entire  success  of 
his  enterprise.  Having  gotten  rid,  at  Ucles,  of  the  army  of 
Andalusia,  Joseph  had  left  to  Sebastiani  the  care  of  hold- 
ing it  in  check,  while  the  first  corps,  established  in  the 
environs  of  Almaraz  on  the  Tagus,  was  opposed  to  the  army 
of  Cuesta,  or  of  Estramadura.  My  plan  was  for  this  corps 
to  descend  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  so  as  to  assist  the  march 
of  Soult  on  Lisbon,  flattering  myself  that  the  victories  of 
Almonacid  and  Ucles  had  destroyed  all  the  chances  of  oppo- 


Ciî.  XY.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1809     IN    SPAIN.  147 

sition  from  the  Spanish  armies.  But  this  calculation  was 
erroneous  ;  the  sujireme  junta  had  exerted  all  jiossible 
activity  in  reorganizing  the  army  of  Cuesta,  an  old  general 
of  mediocre  talent,  but  endowed  with  presence  of  mind, 
courage,  and  perseverance.  Emboldened  by  the  inaction  of 
our  troops  behind  the  Tagus,  Cuesta  took  possession  of 
Almaraz,  and  blew  up  the  bridge.  His  audacity,  however, 
ended  here,  and  he  took  a  defensive  line  behind  the  river. 

The  Duke  of  Belluno,  having  collected  the  necessary 
means,  crossed  the  Tagus,  and  Cuesta  retreated  behind  the 
Guadiana  by  Medellin.  Victor  f  )llowed  in  pursuit,  cross- 
ing the  river  at  Merida,  and  ascending  the  stream.  A 
rencontre  took  place  near  Mengabriel,  in  rear  of  Medellin,  and 
was  one  of  the  warmest  contests  that  occurred  during  the 
war,  at  least  with  the  Spaniards.  The  ephemeral  success  of 
driving  back  our  first  line  for  a  moment,  gave  occasion  for 
exultation  and  boasting  to  the  enemy  ;  but  soon,  charged 
by  the  divisions  of  Levai,  Euffin,  and  Villatte,  assisted  on 
the  left  by  the  cavahy  of  the  redoubtable  Lasalle,  and  on  the 
right  by  Latour-Maubourg,  the  Spaniards  were  everywhere 
beaten.  The  rout  was  the  more  complete,  as,  menaced  by 
the  left,  Cuesta  was  unable  to  maintain  himself  perpen- 
dicular to  the  Guadiana,  without  being  turned  and  thrown 
u])0u  the  river.  Our  troops,  exasperated  by  the  insults 
received  from  the  Spaniards  in  their  moment  of  victory,  were 
at  first  inclined  to  give  no  quarter.  From  six  to  seven  thou- 
sand men,  killed  and  wounded,  were  strewed  over  the  field 
of  battle,  and  five  thousand  were  taken  prioners.  We  paid 
pretty  dearly  for  this  success,  which  cost  us  not  less  than 
four  thousand  men  hors-de-comhat. 

The  day  previous  to  this  glorious  victory  (March  27th), 
Sebastiani  had  marched  against  the  Duke  of  Infantado,  com- 
pletely defeating  him  at  Cuidad-Real,  and  forced  him  to 


148  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XV. 

take  refuge  in  the  Sierra  Moi-ena,  where  the  duke  soon  threw 
up  his  command  and  went  to  Seville. 

The  Spaniards  were  conquered,  but  they  quickly  sprung 
up  again  from  their  ashes  ;  a  part  of  the  prisoners,  through 
the  assistance  of  the  inhabitants,  escaped  from  our  escorts  ; 
and  others,  who  had  enrolled  themselves  under  Joseph,  de- 
serted from  us  and  rejoined  their  own  colors.  The  junta 
pressed  in  the  volunteers,  or  drafted  men  by  lot,  to  fill  up 
the  skeletons  of  their  regiments  of  the  line.  By  the  end  of 
April,  Cuesta  had  reorganized  his  army,  and  increased  its 
numbers  to  about  thirty  thousand  men,  and  Victor,  cantoned 
between  the  Tagus  and  the  Guadiana,  was  embarrassed  to 
penetrate  to  Abrantes  against  the  Anglo-Portuguese,  while 
an  army  still  more  powerful  than  his  owm,  debouching  from 
Badajos  on  Alcantara,  was  coming  to  assail  him  in  rear  ;— 
he  was  in  a  precarious  situation,  and  if  he  had  now  executed 
my  orders,  he  would  have  been  lost. 

Difficult  Position  of  Soult.— Having  received  at  Oporto 
the  materials  which  he  had  been  forced  to  leave  at  Tuy, 
Soult  applied  himself  to  the  pacification  of  the  inhabitants 
of  the  province  of  Minho.  By  order  and  firmness,  he  was 
partially  successful.  It  is  said  by  some,  that  for  the  better 
success  of  his  object,  he  thought  to  have  himself  declared 
sovereign  of  Portugal,  as  a  kingdom  independent  both  of 
Prance  and  England  ;  at  least  it  is  certain  that  proclama- 
tions of  this  character  were  issued  by  his  chief  of  staff  to  the 
army.  But  from  the  good  judgment  and  known  patriotism 
of  Soult,  it  must  be  believed  that  this  project  w^as  designed 
merely  as  a  means  of  creating  a  new  party  in  Portugal  :  the 
idea  of  playing  the  part  of  a  second  Dumouriez,  in  my  reign, 
was  too  absurd  to  be  seriously  entertained  by  a  man  of  his 
judgment."' 

*  Alison  conveys  the  impression  that  Soult  was  at  this  time  intriguing  to 
place  himself  on   the  throne  of  Portugal,  with  or  without  the  authority  of 


Ch.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1809     IN     SPAIN  149 

Be  this  as  it  may  Soult,  before  marching  on  Lisbon,  waited 
to  be  joined  by  his  brother  who  was  bringing  him  four  or  five 
thousand  convalescents  from  Astorga,  and  to  liear  from  the 

Napoleon,  and  that  the  plan  went  even  so  for  as  to  contemplate  a  revolt  a^rainst 
the  French  emperor.  The  statement  is  not  sustained.  Alison's  account  of 
Soult's  operations  at  Oporto,  and  subsequently,  is  greatly  discolored  by  preju- 
dice. On  the  contrary,  Napier's  account  is  entirely  fair  and  just.  We  copy 
his  concluding  remarks  on  Soult's  conduct  in  this  affair: 

"Having  repressed  the  disorders  attendant  on  the  battle,  he  adopted  the 
same  concilatory  policy  which  had  marked  his  conduct  at  Chaves  and  Braga, 
and  endeavored  to  remedy,  as  far  as  it  was  possible,  the  deplorable  results  "of 
the  soldier's  fury  ;  recovering  and  restoring  a  part  of  the  plunder,  he  caused 
the  inliabitants  remaining  in  the  town  to  be  treated  with  respect,  and  invited 
by  proclamation,  all  those  who  had  fled  to  return.  He  demanded  no  contribua 
tions,  and  restraining  with  a  firm  hand  the  violence  of  his  men,  contrived,  from 
the  captured  public  property,  to  support  the  army  and  even  to  succor  the 
poorest  and  most  distressed  of  the  population. 

"But  his  ability  in  the  civil  and  political  administration  of  the  Entre 
lUnho  e  Douro,  produced  an  effect  which  he  was  not  prepared  fir.  The  Prince 
Regent's  desertion  of  the  country  was  not  forgotten.  The  national  feeling  was 
as  adverse  to  Portugal  being  a  dependency  on  the  Brazils,  as  it  was  to  the 
usurpation  of  the  French,  and  the  comparison  between  Soult's  government  and 
the  horrible  anarchy  which  preceded  it,  was  all  in  favor  of  the  former.  His 
victories,  and  the  evident  vigor  of  his  character,  contrasted  with  tlie  apparent 
supineness  of  the  English,  promised  permanency  for  the  French  power,  and 
the  party,  formerly  noticed  as  being  inimical  to  the  house  of  Braganza,  revived. 
The  leaders,  thinking  this  a  favorable  opportunity  to  execute  their  intention* 
waited  upon  the  Duke  of  Dalmatia,  and  expressed  their  desire  for  a  French 
prince  and  an  independent  government.  They  even  intimated  their  good 
wishes  toward  the  duke  himself,  and  demanded  his  concurrence  and  protection 
while,  in  the  name  of  the  people,  they  declared  that  the  Braganza  dynasty  was 
at  an  end. 

"Although  unauthorized  by  the  emperor  to  accede  to  this  proposition,  Soult 
was  yet  unwilling  to  reject  a  plan  from  which  he  could  draw  such  immediate 
and  important  military  advantages.  Napoleon  was  not  a  man  to  be  lightly 
dealt  with  on  such  an  occasion,  but  the  marshal,  trusting  that  circumstances 
would  justify  him,  encouraged  the  design,  appointed  men  to  civil  employments 
and  raised  a  Portuguese  legion  of  five  battalions.  He  acted  with  so  much 
dexterity  that  in  fifteen  days,  the  cities  of  Oporto  and  Braga,  and  the  towns  of 
Bacellos,  Viana,  Villa-de-Conde,  Povoa-de-Barcim,  Feira  and  Avar,  sent  ad- 
dresses, containing  the  expression  of  their  sentiments,  and  bearing  the  signa- 
tures of  thirty  thousand  persons,  as  well  of  the  nobles,  clergy,  and  merchants, 
as  of  the  people.  These  addresses  were  burned  when  the  French  retreated 
from  Oporto,  but  the  fact  that  such  a  project  was  in  agitation  has  never  been 
denied;  the  regency  even  caused  inquest  to  be  made  on  the  matter,  and  it  was 
then  asserted  that  very  few  persons  were  found  to  be  implicated.     That  many 


150  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XV. 

operations  of  Victor  on  the  Tagus  and  of  La2:)isse's  division 
which  was  to  march  by  Almeida.  He  then  hoped  to  be  able 
to  reach  the  capital,  and  to  maintain  himself  there  till  he 


of  the  signatures  were  forged  by  the  leaders  may  readily  be  believed  ;  but  the 
policy  of  lessening  the  importance  of  the  affair  is  also  evident,  and  tlio  inquisi- 
tors, if  willing,  could  not  have  probed  it  to  the  bottom. 

"  This  transaction  formed  the  ground-work  of  a  talc,  generally  credited  even 
by  his  own  officers,  that  Soult  perfidiously  aimed  at  an  independent  crown. 
The  circumstances  were  certainly  such  as  might  create  suspicion  ;  but  that  the 
conclusion  was  false,  is  shown,  by  the  mode  in  which  Napoleon  treated  both 
the  rumor  and  the  subject  of  it.  Shghting  the  former,  he  yet  made  known  to 
his  lieutenant  that  it  had  reached  his  ears,  adding,  '  I  remember  nothing  but 
Austerlitz,'  and  at  the  same  time  largely  increased  the  Duke  of  Dalmatia's 
command.  On  the  other  hand,  the  policy  of  Soult's  conduct  on  this  occasion, 
and  the  great  influence,  if  not  the  numbers  of  the  Portuguese  malcontents, 
were  abundantly  proved  by  the  ameliorated  relations  between  the  army  and 
the  peasantry.  The  fierceness  of  the  latter  subsided  ;  and  even  the  priests 
abated  of  their  hostility  in  the  Entre  Miuho  e  Douro.  The  French  soldiers 
were  no  longer  assassinated  in  that  province  ;  whereas,  previous  to  this  intri- 
gue, that  cruel  species  of  warfare  had  been  carried  on  with  infinite  activity, 
and  the  most  malignant  passions  called  forth  on  both  sides. 

"  A  mono-  other  instances  of  Portuguese  ferocity,  and  of  the  truculent  violence 
of  the  French  soldiers,  the  death  of  Colonel  Lameth  and  the  retaliation  which 
followed,  may  be  cited.  That  young  officer,  when  returning  from  the  marshal's 
quarters  to  his  own.  was  waylaid,  near  the  village  of  Arrifana,  and  murdered  ;  his 
bodv  was  then  stripped,  and  mutilated  in  a  shocking  manner.  This  assassina- 
tion, committed  within  the  French  lines,  and  at  a  time  when  Soult  enforced  the 
strictest  discipline,  was  justifiable  neither  by  tlie  laws  of  war  nor  by  those  of 
humanity.  No  general  could  neglect  to  punish  such  a  proceeding.  The  pro- 
tection due  to  the  army,  and  even  the  welfare  of  the  Portuguese  within  the 
French  jurisdiction,  demanded  a  severe  example;  for  the  violence  of  the  troops 
had  hitherto  been  with  difficulty  restrained  by  their  commander,  and  if,  at 
such  a  moment,  he  had  appeared  indifferent  to  their  individual  safety,  his 
authority  would  have  been  set  at  nought,  and  the  unmeasured  iudiscrimiuating 
vengeance  of  an  insubordinate  army  executed. 

"  Impres-ed  with  this  feeling,  and  afflicted  at  the  unhappy  death  of  a  per- 
sonal friend,  Soult  directed  General  Thomières  to  march,  with  a  brigade  of 
infantry,  to  Arrifana,  and  punish  the  criminals.  Thomières  was  accompanied 
by  a  Portuguese  civilian,  and,  after  a  judicial  inquiry,  shot  five  or  six  persons 
whose  guilt  was  said  to  have  been  proved  ;  but  it  is  certain  that  the  principal 
actor,  a  Portuguese  major  of  militia,  and  some  of  his  accomplices,  escaped 
across  the  Vouga  to  Colonel  Trant,  who,  disgusted  at  their  conduct,  sent  them 
to  Marshal  Beresford.  It  would  also  appear,  from  the  statement  of  a  peasant, 
that  Thomières,  or  those  under  him,  exceeded  Soult's  orders  ;  for,  in  that  state- 
ment, attested  by  oath,  it  is  said  that  twenty-four  innocent  persons  were  killed. 


Cn.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1809    IN    SPAIN.  151 

could  receive  my  instructions  respecting  the  means  to  be 
taken  to  sustain  the  place.  But  my  dej^arture  for  France, 
the  war  with  Austria  and  the  oj^erations  of  the  Anglo-Por- 
tuguese, soon  destroyed  this  illusion. 

The  corps  whose  cooperation  was  indispensable  for  the  suc- 
cess of  his  conquest  could  no  longer  act.  Victor,  as  has  just 
been  explained,  feared,  with  some  reason  to  penetrate  into 
Portugal.  On  the  other  side,  Key  charged  with  the  subju- 
gation and  organization  of  Galicia,  and  of  guarding  Coruna 
and  Ferrol,  had  his  hands  full,  with  eighteen  thousand  men 
to  cover  a  coast  a  hundred  leagues  in  extent,  and  an  entire 
kingdom  from  Orense  to  Eibadeo.  He  had  on  his  left,  the 
insurgent  population  of  the  bishopric  of  Orense  ;  on  his 
right,  Romana  held  the  Asturias,  having  retired,  there,  on 
the  retreat  of  Moore,  and  reënforced  himself  with  the  levies 
of  that  province.  The  occupation  of  Asturias  was  an  im- 
portant operation  ;  for  the  English  had  made  it  a  general 
depot  for  the  immense  quantity  of  arms  and  equipments 
sent  for  the  Spanish  army,  and  for  the  militia  which  had 
been  raised  in  the  provinces  of  the  north,  notwithstanding 
the  presence  of  our  bayonets. 

Key  was  the  only  general  at  hand  to  subdue  this  province  ; 
but  to  act  with  his  whole  corps  would  have  exposed  Coruna 
and  Ferrol,  and  left  all  Galicia  open  to  insurrection  ;  and, 
to  act  with  only  half  of  his  troops,  would  not  only  have 
exposed  him  to  defeat  with  a  divided  army,  but,  even  in 
case  of  success,  would  have  been  too  small  for  the  occupation 
of  the  province.     I  ought  to  have  placed  under  the  orders  of 

and  that  the  soldiers,  after  committing   many  atrocious  excesses,   burned  the 
village. 

"  These  details  have  been  related  partly  because  they  throw  a  light  upon  the 
direful  nature  of  this  contest,  but  chiefly  because  the  transaction  has  been 
adduced  by  other  writers  as  proof  of  cruelty  in  Soult;  a  charge  not  to  be  sus- 
tained by  the  facts  of  this  case,  and  belied  by  the  general  tenor  of  his  conduct, 
which  even  his  enemies,  while  they  attributed  it  to  an  insidious  policy, 
acknowledged,  at  the  same  time,  to  be  mild  and  humane." 


152  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XV. 

this  marshal  the  trooi^s  of  Biscay  and  Castile,  so  that  he 
might  himself  have  combined  some  concentric  movements  to 
fall  on  the  organized  corps  of  the  enemy,  and  sweep  the  pro- 
vinces in  his  rear.  There  were  sufficient  troops  between 
Bayonne  and  Astorga  for  this  purpose,  but  they  did  not  act 
in  concert  ;  the  result  was  that  Ney  could  neither  go  to 
Oviedo  nor  assist  the  army  of  Portugal. 

Soult,  thus  abandoned  to  his  own  resources,  saw  himself, 
like  Junot,  with  a  storm  gathering  on  all  sides.  In  advan- 
cing on  Oporto  he  had  separated,  rather  than  removed,  the 
obstacles  in  his  way.  Already,  Silveira,  reai)pcaring  in  his 
rear,  had  captured  Chaves  and  collected  threatening  forces  on 
the  Tamega.  General  Boutheilo,  retook  Braga  and  infested 
the  country  between  tlie  Minho  and  the  Douro.  As  the 
waves  of  the  sea,  when  separated  by  a  ship,  instantly  close  in 
its  rear,  so  did  the  insurgents  close  around  our  troops  and 
confine  the  army  to  the  possession  of  the  ground  on  which  it 
encamped. 

Combat  of  AmarantCi — The  party  which  favored  us  in 
Portugal,  and  ventured  to  declare  for  me  and  against  the 
house  of  Braganza,  was  the  most  intelligent  but  not  the  most 
numerous.  And  the  presence  of  Silveira  on  the  Tamega  and 
at  Chaves,  could  not  foil  to  rekindle  the  flames  of  insurrec- 
tion in  the  country  which  we  occupied.  It  was  important  to 
get  rid  of  him  before  we  could  complete  tht^  work  of  pacifica- 
tion. Generals  Delaborde  and  Loison,  were  sent  to  attack 
him  at  Amarante,  where  he  had  collected  twelve  thousand 
men.  This  corps  had  intrenched  the  stone  bridge  and  placed 
themselves  on  the  formidable  heights  near  by,  disputing  the 
passage  of  the  river  which  was  no  where  fordable  on  account 
of  its  steep  and  rocky  banks.  All  attempts  to  carry  this 
bridge  were  unsuccessful,  and  Loison  lost  most  precious  time 
till  the  second  of  May,  when  he  at  last  blew  up  the  intrench- 
ment  and  beat  the  enemy. 


Ch.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1809     IN     SPAIN.  153 

The  Anglo-Portuguese  derived  much  advantage  from  this 
delay  of  twelve  days,  to  complete  their  organization  ;  hut  it 
would  he  attributing  too  much  importance  to  this  circum- 
stance to  say  that  it  alone  decided  the  fate  of  the  expedition. 
For  Craddock  and  Beresford  had  thirty  thousand  good  troops 
to  oppose  Soult,  who,  forced  to  guard  Oporto,  could  appear 
at  Coimhra  with  only  eighteen  thousand  French  trooj)S. 

IVew  Descent  of  WclUiisçton  iato  Portiijçaî. — More  serious 
obstacles  were  now  rising  to  ruin  all  my  hopes  in  the  Penin- 
sula. England,  instead  of  being  discouraged  by  the  ill- 
success  of  Moore's  expedition,  felt  more  sensibly  than  ever 
the  importance  of  sustaining  the  Peninsula  and  delivering 
Portugal.  Encouraged  by  the  more  than  energetic  measures 
ordered  by  the  Prince  Regent  of  Portugal,  at  her  instigation, 
she  resolved  to  second  these  measures  with  all  her  power. 
All  the  resources  derived  from  her  perfection  in  the  mechani- 
cal arts  were  put  in  play  to  accelerate  the  manufacture  of 
arms  and  military  munitions.  England  now  resembled  the 
forges  of  Vulcan,  filling  Europe  with  the  thunderbolts  of 
war.  But  the  cabinet  of  St.  James  did  not  limit  themselves 
to  these  succors,  but  sent  to  Lisbon  the  same  Wellington 
who  had  triumphed  over  Junot  at  Yimiera,  and  whose 
talents  and  fortune  were  destined  to  give  a  fatal  direction  to 
the  war. 

Wellington,  who  arrived  at  Lisbon  with  a  rcënforcement 
of  English  troops  on  the  twenty-sixth  of  Ajjril,  made  prepa- 
tions  for  falling  upon  his  adversary  and  taking  advantage  of 
the  nature  of  the  country  to  cut  off  his  retreat.  He  as- 
sembled twenty  thousand  troops  at  Coimbra,  and  advanced  on 
the  Vouga  to  keep  Soult  in  check  near  Oporto  ;  while  Beres- 
ford, at  the  head  of  the  Portuguese  army,  passed  tiie  Douro, 
near  Lamego,  and  took  the  direction  of  Chaves,  seconded  by 
the  partisan  corps  of  Wilson.  The  plan  was  well  conceived, 
and  the  disposition  of  the  forces  good.      Soult's  advanced 


154  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XV. 

guard,  under  the  intrepid  Francesclii,  surprised  and  almost 
enveloped  at  Grijon,  succeeded,  by  presence  of  mind,  iu  re- 
gaining Oporto  without  any  serious  loss. 

The  position  of  Soult  was  critical  ;  vague  reports  an- 
nounced the  coming  tempest  ;  but  he  could  obtain  no  accu- 
rate information  of  the  enemy  ;  for,  if  the  Spanish  insurgents 
are  good  at  keeping  a  secret,  those  of  Portugal  are  still 
better.  Hearing,  however,  on  the  eighth,  of  the  arrival  of 
Wellington  at  Coimbra,  he  begun  to  collect  his  scattered 
detachments,  and  pre23are  either  for  combat  or  retreat.  The 
news  of  the  war  in  Germany  had  shaken  the  inorale  of  his 
army  ;  for  every  one  seemed  to  see  an  open  abyss  before  him 
in  Portugal,  while  all  the  glory  and  honors  were  to  be  won 
by  the  army  in  Germany.  Daily  contests  in  an  insurgent 
country  does  not  suit  the  character  of  the  French  soldier  ; 
he  is  brave,  but  sanguine  and  impatient,  and  soon  becomes 
tired  of  this  kind  of  hostilities.  Moreover,  the  great  triumphs 
which  he  had  gained  in  the  last  few  years  made  him  negli- 
gent of  the  details  of  field  service,  thinking  it  sufficient  for 
him  to  be  brave  in  the  battle-field. 

Finally,  as  a  climax  to  his  anxiety,  Soult  now  discovered, 
by  the  jjlot  of  Major  d'Argenson,  that  he  had  traitors  in  his 
army,  who  were  in  secret  communication  with  the  enemy. 
He  then  resolved  to  unite  his  army  behind  the  Tamega,  in 
order  to  reach  the  vicinity  of  Almeida  and  of  the  division  of 
Lapisse.  Loison  was  already  preceded  at  Amarante  ;  Lorges 
received  orders  to  evacuate  the  province  of  Minho,  and  direct 
himself  on  that  city  ;  but  he  could  not  reach  there  before  the 
fifteenth  of  May.  Soult,  after  having  rallied  his  advanced 
guard,  placed  the  division  of  Mermet  intermediate  between 
him  and  Loison,  broke  the  bridge  of  the  Douro,  and  with- 
drew the  boats  to  the  right  bank,  hoping  to  maintain  his 
position  under  shelter  of  the  river  ;  but  he  was  soon  unde-i 
ceived  in  this  resjiect. 


Cil.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1809     IN     SPAIN.  155 

Wellinifton  attacks  Soult  at  Oporto.— Wellington,  haviug 
passed  the  Vouga  on  the  eleventh,  advanced  in  three  columns 
on  the  Douro.  Murray's  division  was  to  cross  the  river  two 
leagues  above  ;  those  of  Paget  and  Hill  at  Villanova,  and 
the  left  on  the  quays  of  Oporto.  By  means  of  an  under- 
standing with  the  inhabitants,  they  obtained  a  few  boats 
"which  were  negligently  guarded.  General  Paget  p-assed  to 
the  right  bank  without  being  perceived,  and  established  him- 
self in  a  large  building,  from  which  he  could  protect  the 
successive  jîassage  of  the  several  battalions  of  General  Hill. 
Soult,  deceived  by  the  reports  of  his  generals  and  the  negli- 
gence of  his  outjjosts,  was  tranquil  at  Oporto  when  the 
alarm  was  given.  The  Portuguese  boatmen  profited  by  this 
circumstance  to  escape  with  their  boats  and  join  the  left  of 
the  English.  Soult  left  Oporto  with  the  division  of  Dela- 
borde.  He  would  have  taken  the  direct  road  to  Braga,  had 
not  the  necessity  of  rallying  on  Mermet  and  Loison,  in  the 
direction  of  Amarante,  induced  him  to  retire  in  that  direc- 
tion. Ho  encountered  the  columns  of  Paget  and  Hill,  ready 
to  debouch  on  his  line  of  retreat.  He  attacked  them,  and 
drove  them  back  far  enough  to  facilitate  the  successive  pas- 
sage of  his  troops  on  the  road  to  Penafiel  and  Valisa. 

Soult's  Retreat. — This  surprise  was  the  more  fatal  to 
Soult,  as  all  his  dispositions  were  made  for  a  retreat  on 
Loison's  corps  at  Amarante,  which  jilace  was  no  longer  in  our 
possession.  Driven  from  Pavoa,  on  the  tenth,  by  Beresford 
and  Silveira,  Loison  had  failed  to  inform  his  chief,  and,  on 
the  night  of  the  twelfth,  had  even  decamjjed  from  Amarante 
on  Guimarens.  Soult's  army  was  already  on  the  road  to 
Amarante  when  he  heard  this  disastrous  news.  There  was 
now  but  one  means  of  escape  :  this  was  to  throw  all  his 
material  and  baggage  into  the  Souza,  and  march  in  all  haste 
to  Guimarens,  by  a  j^ath  which  was  traveled  only  by  the 
shepherds.    He  boldly  decided  to  make  this  sacrifice,  and  had 


15G  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XV. 

the  good  fortune  to  effect  his  junction  with  Loison.  But  he 
was  not  free  from  embarrassment  ;  for  it  was  probable  that 
Wellington,  taking  the  direct  road  from  0])orto  to  Braga, 
would  reach  this  city  before  the  French.  It  was,  therefore, 
not  worth  while  to  compromise  the  safety  of  the  army  in 
order  to  save  ten  or  twelve  pieces  of  artillery  which  belonged 
to  Loison's  division.  Souh,  therefore,  directed  his  march 
across  the  mountains  on  the  same  field  of  Lanhoso,  where  he 
had  defeated  the  Portuguese  on  the  twentieth  of  March,  thus 
reaching  the  great  road  in  advance  of  the  English.  This 
desperate  resolution  saved  his  army.  He  continued  his 
march  on  Salamonde  and  Ruivaens  ;  but  hearing  that  the 
bridge  was  cut,  and  guarded  by  infantry,  and  that  large 
parties  of  the  enemy  were  near  Chaves,  and  that  Beresford 
was  marching  on  that  place,  he  resolved  to  throw  himself 
into  the  mountains  of  Montalégre.  The  great  difficulties  of 
this  country  were  surmounted  by  our  trooj)S,  whose  march 
was  facilitated  by  the  entire  destruction  of  their  material  and 
baggage  train.  After  forcing  the  passage  of  the  bridge  of 
Misarella,  near  Villa  de  Pons,  Soult  reached  Montalégre. 
These  frightful  precipices,  where  they  were  obliged  to  force 
the  successive  passages  of  two  bridges,  so  impeded  their 
march  that  they  ham-strung  their  draft-horses  and  mules  to 
get  rid  of  the  little  baggage  train  that  remained.  The 
army  finally  reached  Orense,  with  no  further  obstacle  than 
being  harassed  by  three  or  four  thousand  Anglo-Portuguese 
as  far  as  Allariz  ;  but  it  could  not  stop  in  this  miserable 
country  to  punish  the  enemy,  for  fear  of  actual  starvation  ;  it, 
however,  reached  their  rear-guard,  and  headed  them  off  by 
Monterey  and  Abemides. 

Notwithstanding  the  disasters  of  this  retreat,  Soult  might 
deem  himself  fortunate  in  having  effected  his  escape,  even 
with  the  loss  of  his  artillery,  and  two  thousand  men  who  had 
fallen  in  the  several  combats  in  which  he  had  engaged  since 


Ch.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN     OF    1809     IN     SPAIN.  157 

he  left  Oiwrto.  In  f\ict,  ho  reached  Lugo  in  a  still  worse 
condition  than  that  in  which  Moore  had  traversed  the  same 
town  six  months  before.  Soult  found  here  the  army  of 
Komana  who  was  besieging  the  brigade  of  Fournier,  while 
Ney  was  invading  Asturias. 

Ney's  Operations  in  Asturias.— Uneasy  at  hearing  no  news 
of  the  sixth  corps  for  the  last  four  months,  I  had  directed 
Kellerraan  to  advance  from  Astorga  to  communicate  with  it 
by  Lugo,  and  to  act  in  concert  with  it  for  the  subjugation  of 
Asturias  and  the  defeat  of  Romana.     Ney,  accordingly  left 
Mondonedo  with  one  half  of  his  corps  to  reach  the  coast 
from  the  west  side,  while  Kellerman  marched  by  Leon  on 
Oviedo,  crossing  the  high  chain  of  mountains  which  extends 
from  the  Pyrenees  along  the  coast,  or  rather  is  the  prolonga- 
tion of  that  range.     Marchand's  division  was  left  alone  to 
guard  all  Galicia.     At    the   very  moment   when   Ney  was 
valiantly   forcing  the  passage  of  the  Navia,   and    entering 
victorious  into  Gijon  and   Oviedo,   Romana  found   it  con- 
venient to  come  and  take  his  place  in  Gahcia.     Our  move- 
ments were  so  well  known  to  the  enemy,  while  his  were  kept 
from  us  with  such  impenetrable  secrecy,  that  Romana  passed 
as  it  were,  in  sight  of  our  columns  while  on  the  march  to 
Oviedo,  and  fell  on  Lugo  when  he  was  least  expected.     The 
brave  sixty-ninth  was  valiantly  defending  itself  in  this  city, 
determined  to  await  the  return  of  Ney,  when  Soult  came  to 
their  relief.     His  return  at  this  juncture  was  the  more  for- 
tunate as  the  divisions  of  Carrera  and  Morillo  had  attacked 
General   Maucune  at  Caldas-del-Rey,  and  taken  possession 
of  St.   Jago  and  threatened  Coruna.     The  return  of  Ney 
and  his  junction  with  Soult  toward  Lugo,  soon  drove  the 
enemy  from  Galicia. 

Misunderstanding  between  Soult  and  IVey  and  consequent 
Evacuation  of  Galicia.— But  these  difficulties  were  dispersed, 
rather  than  conquered.     Soult   had  supplied  himself  with 


158  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XV. 

arms,  munitions  and  some  light  pieces  of  artillery  in  the 
arsenals  of  Galicia  ;  but  as  Komana  was  at  Orense  and  the 
Anglo-Portuguese  army  were  probably  marching  on  Almeida 
or  the  Tagus,  it  was  important  to  seek  the  enemy.  Soult 
and  Ney  agreed  to  act  in  concert  ;  the  former  was  to  cross 
the  mountains  of  Val-d'Ores  to  Zamora  on  the  Douro,  in 
order  to  hear  something  from  King  Joseph,  and  to  oppose 
the  English  if  they  should  debouch  by  Almeida.  Ney,  on 
his  side,  had  driven  back  Carrera  and  Morillo  on  Vigo.  But, 
supposing  that  Soult  had  agreed  with  him  to  remain  near 
Orense,  he  was  astonished  to  find  that  he  was  not  there. 
Seeing  himself  thus  left  alone  in  Galicia,  surrounded  by 
enemies  and  ignorant  of  the  operations  of  the  victorious 
army  of  AVellington,  Ney  took  it  upon  himself  to  march  on 
Estremadura.  This  resolution  was  premature,  but  a  natural 
one,  if  the  circumstances  had  been  such  as  he  supposed. 
The  Anglo-Portuguese  army  had  been  increased  to  forty-five 
thousand  men  ;  Cuesta  and  Venegas  commanded  two  other 
armies,  making  together  more  than  sixty  thousand  combat- 
ants. The  king  had  in  tlie  vicinity  of  Madrid,  only  forty 
thousand  men  ;  he  might  be  beaten  and  driven  from  his 
capital  by  one  hundred  thousand  allies,  if  our  generals  did 
not  rally  to  his  assistance.  Ney,  therefore,  resolved  to  leave 
Coruiia  where  he  had  difficulty  in  subsisting  his  army.  This 
voluntary  abandonment  of  our  maritime  establishments  at 
Ferrol  was  a  serious  affair,  but  Ney  was  advised  to  it  by  his 
generals  ;  and  the  battle  at  Talavera  proved  that  there  was 
at  least  some  justice  in  their  calculations.  In  presenting  the 
subject  to  his  generals,  however,  for  their  opinion,  Ney  con- 
cealed from  them  the  agreement  he  had  made  with  Soult, 
and  represented  the  disappearance  of  that  marshal  from 
Orense  as  a  new  source  of  disquietude  and  danger  ;  whereas 
in  fact,  Soult's  movements  had  been  agreed  upon  between 


Ch.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1809    IN     SPAIN.  159 

them.-'^  In  addition  to  other  and  more  weighty  reasons  for 
his  advance  on  Estremadura,  Ney  alleged  the  battle  of  Ess- 
ling,  the  news  of  which  he  had  just  received  ;  and  my  diffi- 
cult position  in  the  island  of  Lohau.  By  concentrating  our 
forces  so  as  to  receive  the  orders  of  the  king,  he  thought  he 
ïnanœuvred  as  a  skillful  general  ;  for  the  divisions  of  Romana, 
who  were  continually  patrolling  the  Val-d'Ores  and  Villa 
Franca,  rendered  it  impossible  to  receive  a  dispatch  unless  it 
was  protected  by  at  least  four  thousand  men.  Moreover, 
his  departure  from  this  province  would  place  it  neither  more 
nor  less  in  the  hands  of  the  junta  than  it  was  already,  for  it 
was  continually  traversed  by  bands  of  insurgents  even  during 
Ney's  occupation. 

But  whatever  may  be  said  in  justification  of  this  move- 
ment of  the  sixth  corps,  as  a  military  manœuvre  to  give 
Joseph  the  means  of  crushing  Wellington  on  the  Tagus,  it 
certainly  was  unwise  in  its  political  relations.  I,  myself, 
was  far  from  satisfied  with  his  hasty  abandonment  of 
Coruiia  and  Ferrol.  His  chief  of  staff  (Jomini)  advised  him 
to  throw  six  battalions  in  the  strongest  fortresses  of  Galicia, 
and  to  march  with  the  remainder  of  his  army  to  Astorga, 
returning  again  to  that  province  as  soon  as  he  should  ascer- 
tain that  the  king  did  not  require  his  assistance  against 
Wellington.  But  Ney  was  too  much  attached  to  his  heroes 
of  Friedland,  and  too  uncertain  of  returning,  to  risk,  in  this 
way,  the  safety  of  his  battalions.  It  was  unfortunate,  how- 
ever, that  he  neglected  this  advice,  for  Mortier  and  Soult 
were  abundantly  sufficient  to  enable  Joseph  to  force  Wel- 
lington into  Portugal,  and  Ney  might  have  returned  into 
Galicia.  But,  isolated  in  this  kingdom,  and  separated  from 
the  remainder  of  the  army  by  a  coupe-gorge  of  forty  leagues, 

*  Documentary  evidence  more  recently  published,  proves  tliat  the  view  taken 
by  Jomini  of  Ney's  conduct  on  this  occasion,  is  entirely  correct.  Ney  either 
acted  from  want  of  judgment,  or  from  his  well-known  jealousy  of  Soult. 


IGO  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XV. 

with  Romana  on  his  left  and  the  Asturians  on  his  right,  he 
would  not  probably  have  been  able  to  maintain  this  position 
for  more  than  six  months. 

For  these  reasons,  which  Ney  deemed  sufficient  to  justify 
the  course  he  pursued,  he  left  Coruiia  on  the  twenty-second 
of  Junt^,  and  reached  Astorga  on  the  eighth  of  July,  in  the 
very  best  order.  The  enemy,  however,  have  not  blushed  to 
pronounce  as  a  disorderly  retreat,  what  was,  in  reality,  a 
voluntaiy  manoeuvre,  founded  on  military  principles,  and 
executed  without  the  loss  of  a  single  soldier,  or  even  a  single 
one  of  the  sick." 

Advance  of  Wellington  on  Madrid.  —  Wellington,  not 
deeming  it  best  to  waste  his  time  in  a  vain  pursuit  of  Soult 
in  the  mountains  of  Chaves,  returned  from  Braga  to  the 
Taurus.  After  remaining  more  than  a  month  at  Abrantes 
to  concert  measures  with  the  Spaniards,  and  complete  his 
own  jHeparations,  he  advanced  towards  Alcantara  and  Oro- 
pesa,  where  he  effected,  on  the  twentieth  of  July,  his  junction 
with  Cuesta,  who  had  united  the  élite  of  the  Spanish  forces 
to  the  number  of  thirty-seven  thousand  men,  eight  thousand 
of  this  number  being  cavalry.  Their  object  was  to  march 
together  on  Madrid,  to  which  place  Yenegas  was  to  move  with 
twenty  thousand  men  by  Toledo  and  Aranjuez  ;  at  the  same 
time  that  Colonel  Wilson,  with  his  light  corps,  was  to  advance 
as  partisans  in  the  direction  of  the  Escurial  and  Naval- 
Carnero,  in  order  to  threaten  Joseph's  line  of  communication 
with  the  north  of  Spain.  The  Portuguese,  under  Beresford, 
were  to  march  on  Almeida,  and,  by  acting  in  concert  with 
the  Duke  of  Parque,  who  commanded  about  Ciudad-Eodrigo, 
to  occupy  the  French  on  the  Douro  and  at  Salamanca. 

This  operation  was  skillfully  conceived.    It  was  natural  to 

*  Tho  order  of  relation  in  the  preceding  section  has  been  slightly  transposed 
in  the  translation  ;  but  the  language  of  the  original  has  been  substantially  pre- 
served. 


Ch.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1809     IN     SPAIN.  IGl 

suppose  that,  in  a  country  where  we  were  kept  in  ignorance 
of  operations  beyond  the  view  of  our  camps,  Wellington  might- 
fall  on  our  isolated  corps  and  ajipear  victorious  at  Madrid, 
before  any  efficacious  measure  could  be  taken  to  prevent  him. 
The  success  of  this  23lan  would  have  been  more  certain,  if  it 
had  been  executed  by  the  end  of  June  ;  but  Wellington  did 
not  command  the  Spaniards,  and  it  was  necessary  to  arrange 
his  movements  with  two  generals  and  the  junta,  which  was 
not  the  affair  of  a  day.  Nor  was  it  long  before  discord 
showed  itself  between  these  different  chiefs  ;  and,  as  usually 
happens  between  armies  which,  are  not  agreed,  each  pretended 
to  be  in  the  right.  If  we  are  to  believe  the  Simnish  version 
of  the  affair,  the  jirimitive  plan  was  to  fall  on  Victor,  before 
he  could  join  Jose2)h,  and  Wellington,  instead  of  hastening 
the  operation,  remained  inactive  at  the  very  time  when  he 
was  to  have  effected  his  junction  with  Cuesta.  They  thus 
reproach  the  English  General  with  having  j^aralyzed  Vanega's 
corps,  by  forcing  it  to  pass  in  rear  of  the  Tagus  to  Toledo, 
instead  of  marching  by  Arganda  direct  to  Madrid,  which, 
they  say,  would  have  prevented  the  junction  of  Sebastiani 
and  Victor.  The  English  historians,  on  the  contrary,  affirm 
that  Wellington  wished  to  make  the  attack  immediately  after 
the  junction,  and  that  Cuesta  opposed  it.  It  is  certain,  how- 
ever, that  Victor  having  voluntarily  left  the  Alberche  at  their 
approach,  in  order  to  unite  with  Sebastiani,  the  Spaniard 
animated  Ijy  a  noble  ardor,  put  himself  in  pursuit  as  far  as 
Torrijos.  The  dilatory  movements  of  the  English  general,  on 
this  occasion,  gave  me  no  ver}'  exalted  opinion  of  his  talent 
and  military  character.  I  considered  him  brave  and  ready, 
but  not  bold.  I  was  either  deceived  in  him,  or  else  his  subse- 
quent successes  changed  his  character  in  this  respect. 

Joseph  collects  his  Forces  for  an  Attack.— T lie  ajiproach 
of  the  combined  army  created  great  alarm  at  Madrid — sure 
p.roof  of  the  wisdom  of  the  enterprise.     Victor,  at  the  head 

VOL.    III. — 11. 


162  LIFE     OF     NATOLEON.  [Ch.  XV. 

of  the  first  corps,  fell  back  from  Talavera  on  Toledo.  The 
king  recalled  Sebastian!  from  Aranjuez  to  Toledo,  thus  open- 
ing to  Venegas  the  road  to  the  capital.  Joseph  advanced 
with  his  guards  and  reserve  to  put  himself  at  the  head  of 
forty-five  thousand  men  ;  while  Belliard,  with  only  three 
battalions  was  left  to  guard  Madrid,  which  was  then  a  vol- 
cano ready  to  burst  forth  ;  he  established  himself  in  the 
Retiro. 

The  army  leaves  Toledo,  and  advances  on  the  Alberche, 
two  thousand  men  remaining  to  watch  the  movement  of 
Venegas.  Joseph  now  rests  all  his  hopes  on  the  union  of 
the  corps  of  Soult,  Mortier,  and  Ney,  to  whom  orders  were 
given  on  the  twenty-second  of  July,  to  march  in  all  haste  on 
Plasencia.  On  this  important  operation  depends  the  fate  of 
the  campaign.  Joseph  now,  blindly  and  in  direct  contradic- 
tion to  the  principles  of  the  art,  decides  to  take  the  offensive 
alone,  and  before  he  can  rely  upon  the  cooperation  of  fifty 
thousand  men  led  by  Soult  !  He  should  rather  have  moved 
back  obliquely  toward  the  sources  of  the  Alberche  to  induce  the 
enemy  to  follow  in  pursuit,  and  again  have  fallen  impetuously 
on  him  as  soon  as  our  two  armies  could  enter  in  concert  into 
action.  Joseph  and  Jourdan,  under  the  advice,  it  is  said, 
of  Victor,  took  the  absurd  resolution  to  march  alone  against 
Wellington,  and  to  attack  him.  The  fear  of  exposing  his 
capital,  by  refusing  his  left  wing,  was  the  reason  assigned  by 
my  brother  for  this  resolution. 

On  the  twenty-sixth,  the  army  passes  the  Guadarama,  and 
overthrows  Cuesta,  who  has  advanced  to  Torrijos  ;  he  is 
driven  back  behind  the  Alberche.  On  the  twenty-seventh, 
the  army  crosses  this  river  at  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon, 
and  reaches  the  enemy's  position  near  the  close  of  the  day. 
Strange  as  it  may  seem,  Victor,  seeing  the  importance  of  the 
heights  which  supported  Wellington's  left,  thought  to  carry 
them  in   the  obscurity  of  the  night,  and  directed  RufiSn's 


Ch.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1809     IN     SPAIN.  163 

division  to  assail  them,  at  the  same  time  that  Lapisse  threat- 
ened this  left  wiug  in  front.  The  regiments  of  Rufiin, 
received  by  fresh  and  well-arranged  troops,  were  beaten  one 
after  the  other,  as  they  successively  arrived  on  the  hillocks. 
This  dthut  was  an  unfavorable  augury  for  the  following  dny. 
Jourdau  was  of  opinion  that  a  battle  should  not  be  risked 
till  they  heard  from  Soult  ;  but  Victor,  hoping  to  obtain  the 
honor  of  defeating  an  English  army,  objected  that  this  cir- 
cumspection would  produce  an  unfavorable  impression  on 
soldiers  accustomed  to  victory  ;  and  this  pitiful  consideration 
induced  my  brother  to  renew  an  attack,  condemned  at  the 
same  time  by  reason,  policy,  and  the  rules  of  war. 

Dispositions  for  Battle— The  only  accessible  point  of  the 
enemy's  line  being  its  left,  it  was  necessary  to  assemble  the 
mass  of  our  army  and  the  reserve  on  our  right  wing,  to 
menace  the  position  in  front  and  to  turn  it  by  a  deep  valley, 
while  sustaining  the  general  movement  to  the  right.  By 
prolonging  ourselves  in  this  way  in  a  line  oblique  to  the 
Tagus,  we  would  paralyze  half  of  the  enemy's  army,  or 
force  it  to  make  a  change  of  front,  and  to  fight  with  the 
river  in  its  rear.  We  would  base  ourselves,  in  case  of  retreat 
on  Avila  and  the  Escurial,  thus  securing  our  communication 
with  Soult.  But  instead  of  doing  this,  the  king  established 
his  reserve  on  the  left,  near  Sebastiani,  and,  with  divisions  in 
echelons  coming  successively  into  action  without  support,  he 
attacked  the  hill  where  Wellington  had  placed  his  best  troops 
and  a  numerous  artillery.  In  accordance  with  these  disposi- 
tions, Sebastiaui,onour  left,  was  to  attack  the  point  of  the  allied 
line  where  the  troops  of  Wellington  and  Cuesta  were  united, 
thus  assailing  the  left  of  the  Spaniards  and  the  right  of  the 
Anglo-Portuguese  ;  Avhile  Victor  reserved  to  himself  the 
honor  of  carrying  the  advantageous  heights  occuj^ied  by  the 
extreme  left  of  the  allies.  Their  forces  numbered  sixty 
thousand  men,  while  ours  did  not  exceed  forty  thousand. 


164  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XV 

Wellington's  System  of  Battle. — Wellington's  system  of 
combat  was  what  is  called  the  defensive-offensive  ;  awaiting 
his  adversary  on  chosen  ground,  he  fatigued  his  assailants 
with  his  artillery  and  a  murderous  fire  of  musketry,  and 
when  they  were  about  to  pierce  his  line,  he  avoided  this 
formidable  movement  by  falling  on  them  with  his  united 
forces.  This  system,  under  certain  circumstances,  may  be  as 
good  as  any  other  ;  it  depends  on  the  localities,  the  nature 
of  the  troops  and  the  character  of  your  opponent.  I 
received  defensive-ofifensive  battles  at  Rivoli  and  Austerlitz. 

Battle  of  Talavera. — Such  was  the  system  at  Talavera  ; 
the  infantry  of  the  first  corps  attacking  successively  one 
division  after  another.  Our  brave  men  attacked  the  enemy's 
position  with  admirable  boldness  ;  but  it  only  resulted  in 
their  destruction  ;  reaching  the  enemy's  line,  out  of  breath 
and  in  disorder,  they  were  cut  to  pieces  by  the  fire  of  sharp- 
shooters and  platoons,  and  then  borne  down  with  the  bay- 
onet. The  action  was  begun  by  the  division  of  Ruffin,  which 
bravely  ascended  the  height  on  the  enemy's  flank,  while 
Lapisse  directed  his  attack  toward  the  centre  of  that  wing. 
Our  regiments,  successively  engaged,  were  easily  repulsed.  A 
new  efi'ort,  and  one  better  combined,  though  rather  tardy, 
was  made  about  four  o'clock  ; — three  divisions  advancing 
together  to  the  attack.  Never  did  our  soldiers  fight  more 
bravely  ;  but  the  difficulty  of  the  ground,  the  firmness  and 
the  deadly  fire  of  the  English  triumphed  over  their  efforts. 

During  this  obstinate  contest  Sebastiani  had  assailed  the 
enemy's  right  ;  Leval's  division  was  pushing  before  it  a 
Spanish  division,  when  Wellington  directed  his  reserve  of 
English  to  drive  them  back.  Cut  up  by  a  concentric  and 
deadly  fire,  and  opposed  by  superior  numbers,  this  division 
was  obliged  to  fall  back.  The  remainder  of  the  day  was 
passed  by  engagements  of  the  sharpshooters,  which  produced 
no  result  on  the  line.     Victor  sought  in  vain  to  prolong  his 


Ch.  XV.J  campaign     of     1809     IN     SPAIN.  165 

right  by  the  valley,  so  as  to  turn  Wellington,  who  opposed 
these  efforts  with  his  well-sustained  reserve  of  cavalry.  This 
partial  and  tardy  movement  was  without  success,  and  night 
finally  put  an  end  to  this  useless  butchery.  The  two  armies 
remained  in  each  other's  presence  the  following  day  ;  but 
Joseph,  on  hearing  that  Wilson  was  gaining  the  environs  of 
Naval-Carncro  and  threatening  his  capital,  finally  ordered  a 
retreat.  Victor  returned  on  the  twenty-ninth,  behind  the 
Alberche  ;  Joseph  and  Sebastiani  marched  to  Illescas,  and, 
on  the  thirtieth,  threw  a  division  into  Toledo,  which  place 
was  threatened  by  Venegas.  Wellington,  although  reën- 
forced  by  the  arrival  of  Craufurd's  division,  did  not  advance 
from  his  position  :"■'•"  dissatisfied  with  the  Spaniards,  and 
paralyzed  at  his  own  losses,  he  wished  to  trust  nothing  to 
chance,  and  his  circumspection  Avas  very  natural.  This 
battle,  huwever,  had  restored  the  glory  of  the  successors  of 
Marlborough — a  glory,  which,  for  the  last  century,  had  been  on 
the  decline  ;  and  it  was  here  shown  that  the  English  infantry 
was   capable   of  contending  with   the  best  in  Europe.     Our 

*  The  march  of  Craufurd's  division  is  thus  described  by  Napier  :  "  On  that 
day  (the  twenty-ninth),  General  Robert  Craufurd  reached  the  English  camp, 
with  the  forty -third,  fifty-second,  and  ninety-fifth  regiments,  and  immediately 
took  charge  of  tlie  outposts.  These  troops,  after  a  march  of  twenty  miles, 
were  in  bivouac  near  Malpartida  de  Plasencia,  when  the  alarm  caused  by  the 
Spanish  fugitives  spread  to  that  part.  Craufurd,  fearing  that  the  army  was 
pressed,  allowed  the  men  to  rest  for  a  few  hours,  and  then,  withdrawing  about 
fifty  of  the  weakest  from  the  ranks,  commenced  his  march  with  the  resolution 
not  to  halt  until  be  reached  the  field  of  battle.  As  the  brigade  advanced, 
crowds  of  runaways  were  met  with,  and  although  not  all  Spaniards,  all  propa- 
gating the  vilest  falsehjoJs: — '  The  army  was  dtfeated,'' — '  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley 
was  kiHed,^ — ^  The  French  ivere  only  a  few  miles  distant  f  nay,  some,  blinded 
by  their  fears,  affected  even  to  point  out  the  enemy's  advanced  posts  on  the 
nearest  hills.  Indignant  at  this  shameful  scene,  the  troops  hastened,  rather  than 
slackened,  the  impetuosity  of  their  pace,  and  leaving  only  seventeen  stragglers 
behind,  in  twenty-six  hours  crossed  the  field  of  battle  in  a  close  and  compact 
body,  having,  in  that  time,  passed  over  sixty-two  English  miles,  and  in  the 
hottest  season  of  the  year,  each  man  carrying  from  fifiy  to  sixty  pounds  weight 
upon  his  shoulders  Had  the  historian.  Gibbon,  known  of  such  a  march,  he 
would  have  spared  his  sneer  about  the  '  delicacy  of  modern  soldiers  I'  " 


166  LIFE     or     NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XV. 

loss  in  this  battle  was  eight  thousand,  killed  and  wounded  ; 
and  the  allies  confessed  a  loss  of  seven  thousand. -••■ 

Operations  of  Soiilt,  Key  and  Mortier,  to  cut  off  Wel- 
lington's Retreat. — Joseph  was  wrong  in  fighting  this  battle, 

*  The  following  remarks  of  Napier  on  this  battle  are  -well  worthy  the  at- 
tention of  the  military  reader . 

"  1st.  The  moral  courage  evinced  by  Sir  Arthur  "Wellesley,  when  with  such 
a  coadjutor  as  Cuesta,  he  accepted  battle,  was  not  less  remarkable  than  the 
judicious  disposition  which,  finally,  rendered  him  master  of  the  field.  Yet,  it 
is  doubtful  if  he  could  have  maintained  his  position  had  the  French  been  well 
managed,  and  their  strength  reserved  for  the  proper  moment,  instead  of  being 
wasted  on  isolated  attacks  during  the  night  of  tiie  twenty-seventh,  and  the 
morning  of  the  twenty -eighth. 

"  A  pitched  battle  is  a  great  affair.  A  good  general  must  bring  all  the 
moral,  as  well  as  the  physical,  force  of  his  army  into  play  at  tlie  same  time, 
if  he  means  to  win,  and  all  may  be  too  little.  Marshal  Jourdan's  project  was 
conceived  m  this  spirit,  and  worthy  of  his  reputation  ;  and  it  is  possible  that 
he  might  have  placed  his  army,  unperceived,  on  the  flank  of  the  English,  and 
then  by  a  sudden  and  general  attack,  have  carried  the  key  of  liis  position, 
thus  commencing  his  battle  well  ;  but  Sir  Arthur  "Wellesley's  resources  would 
not  then  have  been  exhausted.  He  had  foreseen  such  an  occurrence,  and  was 
prepared  by  a  change  of  front,  to  keep  the  enemy  in  check  with  his  kft  wing 
and  cavalry  ;  while  the  right,  marching  upon  the  position  abandoned  by  iho 
French,  should  cut  the  latter  off  from  the  Alberche.  In  this  movement  the 
allies  would'  have  been  reenforced  by  Wilson's  corps,  which  was  near  Caza- 
legas,  and  the  contending  armies  would  then  have  exchanged  lines  of  operation. 
The  French  could,  however,  have  gained  nothing,  unless  they  won  a  complete 
victory,  while  the  allies  would,  even  though  defeated,  have  insured  their 
junction  with  Yenegas.  Madrid  and  Toledo  would  thus  have  fallen  to  them, 
and  before  Soult  could  unite  with  Joseph,  a  new  line  of  operations,  through  the 
fertile  country  of  La  Mancha,  might  have  been  obtained.  Bet  these  matters 
are  only  speculative. 

"  2d.  The  distribution  of  the  French  troops  fjr  the  great  attack  cannot  be 
praised.  The  attempt  to  turn  the  English  left  with  a  single  division  was 
puerile.  The  allied  cavalry  was  plainly  to  be  seen  in  the  valley;  how,  then, 
could  a  single  division  hope  to  develop  its  attack  upon  the  hill,  Avhen  five 
thousand  horsemen  were  hanging  upon  its  flank?  and,  in  fact,  the  whole  of 
Euffin's,  and  the  half  of  Villatte's  division,  were  paralyzed  by  the  charge  of  a 
single  regiment.  To  have  rendered  this  movement  formidable,  the  principal 
part  of  the  French  cavalry  should  have  preceded  the  march  of  the  infantry; 
but  the  great  error  was  fighting  at  all  before  Soult  reached  Plasencia. 

"  3d.  It  has  been  said,  that  to  complete  the  victory,  Sir  Arthur  AVellesley 
should  have  caused  the  Spaniards  to  advance;  this  would,  more  probably, 
have  led  to  a  defeat.  Neither  Cuesta,  nor  his  troops,  were  capable  of  an 
orderly  movement.  The  infantry  of  the  first  and  the  fourth  corps  were  still 
above  twenty  thousand   strong,  and,  although   a  rc^iulsed,  by  no  means  a  dis- 


Cn.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1809    IN     SPAIN.  DC/ 

inasmuch  as  Soiilt  was  marching  by  Plasencia  on  Almaraz, 
with  fifty  thousand  men,  and  Wellington  would  have  retired 
at  his  approach.  But  after  he  had  decided  to  give  battle,  he 
ought  to  have  left  one  of  Sebastiani's  divisions  and  three 
thousand  horse  to  annoy  the  centre  and  right  of  the  allies, 
and  then  have  united  all  the  remainder  of  his  army  and  his 
reserve  to  assail  the  decisive  point  and  turn  the  left.  Perhaps 
even  then  he  would  have  failed  of  success,  considering:  the 
superiority  of  the  enemy  and  the  nature  of  the  ground. 
But  if  success  had  been  possible,  it  would  have  been  won  by 
this  manoeuvre,  and  by  no  other.  In  the  mean  time  Soult 
was  marching  in  the  direction  of  Plasencia.  He  had  not 
received  the  order  for  this  movement  till  the  twenty-seventh 
of  July,  and  his  troops  were  then  extended  over  the  country 
as  far  as  the  Douro,  the  fifth  corps  especially  having  a  great 
distance  to  march  in  order  to  anive  in  time.  Soult  satisfied 
himself  with  leaving  a  flying  corps  to  Avatch  Ciudad-Eodrigo, 
and,  without  troubling  himself  with  the  operations  of  Beres- 
ford  and  of  the  Duke  del  Parque,  he  marched  on  Plasencia, 
where  his  columns  an'ived  successively  between  the  first  and 
fourth  of  August. 

Retreat  of  the  Allies.— Wellington  heard  of  Soult's  march 

comfiled  force;  the  cavalry,  the  king's  guards,  and  Dessolle's  division,  had  not 
been  engaged  at  all,  and  were  alone  sufficient  to  beat  the  Spaniards  ;  a  second 
panic,  such  as  that  of  the  twenty-seventh,  would  have  led  to  the  most  deplora- 
ble consequences,  as  those,  who  know  with  what  facility  French  soldier.« 
recover  from  a  repulse,  will  readily  acknowledge. 

•'  The  battle  of  Talavera  was  one  of  hard  honest  fighting,  and  the  exceeding 
gallantry  of  the  troops  honored  the  nations  to  which  they  belonged.  The 
English  owed  much  to  the  general's  dispositions  and  something  to  fortune. 
The  French  owed  nothing  to  their  commander;  but  when  it  is  considered  that 
only  the  reserve  of  their  infantry  were  withheld  from  the  great  attack  on  the 
twenty-eighth,  and  that,  consequently,  above  thirty  thousand  men  were  closely 
and  unsuccessfully  engaged  for  three  hours  with  sixteen  thousand  British,  it 
must  be  confessed  that  the  latter  proved  themselves  to  be  truly  formidable 
soldiers  ;  yet  the  greatest  part  were  raw  men,  so  lately  drafted  from  the  militia 
regiments  that  many  of  them  still  bore  the  number  of  their  former  regiments 
on  their  accoutrements." 


168  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XV. 

on  the  first  of  August,  but  incorrectly  estimating  his  force 
tit  from  twelve  to  fifteen  thousand  men,  he  at  first  marched 
against  him,  while  Cuesta  remained  with  twenty-five  thou- 
sand before  Victor,  and  removed  five  thousand  wounded  from 
Talavera.  This  false  movement,  and  this  important  division 
of  forces,  were  near  proving  fatal  to  the  allies.  In  fact  there 
was  but  one  of  two  courses  for  them  to  pursue,  to  march 
against  Soult  with  their  whole  army  and  attack  him,  or  to 
pi'omptly  fall  back  behind  the  Tagus  by  Almaraz  ;  in  either 
case  it  would  have  been  necessary  for  them  to  march  to 
Casa-Tejada,  to  reach  the  junction  of  the  road  to  Plasencia 
with  the  great  road  to  Badajos.  Learning  from  Cuesta  at 
Naval-Moral,  on  the  third,  what  the  real  force  of  Soult  was, 
and  the  danger  to  Avhich  the  allies  wore  exposed,  Wellington 
was  afraid  to  venture  alone  on  the  road  to  Almaraz,  and  fell 
back  from  Naval-Moral  to  Aizobispo,  instead  of  pushing  on 
to  Casa-Tejada,  so  as  to  be  certain  of  his  retreat  on  the  road 
to  Portugal.  He  might  have  reached  this  village  on  the 
fourth  of  August,  whereas  Soult  did  not  present  himself  at 
that  place  till  the  following  day.  The  idea  of  falling  back 
on  Arzobispo  was  good,  on  the  supposition  that  Cuesta  was 
still  at  Talavera  ;  but  this  general,  thinking  that  the  English 
general  would  hasten  his  retreat  on  Almaraz,  and  that  he 
himself  would  be  compromised  if  he  remained  between  Soult 
and  Victor,  resolved  to  fall  back  on  Oropeza  in  order  to  fol- 
low Wellington.  This  contre-temijs  miglit  have  proved  fatal 
to  the  combined  army,  if  Victor  had  promptly  directed  him- 
self on  Arzobispo,  which  he  unfortunately  neglected  to  do  ; 
and  the  marshal  hearing  too  late  what  was  passing,  and 
deeming  himself  fortunate  that  they  had  not  attacked  him 
on  the  Alberche  after  the  departure  of  Joseph,  did  not  ven- 
ture to  push  an  enemy  who  was  superior  in  numbers  to  his 
own  army. 

The  English  army   was   very  near  paying  dear  for  these 


Ch.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1809     IN     SPAIN.  iCi) 

hesitations  and  indecisions  ;  their  allies,  already  dissatisfied 
with  the  affair  of  Torrijos,  and  reproaching  the  English  with 
leaving  them  in  danger,  hastily  repassed  the  bridge  of  Arzo- 
bispo,  thus  leaving  the  combined  army,  on  the  fifth,  hemmed 
in  against  the  impassable  mountain  of  Guadalupe.  This 
army  would  certainly  have  been  lost,  if  AVellington  had  not 
sent  a  detachment,  in  all  haste,  to  blow  up  the  bridge  of 
Almaraz,  while  another  partly  destroyed  a  portion  of  the 
bridge  of  Arzobispo.  As  Soult  was,  nevertheless,  coming  to 
attempt  the  passage  of  the  Tagus,  it  was  all  important  for 
the  English  to  escape  from  the  cul-de-sac  in  which  they  were 
engaged.  With  great  labor,  and  by  the  aid  of  the  Spanish 
peasants,  they  constructed  a  road  for  artillery,  so  as  to  reach 
the  great  highway  to  Truxillo.  Soult  finally  reached  the 
Tagus,  with  his  three  corps  ;  he  himself  passed  the  river  by 
a  ford  against  the  allies'  right  wing  composed  of  Spanisli 
troops,  while  Mortier  forced  the  bridge  of  Arzobispo  against 
the  centre.  Ney  was  to  seek  a  ford  near  Almaraz,  the  bridge 
at  that  place  having  been  destroyed  ;  he  would  then 
manœuvre  against  Wellington's  left,  and  cut  off  his  com- 
munications by  preceding  him  on  the  great  road  to  Badajos. 
But  Ney  could  find  no  ford  ;  and  the  English,  consequently, 
gained  time  to  finish  their  cross-road  and  effect  their  retreat  ; 
and  the  Spaniards,  after  a  warm  engagement  of  cavalry  fled, 
some  to  Naval-Moral  and  Toledo,  and  others  to  Doleytozn."'-- 

*  Napier's  account  of  this  combat  of  Arzobispo,  and  the  inilitary  operations 
which  followed  are  well  worthy  of  perusal  : 

"The  fifth  and  second  corps  and  a  division  of  the  sixth  were  concentrated, 
to  force  this  passage,  early  on  the  morning  of  tlie  eighth  ;  but  Soult  being  just 
then  informed  of  Yiclor's  movement,  and  perceiving  that  Albuquerque  had 
withdrawn  tlio  Spanish  cavalry,  leaving  only  a  rear  guard  m  the  works,  judged 
that  the  allies  were  retreating,-  wherefore,  without' relinquishing  the  attack  of 
Arzobispo,  ho  immediately  sent  the  division  of  the  sixth  corps  back  to  Xaval- 
Moral,  and,  at  the  same  time,  transmitted  a  plan  of  the  ford  below  Almaraz, 
directed  Ney  to  cross  the  Tagus  there,  seize  the  Puerto  de  Mirabete,  and  be  in 
readiness  to  fall  upon  the  allies,  aa  they  came  out  from  the  defiles  between 
Deleytoza  and  Truxillo.     Meanwhile,  tlie  heat  of  the  day  l.ad  induced  Albu- 


170  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XV. 

This  event  completed  the  discord  of  the  allies.  Cuesta 
being  disgusted  with  the  operations,  and,  in  fact,  far  too  old 
for  so  difficult  a  command,  resigned  it  to  General  Eguia, 

querquG  to  seek  shelter  for  his  horsemen  in  a  wood,  near  Azutan,  a  village  about 
five  miles  from  the  bridge  ;  and  the  Spanish  infantry,  keeping  a  bad  guard,  were 
sleeping  or  loitering  about  without  care  or  thought,  when  Mortier,  who  was 
charged  with  the  direction  of  the  attack,  taking  advantage  of  their  want  of 
vigilance,  commenced  the  passage  of  the  river. 

COilBAT    OF    ARZOBISPO. 

"  The  French  cavalry,  about  six  thousand  in  number,  were  secretly  assem- 
bled near  the  ford,  and  about  two  o'clock  in  the  day,  General  Caulaincourt's 
brigade  suddenly  entered  the  stream.  The  Spaniards,  running  to  their  arms, 
manned  the  batteries,  and  opened  upon  the  leading  squadrons,  but  Mortier,  with 
a  powerful  concentric  fire  of  artillery,  immediately  overwhelmed  the  Spanish 
gunners  ;  and  Caulaincourt  having  reached  the  other  side  of  the  river,  turned 
to  his  right,  and,  taking  the  batteries  in  reverse,  cut  down  the  artillerymen,  and 
dispersed  the  infantry  who  attempted  to  form.  The  Duke  of  Albuquerque,  who 
had  mounted  at  the  first  alarm,  now  came  down  with  all  his  horsemen  in  one 
mass,  but  without  order,  upon  Caulaincourt,  and  the  latter  was  in  imminent 
danger,  when  the  rest  of  the  French  cavalry,  passing  rapidly,  joined  in  the 
combat  ;  one  brigade  of  infantry  followed  at  the  ford,  another  burst  the  barriers 
on  the  bridge  itself,  and,  by  this  time,  the  Spanish  foot,  were  flying  to  the 
mountains.  Albuquerque's  effort  was  thus  frustrated,  a  general  route  ensued, 
and  five  guns  and  about  four  hundred  prisoners  were  taken. 

"  Soult's  intention  being  to  follow  up  tliis  success,  he  directed  that  the  first 
corps  should  move,  in  two  colunms,  upon  Guadalupe  and  Deleytoza,  intending 
to  support  it  with  the  second  and  fifth,  while  the  sixtli  corps  crossed  at  Almaraz, 
and  seized  the  pass  of  Mirabete.  This  would  undoubtedly  have  completed  the 
ruin  of  the  Spanish  army,  and  forced  Sir  Arthur  to  make  a  rapid  and  disastrous 
retreat  ;  for  so  complete  was  the  surprise  and  so  sudden  the  overthrow,  that 
some  of  the  English  foragers  also  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  ;  and  that 
Cuesta's  army  was  in  no  condition  to  have  made  any  resistance,  if  the  pursuit 
had  been  continued  with  vigor,  is  clear,  from  the  following  facts  : 

"  First,  when  he  withdrew  his  main  body  from  the  bridge  of  Arzobispo  to 
Peralada  de  Garbin,  on  the  seventh,  he  left  fifteen  pieces  of  artillery  by  the 
road  side,  without  a  guard.  The  defeat  of  Albuquerque  placed  these  guns  at 
the  mercy  of  the  enemy,  who  were,  however,  ignorant  of  their  situation,  until 
a  trumpeter  attending  an  English  flag  of  truce,  either  treacherously  or  foolishly-, 
mentioned  it  in  the  French  camp,  from  whence  a  detachment  of  cavalry  was 
sent  to  fetch  them  off.  Second,  the  British  military  agent  placed  at  the  Spanish 
head-quarters,  was  kept  in  ignorance  of  the  action;  and  it  was  only  by  the 
arrival  of  the  Duke  of  Albuquerque,  at  Deleytoza,  on  the  evening  of  the  ninth, 
that  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  knew  the  bridge  was  lost.  He  had  before  advised 
Cuesta  to  withdraw  behind  the  Ibor  river,  and  even  now  contemplated  a  par- 


Ch.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1809     IN     SPAIN.  171 

who,  with  one  half  of  his  army,  moved  to  the  right  on  Toledo 
to  assist  Venegas,  while  the  Duke  of  Albuquerque,  with  the 
left,  rallied  on  Wellington.     The  latter  gained  Truxillo  with 

tial  attack  to  keep  tlie  enemy  in  check  ;  but  when  he  repaired  in  person  to  that 
genorars  quarter,  on  the  tenth,  he  found  thu  country  covered  with  fugitives 
and  stragglers,  and  Cuesta  as  helpless  and  yet  as  haughty  as  ever.  All  his 
ammunition  and  guns  (forty  pieces)  were  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Ibor,  and,  of 
course,  at  the  foot  of  the  Meza,  and  within  sight  and  cannon-sliot  of  tiio 
enemy,  ou  the  right  bank  of  the  Tagus;  they  would  have  becu  taken  by  ih? 
first  French  patrols  that  approached,  but  that  Sir  Arthur  Welleslcy  persuaded 
the  Spanisli  staft' officers  to  have  them  dragged  up  the  hill,  in  the  course  of 
the  tenth,  witliout  Cuesta's  knowledge. 

"In  this  state  of  affair.',  the^  impending  fate  of  the  Peninsula  was  again 
averted  by  the  king,  who  recalled  the  first  corps  to  the  support  of  the  fourth, 
then  opposed  to  "Venegas.  Marshal  Ney,  also,  was  unable  to  discover  the  ford 
below  the  bridge  of  Almaraz,  and,  by  the  eleventh,  the  allies  had  reestablished 
their  hne  of  defense.  The  headquarters  of  the  British  were  at  Jaraicejo,  and 
those  of  the  Spanish  at  Deleytoza  ;  the  former  guarding  the  ford  of  Almaraz, 
formed  the  left  ;  the  latter,  occupying  the  Meza  d'Ibor  and  Campillo,  were  on 
the  right.  The  twelfth,  Cuesta  resigned.  General  Eguia  succeeded  to  the 
command,  and  at  first  gave  hopes  of  a  better  cooperation,  but  the  evil  was  in 
the  character  of  the  people.  The  position  of  the  allies  was,  however,  compact 
and  central  ;  the  reserves  could  easily  support  the  advanced  posts  ;  the  com- 
munication to  the  rear  was  open,  and,  if  defended  with  courage,  the  Meza 
d'Ibor  was  impregnable;  and  to  pass  the  Tagus  at  Almaraz,  in  itself  a  difBcult 
operation,  would,  while  the  Mirabete  and  Meza  d'Ibor  were  occupied,  have 
been  dangerous  for  the  French,  as  they  would  be  iuclosed  in  the  narrow  space 
between  those  ridges  and  the  river. 

"  The  Duke  of  Dalmatia,  thus  thwarted,  conceived  that  Sir  Arthur  "Wellesley 
would  endeavor  to  repass  the  Tagus  by  Alcantara,  and  so  rejoin  Bcrcsford  and 
the  five  thousand  British  troops  under  Catliu,  Craufurd  and  Lightburn,  which 
were,  by  this  time,  near  the  frontiers  of  Portugal.  To  prevent  this  h.e  resolved 
to  marcli  at  once  upon  Coria,  with  the  second,  fifth,  and  sixth  corps,  threaten 
both  Beresford's  and  Sir  Arthur's  communication  with  Lisbon,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  prepare  for  the  siege  of  Ciudad-Rodrigo  ;  but  Marshal  Ney  absolutely 
refused  to  concur  in  this  operation.  He  observed  that  Sir  Arthur  Welleslcy 
was  not  yet  in  march  for  Alcantara  ;  that  it  was  exceedingly  dangerous  to  in- 
vade Portugal  in  a  hasty  manner  ;  and  that  the  army  could  not  be  fed  between 
Coria,  Plasencia,  and  the  Tagus  ;  finally,  that  Salamanca,  being  again  in  pos- 
session of  the  Spaniards,  it  was  more  fitting  that  the  sixth  corps  should  retake 
that  town,  and  occupy  the  line  of  the  Tormes,  to  cover  Castile.  This  reasoning 
was  approved  by  Joseph,  who  dreaded  the  further  flitigue  and  privations  that 
would  attend  a  continuance  of  the  operations  during  the  excessive  heats,  and 
in  a  wasted  country;  and  he  was  strengthened  in  his  opinion  by  the  receipt  of 
a  dispatch  from  the  emperor,  dated  Schonbrunn,  the  twenty-ninth  of  July,  in 
which  any  further  oflensive  operations  were  forbidden,  until  the  reenforcemenis 


172  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Cfi.   XY. 

difficulty,  and  afterward  fell  Lack  on  Badajns.  General 
Wilson,  compromised  at  Naval-Carnero,  had  the  good  for- 
tune to  escape  in  rear  of  Soult,  and  take  refuge  in  the 
mountains  of  Gredos. 

Battle  of  Alcaonacid.— Joseph,  encouraged  by  the  retreat 
of  the    enemy,  returned   to   Toledo,  at  the   moment    when 

which  the  recent  victory  of  Wagram  enabled  him  to  send  should  arrive  in  Spain. 
The  second  corps  was,  consequently,  directed  to  take  post  at  Plasencia;  the  fifth 
corps  relieved  the  first  at  Talavera,  and  the  English  wounded  being,  by 
Victor,  given  over  to  Marshal  Mortier;  the  latter,  with  a  chivalrous  sense  of 
honor,  would  not  permit  his  own  soldiers,  although  suffering  severe  jir'-vations 
themselves,  to  receive  rations  until  the  hospitals  were  first  supplied:  tlie  sixth 
corps  was  directed  upon  Valladolid,  for  Joseph  was  alarmed  lest  a  fresh  insur- 
rection, excited  and  supported  by  the  Duke  del  Parque,  should  spread  over  the 
whole  of  Leon  and  Castile. 

"Ney  marched  on  the  eleventh  ;  but,  to  his  surprise,  found  that  Sir  Robert 
"Wilson,  with  about  four  thousand  men,  part  Spaniards,  part  Portuguese,  was 
in  possession  of  the  pass  of  Banos.  To  explain  this,  it  must  be  observed,  that 
when  the  British  army  marched  from  Talavera,  on  the  third,  Wilson,  being  at 
Nombella,  was  put  in  communication  with  Cuesta.  He  bad  sent  his  artillery 
to  the  armj^  on  the  third,  and  on  the  fourth,  finding  that  the  Spaniards  had 
rbandoned  Talavera,  he  fell  back  with  his  infantry  to  Yellada,  a  few  miles  north 
of  Talavera.  Ho  was  then  twenty-four  miles  from  Arzobispo,  and,  a.s  Cuesta 
did  not  quit  Oropesa  until  the  fifch,  a  junction  with  Sir  Arthur  "Wellesley 
might  have  been  effected;  but  it  was  impossible  to  know  this  at  the  time,  and 
"Wilson,  very  prudentlj-.  crossing  the  Tietar,  made  for  the  mountains,  trusting 
to  his  activity  and  local  knowledge  to  escape  the  enemy.  "V'illattc's  division 
pursued  him,  on  the  fifth,  to  Nombella;  a  detachment  from  the  garrison  of 
Avila  was  watching  for  him  in  the  passes  of  Arenas  and  Monbeltran  ;  and 
General  Foy  Avaited  for  him  in  the  "Vera  de  Plasencia.  Nevertheless,  baffling 
his  opponents,  he  broke  tlirough  their  circle  at  Viander,  passed  the  Gredos  at 
a  ridge  called  the  Sierra  do  Lanes,  and,  getting  into  the  valley  of  the  Termes, 
reached  Bcjur  ; — from  thence,  thinking  to  recover  his  communications  with  the 
army,  he  marched  toward  Plasencia,  by  the  pass  of  Baùos,  and  thus,  on  the 
twelfth,  met  with  Ney  returning  to  the  Salamanca  country. 

"  The  dust  of  the  French  column  being  seen  from  afar,  and  a  retreat  to 
Ciudad-Rodrigo  open,  it  is  not  easy  to  comprehend  why  Sir  Robert  Wilson 
should  have  given  battle  to  the  sixth  corps.  His  position,  although  difiScult 
of  approach,  and  strengthened  by  .the  piling  of  large  stones  in  the  narrowest 
parts,  was  not  one  in  which  he  could  hope  to  stop  a  whole  army  ;  and.  accord- 
ingly,  when  the  French,  overcoming  the  local  obstacles,  got  close  upon  his  left, 
the  fight  was  at  an  end  ;  the  first  charge  broke  both  the  legion  and  the 
Spanish  auxiliaries,  and  the  whole  dispersed.  Ney  continued  his  march,  and, 
having  recovered  the  line  of  the  Tormes,  resigned  the  command  of  the  sixth 
corps  to  General  Marchand,  and  returned  to  France." 


Cil.  XY.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1809    IN    SPAIN.  173 

Venegas  was  bombarding  that  city  from  tlie  left  bank  of  the 
Tagns,  and  seeking  to  get  possession  of  the  jjassago  of  the 
river  ;  but  the  Si)aniard's  hopes,  in  tliis  respect,  were  soon 
terminated.  The  corps  of  Sebastiani,  seconded  b}-  Desolles' 
division,  passed  the  Tagns  on  the  ninth  of  August  to  punish 
the  Spanish  general  f  )r  his  untimely  movement  ;  ho  drove 
in  his  vanguard  ;  and,  on  the  eleventh  of  August,  reached 
Venegas  himself,  at  Almonacid,  on  the  road  to  Mora  and 
Madridejos.  The  Spanish  forces  amounted  to  about  thirty 
thousand  after  receiving  their  reënforcements.''-"  They  occu- 
pied a  well-selected  jjosition  ;  a  good  reserve,  supported  by 
forty  pieces  of  artillery,  crowned  the  formidable  heights,  on 
which  is  situated  the  old  chateau  of  Almonacid.  Encouraged 
by  the  cntliusiasm  of  his  troops  who  requested,  with  loud 
cries,  to  be  led  against  the  enemy,  and  willing  to  give  them 
all  the  honor  of  the  victory,  Sebastiani,  without  waiting  for 
Desolles,  directed  his  attack  on  the  hill  occupied  by  the 
Spanish  left  ; — the  Polish  division,  under  Prince  Sulkoski, 
attacked  the  position  in  front,  while  the  German  division, 
under  Laval,  turned  it  by  the  right.  The  French  division, 
in  order  to  favor  this  attack,  assailed  the  centre  on  the 
plateau  of  Almonacid.  The  front  line  of  the  "  Spaniards  is 
everywhere  forced.  Venegas,  in  order  to  disengage  it,  throws 
his  cavalry  on  the  right  flank  of  Sebastiani,  and  drives  it 
back.  This  movement  gives  the  enemy  a  temporary  success  ; 
but  the  arrival  of  Desolles'  division  soon  restores  the  chances 
in  our  favor.  New  dispositions  arc  made  to  complete  the 
victory,  Desolles  is  to  attack  the  enemy's  left  in  front, 
while  its  flank  is  turned  by  the  Polish  and  German  divisions  ; 
a  brigade  is  at  the  same  time  to  assail  the  right  wing.  Every 
thing  falls  before  this  well-combined  effort  ;~the  position  is 

*  The  number  of  this  army  is  ^'tl^iously  estimated  at  from  fifteen  to  thirty- 
six  thousand  men.  Napier  says  the  force  "  was  somewhat  more  than  twenty- 
five  thousand  strong,  with  forty  pieces  of  artillery." 


174  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XV. 

carried  ;  the  chateau  and  the  heights,  occupied  by  the 
Spanish  reserve,  arrest  our  enthusiastic  troops  fur  scarcely  a 
quarter  of  an  hour  ;  and  the  cavahy  of  Milhaud  and  Merlin 
carry  terror  and  death  into  the  broken  battalions  of  the 
enemy.  The  Spaniards,  routed  with  horrible  slaughter,  take 
the  road  to  the  Sierra  Morena,  leaving  behind  thirty-five 
pieces  of  artillery,  two  hundred  carriages,  four  thousand 
prisoners,  and  an  equal  number  hors~de-comhat. 

Mj  defeats  Wilsoa. — This  brilliant  feat  of  arms,  which 
crowned  the  campaign  of  Talavera,  was  well  calculated  to 
encourage  Joseph  ;  but  he  had  already  deprived  himself  of 
the  means  of  profiting  by  it,  as  he  could  otherwise  have  done, 
by  too  soon  detaching  Key's  corps  and  directing  it  to  return 
toward  Salamanca.  While  on  this  march,  Ney's  vanguard 
encountered  the  partisan  Wilson,  at  the  hill  of  Banos  in  the 
arid  mountains  of  Gredos.  The  Anglo-Portuguese  general, 
notwithstanding  the  natural  strength  of  his  position,  which 
had  been  rendered  still  more  impregnable  by  all  the  artificial 
means  in  his  power,  was  defeated  and  driven,  with  the  loss 
of  a  thousand  men,  into  the  mountains  of  Gata  on  the  con- 
fines of  Portugal. 

Remarks  on  these  Operations! — Thus  ended  the  short 
campaign  of  Talavera,  one  of  the  most  remarkable  episodes 
in  this  war.  The  military  talents  of  Joseph  were  fiir  from 
brilliant.  Having  got  rid  of  the  English  who  retreated 
toward  Badajos,  but  being  still  embarrassed  by  the  danger 
with  which  the  Spaniards  threatened  his  capital,  and  not 
knowing  how  to  profit  by  the  imposing  force  which  the 
union  of  five  corps-d'armee  had  given  him,  his  only  thought 
was  to  despatch  Sebastiani  against  Venegas  ;  and  Ney 
toward  Salamanca  I  It  is  true  that  this  point  was  without 
defense,  and  that  Beresford,  with  the  aid  of  the  Duke  del 
Parque,  might,  had  he  been  of  a  more  enterprising  character, 
have   threatened   our   communications  in   the   north.     But 


Ch.  XV.]  CAMPAiaX     OF     1809     IN     SPAIN.  175 

mere  accessories  like  this,  however  important  in  themselves, 
must  frequently  be  sacrificed  in  order  to  secure  more  import- 
ant results.  If  Joseph  had  been  a  better  geneml,  and  less 
anxious  to  return  to  his  palace,  ho  would  not  have  given 
Wellington  a  moment's  rest.  Leaving  a  single  corps-d'armée 
at  Toledo,  witli  his  four  others,  he  should  have  fallen  on 
the  English  wherever  they  could  be  found,  if  it  were  even  at 
Lisbon  or  Cadiz.  Never  was  there  so  fine  an  opjjortunity 
for  a  decisive  operation,  during  the  whole  war  in  Spain. 
One  of  the  greatest  regrets  I  have  felt  in  leaving  my  stormy 
career,  is  that  of  not  having  been  present  at  that  time  with 
my  army  on  the  Tagus.  Even  supposing  Beresford  had 
advanced  to  the  Douro  and  Venegas  had  jnished  forward  to 
the  capital,  I  should  have  troubled  myself  very  little  about 
their  operations  ;  for  they  would  have  deemed  themselves 
exceedingly  fortunate  to  escape  safe  and  sound  after  the 
defeat  of  the  principal  array. 

The  news  of  my  victory  at  Wagram,  the  armistice  of 
Znaim,  and  the  retreat  of  the  English  on  the  Guadiana,  con- 
soled Joseph  for  the  loss  of  Galicia  and  his  want  of  success 
at  Talavera  ;  but  it  was  important  not  to  sleep  on  the  bosom 
of  a  negative  victory.  Marshal  Soult,  it  is  said,  proposed  to  the 
king  to  advance  on  Lisbon  by  forced  marches,  at  the  moment 
when  Wellington  was  seeking  to  repair,  near  Badajos,  the 
losses  which  he  had  experienced  in  the  defiles  of  Arzobispo 
and  Guadalupe.  The  movement,  indeed,  seemed  most  favor- 
able for  anticipating  the  enemy  m  the  capital  of  Portugal, 
and  of  thus  overthrowing  his  whole  system  of  defence.  But 
why  go  to  Lisbon,  and  leave  Wellington  an  opportunity  to 
base  himself  on  Badajos  and  Cadiz  ?  It  was  against  hia 
army  that  the  king  should  have  marched  with  four  corps, — a 
force  sufficient  to  force  him  in  front,  and.  at  the  same  time, 
to  manoeuvre  so  as  to  cut  off  his  line  of  retreat.  But  the 
fear  that  Madrid  might  be  exposed  to  the  attacks  of  the 


176  .  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XV. 

S[taiiiards  closed  the  eyes  of  Joseph  to  every  other  consider- 
ation. 

The  most  experienced  military  men  have  generally  agreed 
in  the  opinion  that  this  was  the  decisive  moment  in  the 
whole  war,  and  that  the  unfortunate  issue  of  that  war  was 
attributable  to  allowing  this  opportimity  to  escape  unim- 
proved. It  is  certain  that  all  j3robable  conjectures  on  the 
resulting  operations  fully  confirm  this  opinion  ;  and,  espe- 
cially, if  they  had  been  so  directed  as  to  strike  a  mortal  blow 
to  Wellington's  army  before  he  could  regain  his  vessels  ;  but 
if  he  had  succeeded  in  reaching  Cadiz,  and  had  based  himself 
on  that  place  and  Gibraltar,  he  might  still  have  prolonged 
the  war.  Although  it  would  have  been  much  easier  fur  us 
to  reduce  him  to  the  defensive  in  the  island  of  Leon  than  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Tagus,  still  there  would  have  been  chances 
for  him  to  carry  on  successful  operations  along  the  immense 
extent  of  coast  from  Coruna  to  Tarragona  ;  and  the  contest 
might  still  have  been  continued,  though  under  circumstnnces 
much  more  favorable  for  us.""''" 

*  The  following  remarks  of  Xapier  upon  the  operations  of  the  French  during 
this  campaigu  are  both  able  aud  just. 

"  Joseph  was  finally  successful ,  yet  it  may  be  safely  aEQrmed  that,  with  the 
exception  of  uniting  his  three  corps  behind  the  Guadarama,  on  the  evening  of 
the  twenty-fiftli,  his  proceedings  were  an  almost  uninterrupted  series  of  errors. 
He  would  not  suffer  Soult  to  besiege  Ciudad-Rodrigo  with  seventy  thousand 
men,  in  the  end  of  July.  To  protect  Madrid  from  the  army  of  Vcncgas,  over- 
balanced, in  his  mind,  the  advr^tages  of  this  bold  and  grand  project,  which 
would  inevitably  have  drawn  Sir  Arthur  "U'ellesley  from  the  Tagus,  and 
which,  interrupting  all  military  communication  between  the  northern  and 
southern  provinces,  and  insuring  possession  of  Castile  and  Leon,  would,  by  its 
success,  have  opened  a  broad  way  to  Lisbon.  Cuesta  and  "Venegas,  mean- 
while, would  have  marched  against  Madrid  1  Cuesta  and  Venegas  acting  on 
external  lines,  and  whose  united  force  did  not  exceed  sixty -five  thousand  men! 
The  king,  holding  a  central  position,  with  fifty  thousand  French  veterans,  was 
alarmed  at  this  prospect,  and,  rejecting  Soult's  plan,  drew  Mortier,  with  the 
fifth  corps,  to  Yilla  Castin.  Truly,  this  was  to  avoid  the  fruit  tree  from  fear 
of  a  nettle  at  its  stem  ! 

"  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley's  advance  to  Talavera  was  the  result  of  this  great 
error;   but  he  having  thus  incautiously  afiordcd  .'-'oult  an  oi^o  tuiiity  of  strik- 


Ch.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1809     IN     SPAIN.  177 

Soiilt  succeeds  Jourdan  as  Joseph's  Cbjcf  of  Staff.— All 
parties  were  dissutisfied  with  the  results  of  the  cxiiedition  on 
Talavera.     Less  displeased  with  the  errors  committed  in  the 

ing  a  fatal  blow,  a  fresh  combination  was  concerted.  The  king,  with  equal 
judgment  and  activity,  then  united  all  his  own  forces  near  Toledo,  separated 
Venegas  from  Cuesta,  puslied  back  the  latter  upon  tho  English  ami}-,  and 
obliged  both  to  stand  on  the  defensive,  with  eyes  attentively  directed  to  their 
front,  when  the  real  point  of  danger  was  in  the  rear.  This,  indeed,  was  skill- 
ful ;  but  ihe  battle  of  Talavera,  which  followed,  was  a  palpable,  au  enormous 
fault  The  allies  could  neither  move  forward  nor  backward,  without  being 
infinitely  worse  situated  for  success  than  in  that  strong  position,  which  seemed 
marked  out  by  fortune  herself  for  their  security.  Uutil  the  thiity-tirst,  the 
ojierations  of  Venegas  were  not  even  felt,  hence,  till  the  thirty-first,  the  French 
position  on  the  Alberche  m'ght  have  been  maintained  without  danger;  and, 
on  the  first  of  August,  the  head  of  Soulc's  column  was  at  Plasencia. 

"Let  us  suppose  that  the  French  had  merely  made  demoiistiations  on  the 
twenty-eighth,  and  had  retired  behind  the  Alberche  on  the  twenty-nintli, 
would  the  allies  have  dared  to  attack  them  in  that  position  ?  The  conduct  of 
the  iipfi^iards,  on  the  evening  of  the  twenty-seventh,  answers  the  question; 
and,  moreover,  Joseph,  with  an  army  compact,  active,  and  exiicrienccd,  could 
with  ease  have  baffled  any  efforts  of  the  combined  forces  to  bring  him  to  action: 
he  might  have  covered  himself  by  the  Guadarama  river  and  by  the  Tagus  in 
succession,  and  the  further  he  led  his  opponents  from  Talavera,  without  uncov- 
ering the  line  of  La  Mancha.  the  more  certain  the  effect  of  Soult's  operations  ; 
but  here  we  have  another  proo/ that  double  external  lines  are  essentially  vicious. 
"  Tlie  combined  movement  of  tl.o  Fiench  was  desirable,  from  the  greatness 
of  the  object  to  be  gained,  and  safe,  from  the  powerful  force  on  each  point  ;  and 
the  occasion  was  so  favorable  that,  notwiiustanding  the  imprudent  heat  of 
Victor,  the  reluctance  of  Ney,  and  the  unsteady  temper  of  the  king,  the  fate  of 
the  allies  was,  up  to  the  evening  of  the  third,  heavy  in  the  scale.  Neveithe- 
Icss,  as  the  central  position  held  by  the  allies,  cut  the  line  of  correspondence 
butween  Joseph  and  Soult,  the  king's  dispatches  were  intercepted,  and  the 
wliole  operation,  even  at  the  last  hour,  was  thus  baffled.  The  first  element  of 
success  in  war  is,  that  every  thing  should  emanate  from  a  single  head  ;  and  it 
would  have  been  preferable  that  the  king,  drawing  the  second  and  fifth  corps 
to  him  by  the  pass  of  the  Guadarama,  or  by  that  of  Avila.  should,  with  tho 
eighty  thousand  men  thus  united,  have  fallen  upon  the  allies  in  front.  Such  a 
comb.naiion,  although  of  less  brdhaut  promise  than  the  one  adopted,  would 
have  been  n.(K.  sure  ;  and  tho  less  a  general  trusts  to  fortune  the  better;— she- 
is  capric'ous  ! 

"  When  one  Spanish  army  was  surprised  at  Arzobi.spo,  another  completely 
beaten  at  Alnionacid,  and  when  Wilson's  Portuguese  corps  was  dispersed  at 
Banos,  the  junta  had  just  completed  the  measure  of  their  folly  by  quarreling 
with  the  British,  which  was  the  only  force  left  that  could  protect  them.  The 
French  were,  in  truth,  therefore,  the  masters  of  the  Peninsula,  but  they  termi- 
nated their  operations  at  the  very  moment  when  they  shoiiUl  have  pursued 
VOL.   III. — 12. 


178  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON,  [Ch.  XV. 

battle  itself  than  in  the  subsequent  operations,  I  gave  to 
Soult  the  office  of  major-general  to  Joseph,  hoping  that  he 
WDuld  conduct  his  operations  with  more  skill  than  his  prede- 
cessor. 

Combats  of  Tamanics  and  Alba  de  Tormcs. — On  arriving  at 
Salamanca,  Marshal  Ney,  who,  like  many  others,  quarreled 
with  his  colleagues  when  placed  under  their  orders,  left  the 
country  and  returned  to  France,  rather  than  obey  the  orders 
of  Siiult.  General  Marchand,  who,  in  Ncy's  absence,  was 
charged  with  the  command  of  the  sixth  corps,  was  disturbed 


them  -with  redoubled  activity,  because  the  general  aspect  of  affairs  and  the 
particular  circumstances  of  the  campaign  were  alike  favorable.  For  Napoleon 
was  victorious  in  Germany;  and  of  the  British  expeditions  against  Italy  and 
Holland,  the  former  had  scarcely  struggled  into  life, — the  latter  was  already 
corrupting  in  death.  Hence,  Joseph  might  have  been  assured  that  he  would 
receive  rc-ënlbrcements,  but  that  none,  of  any  consequence,  could  reach  his 
adversanei  ;  and,  in  the  Peninsula,  there  was  nothing  to  oppose  him.  Navarre, 
Bi.scay,  Aragon,  and  the  Castiles  were  subdued;  Gerona  closely  beleagured, 
and  tlie  rest  of  Catalonia,  if  not  quiescent,  totally  unable  to  succor  that  noble 
city.  Valencia  was  inert;  the  Astunans  still  trembling;  in  Galicia  there  was 
nothing  but  confusion.  Romaiia,  commanding  lifte.on  thousand  infantry,  but 
neither  cavalry  nor  artillery,  was  then  at  Coruna  and  dared  not  quit  I  ho 
mountains.  The  Duke  del  Parque  held  Ciudad-Rodrigo,  but  was  in  no  con- 
dition to  make  head  against  more  than  a  Frencli  division.  The  battle  of  Almo- 
nacid  had  cleared  La  Mancha  of  troops.  Estremadura  and  Andalusia  were,  as 
we  have  seen,  weak,  distracted,  and  incapable  of  solid  resistance.  There 
remained  only  the  English  and  Portuguese  armies,  the  one  being  at  Jaraceijo, 
the  other  at  Moraleja. 

"  The  line  of  resistance  may,  therefore,  be  said  to  have  extended  from  the 
Sierra  Morena  to  Coruiia — weak  from  its  length  ;  weaker,  that  the  allied  corps, 
being  separated  by  mountains,  by  rivers,  and  by  vast  tracts  of  country,  and 
having  different  bases  of  operation,  such  as  Lisbon,  Seville,  and  Ciudad- 
Rodrigo,  could  not  act  in  concert,  except  offensively  ;  and  with  how  little  effect 
in  that  way  the  campaign  of  Talavera  had  proved.  But  the  French  were  con- 
centrated in  a  narrow  space,  and,  having  only  Madrid  to  cover,  were  advan- 
tageously situated  for  offensive  or  defensive  movements.  Tlie  allied  forces 
were,  for  the  most  part,  imperfectly  organized,  and  would  not,  altogether,  have 
amounted  to  ninety  thousand  fighting  men.  The  French  were  above  one  hun- 
dred thousand,  dangerous  from  their  discipline  and  experience,  more  dangerous 
that  they  held  a  central  position,  and  that  their  numbers  were  unknown  to 
their  opponents  ;  and,  moreover,  having,  in  four  day.s,  gained  one  general  and 
two  minor  battles,  their  courage  was  high  and  eager." 


Ch.  XY.]  campaign     of     1809     IN     SPAIN.  179 

in  his  cantoncments  about  Salamanca  by  the  corps  of  the 
Duke  del  Parque  (formerly  Eomana's  army),  which,  by 
means  of  the  fortifications  of  Ciudad-Rodrigo  and  the  prox- 
imity df  the  English  army,  was  enabled  to  harass  our  troops 
almost  incessantly.  Marchand  attacked  him  on  the  sixteenth 
of  October,  at  Tamames,  in  a  position  difficult  of  access, 
where  the  efforts  of  the  brave  division  of  Maucune  were  of  no 
avail  against  an  enemy  sheltered  behind  rocks.  At  the  end 
of  the  combat  the  Duke  del  Parque  gained  possession  of 
Salamanca.  As  it  was  incompatible  with  the  safety  of  the 
army  to  suffer  this  slight  success  to  go  unpunished,  General 
Kellerman,  leaving  Valladolid  at  the  head  of  a  division  of 
dragoons,  rejoined  the  sixth  corps,  and  on  the  twenty-eighth 
of  November,  attacked  and  defeated  the  Duke  del  Parque  at 
Alba  de  Termes,  without  even  waiting  for  a  union  of  his 
own  forces.  He,  therefore,  was  unable  to  cut  up  the  beaten 
enemy,  who  escaped,  during  the  night,  from  the  resentment 
of  the  sixth  corps,  who  were  anxious  to  revenge  the  affront 
which  they  had  received  a  few  weeks  before  at  Tamames. 

ArrJzaga  beaten  at  Ocana.— The  junta  of  Cadiz,  dissatis- 
fied with  the  dispersion  of  its  armies  and  the  failure  of  its 
project  on  Madrid,  now  ordered  General  Eguia  to  unite  the 
army  of  Cuesta  with  the  remains  of  Venegas'  command. 
The  Marquis  of  Arrizaga  took  command  of  these  united 
forces,  which  numbered  fifty  thousand  men.  Proud  of  so 
imposing  a  force,  the  presumptuous  Spaniard  thought  that 
he  alone  could  accomplish  what  Wellington  had  ftiiled  to  do. 
He  advances  on  Aranjuez  ;  a  vanguard  of  the  elite,  preceding 
the  Spanish  army,  debouches  into  the  plain  of  Ocana,  on  the 
twelfth  of  November,  and  attacks  Sebastiani,  The  Spanish 
cavalry  even  ventures  to  assail  Milhaud,  who  draws  it  on  to 
a  square  of  a  Polish  regiment,  whose  fire  makes  terrible 
havoc  in  its  ranks.  Milhaud  then  throws  himself  on  the 
enemy  at  the  head  of  his  dragoons,  beats  him,  and  destroys 


180  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XV. 

almost  the  entire  corps  of  royal  carabineers,  the  pride  of 
Castile.  By  means  of  this  success  Sebastiani  maintains  him- 
self audaciously  between  Ocana  and  the  Tagus,  and  covers 
the  bridge  of  Aranjuez  till  the  arrival  of  reenforcements. 
Soult  and  Joseph,  on  hearing  of  this  combat,  ily  to  the 
assistance  of  Sebastiani,  at  the  head  of  Mortier's  corps  ; 
Victor,  also,  receives  orders  to  march  from  Yillamaurique  on 
Ocana,  where  he  will  arrive  on  the  eighteenth,  until  which 
time  our  troops  are  to  suspend  their  attack.  The  Spanish 
army,  united  to  its  vanguard,  either  wishing  to  anticipate 
this  junction,  or  taking  our  hesitation  as  an  indication  of 
fear,  attack  us  on  the  morning  of  the  eighteenth.  Leval's 
division  is  obliged  to  fall  back,  and  the  presumptuous  enemy 
pursues  it  across  the  ravine.  Soult  wishes  to  retire,  in  order 
to  gain  time  for  Victor  to  come  up  ;  but  our  troops  are  so 
eager  for  the  tight,  and  Levai  so  seriously  engagc^d,  that  all 
are  directed  to  fall  at  once  on  the  enemy,  now  puffed  up 
with  his  temporary  success.  General  Senarmont  advances, 
as  at  Friedland,  with  a  battery  of  thirty  pieces  of  artillery, 
and  thunders  against  the  front,  which  Mortier  attacks  from 
his  side.  At  this  decisive  moment  the  cavalry  of  Sebastiani 
charges  the  right  of  the  Spaniards,  whose  squadrons,  still 
terrified  by  the  affair  of  the  twelfth,  remain  quiet  spectators 
of  this  movement  ;  their  infantry  seek  in  vain  to  form 
squares  in  a  wood  of  olive-trees,  but  are  everywhere  routed, 
sabred  or  taken  prisoners.  The  division  of  Latour-Mau- 
bourg,  belonging  to  Victor's  corps,  arrives  at  this  opportune 
moment,  and  completes  the  total  rout  of  the  enemy,  who 
flies  even  to  Guardia,  leaving  behind  him  horrible  traces  of 
disorder  and  confusion.  Fifty  pieces  of  cannon,  thirty  stand 
of  colors,  and  twenty  thousand  prisoners,  are  the  brilliant 
trophies  of  their  victory,  and  furnish,  at  the  same  time,  a 
glorious  and  irrefragable  proof  of  the  superiority  of  our  sol- 
diers over  the  Spanish.     The  flying  enemy  does  not  rally  till 


Cil.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1809     IN    SPAIN.  181 

he  reaches  the  defiles  of  the  Sierra-Morena,  where  Joseph, 
troubled  by  the  presence  of  Wellington's  army  on  the  con- 
fines of  Portugal,  thought  he  ought  not  to  follow  them. 

Inaction  of  WelIinj?ton.— It  is  quite  remarkable,  that  at 
this  moment,  when  Spain  was  receiving  such  a  terrible  check, 
Wellington  remained  completely  inactive  on  the  confines  of 
Portugal,  although   the  dispersion  of  the  second  and  third 
corps  between  the  Tagus  and  Salamanca,  offered  an  oppor- 
tunity for  a  powerful  diversion.     The  f\iult  of  this  inaction 
is  attributed  to  English  policy,  and  an  excessive  care  for  the 
preservation  of  an  army,  on  which,  according  to  them,  entirely 
depended  the  success  of  the  war  and  the  deliverance  of  the 
Peninsula.     However  excessive  this  prudence  may  ajipear  in 
a  military  point  of  view,  still  it  would  be  unjust  to  find  fliult 
with  it  ;  for  it  was,  in  fact,  of  very  little   importance  to 
Wellington  if  the  war  should  last  for  ten  years,  provided  he 
did  not  hazard  the  safety  of  his   own  army  ;   had  it  been 
English  soil  from  which  he  was  seeking  to  drive  us,  he  should 
have  risked  everything  to  accomplish  that  object.     But  here 
the  case  was  difierent.     And  to  these  plausible  motives  for 
inaction,  there  must  be  added  others  still  more  powerful. 
Wellington,  dissatisfied  at  the  hesitation   of  the   supreme 
junta  to  place  the  Spanish  troops  formally  under  his  own 
orders,  had  rei)aired  to  Seville  after  the  retreat  to  Badajos, 
and  consulted  with  his  brother,  the  Marquis  of  Wellesley, 
then  British  embassador,  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  the 
basis  of  some  system  which  would  secure  greater  unity  of 
action.     The  risk  he  had  run  at  Arzobispo  proved  to  the 
English  general  that,  notwithstanding  the  great  advantage 
derived  from  the  national  war  in  Spain,  it  would  be  danger- 
ous for  him  to  attempt  any  bold  enterprises  into  the  heart 
of   the   kingdom,    until   he   had   first   secured  a  place   of 
refuge,  sufficient   reënforcements,   and   a  better   system  of 
cooperation  on  the  part  of  the  Spanish  troops.    Romana  was 


182  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XV. 

called  for  this  purpose  to  the  junta  of  Seville,  where  it  was 
hoped  that  his  services  and  credit  would  give  great  additional 
support  to  the  English  influence. *■'•" 

*  "When  remonstrated  with  by  Lord  Wellesley  for  abandoning  the  Spaniards 
at  this  period,  Wellington  replied,  that  "  Want  had  driven  hiiu  to  separate  from 
them,  but  their  shameful  flight  at  Arzobispo  would  alone  have  justified  him  for 
doing  so.  To  take  up  a  defensive  position  behind  the  Guadiana  would  be  use- 
less, because  that  river  was  fordable,  and  the  ground  behind  it  weak.  The 
line  of  the  Tagus,  occupied  at  the  moment  by  Eguia,  was  so  strong  that  if  the 
Spaniards  could  defend  anything  they  might  defend  that.  His  advice,  then, 
was,  that  they  should  send  tlie  pontoon  bridge  to  Badajos,  and  remain  on  the 
defensive  at  Delcytoza  and  Almaraz.  But,  it  might  be  asked,  he  said,  waa 
there  no  chance  of  renewing  the  offensive  ?  To  what  purpose  ?  The  French 
were  as  numerous,  if  not  more  so,  than  the  allies;  and,  with  respect  to  the 
Spaniards  at  least,  superior  in  discipline  and  every  military  quality.  To 
advance  again  was  only  to  play  the  same  losing  game  as  before.  Bafios  and 
Perales  must  bo  guarded,  or  the  bands  in  Castilo  would  again  pour  through 
upon  the  rear  of  the  allied  army  ;  but  who  was  to  guard  these  passes.  The 
British  were  too  few  to  detach,  and  the  Spaniards  could  not  be  trusted  ;  and  if 
they  could,  Avila  and  Guadarama  passes  remained,  by  which  the  enemy  could 
reënforce  the  army  in  front, — for  there  were  no  Spanish  troops  in  the  north  of 
Spain  capable  of  making  a  diversion. 

"  But  there  was  a  more  serious  consideration,  namely,  the  constant  and 
shameful  misbehavior  of  the  Spanish  troops  before  the  enemy.  We,  in  P'ng- 
land,  never  hear  of  their  defeats  imd  flights,  but  I  have  heard  Spanish  officers 
telling  of  nineteen  or  twenty  actions  of  the  description  of  that  at  the  bridge  of 
Arzobispo,  accounts  of  which,  I  believe,  have  never  been  published.  In  the 
battle  of  Talavera,  in  which  the  Spanish  army,  with  very  trifling  exception, 
was  not  engaged — whole  corps  threw  away  their  arras,  and  ran  off,  when  they 
were  neither  attacked  nor  threatened  with  an  attack.  When  these  dastardly 
soldiers  run  away  they  plunder  everything  they  meet.  In  their  flight  from 
Talavera  they  plundered  the  baggage  of  the  British  army,  which  was,  at  that 
moment,  bravely  engaged  in  their  cause. 

"For  these  reasons  he  would  not,  he  said,  again  cooperate  with  the 
Spaniards  ;  yet,  by  taking  post  on  the  Portuguese  frontier,  he  would  hang  upon 
the  enemy's  flank,  and  thus,  unless  the  latter  came  with  very  great  forces,  pre- 
vent him  from  crossing  the  Guadiana.  Tliis  reasoning  was  conclusive,  but  ere 
it  reached  Lord  Wellesley,  the  latter  found  that,  so  far  from  his  plans,  relative  to 
the  supply,  having  been  adopted,  he  could  not  even  get  nn  answer  from  the 
junta;  that  miserable  body,  at  one  moment  shrinking  with  fear,  at  the  next 
bursting  with  folly,  now  talked  of  the  enemy's  being  about  to  retire  to  the 
Pyrenees,  or  even  to  the  interior  of  France  !  and  assummg  the  right  to  dispose 
of  the  Portuguese  army  as  well  as  their  own,  importunately  pressed  for  an 
immediate,  combined,  offensive  operation,  by  the  troops  of  the  three  nations  to 
harass  the  enemy  in  his  retreat  !  but,  at  the  same  time,  they  ordered  Eguia  to 
withdraw  from  Deleytoza,  behind  the  Guadiana." 


Cu.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     18  0  9     IN     SPAIN.  183 

The  expedition  of  Arrizaga  was  in  no  way  connected  with 
the  defensive  plan  of  the  English  general  ;  to  march  again 
into  Estremadura,  in  time  to  act  in  concert,  was  diametri- 
cally opposed  to  his  present  projects.  In  fact,  instead  of 
again  ascending  the  Guadiana  to  act  with  Arrizaga,  as  soon 
as  he  had  terminated  the  conferences  of  Seville,  Wellington 
directed  his  army  from  Badajos  by  Albuquerqne  to  (he  north 
of  Portugal,  to  act  in  concert  with  the  Duke  del  Parque, 
who  was  commanding  the  former  corps  of  Romana,  under 
Ciudad-Rodrigo,  and  with  Beresford,  who  covered  Almeida. 
This  new  plan  of  operations  was  not  without  merit,  since  it 
carried  the  English  army  on  the  most  important  point  of  our 
communications,  which  had  been  stripped  of  its  means  of 
defense  by  the  concentration  of  our  troops  on  the  frontier  of 
Andalusia.  To  this  important  advantage,  dt  also  added  that 
of  better  covering  Portugal,  which  constituted  the  essential 
base  of  all  British  operations  for  the  deliverance  of  the 
Peninsula. 

Intrenched  Camp  of  Torres  Vedras. — But  Wellington  did 
not  stop  here.  He  felt  that  a  solid  mass  of  forty  thousand 
Anglo-Hanoverians,  with  as  many  more  disciplined  and 
devoted  Portuguese,  would  contend  with  strong  chances  of 
success  against  an  army  like  ours,  compelled  to  greatly 
extend  itself  in  order  to  procure  provisions,  cover  its  long- 
line  of  communications,  and  repress  insurrections  ;  but  the 
example  of  Moore  proved  to  the  English  that,  with  adver- 
saries so  active  and  impetuous,  they  might  encounter  rude 
assaults.  It  was,  therefore,  important  for  Wellington  to 
secure  to  his  army  a  formidable  place  of  refuge  against  a 
catastrophe  like  that  of  Coruna,  to  give  him  time  to  employ 
his  forces  to  the  best  advantage,  to  enable  him  to  receive 
reënforcements,  and,  in  case  of  necessity,  to  embark  his  army 
in  safety  and  descend  again  upon  some  other  point  of  the 
vast    Peninsula.     For    this    purpose,  immediately  after  his 


184  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XV. 

return  from  Sevillo,  he  directed  an  immense  intrenched 
camp  to  be  laid  out  on  the  heights  of  Torres  Vedras,  which 
constituted  the  base  of  a  vast  triangle,  the  sea  coast  and  the 
Tagus  forming  the  sides,  with  Lisbon  for  the  vertex. 

Romana  and  the  Jiisita  of  Seville. — These  measures 
seemed  the  more  wise,  as  the  presence  of  Eomana  at  Seville 
failed  to  accomplish  the  desired  object  ;  tiiis  general  being 
soon  involved  in  a  controversy  with  the  junta.  The  latter 
was  jealous  of  the  national  independence,  and  treated  the 
English  as  auxiliaries  who  affected  a  false  disinterestedness 
for  Spain.  It  thought,  with  reason,  that  it  was  less  for  Spain 
than  for  England  herself  that  they  exhibited  so  much 
empressement  ;  it  had,  therefore,  refused  to  receive  the 
English  troops  in  Cadiz.  Wellington  attributed  to  this 
jealousy  the  conduct  of  Cuesta,  and  the  ill-success  of  the 
enterj)rise  against  Madrid.  Both  had  good  reasons  for  their 
opinions  ;  but  such  a  difference  of  interests  might  assist  our 
cause  as  much  as  the  force  of  bayonets.  The  English  having 
obtained  complete  influence  over  the  mind  of  Komana,  they 
persuaded  him  that  the  junta  would  lose  all  through  their 
ill-placed  jealousy  and  national  vanity,  and  determined  him 
to  dissolve  that  body  and  establish  in  its  place  a  less  numer- 
ous regency.  He  issued  proclamations  in  which  he  reproached 
the  junta  for  the  same  faults  with  which  I  had  charged  the 
Directory  on  my  return  from  Egypt  He  seemed  ready  to 
effect  a  political  revolution  and  seize  on  the  liclm  of  govern- 
ment ;  but  his  trifling  character  ill-fitted  him  for  playing 
the  part  of  Cromwell,  or  even  that  which  I  had  acted  on  the 
eighteenth  Brumaire.  Let  us  leave  these  intrigues  as  foreign 
from  the  object  of  the  present  narrative,  and  complete  our 
hasty  sketch  of  the  military  operations  of  the  Peninsula. 

Blake's  Eû'orts  to  deliver  Aragon.  —  The  obstinate 
defense  of  Saragossa  had  given  additional  eclat  to  its  fliU  ; — • 
it  was   a   second  Numantia  reduced.     Satisfied  with  these 


Cil.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1809     IN     SPAIN.  185 

results,  my  generals  deemed   the  question  deeided,  and  that 
there  was  no  need  of  great  efforts  to  consolidate  their  success. 
But   the  more  prompt  we  were  to  proclaim  our  success  as 
decisive,  the  more  active  were  the  Spaniards  to  counteract  its 
moral  influence  on  the  people.     No  sooner  were  they  informed 
of  my  departure  for  France  and  that  of  Mortier's   corps  for 
Castile,  than  they  perceived  the  advantages  that  would  result 
from  their  falling  in  force  on  the  third   corps,  which  alone 
remained  to  guard   Aragon.     The  regency  took  advantage, 
without  delay,  of  this  circumstance.     Their  troops  in  Cata- 
lonia and  at  Valencia  were  placed  under  the  orders  of  General 
Blake,  who  was,  at  the  same    time,  made  commandant  of 
Aragon.     He  soon  collected  a  disposable  corps-d' armée,  and 
formed  the   bold   and    important  plan  of  driving  us   from 
Aragon  by  raising  and  again  arming  the  inhabitants  of  the 
country  against  us  ;  if  he  should  obtain  complete  success  in 
this,  he  would  afterward  march  by  Navarre,  reascendino-  the 
Ebro  toward  Miranda,  in  order  to  establish  himself  between 
Bayonne  and  Madrid,  threatening  all  our  lines  of  operations 
and  interrupting  all  communication  between  the  capital  and 
France.     The  latter  jmrt  of  this  plan,  although  hazardous, 
will  appear  less  rash,  if  we  reflect  that  I  was  at  this  time 
engaged  in  a  new  contest  with  Austria,  and   that  Marshal 
Soult  was  moving  from  Coruna  toward  the  centre  of  Portu- 
gal, where  the  English  were  beginning  to  organize  an  army 
for  the  defense  of  the   Peninsula.     But  Blake  had  first  to 
fight  the  French  corps  who  were  defending  Saragossa  ;  and 
if  he  fliiled  in  this  attempt,  he  succeeded  but  too   well  in 
reviving  the  resistance  of  the   populace.     Levies  and  arma- 
ments were  prepared  in  all  parts  of  Aragon  ;  Villa-Cam  pa 
Durand,   Ramon,   Gayan,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Ebro  ; 
Mina,    on    the    frontier    of    Navarre.;    Renovalis,    Sarrara 
Perena,   Pero-Duro,  Cantarero,  and   others  in  U})per  Ara- 
gon,—formed  successively  around  the  third  corps-d'arînée   a 


186  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XV. 

circle  of  partisans  and  guerilla  bands  which,  did  not  cease, 
till  the  end  of  the  war,  to  fetter  its  movements  and  oppose 
its  operations. 

Operations  of  Suchct. — The  troops  of  this  corps  were 
mainly  composed  of  recruits  collected  from  different  nations, 
and  the  severe  labors  of  the  siege  had  both  fatigued  and 
disgusted  them.  They  did  not  exceed  fifteen  or  sixteen  thou- 
sand combatants,  and  their  moral  force  was  still  less  than 
their  numbers.  Happily  General  Suchet  had  just  replaced 
Junot  in  this  important  command.  When  this  general 
reached  Saragossa,  on  the  nineteenth  of  May,  his  predecessor 
was  still  entirely  ignorant  of  the  movements  and  jjrojects  of 
Blake  ;  but  the  next  day  after  his  arrival,  he  learned  that 
General  Levai  had  been  attacked  at  Alcauitz,  and  obliged  to 
retire  before  considerable  forces  ;  at  the  same  time  General 
Robert,  posted  on  the  Cinca,  having  passed  eight  companies 
of  the  elite  to  the  left  bank  of  that  river,  was  prevented  by 
the  rise  of  water  from  going  to  their  assistance,  and  reported 
that  they  had  been  surrounded  and  captured  by  the  armed 
inhabitants  with  the  aid  of  the  garrison  of  Lerida,  after  a 
glorious  Combat  of  three  days.  The  loss  of  these  brave  men 
was  to  be  regretted,  but  could  not  be  repaired.  The  move- 
ment of  Blake  on  Alcanitz,  demanded  serious  attention  and 
prompt  resolution  ;  that  general  at  the  head  of  eighteen 
thousand  men,  was  entering  Aragon  and  menacing  Saragossa. 
The  third  corps  was  scattered  ;  General  Suchet  hastened  to 
recall  General  Habert  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Ebro  ;  he 
took  away  all  the  reserve  at  Saragossa,  and,  marching  on  the 
Puebla  of  Ixar  to  the  support  of  Leval's  division,  encoun- 
tered the  enemy  on  the  twenty-third  of  May.  The  S])aniards 
had  taken  an  advantageous  position,  and  had  a  numerous  and 
well-served  artillery  ;  and  Suchet,  notwithstanding  all  his 
efforts,  could  not  bring  his  troops  to  the  charge.  He  with- 
drew them  at  the  close  of  the  day,  and  a  panic  terror   was 


Cil.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1809     IN     SPAIN.  187 

near  causing  a  total  rout  ;  the  authors  of  this  were  tried  and 
shot  ;  order  was  restored  and  Suchet  marched  his  army  to 
Saragossa. 

His  position  was  critical  ;  if  ho  should  risk  a  decisive 
affair  and  be  beaten,  he  would  compromise  all  the  centre  of 
Spain  ;  if  he  should  now  abandon  Saragossa,  whose  defense 
had  covered  the  enemy  with  so  much  glory,  Europe  would 
not  fail  to  contrast  his  conduct  with  the  heroism  of  Palafox, 
without  taking  into  consideration  the  difference  of  situations 
and  of  the  elements  of  defense.  Suchet  encamped  his 
troops  on  Mount  Torero  and  caused  them  to  manoeuvre  ;  he 
excited  their  enthusiasm  by  presenting  to  them  the  disgrace 
of  yielding  in  energy  to  the  defenders  of  Saragossa,  and 
merely  waited  for  the  return  of  the  five  battalions  which  had 
escorted  the  prisoners  to  France  to  punish  Blake  for  his 
audacity.  Fortunately,  the  Spanish  general  allowed  him 
time  for  all  his  preparations  ;  either  wishing  to  surround  the 
third  corps,  or  fearing  to  attack  it  in  front,  he  took  fifteen 
days  to  go  round  from  Alcanitz  by  Ixar,  Belchite,  Botorte 
and  Muela. 

Combat  of  Maria. — The  battalions  from  France  were  not 
expected  to  return  till  the  fifteenth  of  June.  But  on  the 
thirteenth,  Blake,  advancing  by  the  valley  of  the  Huerba, 
had  separated  from  the  corps-d' armée  and  driven  on  Epila  a 
detachment  commanded  by  General  Fabre,  thus  threatening 
Alagon  and  our  line  of  retreat,  Suchet  carried  the  brigades 
of  Musnier  and  Habert  with  his  cavalry  to  the  convent  of 
Santa-Fé,  avoiding,  however,  a  general  action.  Greneral 
Levai  was  left  on  Mount  Torero  with  a  part  of  his  division, 
and  a  reserve  occupied  Saragossa  under  Colonel  Haxo.  The 
interval  till  the  fifteenth  was  occupied  with  skirmishes  ; 
Blake  then  deployed  tvs^enty-five  thousand  men  and  oûered 
battle.  His  position  was  taken  in  front  of  the  village  of 
Maria,  his  right  resting  on  the  Huerba  and  the  great  road 


188  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XV. 

which,  at  this  place,  crosses  by  a  bridge  a  small  affluent  of 
the  Huerba,  his  centre  and  his  left  resting  on  heights  which 
were  cut  up  by  ravines.  A  knowledge  of  the  ground 
instantly  determined  the  dispositions  of  General  Suchet. 
After  waiting  till  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  for  the  arrival 
of  the  trooj)s  returning  from  France,  and  hearing  that  they 
were  wdthin  a  league  of  him,  he  determined  to  regard  them 
as  a  reserve  and  to  engage  all  the  troops  he  had  on  the 
field  of  battle.  He  established  his  line  parallel  to  that  of 
Blake,  and  attacked  the  left  and  centre  ;  then,  making  a 
vigorous  charge  on  his  right,  he  carried  the  bridge  and  road, 
which  was  the  only  defile  by  which  Blake  could  retire  with 
the  artillery  with  which  he  had  well  furnished  the  front  of 
his  line.  The  contest  on  the  heights  was  prolonged  by  a 
violent  storm,  but  the  retreat  and  flight  of  the  Spanish 
infantry  closed  it,  leaving  in  our  hands  twenty-three  pieces 
of  cannon  and  a  small  number  of  prisoners,  among  whom 
were  a  colonel,  and  General  O'Donoju. 

Coiabat  of  Belchite. — The  victory  of  Maria  saved  the  third 
corps  and  also  Saragossa  ;  but,  in  order  to  deliver  all  Ara- 
gon from  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  Suchet  desired  to  cut  up 
and  destroy  the  army  of  Blake  ;  he,  therefore,  pushed  it 
with  all  possible  rapidity  in  the  direction  of  Belchite,  to 
which  place  it  had  retreated.  Blake  took  position  in  front 
of  this  little  town  on  the  eighteenth,  and  awaited  his 
approach  ;  to  attack  the  enemy  in  front,  and  to  turn  and 
force  his  left,  was  only  the  work  of  an  hour.  The  new  levies 
were  seized  with  panic.  The  regiment  of  Valencia,  in 
attempting  an  orderly  retreat,  was  sabred  by  our  cavalry  and 
taken  prisoners  ;  the  remainder  fled  to  Alcanitz.  Blake 
reached  Tortosa  with  the  loss  of  twenty-three  pieces  of 
cannon,  and  four  or  five  thousand  men  killed   and   taken 

prisoners. 
St.  Cyr's  Operations  in  Catalonia.— Our   troops  had  also 


Cil.  XY.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1809     IN     SPAIN.  189 

been   successful  in   Catalonia,  although   the  successes  there 
had  not  been  attended  with  the  same  results,  on  account  of 
the  magnitude  of    the  obstacles   to  be   overcome,   and    the 
immense  resources  furnished  to  the  insurgents  by  sea.     St. 
Cyr  had  been  before  Tarragona  since  the  njonth  of  February  ; 
in  the  impossibility  of  holding  out   a  long  time  before  this 
place,  he  asked  for  the  means  of  besieging  Geron;;,  for  with- 
out the  possession  of  that  place  our  position  in  Catalonia 
would  always   bo  precarious.     It  was  almost  impossible  to 
maintain  our  communications  ;  the  correspondence  was  car- 
ried on  by  sea  with  the  greatest  difficulty,  and  not  less  than 
six  or  seven  battalions  were  required  to  convey  an  order  from 
Perpignan    to    Barcelona.     St.    Cyr,    therefore,    resolved    to 
march  toward  Vich,  both  for  the  purpose  of  supplies  and  to 
facilitate  the  siege  of  Gerona.      On  learning  the  obstacles 
which  opposed   us  in  this  province,  I  had  resolved,  near  the 
end  of  1808,  to  send  there  the  fourth  co7ys-d'armce,  under 
the  orders  of  Massena.     He  had  already  crossed  the  Rhine 
on  his  march  to  Spain  when  the  war  with  Austria  forced  him 
to  return  to  Germany,  where  the  conquerors  of  Eylau  proved 
themselves   worthy  of   their  ancient  glory.     This  diversion 
was  peculiarly  unfortunate,  and  contributed  not  a  little  to 
the    unfiivorable    issue   of    the   war   in    Spain.       However, 
measures  were   taken  to  supply  the   deficiency  as  soon   as 
possible  ;  a  siege  park  was  assembled  at  Perpignan  ;  General 
Verdier  replaced  Eeille  at  Figueras,  and  formed  a  corps  of 
eighteen  battalions  destined   to  conduct  the  attack  on  this 
place. 

Siege  of  Gerona.— Gerona  has  become  illustrious  in  history 
for  a  defense  no  less  extraordinary  than  that  of  Sarao-ossa. 
It  is  true  that  this  place  was  more  regularly  fortified  than 
the  capital  of  Aragon  ;  but  it  is  also  indisputable  that  the 
obstinacy  of  its  defense  was  due  as  much  to  the  bmvery  of 
its  inhabitants  as  to   the  resources  of  art.     More  fanatical 


190  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XV. 

still  than  their  neighhors,  the  Geronians  gave  to  St.  Xarcisso, 
the  command  not  only  of  their  battalions  and  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  place,  but  also  of  all  Spain.  Proud  of  the  sup- 
port of  this  generalissimo,  the  inhabitants  and  even  the 
women,  armed  themselves  against  our  attacks.  If  the  resist- 
ance of  the  S2)aniards  had  been  the  result  of  a  patriotism, 
at  the  same  time  heroic  and  enlightened,  they  would 
undoubtedly  have  recurred  to  other  means  of  resistance  and 
have  appointed  different  generals  to  command  them  !  For- 
tunately for  them  St.  Narcisse  had  a  lieutenant  worthy  of 
the  command  ;  for  General  Alvarez  was  in  every  respect  a 
brave  man,  and  not  less  determined  than  Palafox,  to  render 
his  name  immortal  by  a  desperate  defense  ;  the  enthusiasm 
of  the  inhabitants  assisted  this  natural  resolution. 

Gerona  is  situated  on  the  Ter,  at  the  foot  of  a  gorge 
through  which  passes  the  road  to  Perpignan.  The  city  has 
an  enciente  of  mediocre  character  ;  but  the  mountains  which 
surround  it  on  the  north  and  east,  are  crowned  with  four  forts 
which  render  its  investment  difficult  and  of  considerable 
extent.  In  order  to  attack  it  on  the  south  side,  it  was 
necessary  to  o^Dcn  a  road  for  the  artillery  ;  for  the  only  prac- 
ticable carriage  road  passes  by  the  city.  Men  were  wanting 
for  such  a  work  ;  moreover,  it  would  have  been  difficult  to 
maintain  ourselves  in  the  city,  in  case  of  its  capture,  against 
a  hostile  population,  if  the  forts  had  not  first  been  reduced. 
The  most  expeditious  and  natural  plan  was  to  take  those 
first. 

Yerdier  was  reënforced  to  the  number  of  eighteen  thou- 
sand Tuen,  and  St.  Cyr  remained  at  Vich  to  assist  him.  The 
Spaniards  were  not  idle  ;  Reding  having  died  at  Tarragona, 
the  junta  had  confided  to  Blake  the  command  of  the  king- 
doms of  Grenada,  Valencia,  and  Catalonia.  His  first  effort 
to  justify  the  confidence  thus  reposed  in  him,  was  to  deliver 
Saragossa.     We  have  just  seen  how  Suchet  received  him  at 


Cn.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1809JN     SPAIN.  191 

Santa  Maria  ;  Blake  now  sought  to  avenge  himself  for  this, 
by  delivering  Gerona.  He  began  by  attempting  to  throw 
provisions  into  the  place,  and  his  very  rich  convoy  fell  into 
the  hands  of  our  soldiers.  St.  Cyr  now  saw  the  importance 
of  taking  from  the  insurgents  the  support  of  Port  Palamos, 
which  facilitated  their  receiving  succors  by  sea  ;  the  place 
was  carried  by  the  Italians  with  great  bravery.  This  capture 
rendered  the  provisioning  of  Gerona  more  difficult,  and  also 
enabled  us  to  push  forward  our  works  with  more  security. 

After  a  first  assault  had  failed,  and  several  eff'urts  of  the 
enemy  to  succor  Gerona  had  been  repelled,  Blake  himself 
finally  appeared  on  the  first  of  September,  to  provisi(m  the 
place.  By  pretending  to  attempt  the  deliverance  of  Gerona 
by  open  force,  he  succeeded  in  deceiving  St.  Cyr,  and  draw- 
ing avay  the  mass  of  his  army  toward  Bellona,  while  Briga- 
dier Garcia-Condé  introduced  two  thousand  men,  with  a 
grand  convoy  of  provisions  and  munitions.  St.  Cyr  marched 
after  Blake  to  offer  him  battle,  but  the  latter  fell  back  ;  our 
troops  now  returned  to  Gerona,  but  they  were  too  late,  for 
the  enemy  had  deposited  their  convoy  in  the  j^lace  and 
effected  their  escape.  On  the  nineteenth  of  November,  a 
practicable  breach  was  effected  in  the  enciente  of  the  place, 
and  an  assault  attempted  ;  but  it  was  unsuccessful.  On  the 
twenty-sixth,  Blake  made  a  third  attenipt  to  succor  the 
place  ;  but  this  time  St.  Cyr  made  his  dis2:)ositions  so  well 
that  the  convoy,  coming  from  Abisbal,  was  completely  sur- 
rounded and  captured.  This  brilliant  affair,  which  cost  the 
Spaniards  three  thousand  men,  took  place  in  full  view  of 
Blake's  army,  which  was  encamj^ed  near  San-Pelago. 

The  great  length  of  the  siege  of  Gerona  appeared  to  me  to 
argue  against  the  energy  and  efficiency  of  St.  Cyr,  and  I 
resolved  to  replace  him  by  Augereau,  who  had  rendered  him- 
self illustrious  in  this  country  by  the  celebrated  battle  of 
Figueras,  in  1794.     This  general  took  command  of  the  army 


192  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XV. 

a  few  days  afterward,  but  lie  did  nothing  to  justify  my  choice. 
He  allowed  O'Donnell  to  escape  from  Gerona  where  his  pres- 
ence had  become  superfluous  after  the  loss  of  his  convoy  of 
provisions.  On  the  eleventh  of  December,  this  place,  pushed 
more  and  more  warmly,  and  reduced  to  the  last  extremity, 
finally  determined  to  capitulate.  One  half  of  its  garrison  and 
of  its  poi)ulation  had  fallen  in  this  glorious  contest. 

General  Remarks  on  the  Operatioas  of  the  Campaign. — 
This  event  terminated  the  campaign  of  1809,  in  which  w^e 
had  gained  great  successes  and  committed  great  errors.  The 
worst  error  was,  undoubtedly,  that  of  leaving  the  command 
of  the  army  to  a  king  without  energy  and  Avithout  military 
talents.  Our  forces  should  have  been  divided  into  three 
indeijendent  armies,  with  a  reserve  forming  a  corps  of  occu- 
pation on  their  rear.  The  king  should  have  been  empowered 
to  order  the  junction  of  two  of  these  armies,  in  case  it  had 
been  necessary  to  attack  the  English,  or,  in  case  a  serious 
check  had  required  a  concentration  of  forces.  The  most 
skillful  of  my  marshals  should  have  been  given  to  the  king 
as  a  major-general,  to  guide  this  mass  to  victory.  In  every 
other  case  each  array  should  have  acted  independently  within 
the  limits  assigned  to  it.  But  divided  as  our  troops  were 
into  eight  or  ten  isolated  corps,  their  power  was  paialyzed  by 
the  jealousy  and  rivalry  of  their  chiefs.  Ney,  for  example, 
hiy  six  months  in  Galicia  with  his  arms  folded,  without 
being  able  to  communicate  either  with  Madrid  or  Bayonnc, 
because  he  commanded  neither  at  Valladolid,  nor  at  Leon, 
nor  in  the  Asturias,  and  could  form  no  plan  of  cooperation. 
All  the  troops  between  Bnrgos  and  the  ocean  should  have 
been  put  under  the  orders  of  a  single  chief.  In  the  East 
there  should  have  been  an  army  of  the  Oriental  Pyrenees,  to 
operate  in  Aragon  and  in  Catalonia. 

The  king  was  too  anxious  to  enjoy  the  pleasures  of  royalty 
at  Madrid  ;  he  should  have  waited  till  Spain  was  subjected 


Ch.  XV.J  CAMPAIGN     OF     1809     IN     SPAIN.  193 

to  his  power  ;  liis  capital  should  have  been  at  the  head- 
quarters of  the  army  of  the  centre,  until  his  kingdom  was 
conquered.  But  he  wished,  at  every  cost,  to  .«pare  his 
country,  and  he  rendered  many  of  the  military  operations 
subordinate  to  this  object.  He  acted  the  Spaniard  more 
thoroughly  than  Philip  V.  in  his  war  with  the  Regent.  In 
truth,  it  was  necessary  to  act  well  for  Spain  in  order  to  create 
a  party  in  his  favor,  and  his  only  error  Avas  in  beginning  this 
course  of  policy  two  years  too  soon.  Joseph  had  four  or  five 
thousand  French  guards  ;  but  he  wished  an  army  ;  regiments 
were  organized  from  the  Spanish  prisoners  taken  in  different 
parts  of  the  kingdom,  and  armed  and  equipped.  But  this 
was  merely  giving  arms  and  equipments  to  the  insurgents, 
for  all  deserted  on  the  first  opportunity  and  rejoined  their 
comrades.  Instead  of  this  course,  all  prisoners  should  have 
been  sent  to  France,  until  the  pacification  of  the  country  ; 
they  could  then  have  been  employed  to  some  purpose.  The 
occupation  of  all  the  provinces  at  the  same  time,  was  also 
unfortunate,  as  it  prevented  the  king  from  levying  contribu- 
tions ;  this  rendered  it  necessary  for  me  to  allow  him  an 
annual  subsidy  from  the  French  treasury  of  six  millions  for 
the  support  of  his  household. 

Soult  was  advanced  into  Portugal  with  insufiicient  forces  ; 
the  embarkation  of  Moore's  army,  had  deceived  me  respecting 
the  resistance  we  were  likely  to  meet  in  Portugal  ;  I  thought 
that  the  fame  of  our  victories  of  Burgos,  Tudela,  Espinosa, 
and  Corufia,  and  the  slight  assistance  received  from  the 
English,  would  disgust  the  Portuguese  with  their  destructive 
contest.  But  the  inhabitants  of  the  Peninsula  knew  noth- 
ing but  what  was  told  them  by  their  priests,  who  took  good 
care  to  represent  our  victories  as  so  many  reverses  ;  the  war 
with  Austria  and  my  departure  from  the  country  were 
described  to  them  as  certain  pledges  of  their  speedy  deliver- 
ance.    Ten  thousand  English  still  reuuiined  in  Portugal,  and, 

VOL.    III. — 13. 


194  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch    XV. 

when  united  with  the  resrular  .and  militia  forces  of  the  kinjï- 
dom,  were  more  powerful  than  SouU's  army  of  twenty-six 
thousand  men.  This  army  should  have  been  reënforced  by 
the  sixth  corps,  leaving  some  seven  or  eight  thousand  men  to 
occupy  Ferrol  and  Corufia.  The  plan  to  be  pursued  was  to 
attack  the  enemy  incessantly  with  movable  armies,  without 
stopj)ing  to  administer  the  laws,  till  the  whole  country  was 
conquered  and  its  pacification  completed  ;  but  my  brother 
and  his  lieutenants  did  not  comj)rehend  the  policy  of  such  a 
course. 

The  unfortunate  issue  of  this  contest  resulted  mainly  from 
the  declaration  of  war  by  Austria,  which  effected  more  for 
the  Peninsula  than  all  the  succors  of  England,  both  by  the 
moral  influence  on  the  contending  forces,  and  by  compelling 
me  to  be  absent  from  the  theatre  of  the  war,  thus  causing 
the  most  fatal  results  in  the  want  of  union  among  my  gen- 
erals, and  in  the  false  direction  of  their  operations.  As  the 
Spaniards  had  driven  the  army  of  Joseph  behind  the  Ebro 
before  my  arrival,  they  believed  themselves  capable  of  doing 
the  same  after  my  departure,  considering  my  presence  as  the 
instrument  of  our  victories. 

Those  who  have  compared  this  war  with  that  of  1704-9, 
which  Louis  XIV.  carried  on  in  Spain,  are  but  little 
acquainted  with  history.  The  French  under  Philip  V.  had 
three-quarters  of  the  population  of  the  kingdom  in  their 
favor  ;  only  Aragon,  Catalonia  and  Valencia  had  declared 
in  favor  of  the  house  of  Austria.  If  I  had  had  in  my  favor 
one  half  of  the  force  which  supported  the  arms  of  Louis 
XIV.,  my  enemies  and  the  English  would  have  disajîpeared 
before  my  eagles  like  a  breath,  and  the  war  would  have  ended 
in  two  campaigns.  With  such  a  party  in  our  favor,  and 
havin'T'  plenty  of  provisions,  and  no  reason  for  a  military 
occupation  of  each  province,  we  could  have  directed  all  our 
efforts  against  the  English  army  and  the  few  additional  forces 


Ch.  XV.]  CAMPAIGîSr    OF     1809    IN     SPAIN.  195 

which  Spain  could  have  supplied  ;  in  a  word,  we  could  have 
conducted  the  war  in  strict  accordance  with  the  rules  of 
military  science  ;  as  Vendôme  and  Berwick  were  able  to  do 
at  their  ease  having  never  had  more  than  thirty  thousand 
Anglo-Austrians,  and  perhaps  as  many  Spaniards,  to  con- 
tend with,  while  nearly  eight  millions  of  the  Spanish  people 
were  in  their  favor. 

Operations  of  Russia  against  Sweden.— While  my  arms 
were  triumphing  in  Spain  and  Austria,  those  of  the  Emperor 
Alexander  were  not  idle,  and  although  their  operations  may 
ajjpear  somewhat  foreign  from  the  object  of  these  commen- 
taries, still  they  were  so  intimately  connected  with  my  policy 
as  to  justify  a  brief  sketch  of  these  several  events."^' 

The  little  Russian  army,  which  had  entered  Finland  in 
1808,  and  captured  Sweaborg,  had  not  been  able  to  reduce 
that  province  ;  but  when  reënforced  to  forty  thousand  men, 
it  finally  succeeded  in  effecting  the  expulsion  of  the  Swedes, 
JBut  as  it  was  necessary  to  menace  the  capital  of  Sweden,  in 
order  to  effect  the  cession  of  this  province,  the  Russians  took 
advantage  of  the  severe  winter  of  1809,  to  send  across  the 
frozen  gulf  two  corps  under  Bagration  and  Barclay  de  Tolly. 
The  former  took  Aland  and  menaced  Stockholm,  while  the 
latter  marched  on  Umeo  to  form  a  junction  with  Schuwalof 
This  double  operation  offers  the  new  spectacle  of  an  entire 
army  crossing  the  sea  on  the  ice,  carrying  with  it  its  artillery, 
its  magazines,  and  even  wood  for  the  fires  of  its  bivouacs  ; 
a  remarkable  instance  of  audacity  and  devotion,  for  the 
slightest  wind  from  the  south-west  would  have  engulfed  its 
entire  columns  !  Consternation  spread  to  Stockholm  at  the 
news  of  the  capture  of  Aland  ;  the  Swedish  nobility,  wearied 
with  the  rule  of  Gustavus  IV.,  dethroned  that   king  and 

*  As  the  relation  of  these  events  must  be  still  less  interesting  to  American 
than  to  French  and  Russian  readers,  the  translator  has  considerably  abreviated 
the  matter  of  this  article. 


196  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XV. 

elected  his  uncle,  the  Duke  of  Sudermania  in  his  place  ;  this 
prince  being  a  partisan  of  the  French  alliance,  it  was 
thought  that  he  might  save  the  monarchy  from  inevitable 
ruin.  He  was  crowned  with  the  title  of  Charles  XIII.,  and, 
on  the  seventeenth  of  September,  he  purchased  peace  with 
Eussia,  by  the  cession  of  Swedish  Finland.  Peace  with 
France,  and  the  reconciliation  between  Sweden  and  Denmark 
soon  followed.  Sweden  adopted  the  Continental  System 
with  the  exception  of  the  restrictions  on  salt.  I  restored  to 
her  Pomerania. 

War  between  Russia  and  Turkey.— The  affairs  of  Turkey 
now  attracted  the  attention  of  Europe.  Feeling  at  liberty 
after  the  conference  of  Erfurth  to  push  her  projects  in  that 
direction,  Russia  had  employed  the  first  part  of  1808,  in 
preparations  for  carrying  on  the  war  with  vigor,  if  she  did 
not  succeed,  by  the  negotiations  of  Jassy,  in  obtaining  the 
Principalities.  The  Ottoman  Empire  at  the  end  of  the  year, 
had  become  a  prey  to  the  most  horrible  convulsions.  The 
party  which  had  wished  to  subject  the  janissaries  to  disci-^ 
pline,  and  to  shelter  the  throne  from  their  insolence,  by  giving 
them  a  European  organization,  had  not  been  discouraged  by 
the  imprisonment  of  Selim  ;  Mustapha  Bariactar,  at  the 
head  of  this  party  had  overthrown  the  existing  government, 
imprisoned  the  sultan,  and  proclaimed  Mahmud  in  his  place. 
But  the  janissaries  soon  effected  a  counter-revolution  amidst 
the  most  horrible  massacres  and  conflagrations.  Constan- 
tinople  became  one  vast  field  of  carnage  ;  the  janissaries 
set  fire  every  where,  in  hopes  of  enveloping  their  adversaries  ; 
men,  women,  and  children,  fell  a  prey  to  the  flames,  or  to 
the  rage  of  the  combatants. 

This  state  of  things  seemed  to  leave  Constantinople  exposed 
to  the  inroads  of  Russia  ;  but  the  latter  were  not  prepared  to 
profit  by  the  circumstance,  and  the  Turks  had  the  following 
winter  in  which  to  orjranize  their  resistance.     The  relations 


Ch.  XV.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1809    IN     SPAIN.  197 

entered  into  between  the  Porte  and  England,  and  the  result 
of  the  negotiations  at  Jassy  leaving  no  hopes  of  efifecting  his 
objects  without  an  appeal  to  arms,  the  Emperor  Alexander 
reënforced  his  army  with  sixty  battalions,  and  ordered  it 
to  pass  the  Danube. 

Prince  Prosorowski  was  not  well  suited  for  conducting  this 
war,  which  was  of  a  peculiar  character,  and  more  resembled 
than  any  other  that  which  I  was  waging  in  Spain.  The 
Turkish  forces  might  be  overthrown  in  the  field,  and  their 
immense  masses  of  cavalry  be  put  to  flight  and  apparently 
destroyed,  but  still  it  was  found  impossible  to  advance  with- 
out besieging  their  fortresses,  and  their  troops,  so  little  to  be 
feared  in  the  open  field,  are  the  most  redoubtable  behind 
their  ramparts,  which  they  defend  with  the  greatest  tenacity. 
To  this  peculiar  character  of  the  Turks  and  the  almost  im- 
possibility of  obtaining  supplies  of  provisions  in  their  country, 
we  must  add  the  difficulties  of  the  Balkan,  and  of  the 
Danube,  which  is  here  like  an  arm  of  the  sea  ;  and  the  con- 
figuration of  the  frontier,  shut  in  by  Transylvania  on  one 
side,  but  soon  widening  out  to  the  confines  of  Dalmatia  and 
Montenegro. 

The  assaults  of  Ismail  and  Oczakof  had  been  so  successful 
for  the  Russians  that  this  system  had  become  the  fashion  in 
their  army  ; — they  thought  to  conquer  the  Turks  by  esca- 
lades and  squares.  These  escalades,  often  ill-directed  and 
always  premature,  cost  them  enormous  losses — losses  which 
might  have  been  avoided  by  the  expenditure  of  a  hundred 
barrels  of  powder  and  a  delay  of  a  week  for  the  operations  of 
the  miners  ;  for,  in  that  time  the  engineers  might  have 
efiected  breaches  j^i'acticable  to  an  assault  in  any  of  the 
miserable  works  of  the  Turks  ;  and  an  assault  under  such 
circumstances  is  a  very  different  affair  from  attempting  an 
escalade  as  soon  as  the  2)lace  has  been  reconnoitered. 

The  Russian  army  took  the  field  with  one  hundred  and 


198  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XV, 

twenty-five  battalions,  ninety-five  squadrons,  and  ten  thou- 
sand Cossacks,  Prosorowsky  resolved  to  lay  siege  to  Brahilov, 
but,  while  the  preparations  were  making  for  this  purpose,  he 
directed  the  escalade  of  Giurgevo,  which  was  fortified  with  a 
bastioned  enciente  that  might  readily  have  been  reduced  with 
heavy  artillery.  The  escalade  was  unsuccessful,  and  the 
Russians  lost  from  two  to  three  thousand  men  in  the  at- 
tempt. The  marshal  next  directed  the  escalade  of  Brahilov  ; 
but  after  the  useless  sacrifice  of  three  or  four  thousand  men 
more,  he  found  it  preferable  to  resort  to  the  slower  but  more 
wise  system  of  regular  sieges.  The  passage  of  the  Danube 
was  effected  in  the  early  part  of  August  near  Galatz,  and 
Ismail  invested  ;  but  Prosorowsky  now  died,  and  Bagration 
was  placed  in  temporary  command  of  the  army.  After 
various  unsuccessful  operations  against  the  enemy,  this  gen- 
eral directed  Brahilov  to  be  again  attacked  by  ten  thousand 
men  under  Essen,  while,  with  twelve  thousand  men,  he  pro- 
tected that  operation  from  the  direction  of  the  ramj)art  of 
Trajan,  at  the  right  of  the  Danube.  The  place,  being  bat- 
tered and  invested,  capitulated  on  the  twenty-first  of  No- 
vember. The  army  then  retired  to  winter-quarters  on  the 
left  of  the  Danube,  leaving  only  its  advanced  guards  on  the 
right  bank. 

In  i^sia  the  Russians,  under  Tormasof,  had  gained  posses- 
sion of  Poti,  notwithstanding  the  efforts  of  the  Pacha  of 
Trebis  )nd  to  succor  the  place.  This  city,  situated  on  the 
eastern  shore  of  the  Black  Sea  at  the  mouth  of  the  Euphrates, 
was  indispensable  to  the  Russians  for  securing  their  posses- 
sions in  Abasia,  and  protecting  their  relations  with  Persia. 


CHAPTER    XVI. 

CA.MPAIGISr   OF    1810;— CONTINUATION  OF   THE   PENINSULAR 

WAR. 

Napoleon's  Marriage  with  an  Austrian  Princess — Tie  again  offers  Peace  to  Eng- 
land— Preparations  for  a  new  Campaign  in  Spam — Napoleon's  Plan  of  Opera- 
tions— Soult's  Plan — Division  of  the  Army — Invasion  of  Andalusia — Joseph's 
fatal  Delay — Capture  of  Seville — Sébastian!  takes  Grenada  and  Malaga — Re- 
marks on  Joseph's  Operations — His  Return  to  Madrid — Internal  Dissensions 
In  Spain — The  EngUsh  Faction  triumphs — Military  Organization  of  the  Pro- 
vinces of  the  North — Soult  neglects  to  take  Badajos — Inaction  of  Wellington 
— Soult  invests  Cadiz — His  Occupation  of  Andalusia — Operations  in  the 
North — Chances  of  Napoleon's  Success — Massena's  Expedition  against  Por- 
tugal— Sieges  of  Ciudad-Rodrigo  and  Almeida — Position  of  "Wellington — 
Third  Invasion  of  Portugal — Battle  of  Busaco — Massena  turns  the  Position — 
Devastating  System  of  the  English  General — Lines  of  Torres- Vedras — Mas- 
sena's Position — Sufferings  of  his  Army — Junction  with  Drouet — Remarks 
— Suchet's  Success  in  Catalonia — Combat  of  Margalef — Sieges  of  Lerida  and 
Mequinenza — Operations  of  Augereau — Siege  of  Tortosa — General  Remarks 
on  the  War — Bernadette  elected  Prince-Royal  of  Sweden — Reunion  of 
Holland  —  Consequent  Negotiations  with  England  —  Annexation  of  the 
Mouths  of  the  Ems,  the  Elbe,  and  the  Weser — Napoleon's  Tour  in  Holland 
— Senatus-consultum  on  the  Reunion  of  Rome — Council  of  Paris — Religious 
Fanaticism — Continuation  of  the  War  between  Russia  and  Turkey. 

IVapoleon  marries  an  Austrian  Princess. — The  result  of 
the  war  of  1809,  proved  that  I  had  not  miscalculated  in  my 
attempt  to  carry  on  operations,  at  the  same  time,  against 
Austria  and  the  Anglo-Sjianiards  in  the  Peninsula.  I  had 
now  to  profit  by  these  astonishing  successes  in  order  to  con- 
solidate my  empire  ;  a  grand  family  alliance  seemed  to  me 
the  most  certain  means  of  securing  this  object.  I  had  no 
children  ;  and  the  restoration  of  the  Bourbons  seemed  inevi- 
table at  my  death  ;  they  alone  had  claims  to  it,  and  none  of 
my  brothers  were  capable  of  disputing  them  ;  even  I,  myself, 


200  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch   X V '. 

in  elevating  Joseph,  Jerome,  and  Louis  to  thrones,  had  been 
unable  to  give  them  the  consideration  and  merit  necessary 
for  maintaining  their  position  ;  and  Lucien  had  dishonored 
himself  by  a  ridiculous  opposition  and  a  scandalous  marriage. 
The  entire  male  population  of  France  were  deeply  interested 
in  the  preservation  of  my  empire  ;  not  that  the  princes  of 
the  house  of  Bourbon  were  not  personally  good  men,  but 
because  their  return  would  be  attended  by  a  cortège  of  men 
avaricious  of  power  and  wealth  and  hateful  to  the  people. 
If  the  restoration  of  these  princes  at  my  death  should  pro- 
duce intestine  Avar,  would  not  foreign  powers  be  certain  to 
profit  by  the  circumstance  to  overthrow  my  edifice  in  Poland, 
Germany  and  Italy  ?  If,  on  the  contrary,  this  restoration 
should  be  eifected  by  foreign  war,  would  not  the  consequences 
be  still  more  dangerous  for  France  ? 

I  thus  foresaw  the  humiliation  of  France,  and  above  all, 
of  that  million  of  brave  men  who  had  shed  their  blood  in 
their  country's  cause.  Of  what  importance  was  it  to  me 
personally,  whether  or  not  I  left  a  dynasty  after  me  ?  Would 
that  render  my  glory  any  more  brilliant  or  lasting  ?  Was 
Alexander  any  the  less  great  because  he  had  no  successor, 
and  the  empire  of  Macedonia  was  divided  after  him  ?  It 
was  the  good  of  France  alone  that  I  sought,  and  if  I  was 
deceived  in  this  matter,  not  only  my  council,  but  the  whole 
French  nation  partook  of  the  same  error. 

My  divorce  having  been  completed,  it  was  now  necessary  to 
decide  between  a  Kussian  and  an  Austrian  princess.  As  the 
Grand  Duchess  Catharine  had  been  married  to  the  Prince 
of  Oldenbourg,  negotiations  were  opened  for  her  younger 
sister  the  Princess  Anne  ;  here  a  difficulty  arose  ;  it  was  the 
erection  of  a  Russian  chapel  in  the  Tuileries,  a  condition 
strongly  insisted  on  by  the  cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg.  I  was 
never  very  orthodox,  and  even  at  this  time  was  in  a  contro- 
troversy  with  the  clergy,  and   I   wished  no  new  subject  for 


Cil.  XVI.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1810     IN     SPAIN.  201 

religious  disputes.  Moreover,  tlio  Ptussian  cabinet  asked  for 
time  on  account  of  the  youth  of  the  princess  and  the  repug- 
nance of  the  empress-mother  to  the  marriage  ;  this  was 
sufficient  to  determine  my  decision  in  favor  of  an  Austrian 
alliance. 

The  question  was  both  delicate  and  complicated,  and  the 
future  of  France  perhaps  depended  on  its  solution.  The 
first  point  to  be  considered  was  whether  a  distant  and  pow- 
erful ally  would  be  more  useful  and  lusting  than  one  more 
near,  but  of  a  more  limited  character.  If  I  had  purposed 
conquests  the  first  would  be  jireferable,  for  the  other  would 
be  rather  an  obstacle  than  an  auxiliary.  If,  on  the  contrary, 
I  purposed  only  defensive  operations,  the  nearer  power  would 
be  the  most  suitable,  as  it  would  cover  our  frontier  and  act 
ifi  concert  with  our  arms.  But  these  axioms  of  general 
policy  were  subordinate  to  others  not  less  jiowerful.  In  the 
first  place  we  had  both  defeated  Austria  and  stripped  her  of 
a  portion  of  her  territory  ;  whereas  Russia  had  by  her  rela- 
tions with  us  gained  Finland,  Bialystok  and  Tarnopol.  The 
Austrians  were,  therefore,  not  so  likely  to  become  our  allies 
in  good  faith,  unless  we  indemnified  them  fur  their  losses, 
which  was  not  an  easy  matter.  The  Russians  had  lost  no 
province  by  us,  and  might  gain  much  by  a  community  of 
interest  ;  they  had  fleets,  sailors  and  seaports,  and  their 
frontiers  on  the  Caspian  Sea  and  Grand  Bucharia  opened  to 
us  the  road  to  India,  which  was  a  great  point  against 
England.  An  alliance  with  Austria  and  war  with  Russia 
would  render  it  necessary  to  decide  the  contest  on  the  Dwina, 
or  at  least  in  Poland  ;  whereas  an  alliance  with  the  Russians 
against  the  Austrians  would  transfer  the  field  of  battle  to 
the  superb  valley  of  the  Danube  and  the  centre  of  the  Aus- 
trian monarchy.  These  motives  were  strong  in  favor  of  the 
Russian  alliance  ;  but  on  the  other  hand  the  maritime 
interest  of  the  great  landed  proprietors  and  merchants  of 


202  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XVI. 

that  empire  were  too  seriously  compromised  by  tlie  closing 
of  the  ports  to  hope  for  a  continuance  of  their  friendship. 
The  Russian  nobility,  devoted  to  the  profession  of  arms, 
pretended  that  the  treaty  of  Tilsit  had  been  imposed  by  vic- 
tory, and  was  therefore  odious  ;  and  not  the  less  so  because 
it  closed  up  the  outlets  of  their  agricultural  products,  the 
source  of  all  their  private  wealth  ;  it  is  not  every  one  who  is 
willing  to  suffer  in  private  fortune,  for  a  term  of  years,  for 
the  future  prosperity  of  their  country.  I  was  not  ignorant 
of  this  cause  of  opposition  at  St.  Petersburg  to  my  alliance, 
and  was  not  a  little  piqued  at  the  unfavorable  dispositions 
toward  me  exhibited  by  a  part  of  the  royal  family.  I  had 
on  my  side  the  Emperor  Alexander,  Count  Romanzof,  and  a 
small  number  of  the  intelligent  men  of  the  empire  ;  but 
even  this  influence  had  been  somewhat  w^eakened  by  the 
unfortunate  dispositions  of  the  treaty  of  Vienna,  opposed  to 
the  sti[)ulations  of  Tilsit. 

'  In  this  relation  there  were  less  inconveniences  in  the 
alliance  with  Austria  ; — she  had  very  little  commerce  ;  her 
manufactories  were  sufficient  for  her  own  wants  ;  her  cities 
offered  a  suitable  market  for  her  agricultural  jiroducts,  and 
Hungary  and  Moravia  supplied  her  with  wines.  She  had  no 
military  or  commercial  marine,  and  might  remain  in  hostile 
relations  with  England  without  any  sensible  injury.  In  this 
respect  I  might  calculate  upon  a  more  durable  alliance  with 
her  than  with  Russia.  France,  within  the  limits  of  the 
Rhine,  might  be  the  natural  ally  of  Russia,  but  an  empire 
like  mine,  extending  its  influence  to  the  Kiemen,  would  find  it 
difficult  to  maintain  friendly  relations  with  the  Russian  gov- 
ernment. The  unfortunate  circumstance  which  had  rendered 
this  treaty  of  Vienna  equally  odious  to  Russia  and  Austria, 
placed  me  in  an  embarrassing  situation  toward  these  two 
powers,  rendering  the  choice  of  alliance  dependent  upon  the 
relative  amount  of  hostility  likely  to  be  encountered. 


Cn.  XVI.]         CAMPAIGN    OF     ISIO     IN    lTAIN.  203 

Let  us  add  to  theso  considerations  the  influence  tliis  mar- 
riage was  likely  to  produce  on  Sjjain.  Russia  was  too  dis- 
tant from  the  Peninsula  to  take  any  active  part  in  this  war  ; 
Austria,  on  the  contrary,  when  allied  to  my  family,  might 
become  interested  in  it.  Under  Charles  Y.,  and  in  the  war 
of  the  succession  of  Charles  II.,  Austria  had  played  an  im- 
portant part  in  the  affairs  of  Spain.  This  motive  alone 
appeared  of  much  weight.  If  Austria  reproached  us  for  her 
losses,  she  might  also  console  herself  with  the  assurance  that 
my  alliance  would  give  her  a  secure  harbor  against  the  tem- 
pest which,  for  the  last  fifteen  years,  had  threatened  her  ship 
of  state.  We  had  antecedents  for  this  alliance  in  the  treaty 
of  1756,  of  which  I  have  already  spoken  ;  if  that  treaty  had 
been  declaimed  against  at  the  beginning  of  the  revolution,  it 
was  because,  under  Madame  Pompadour,  it  had  had  a  vicious 
application,  and  not  because  the  ])riraitive  treaty  was  not 
wise  and  jiositively  advantageous.  But  now,  there  could  be 
little  fear  that  my  policy,  like  that  of  Louis  XV.,  would 
become  subordinate  to  the  cabinet  of  Vienna.  The  motives 
which  had  then  induced  the  cabinet  of  Versailles  to  secure  a 
powerful  ally  against  the  rivalry  of  England,  were  now  more 
powerful  than  ever.  These  motives  influenced  the  majority 
of  my  council,  and,  finally,  determined  my  own  decision. 
There  was  one  consideration,  however,  which  made  me  hesi- 
tate for  a  moment  ;  it  was  the  idea  that,  after  the  intimate 
relations  which  I  had  so  recently  contracted  at  Erfurth  with 
the  Emperor  Alexander,  it  might  appear  perfidious  on  ray 
part  to  so  abruptly  abandon  his  friendship.  But  such 
scrujjles  must  yield  to  reasons  of  state.  I,  however,  mifdit 
consider  myself  secured  from  any  such  reproach  by  the  slight 
inclination  exhibited  by  the  Russian  government  for  the 
alliance,  and  the  little  importance  attached  to  the  preference 
I  had  given  to  it.  I,  therefore,  resolved  on  a  union  Avith  an 
Austrian  princess. 


204  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON,  [Ch.  XYT. 

Subsequent  events  have  apparently  authorized  the  opinion 
that  I  committed  a  fault  in  this  decision,  and  that  a  Russian 
alliance  would  have  been  more  advantageous.  It  is  certain 
that  it  would  have  avoided  the  disastrous  campaign  of  1812  ; 
but  was  my  march  on  Moscow  a  necessary  result  of  my 
alliance  with  Austria  ?  All  things,  however,  taken  into  con- 
sideration, it  must  be  confessed  that  the  Eussian  alliance 
would  probably  have  been  the  preferable  one. 

But  I  determined  differently  ;  and  the  negotiations  entered 
into  with  Prince  Schwartzenberg  were  soon  terminated,  for 
the  Emperor  Francis  hastened  to  give  me  his  daughter, 
Maria  Louisa.  Some  have  attributed  this  union  Avith  a 
daughter  of  the  Cœsars  to  my  inordinate  pride  ;  nothing 
could  be  more  absurd.  Josephine  Avas  no  longer  capable  of 
child-bearing,  and,  in  dissolving  my  connection  with  her  and 
forming  a  new  alliance,  was  it  not  important  to  France 
that  I  should  form  such  a  one  as  would  effectually  destroy 
the  line  of  demarkation  between  the  old  dynasties  and  my 
own  ?  It  was  of  little  use  to  have  put  the  crown  on  my 
head,  unless  I  could  fix  it  there  permanently  ;  and  nothing 
could  consolidate  it  better  than  the  ties  of  consanguinity 
with  the  noble  houses  of  Hapsburg  or  Romanof  By  leav- 
ing my  dynasty  isolated  from  the  rest  of  Europe,  I  would 
have  condemned  it  to  a  kind  of  reprobation,  or  to  maintain 
its  high  position  by  new  victories.  There  is  no  statesman 
who  would  not  have  approved  a  resolution  which  in  no  re- 
spect added  to  my  glory  or  dignity,  but  which  was  calculated 
to  consolidate  my  empire.* 

*  Alison  thus  describes  the  second  empress  and  her  unenviable  fate  :— 
"  Born  in  the  highest  rank,  descended  from  the  noblest  ancestry,  called  to 
the  most  exalted  destinies,  the  daughter  of  the  Cœsars,  the  wife  of  Napoleon, 
the  mother  of  his  son,  Marie  Louise  appeared  to  unite  in  her  person  all  the 
grandeur  and  felicity  of  which  human  nature  is  susceptible.  But  her  mind 
had  received  no  lofty  impress  ;  her  character  was  unworthy  of  the  greatness 
of  her  fortune.     She  had  the  blood  of  Maria  Theresa  in  her  veins,  but  not  her 


Ch.  XYL]         campaign    of     1810    IN    SPAIN.  205 

Mv  mari'iage  took  place  at  Paris  on  the  second  of  April. 
The/e^es  to  which  this  great  event  gave  rise  eclipsed  all  those 
which  had  marked  my  reign  ;  France  saw  the  dawn  of  a 
happy  future,  and  a  jiledge  of  that  peace  which  she  so  much 
desired.  The  preponderance  which'  this  marriage  gave  me 
in  Europe  was  well  calculated  to  discourage  my  enemies, 
and  every  one  believed  that  my  throne  was  secure  from  all 
danger  when  Providence  crowned  my  wishes  by  giving  me  a 
son'^on  the  twentieth  of  March,  1811.  The  Continent  was 
tranquil,  and  had  apparently  become  reconciled  to  my  reign. 
The  respect  bore  to  the  house  of  Hapsburg  legitimatized  my 
reign  in  the  eyes  of  European  sovereigns,  and  sanctioned  it 
in  the  eyes  of  the  ditferent  nations  which  had  become  a  part 
of  my  empire.     My  dynasty  now  took  rank  with  the  highest 

spirit  ia  her  soul.     Her  fair  hair,  blue  eyes,  and  pleasing  expression,  bespoke 
the  Gothic  race  ;  and  the  affability  of  her  demeanor,  and  sweetness  of  her 
manners,  at  first  produced  a  general  prepossession  iu  her  favor.     But  she  was 
adapted  to  the  sunshine  of  prosperity  only  ;  the  wind  of  adversity  blew,  and 
she  sunk  beneath  its  breath.     Young,  amiable,  prepossessing,  she   won  the 
emperor's  affections  by  the  ndivdé  and  simplicity  of  her  character  ;  and  he 
always  said  that  she  was  innocence  with  all  its  sweetness,  Josephine,  grace 
with  all  its  charms.     All  the  attractions  of  art,  says  he,  were  employed  by  the 
first  empress  with  such  skill,  that  they  were  never  perceived  ;  all  the  charms 
of  innocence  displayed  by  the  second  with  such  simplicity,  that  their  existence 
was  never  suspected.     Both  were  benevolent,  kind-hearted,  affectionate    both, 
to  the  last  hour  of  his  life,  retained  the  warm  regard  of  the  emperor;  and  both 
possessed  qualities  worthy  of  his  affection.     If  her  husband  had  lived  and  died 
on  tlie  imperial  throne,  few  empresses  would  have  left  a  more  blameless  repu- 
tation ;  but  she  was  unequal  to  the  trials  of  the  latter  years  of  his  life.     If  her 
dubious  situation,  the  daughter  of  one  emperor,   the  wife  of  another,  both 
leaders  in  the  strife,  might  serve  her  excuse  for  not  taking  any  decided  part  in 
favor  of  the  national  independence  on  the  invasion  of  France,  the  misfortunes  of 
her  husband  and  son  had  claims  upon  her  fidelity  which  should  never  have 
been  overlooked.     The  wife  of  the  emperor  should  never  have  permitted  him 
to  go  into  exile  alone;  the  mother  of  the  King  of  Rome  should  never  have  for- 
gotten to  what  destinies  her  son  had  been  born.     "What  an  object  would  she, 
after  such  sacrifices,  returning  from  St.  Helena  after  his  death,  have  formed  in 
history!     Force  may  have  prevented  her  from  discharging  that  sacred  duty; 
but  force  did  not  compel  her  to  appear  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  leaning  on 
the  arm  of  Wellington,  nor  oblige  the  widow  of  Napoleon  to  sink  at  last  into" 
the  degraded  wifj  of  her  own  chamberlain." 


206  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVI. 

in  Europe,  and  I  flattered  myself  that  they  would  no  longer 
dispute  the  throne  with  the  son  to  which  the  empress  had 
given  h'wih.  My  marriage,  and  the  erection  of  a  new  nobility, 
were  the  bonds  to  unite  the  revolution  and  the  enemies  of  its 
doctrines  ; — that  revolution  now  seemed  to  be  completed,  for, 
from  this  moment,  Franco  resumed  her  ancient  line  of  inter- 
course Avith  the  other  powers  of  Europe.  But  in  the  eyes  of 
the  French  refugees  in  England,  of  the  one  hundred  thousand 
broken  down  families  of  the  old  régime,  and  of  the  fanatics 
of  the  church,  the  quarrel  was  not  yet  ended.  Such  is  the 
force  of  legitimacy  that  the  Bourbons,  of  whom  no  one  now 
spoke,  gave  me  more  trouble  than  the  greatest  power  in 
Euro})e.  I  pity  states  who  have  pretenders  in  the  ranks  of 
their  enemies. 

He  again  offers  Peace  to  England.— I  now  desired  peace, 
and  wished  ray  empire  to  be  recognized  by  the  English 
government  ;  for  I  desired  to  give  some  relaxation  to  my 
people,  who  had  as  yet  been  unable  to  enjoy  the  benefits  they 
had  derived  from  the  revolution.  We  were  no  longer  the 
protectors  of  jiropagandism  or  of  popular  insurrections,  and 
to  accustom  Europe  to  the  nature  of  my  power,  it  was 
important  to  appear  less  in  a  hostile  attitude.  Moreover, 
my  system  of  repression  against  the  English  supreniacy  had 
imposed  great  sacrifices  by  the  closing  of  the  ports.  From 
St.  Petersburg  to  Cadiz,  and  from  Cadiz  to  Trieste,  not  a 
hamlet  on  the  coast  but  had  suffered  from  this  restriction  ; 
the  reaction  which  the  closing  of  the  ports  had  produced  on 
our  manufactures  and  agricultural  products  (wines),  it  was 
not  in  my  power  to  avoid.  My  enemies  took  good  care  to 
profit  by  the  advantages  of  this  position  ;  they  proclaimed 
themselves  the  avengers  of  the  independence  of  nations  ; 
and  by  an  extravagance  peculiar  to  the  age,  the  despots  of 
the  seas  j^rctended  to  fight  me,  in  order  to  restore  the  liberty 
of  commerce  !  !  I      These  insinuations  made  dupes  among 


Cil.  XVI.]  CAMTAIGN     OF     1810    IN     STAIN.  207 

the  unreflecting  part  of  community,  and  gradually  diminished 
the  popularity  of  my  administration,  by  inducing  people  to 
believe  that  I  did  not  desire  peace.  I  nevertheless,  proposed 
it  every  time  that  there  was  an  occasion,  but  England  jjer- 
sisted  in  her  lefusal.  This  obstinacy  on  her  part  showed  her 
possessed  of  more  resources  than  I  had  at  first  supposed. 

In  truth,  a  reconciliation  was  not  easy.  Since  the  treaty 
of  Amiens,  England  had  conquered  twenty  millions  of  sub- 
jects in  India,  which  she  was  not  disposed  to  surrender,  while 
at  the  same  time  she  was  unwilling  to  allow  us  evçn  Belgium, 
for  fear  of  the  use  we  might  make  of  Antwerp  !  How  had 
she  yielded  me  the  crown  of  Italy,  and  how  had  I  resigned 
it,  after  I  had  placed  it  on  my  brow  ?  The  nature  of  the 
contest  between  us  rendered  it  interminable.  Instead  of 
reducing  my  army,  I  was  compelled  to  maintain  it  on  a  war 
footing  and  thus  disturb  the  quiet  of  Europe.  If  I  won  the 
glory,  my  enemies  gathered  all  the  honor  of  the  contest  ;  for 
they  assumed  the  innocent  air  of  one  fighting  for  legitimate 
objects  ;  while  I  was  made  to  appear  the  aggressor  by  des- 
troying old  institutions  and  building  up  new.  I  was  thus 
made  to  bear  the  entire  weight  of  the  accusation.     My  jier- 

sonal  enemies,  the  T ,  the  L ,  and  the  C , 

profited  by  this  circumstance  to  represent  me  to  France  as 
the  only  cause  of  evils  which  were  in  reality  the  legitimate 
results  of  the  revolution,  and  of  the  position  in  which  it 
had  placed  the  different  nations  of  Europe  toward  each  other, 
by  destroying  their  most  natural  political  relations.  I  defy 
my  enemies  to  point  out  any  epoch  after  the  peace  of  Amiens, 
when  it  had  been  possible  to  make  an  honorable  and  durable 
peace  with  England,  The  negotiation  of  Lauderdale  was 
the  only  occasion  that  gave  the  slightest  hopes  of  such  a 
result  ;  and  we  have  already  seen  that  this  was  a  mere  lure, 
designed  to  involve  us  at  the  same  time  with  Russia  and 
Spain. 


208  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XYI. 

Preparalions  for  a  new  Canipais^n  in  Spain.  —  England, 

although  dei:)rive(i  of  her  most  powerful  allies,  was  not  carrying 
on  the  war  alone  ;  for  she  had  on  her  side  all  the  enemies  of  the 
revolution  and  of  my  j)ower.  We  had  plenty  of  room  in 
Spain  to  fight  out  the  contest.  I  sent  there  a  jiart  of  the 
conquerors  of  Wagram,  hut  did  not  go  myself.  If  we  are  to 
judge  from  the  appearance  of  things  it  was  unfortunate  that 
I  did  not  return,  for  if  I  had  terminated  the  war  in  Spain 
and  avoided  the  contest  with  Russia,  I  should  have  died  on 
my  throne,  feared  and  respected  ;  I  should  have  given  France 
time  to  breathe,  and  to  recover  her  strength,  so  as  to  sustain 
my  work.  I  fell,  by  attempting  to  finish  the  most  difficult 
part  myself  before  the  proper  time  had  arrived.  I  have  said 
that  twenty  years  were  required,  whereas  I  attempted  to 
accelerate,  by  seven  or  eight  years,  the  termination  of  this 
great  drama.  But  appearances  are  often  deceitful,  and  before 
deciding  whether  I  committed  an  error  in  not  returning  to 
Madrid,  it  is  but  just  to  weigh  the  motives  of  my  conduct. 

In  the  first  place,  I  did  not  expect  that  the  affairs  in  Spain 
would  take  so  unfavorable  a  turn  ;  the  advantage  gained  by 
Wellington  at  Talavera  had  proved  him  a  dangerous  adver- 
sary ;  but  the  promj)titude  with  which  he  had  retreated  into 
Portugal  and  the  victories  of  Joseph  at  Almonacid  and 
Ocana  over  the  Spanish  army,  had  deceived  me  into  the 
belief  that  Soult  and  Massena  would  be  sufficient  to  oppose 
the  English  in  the  Peninsula,  if  I  only  sent  them  new  reën- 
forcements.  Some  have  attributed  this  decision  to  the  fear 
that  the  Emperor  Alexander,  dissatisfied  with  my  cdliance 
with  Austria,  might  fall  on  the  Duchy  of  Warsaic,  as  soon 
as  I  should  be  engaged  beyond  the  Pyrenees,  and  that  he 
might  draio  after  him  Prussia  and  all  the  north  of  Ger- 
many. This  was  his  game,  and,  in  his  place,  I  should  have 
hardly  hesitated  to  adopt  such  a  plan.  And  it  was  the  more 
natural  to  expect  him  to  seize  upon  such  an  o])portunity,  in- 


Ch.  XVL]  campaign    of     1810     IN    SPAIN.  209 

asmucli  as  my  marriage  and  the  treaty  of  Sclionbrunn,  were 
grave  subjects  of  dissatisfaction  to  Russia  ;  there  was  no  very 
close  union  between  us.  But  on  the  other  hand  the  frank 
and  loyal  conduct  of  the  Emperor  Alexander  at  the  time  of 
our  reverses  in  Spain,  and  the  assurances  of  my  ambassador, 
the  Duke  of  Vicenza,  were  sufficient  to  dissipate  such  fears 
as  chimerical.  Moreover,  Eussia  Avas  at  this  time  at  war 
with  Turkey,  and  Austria  being  now  allied  to  my  interests, 
Alexander  could  hardly  trouble  the  north  of  Europe  with 
the  probability  of  success. 

But  there  were  other  and  less  visionary  reasons  to  prevent 
my  return  to  Spain  at  this   time.     The  country  was  filled 
with  religious  fanatics,  who  sought  an  opportunity  to  destroy 
my  life  in  order  to  terminate  the  war  ;  this  contest  was  now 
waged,  not  against  large  organized  bodies,  but  against  troops 
scattered  throughout  the  whole  Peninsula.     Our  forces  moved 
in  separate  armies,  the  communications  between  them  being 
frequently   impossible,    so    that    I    could    not    myself    have 
directed  them  all  at  the  same  time  ;  but  I  considered  my 
lieutenants  were  capable  of  conducting  an   army,  and  they 
proved  themselves  so  by  the  constant  successes  which  they 
gained  during  the  campaign.    I,  therefore,  merely  announced 
my  intended  return  to  Sj)ain,  and  sent  there  a  half  of  the 
old  guard,  and  a  part  of  the  young  guard,  which  had  been 
increased  by  several  regiments  of  voltigeurs  and  sharpshoot- 
ers.    The  strength  of  this  reserve  already  amounted  to  eight 
or  nine  thousand  men  ;  I  now  increased  it  to  twenty  thou- 
sand, so  as  always  to  have  a  part  of  it  disposable  either  at  the 
north  or  at  the  south.     This  was  a  most  valuable  body  in 
itself,  and,  at  the  same  time,  produced  a  good  influence  on 
the  rest  of  the  army,  for  this  guard  being  an  object  of  my 
special  care,  the  French  strove  among   themselves  for  the 
honor  of  forming  a  part  of  it.     These  troops  formed  the  elite 
of  the  army  of  the  north  of  Spain  under  the  orders  of  Mar- 

VOL.    ill. — 14. 


210  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XVI. 

shal  Bessières  ;  in  addition  to  the  battalions  of  recruits  which 
were  sent  to  all  the  regiments  to  which  they  already  belonged, 
I  also  sent  there  the  entire  eighth  corps-d'armée  under  the 
orders  of  Junot, 

Napoleon's  new  Plan  of  f ampaign.  —  "We  have  already 
seen  how  Joseph,  after  the  affair  of  Arzobispo,  neglected  to 
profit  by  the  union  of  eighty  thousand  men  on  the  Tagus, 
in  order  to  fall  without  delay  on  the  English,  who  then  had 
no  fortified  port  to  favor  their  rcëmbarkation  ;  and,  also,  how 
successfully  "Wellington  had  profited,  by  the  repose  of  eight 
months  allowed  him  by  my  generals,  to  form  a  suitable 
system  of  defense  for  Portugal.  I  at  first  resolved  to  make  a 
strong  effort  to  repair  this  fault,  and  to  intrust  this  task  to 
Massena,  v/ho  was  to  advance  with  three  corios-d' armée  by 
the  right  bank  of  the  Tagus  on  Lisbon,  while  Joseph  and 
Soult  marched  by  the  left  bank  with  two  or  three  other 
corps.  The  moment  appeared  the  more  propitious,  as  the 
English  had  just  lost  ten  thousand  men  in  the  island  of 
Walcheren  ;  and  as  they  had  now  few  troops  to  send  to  the 
Continent,  another  disastrous  campaign  might  disgust  them 
with  the  war. 

Soult's  Plant — With  this  view  I  directed  the  king  to  col- 
lect his  forces  between  the  Tagus  and  the  Guadiana,  and 
prepare  them  for  a  renewal  of  operations  early  in  the  spring. 
Soult,  anxious  to  distinguish  himself  in  his  new  position  of 
major-general,  and  fearing,  perhaps,  that  he  would  be  placed 
subordinate  to  Massena,  thought  to  anticipate  my  wishes  and 
begin  the  campaign  with  the  subjugation  of  Andalusia. 
Joseph,  who  was  more  desirous  to  reduce  the  provinces  of 
his  own  kingdom  than  to  drive  the  English  from  Portugal, 
was  easily  persuaded  to  this  plan.  The  decisive  victory  of 
Ojana  rendered  the  success  of  this  enterprise  almost  certain, 
and  then,  after  the  dispersion  of  the  Spanish  army  of  the 
south,  the  expedition  would  seem  more  easy  and  certain. 


Ch.  XVT.]        campaign    of     ISIO     IN     SPAIN.  211 

But,  in  order  to  do  this,  it  would  be  necessary  to  ftxll  with 
impetuosity  on  the  Spaniards,  and  either  cut  ofF  their  re- 
treat or  enter  pell-mell  with  them  into  the  island  of  Leon 
and  Cadiz,  and  then  to  immediately  march  the  victorious 
army  on  Badajos  and  Evora.  If  Soult  and  the  king  had 
acted  in  this  way,  they  would  still  have  carried  out  the  spirit 
of  my  2)lan  of  operations.  But  they  deviated  from  my  project 
to  fail  before  Cadiz,  and,  by  the  untimely  occupation  of  an 
immense  territory,  to  lose  the  means  of  concentrating  a 
sufficient  force  against  Wellington. 

Division  of  the  Army. — The  army  in  Spain  was  now  organ- 
ized as  follows  : — 

The  1st   corps  under  Victor; 


2d       " 

"        Reynicr; 

3d        " 

"       Suehct ; 

4tli      " 

"       Sebastiani  ; 

5th      " 

"        Mortier; 

Gth     " 

"        Ney; 

Uh     " 

"        Augereau  and  Macdonald: 

8th     " 

"       Junot. 

There  was  also  the  army  of  Marshal  Bessières,  which 
occupied  the  north  of  Spain,  and  the  ninth  corjys-d' armée 
which  Avas  organizing,  at  Bayonne,  from  the  four  battalions 
of  the  army  of  the  south.  The  army  of  Andalusia,  which 
Joseph  united  between  the  Guadiana  and  the  Sierra  Morena, 
was  composed  of  the  first,  fourth,  and  fifth  corps.  King 
Joseph's  guards,  and  the  reserve  of  General  Desselles  ;  the 
second,  sixth,  and  eighth  corps  were  to  march  on  Portugal, 
and  cover  Madrid  ;  while  the  other  two  corps  were  detached 
in  Catalonia  and  Aragon.  The  army  of  Andalusia,  with  an 
effective  force  of  fifty  thousand  men,  took  the  field  about  the 
middle  of  January,  to  attack  the  remnant  of  Arrizaga's 
forces,  which  had  escaped  the  disaster  of  Ocana  and  in- 
trenched themselves  in  the  defiles  of  the  Sierra  Morena. 
Invasion  of  Andalusia.— Victor,  on  the  right,  debouched 


212  LIFE     OF    NAPOLEON  [Cn.  XYI. 

by  the  mountains  of  Pedroliohes  on  Cordova  ;  the  king,  with 
Mortier  and  the  reserve,  at  the  centre,  crossed  the  defile  of 
Despena-Perros,  and  followed  the  road  to  Andiijar  ;  Sebas- 
tiani,  on  the  left,  took  the  direction  of  Infantes  on  Ubeda.  It 
was  here  that  Arrizaga  had  fixed  his  principal  attention,  and 
had.  defended  the  intrenched  heights  of  Montizon,  Pierced 
in  the  centre,  and  vigorously  pushed  by  the  right,  he  was 
completely  put  to  rout.  Montizon  was  taken  with  its  gar- 
rison of  three  thousand  men,  and  the  division  of  Castejon, 
about  five  thousand  strong,  also  laid  down  their  arras  at  no 
great  distance  from  that  place.  The  victorious  Sebastiani 
received  orders  at  Jaen  to  direct  himself  on  Grenada  and 
Malaga  ;  he  entered  the  former  of  these  cities  after  a  slight 
combat  at  Alcala  Real. 

Joseph's  fatal  Delay. — Joseph,  at  the  head  of  Mortier's 
corps,  the  guard  and  the  reserve,  after  having  forced  the 
defile  of  Despena-Perros,  descended,  without  any  great 
obstacle,  by  Carolina  on  Andujar,  on  the  twenty-first  of 
January  ;  Victor  debouched  the  following  day  on  Cordova. 
These  two  corps  hid  merely  to  hasten  their  march  by  Acija 
directly  on  Seville,  before  the  Spanish  left,  engaged  near 
Zafra,  could  reach  that  place.  Instead  of  giving  this  order, 
Joseph  stopped  at  Andujar  to  issue  proclamations,  and  plan 
useless  manoeuvres,  and  then  slowly  resumed  his  march.  The 
left  of  the  Spaniards,  which  was  now  isolated  under  the 
Duke  of  Albuquerque  between  Badajos  and  Zafra,  was  thus 
allowed  time  to  reach  San-Lucar  and  Cadiz,  where  it  arrived 
on  the  fourth  of  February. 

My  brother  must  have  had  his  imagination  strongly  affected 
by  the  catastrophe  of  Baylen,  to  act  with  so  great  circum- 
spection. If  I  had  commanded  the  expedition,  I  should 
have  presented  myself,  on  the  twenty-seventh  of  January, 
before  Santi-Petri  and  the  island  of  Leon,  and  from  what 
was  then  passing  within  Cadiz,  it  is  probable  that  I  should 


Cu.  XVl.J        CAMPAIGN     OF     1810     IN     SPAIN.  213 

have  entered  that  city  without  opposition.  Terror  reigned 
there  ;  at  tlie  news  of  our  march  on  Seville,  the  junta  of 
government,  forced  to  yield  to  a  popular  insurrection, 
resigned  their  powers,  and  fled  to  Cadiz.  A  portion  of  the 
members  attempted  to  regain  their  jwwcr,  but  public  opinion, 
incited  by  the  proclamations  of  Komana,  again  put  them 
down  ;  there  was  no  longer  any  regularly  constituted 
authority  ;  the  most  influential  families  in  Andalusia,  fled  in 
disorder  into  Cadiz  ;  and  this  place  was  without  a  garrison. 
What  result  then  should  we  expect  from  an  impetuous 
attack  ?  But  even  suppose  we  should  not  have  obtained  an 
entrance  into  that  city,  had  we  not  plenty  of  time  to 
blockade  it  and  to  reduce  Seville  "? 

Capture  of  Seville. — Josej)h,  instead  of  marching  rapidly 
from  Cordova  to  Cadiz,  directed  all  his  forces  on  Seville,  the 
entrance  to  which  jDlace  was  defended  by  intrenchments, 
armed  with  one  hundred  and  twenty  old  pieces  of  artillery, 
served  only  by  armed  peasants.  Nevertheless,  Joseph  stop- 
ped to  negotiate  with  them  until  the  thirty-first,  without 
making  any  use  of  the  thirty-six  thousand  men  which  he 
had  uselessly  collected  on  this  point.  At  last  our  troops 
advanced  to  Chiclana  the  fifth  of  February,  twenty-four 
hours  after  the  arrival  of  the  Duke  of  Albuquerque,  who 
made  active  preparations  for  their  reception. 

Scbastiani  takes  Grenada  and  Malaga. — Sebastiani,  on 
his  side,  entered  Grenada  on  the  twenty-eighth,  and  hotly 
pursued  the  enemy  into  the  defile  between  Antequera  and 
Malaga.  A  part  of  the  debris  of  Arrizaga  had  taken  the 
road  to  Murcia  ;  seven  or  eight  thousand  fugitives,  with  two 
battalions  of  monks  and  the  armed  population  of  the  country, 
sought  in  vain  to  dispute  Sebastiani's  passage  ;  he  drove 
every  thing  before  him,  and  reached  Malaga  at  the  head  of 
three  thousand  horse  and  six  battalions  of  infantry.  The 
enemy  had  the  audacity  to  march  out  with  six  thousand  men 


214  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XVl 

to  give  him  battle.  To  charge  upon  this  body,  to  overthrow 
it,  and  enter  pell-mell  with  it  into  Malaga,  was,  for  our 
dragoons,  the  afifair  of  only  a  quarter  of  an  hour.  The 
enemy,  however,  made  fight  in  the  streets  of  the  city  until 
the  arrival  of  our  infantry  put  an  end  to  all  resistance.  A 
part  of  the  insurgents  dispersed,  and  the  remainder  laid  down 
their  arms.  The  place  was  armed  with  one  hundred  and 
forty  jiieces  of  cannon,  and  was  capable  of  a  good  defense. 

Remarks  on  Joseph's  Operations. — However  brilliant  and 
raj)id  these  successes,  our  army  had  failed  by  the  unpardon- 
able slowness  of  its  movements  to  secure  the  important  key 
of  all  the  southern  provinces.  It  is  not  positively  certain 
that  Cadiz  would  have  surrendered,  if  we  had  presented  our- 
selves, some  days  sooner,  before  that  place  ;  but  there  was 
every  probability  that,  in  the  stupor  of  a  surprise,  and  an 
entire  Avant  of  the  means  of  defense,  the  operation  would 
have  been  completely  successful  ;  and,  in  that  case,  we  can 
hardly  venture  to  fix  a  limit  to  the  consequences  that  would 
have  followed.  In  that  rich  city  were  the  soul  and  the 
strength  of  the  government  ;  the  columns  of  Hercules  were 
at  that  epoch  regarded  as  the  palladium  of  Spanish  liberty, 
and  even  if  the  regency  had  been  removed  to  Gartliagena, 
Alicante  or  Corufia,  it  would  only  have  been  the  less  power- 
ful and  the  more  easily  attainable  with  our  bayonets. 

He  returns  to  Madrid.  —  Joseph,  after  the  capture  of 
Seville,  returned  to  Madrid,  and  left  Soult  in  command  of 
the  army  of  the  south.  Notwithstanding  the  fatal  delay 
that  had  allowed  Cadiz  to  escape  us,  the  conquest  of  Anda- 
lusia was  important  in  its  political  as  well  as  military  rela- 
tions. Seville  had  an  artillery  school  of  much  celebrity,  a 
superb  arsenal,  founderies,  and  jDowder-mills.  We  found 
here  a  considerable  quantity  of  provisions  and  two  hundred 
and  forty  pieces  of  artillery,  exclusive  of  the  armament  of 
the  iutrenchments.     Besides,  this  invasion  was  made  at  the 


Cu.  XVI.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1810    IN     SPAIN.  21.3 

proper  moment,  when  anarchy  was  beginning  to  reign  in  the 
Spanish  councils  of  administration. 

Internal  Dissensions  in  Spain.— The  junta  was  dissolved, 
and  the  administration  intrusted  to  a  regency  of  five  mem- 
hers — the  bishop  of  Orense,  General  Castanos,  the  Ex-minis- 
ter Saavedra,  Admiral  Escano,  and  Councillor  Ardizabal  ; 
they  also  convoked  the  Cortes.  Each  party  attributed  to  the 
other  the  evils  which  had  befallen  their  country;  and  the 
germs  of  discord  were  becoming  serious.  The  people  attri- 
buted all  their  ills  to  their  chiefs.  In  this  respect  the  junta 
of  Seville  was  rather  to  be  pitied  than  blamed  ;  the  people 
were  absurd  enough  to  attribute  to  this  body  all  the  disasters 
of  Spain,  although  it  had  contended  against  these  disasters 
with  all  the  firmness  and  activity  possible  in  the  generally  dis- 
organized condition  of  the  kingdom.  Nor  could  the  new 
regency  under  these  grave  circustances  direct  the  helm  of 
state  in  a  manner  to  satisfy  all  parties  ;  it  was  already 
reproached  with  seeking  to  evade  the  convocation  of  the 
Cortes. 

The  Englis!i  Faction  triumphs.— These  petty  internal  re- 
volutions, to  which  no  doubt  Wellesley,  the  English  ambas- 
sador, was  privy,  centralized  for  a  moment  all  power  in  hands 
wholly  devoted  to  the  cabinet  of  London.  The  English 
troops  were  permitted  to  assist  in  the  defense  of  Cadiz,  and 
a  division  under  General  Graham  was  destined  for  this  object. 
Eomana,  directed  to  return  to  Estremadura,  placed  himself 
without  hesitation  under  the  orders  of  Wellington  ;  there 
was  now  more  unity  in  the  military  operations  ;  but  Spain 
was  pot  yet  an  auxilliary  which  the  English  general  could 
direct  at  his  pleasure. 

Informed  of  the  coming  session  of  the  Cortes  at  Cadiz,  I 
authorized  my  brother  to  sound  the  views  of  that  assembly  ; 
it  would  not  have  been  impossible,  by  speaking  to  them  of 
the  future  interests  of  Spain  and  by  leaving  them  free  arbi- 


216  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVL 

ters  in  the  choice  of  their  king,  and  in  the  selection  of  their 
system  of  governmentj  to  cahn  their  efFervescence  and  to 
attach  them  to  our  party.  It  was  a  matter  of  little  import- 
ance to  me  whether  Josejih  or  Ferdinand  was  nominated 
king  of  Spain,  provided  Spain  and  Spanish  America  adopted 
the  Continental  System  and  closed  their  jjorts  to  the 
English. 

Military  Organization  of  the  Provinces  of  tîic  North.— 
While,  on  the  one  hand,  I  was  offering  them  the  hopes  and 
the  means  of  reconciliation,  I  thought  it  necessary,  on  the 
other,  to  show  myself  formidable,  in  case  Spain  persisted  in 
repelling  my  advances.  I  then  directed  the  organization  of 
the  provinces  between  the  Pyrenees  and  the  Ebro,  into  mili- 
tary governments,  under  French  generals  ;  thus  giving  them 
to  understand  that  these  provinces  would  be  united  to  my 
empire,  unless  quiet  should  be  restored  in  the  Peninsnla  ; 
this  was  arming  my  generals  with  temporary  and  dictatorial 
power  over  the  provinces  of  Joseph.  The  measure  was 
authorized  by  the  laws  of  conquest,  and  might  turn  to  the 
account  of  the  inhabitants,  by  j^rotecting  them  from  the 
partial  vexations  of  the  crowd  of  civil  vampires  who  followed 
the  army,  and  by  establishing  order  in  these  jiruvinces  by 
means  more  effectual  than  those  employed  by  the  king  ;  in  a 
word,  this  measure  would  prove  to  the  Spaniards  that  the 
integrity  of  their  soil  would  de2:)end  U2)on  their  own  resolu- 
tions. Nor  is  it  to  be  denied  that  the  measure  was  also 
influenced  in  some  degree  by  the  consideration  that  these 
provinces,  thus  becoming  accustomed  to  our  government, 
might  in  time  be  exchanged  for  Portugal  if  Joseph  should 
continue  king,  or  become  consolidated  with  my  empire,  in 
case  it  became  necessary  for  us  to  give  up  the  rest  of  Sj^ain. 
In  conformity  with  this  system.  Bonnet  was  made  governor 
of  the  Asturias,  Caffarelli  of  Biscay,  Keillc  of  Navarre, 
Baraguay  d'Hilliers  of  Upper  Catalonia,  Maurice  Mathieu  of 


Cu.  XVI.l  CAMPAIGN     OF     1810     IN     SPAIN.  217 

Lower  Catalonia,  wliile  Aragon  remained  under  llic  direction 
of  Suchet,  who  was  tliere  both  feared  and  esteemed.  Each 
of  these  generals  commanded,  in  his  department,  a  strong 
division  of  troops.  Marshal  Bessières  commanded  the  army 
of  the  north  ;  and  his  active  divisions  guarded  the  country 
between  the  Ebro  and  the  Douro.  These  measures,  however, 
did  not  have  the  complete  success  that  I  anticipated;  it 
required  one  or  two  more  successful  campaigns  to  give  them 
their  desired  effect.  They,  however,  caused  loud  cries  against 
the  partisans  of  Joseph,  on  the  ground  that  they  attacked 
the  integrity  of  the  Spanish  soil. 

So!i!t  neglects  to  take  Badajos. — Soult,  who  was  now  in- 
vested with  the  command  of  the  three  corps-tV armée  in  Anda- 
lusia, ought  to  have  hastened  to  repair  the  error  committed 
in  not  having,  in  the  preceding  Oc'.ober,  fallen  on  Welling- 
ton and  cut  up  his  army,  or  at  least  have  reduced  Badajos 
before  entering  Andalusia.  The  garrison  of  that  place,  situ- 
ated on  the  left  bank  of  the  Gnadiana,  not  only  threatened 
the  rear  of  the  army  of  the  south,  but  also  enabled  the 
Spaniards  to  light  up  the  fires  of  insurrection  in  the  very 
heart  of  the  kingdom.  Such  a  fortified  base,  sustained  as  it 
was  by  the  intact  army  of  Wellington  in  its  vicinity,  de- 
manded all  the  attention  of  Soult,  for  he  could  not  remain 
quietly  before  Cadiz  and  gu:ird  the  coast  of  ancient  Bœtica, 
so  Ions;  as  there  remained  on  his  line  of  communication  so 
important  a  place  of  arms,  from  which  the  enemy  might  at 
any  time  debouch  in  force  against  his  troops,  which  were 
necessarily  divided  in  order  to  observe  Cadiz  and  Gibraltar 
and  occupy  Grenada  and  Malaga  ;  but  this  marshal  did  not 
decide  in  time  to  act  with  vigor  on  the  banks  of  the  Guadi- 
ana  ;  he  directed  his  attention  to  the  submission  of  the 
country  before  he  had  destroyed  the  hostile  masses  which 
might  dispute  its  possession.  The  want  of  a  suitable  park 
for  the  siege   of  Badajos  might  have  been  an  admissablc 


218  LIFE     or     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.    XVL 

excuse,  before  the  capture  of  the  arsenal  of  Seville  and  the 
heavy  artillery  in  the  Sierra  Morena. 

Wellington  remains  inactive.  —  Wellington,  on  his  side, 
did  not  take  full  advantage  of  this  dispersion  of  our  forces. 
His  march  to  the  environs  of  Ciudad-Rodrigo,  which  might 
have  produced  important  results  at  the  beginning  of  the 
campaign  of  1810,  if  he  had  in  time  resumed  the  offensive, 
became  of  no  importance  when  he  decided  to  remain  at  that 
place.  From  his  intermediary  position  it  would  seem  that 
he  might  have  acted  wdth  more  vigor,  either  against  Ney  at 
Salamanca,  or  on  the  rear  of  Soult  by  debouching  by  Ba- 
dajos.  ^Ye  have  already  mentioned  the  motives  of  this 
inaction  which,  for  eight  months,  left  the  whole  weight  of 
the  war  on  the  Spaniards  ;  the  system  had  been  agreed  upon 
at  Seville  between  Wellington  and  his  brother  Wellesley  ; — 
they  asked  of  the  cabinet  of  London  a  reënforcement  of  from 
twelve  to  fifteen  thousand  men,  augmented  the  levies  of 
Portu'^al  and  pushed  forward  with  activity  the  works  of  the 
vast  intrenched  camp  of  Lisbon.  Until  these  objects  were 
accomplished  it  suited  Wellington's  policy  to  remain  in- 
active ;  he  had  no  object  in  bold  and  adventurous  enterprises 
for  the  relief  of  a  foreign  soil,  and  waited  for  the  force  of 
events  to  display  the  advantages  of  his  system.  Soult,  not 
comprehending  the  motives  of  his  adversary's  conduct, 
thouo-ht  to  profit  by  his  distance  and  inaction  to  establish 
firmly  his  own  position  in  Andalusia,  adjourning,  for  the 
present,  the  reduction  of  Badajos. 

Soalt  iîîvcsîs  Cadiz. — His  first  care  was  to  blockade  by 
land  the  important  place  of  Cadiz,  which  he  had  allowed  to 
escape  by  his  dilatory  march.  Three  hundred  pieces  of  can- 
non, taken  in  the  Spanish  depots  of  Seville,  and  in  the 
intrenchments  of  Sierra  Morena,  served  to  arm  a  line  of  con- 
travallation,  which  was  not  less  than  ten  leagues  in  length, 
extending  from  Rota  to  the  tower  of  Bermeja.     He  flattered 


Ch.  XVI.]         CAMTAIGN     OF     1810    IN     SPAIN.  219 

himself  that,  by  the  aid  of  these  formidable  lines,  he  could 
shut  up  the  Anglo-Spanish  forces  within  this  narrow  tongue 
of  land  ;  as  though  Gibraltar,  Carthagena,  and  twenty  otlier 
ports  on  the, Mediterranean  and  the  ocean  did  not  permit  the 
enemy  to  carry  even  the  defenders  of  Cadiz  to  any  point  they 
might  select  for  operating  against  our  troops. 
'  On  learning  what  was  passing  in  Andalusia,  I  deemed  it 
best,  as  the  error  had  been  committed,  not  to  evacuate  where 
we  had  already  experienced  the  check  of  Baylen,  and  where 
our  reception  by  the  population,  who  were  already  fatigued 
with  revolutions  and  losses,  had  been  more  favorable  than 
we  expected.  Nevertheless,  as  this  occupation  would  change 
the  nature  of  my  projects  against  Portugal,  I  directed  Mas- 
sena  to  act  with  caution,  and  to  first  reduce  the  places  of 
Ciudad-Rodrigo  and  Almeida  ;  while  Soult  w^as  to  second 
these  operations  by  pressing  the  reduction  of  Badajos,  so  as 
to  make  a  diversion  in  Alemtejo.  ' 

Although  I  was  well  aware  of  the  slight  advantage  likely 
to  result  from  a  land  investment  of  Cadiz  without  the  naval 
means  required  for  the  blockade  of  a  place  thus  situated,  still 
I  thought  it  possible  that  a  bombardment  might  induce  the 
inhabitants,  and,  perhaps,  the  regency  also,  to  surrender.  I 
caused  mortars  of  a  new  model  (called  à  la  Villantroysi)  to 
be  cast  and  sent  to  Cadiz,  which  would  carry  shells  to  the 
distance  of  three  thousand  toises.  A  convoy  of  these  mortars, 
with  the  shells  and  munitions,  left  Toulon,  took  in  some 
troops  at  Porto  Ferrajo,  and  sailed  for  Malaga  ;  others  wx^re 
sent  by  land.  I  did  not  anticipate  any  great  result  from  this 
attempt  ;  but  it  was  worth  the  trial.  It  Avas  essential  either 
to  withdraw  this  army,  or  to  take  measures  to  consolidate  its 
position  in  Andalusia  ;  and  one  of  the  very  first  conditions 
for  securing  this  consolidation  was  either  to  reduce  Cadiz,  or 
to  mask  it  so  as  to  prevent  any  sorties  from  the  place  against 
our  scattered   troops.     Victor  was  charged  with  this   task. 


220  LIFE      OF     NAPOLEON,  [Cn.  XVI. 

Mortier  was  to  guard  Seville  and  observe  the  road  to  Ba- 
dajos  ;  the  old  division  of  Desolles  occupied  Cordova  and 
Jaen  ;  Sebastian!  had  his  hands  full  in  occupying  Grenada 
and  Malaga,  and  in  watching  Gibraltar  on  the  one  side,  and, 
on  the  other,  the  numerous  assemblings  which  the  enemy  was 
forming  in  the  kingdoms  of  Murcia  and  Valencia.  Joseph 
had  returned  to  Madrid  with  his  guard. 

His  Occupation  of  Andiiliisiai — Soult  employed  the  entire 
year  of  1810,  in  seeking  to  obtain  these  several  results  ;  and 
it  must  be  confessed  that  if  Soult  had  neglected  to  employ 
his  forces  in  a  more  useful  manner  against  the  English  on 
the  Tagus,  lie  did  every  thing  in  his  power  to  repair  this 
fault,  by  the  care  he  devoted  to  his  establishments  at  Grenada 
and  Seville,  and  to  his  preparations  at  Cadiz.  There  was  a 
short  time  when  our  efforts  appeared  on  the  i)oint  of  being 
crowned  with  success,  and  when  the  Spaniards  themselves 
regarded  our  power  as  definitively  consolidated  in  Andalusia. 
Soult  at  Seville,  and  Sebastiani  at  Grenada,  maintained 
sumptuous  courts  ;  jjlaced  on  the  classic  soil  of  the  Moorish 
chivalry,  they  made  every  effort  to  revive  the  bright  days  of 
the  Abencerages,  and  h j  fêtes  to  draw  this  voluptuous  people 
of  Andalusia,  from  the  horrors  of  insurrection  ;  but  this 
seducing  Bœtica,  without  being  exactly  a  Capua  for  our 
army,  nevertheless,  paralyzed  fifty  thousand,  or  rather 
engao-ed  them  in  mere  accessaries,  while  Wellington  was 
quietly  laying  the  foundation  of  a  defensive  system  which  he 
ought  never  to  have  been  allowed  time  to  organize. 

If  the  head-quarters  of  these  two  generals  offered  all  the 
charms  of  peace  and  the  agréments  of  a  happy  conquest, 
their  cantonments  were  not  always  thus  tranquil.  The  dis- 
persion of  our  troops  necessary  to  secure  the  quiet  of  the 
country,  gave  the  allied  generals  an  opportunity  to  fall  on 
our  isolated  brigades  and  to  expose  them  to  all  the  hoiTors 
of  partisan  warfare.     Romana,  Ballesteros,  and  Mendizabel, 


Cil.  XYI.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1810    IN     SPAIN.  221 

on  the  Lorders  of  Portugal  and  Estremadura,  Blake  and 
Ellio  in  the  direction  of  Murcia.  and  histly,  Lascy  and  many 
others,  leaving  Cadiz  to  land  on  the  coast  near  Moguer, 
engaged  in  numerous  partial  combats,  in  which  they  were  at 
first  successful  against  detached  parties,  but  immediately 
after  beaten  and  put  to  flight.  The  very  names  of  these 
combats  would  occupy  a  space  greater  than  can  here  be 
devoted  to  this  particular  subject  ;  but  the  names  of  the 
heroes  who  fell  in  these  contests  are  already  written  in  the 
temple  of  fame. 

Eomana  and  Ballesteros,  distinguished  themselves  by 
their  activity  and  perseverance.  The  former  had  left  to  the 
convoked  Cortes  and  the  regency  the  reins  of  a  state  given 
up  to  anarchy,  and  returned  to  the  army  in  the  middle  of 
1810.  Some  have  attributed  to  Eomana  the  honor  of  form- 
ing the  plan  of  Spanish  resistance  ;  without  wishing  to 
detract  in  any  degree  from  the  fame  of  that  general,  I  am 
inclined  to  believe  that  that  resistance  was  rather  the  result 
of  circumstances,  and  of  the  character  of  the  war  ;  for  the 
provincial  juntas  comprised,  in  all  their  different  proclama- 
tions, the  only  system  of  resistance  that  was  employed  in  the 
Peninsula. 

The  enemy,  acting  under  the  protection  of  Gibraltar, 
Cadiz,  Badajos,  and  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  and  aided  by  the 
inhabitants,  continued  to  annoy  and  fatigue  our  troops  with 
the  harassing  operations  of  partisan  warfare.  To  aid  these 
efforts,  the  English  had  planned  an  attack  on  Malaga  in  con- 
cert with  the  army  of  Murcia.  Lord  Blenheim  land.ed,  the 
thirteenth  of  August,  on  the  coast  of  Almeria,  but  was  him- 
self captured  with  seven  or  eight  hundred  of  his  men  by 
Sebastiani,  while  the  remainder  with  difiSculty  regained  their 
vessels. 

Operations  in  the  North.— During  this  time,  nothing 
remarkable  occurred  in  the  north-west.    The  eighth  corps, 


222  LIFE     OF    NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVI- 

under  Junot,  had  retaken  the  important  post  of  Astorga, 
which  Ney  in  his  advance  on  Tahivera  had  abandoned  to  the 
army  of  Galicia.  General.  Bonnet,  guarding  the  Asturias, 
was  daily  skirmishing  with  the  corps  reorganized  by  the 
Spaniards  in  Galicia  immediately  after  the  evacuation  of  that 
province.  Porlier,  a  nephew  of  Romana,  operated  against 
this  division  in  the  Asturias,  and  those  which  guarded  the 
kingdom  of  Leon.  Other  jiartisans  successively  attacked  the 
several  points  of  Navarre  and  Castile  which  wTre  exposed, 
keeping  the  troops  left  to  guard  these  jirovihces  in  continual 
watchfulness.  Ney  had  returned  from  Paris  to  take  com- 
mand of  the  sixth  corps-d'armée,  after  the  affair  of  Tama- 
mes,  and  established  himself  at  Salamanca  to  observe  Beres- 
ford,  who  was  soon  joined  by  the  entire  army  of  Wellington. 
Reynier,  at  the  head  of  the  second  corps-d'armée,  was  fighting 
against  the  English  division  of  General  Hill,  and  the  troops 
of  Romana,  on  the  left  of  the  Tagus. 

Napoleon's  Chances  of  Success. — Notwithstanding  the 
presence  of  this  army,  which  from  day  to  day  became  more 
threatening,  the  brilliant  successes  of  Soult  and  Suchet,  the 
victories  of  Ocana,  Sierra  Morena,  and  Santa  Maria,  joined 
to  the  subjugation  of  the  2)rovinces  of  the  south,  confirmed 
me  in  the  hope  that  success  would  crown  our  perseverance. 
I  thought  that  the  patience  of  the  Spaniards  Avould  finally 
become  exhausted  ;  but  I  was  deceived  in  the  character  of 
this  people,  and  in  the  importance  of  the  English  army, 
estimating  its  efficiency  from  its  operations  in  Holland  and 
Flanders.  Although  the  Spanish  regency  was  shut  up  in 
Cadiz,  it  nevertheless,  continued  to  give  its  orders  throughout 
the  monarchy.  Priests  were  the  staff  officers  who  transmit- 
ted these  orders,  and  watched  over  their  execution  ;  speaking 
in  the  name  of  heaven,  they  were  obeyed  ;  and  even  admirals 
were  sent  to  serve  in  the  insurgent  infantry.  Resistance 
sprung  up  every  where,  and  although  we  were  continually 


Ch.  XVI.]         CAMPAIGN     OF     1810    IN     SPAIN.  223 

victorious,  stilly  we  were  always  engaged  in  partial  combats, 
for  no  sooner  was  one  place  conquered,  than  we  were  obliged 
to  put  down  the  new  forces  that  sprang  up  in  another. 

Massena's  Expedition  against  Portugal.  — In  the  mean- 
time Massena  jjrcpared  to  execute  his  part  of  the  project 
which  I  had  formed  for  the  overthrow  of  the  English  army, 
and  which  had  been  partially  disan-anged  by  the  untimely 
invasion  of  Andalusia.  I  gave  him  the  corps  of  Ney,  Rey- 
nier,  and  Junot,  numbering  together  about  fifty  thousand 
men. 

Siege  of  Ciiidad-Rodrigo.— Before  advancing  far  in  this 
expedition,  it  was  necessary  to  reduce  those  fortifications 
behind  which  Wellington  had  been  alloM^ed  for  the  last  ten 
months  to  prepare  his  means  of  offense  and  defense.  Junot 
had  already  captured  Astorga,  and  it  was  now  necessary  to 
reduce  Ciudad-Rodrigo  and  Almeida..  This  task  was  con- 
fided to  Xey,  who,  notwithstanding  his  want  of  proper 
means,  succeeded  beyond  the  most  sanguine  hopes.  To  col- 
lect and  move  his  material  for  a  siege  two  hundred  leagues 
from  liis  frontier,  in  the  midst  of  an  insurgent  and  hostile 
population,  who  pillaged  the  convoy,  and  massacred  the 
escorts,  was  a  most  herculean  task.  The  place  was  sur- 
rounded with  an  old  and  irregular  enciente,  but  one  capable 
of  a  pretty  good  resistance  ;  it  also  possessed  one  of  those 
excellent  artillery  schools  for  which  Spain  was  indebted  to 
Charles  III.  The  garrison  of  eight  thousand  men,  under 
Brigadier  Ilerasti,  announced  its  intention  of  doing  its  duty, 
to  which  it  was  doubly  incited  by  the  fanaticism  of  the 
administrative  junta.  It  sustained,  for  a  long  time,  the 
destructive  fire  of  our  batteries,  which  caused  great  havoc  in 
the  citj^,  and  blew  up  the  arsenal  ;  but  these  batteries  were 
too  distant  to  destroy  the  masonry  of  the  fortifications  ; — it, 
therefore,  became  necessary  to  establish  them  nearer.  The 
breach  was  finally  made  practicable,  and  the  ditch  filled  up 


224  L  1 1'  E      OF      NAPOLEON  [Ch.  XVI, 

by  the  explosion  of  the  counterscarp  ;  and,  on  the  tenth  of 
July,  after  an  attack  of  forty-five  days,  the  garrison  capitu- 
lated as  prisoners  of  war. 

Siege  of  Almeida. — Our  troops  now  marched  to  the  invest- 
ment of  Almeida,  and  dislodged  the  English  rear-guard 
which  was  posted  in  the  vicinity.  Six  thousand  Portuguese, 
half  regulars,  and  half  militia,  prepared  for  a  desperate  de- 
fense ;  but  the  exjjlosion  of  an  immense  powder  magas^ine 
blew  up  the  citadel  and  a  part  of  the  city,  so  that  the  gov- 
ernor surrendered  the  same  day.  ■■■'•'  Massena,  under  the  per- 
suasion of  the  Marquis  of  Alorna,  and  forgetting  what  had 
already  happened  to  Soult  and  Junot,  had  the  misplaced 
generosity  to  release  the  Portuguese  prisoners  and  incorporate 
the  regulars  into  his  own  army.  He  remembered  that  a 
Portuguese  brigade  had  been  distinguished  in  our  ranks  in 
the  AVagram  campaign  ;  and  he  now  thought  to  gain  over 
the  Portuguese  by  good  treatment.  But  the  general  hatred 
was  too  violent,  and  his  misplaced  confidence  resulted  in  the 
virtual  surrender  to  our  enemies  of  four  or  five  thousand  of 
their  captured  soldiers. 

Position  of  Wellington. — Wellington  remained  immov- 
able during  these  two  sieges,  although  the  corps  of  Ney  and 

*  Napier  thus  describes  this  terrible  explosion: — "On  the  eighteenth,  the 
trenches  were  begun  under  cover  of  a  false  attack,  and  on  the  twenty-sixth 
(the  second  parallel  being  commenced),  sixty-five  pieces  of  artillery,  mounted 
on  ten  batteries,  opened  at  once.  Many  houses  were  soon  in  flames,  and 
the  garrison  was  unable  to  extinguish  them  :  the  counter-fire  was,  how- 
ever, briskly  maintained,  and  little  military  damage  was  sustained.,  To- 
ward evening  the  cannonade  slackened  on  both  sides;  butjast  at  dark  tlio 
ground  suddenly  trembled,  the  castle  bursting  into  a  thousand  pieces,  gave 
vent  to  a  column  of  smoke  and  fire,  and  with  a  prodigious  noise  the  whole 
town  sunk  into  a  shapeless  ruiu.  Treason  or  accident  had  caused  the 
magazines  to  explode,  and  the  devastation  was  incredible.  The  ramparts 
were  breached,  the  greatest  part  of  the  guns  thrown  into  the  ditch,  five  hun- 
dred people  were  struck  dead  on  the  instant,  and  only  six  houses  left  standing; 
the  stones  thrown  out  hurt  forty  of  tlie  b-'siogers  in  th3  trendies,  and  the  sur- 
viving garrison,  aghast  at  the  horrid  commotion,  disregarded  all  exhortations 
to  rally." 


Ch.   XVI.  CAMPAIGN     OF     1810    IN     SPAIN.  225 

Junot  did  not  number  over  thirty-six  thousand  men,  and 
half  of  these  were  engaged  in  the  ojjerations  of  the  sieges. 
For  some  reason  not  known,  the  forces  of  the  English  '^en- 
era!  were  divided  ;  there  were  only  thirty  thousand  men  at 
Celorico,  at  the  head  of  the  valley  of  the  Mondego  ;  General 
Hill,  with  fifteen  thousand  men  on  the  right,  was  at  Porta- 
legro,  on  the  left  hank  of  the  Tagus,  against  Keynier's  corps, 
which  was  observed  by  a  light  corps  of  Portuguese  and  that 
of  Romana  ;  the  reserve  of  ten  thousand  men,  under  Leith, 
remained  at  Thomar,  thirty  leagues  from  the  army,  and 
twelve  thousand  Portuguese  were  thrown  upon  the  frontiers 
as  partisans.  It  would  seem  that  Wellington  might  readily 
have  united  these  means,  and,  by  taking  the  initiative,  have 
greatly  troubled  our  operations,  without  compromising  the 
system  on  which  he  had  based  his  hopes.  But  he  remained 
immovable  in  his  position. 

Third  lovasioii  of  Portugal.— Having  completed  all  his 
preparations  for  invasion,  Massena  drew  to  himself  the  corps 
of  Reynier,  about  the  middle  of  September,  and  directed 
himself  on  Celorico.  The  enemy  now  fell  back,  descending 
the  left  of  the  Mondego,  where  ten  affluents  with  deep 
ravines  presented  as  many  good  lines  of  defense.  But  as 
Massena  descended  by  the  right  bank  on  Viseu,  the  English 
g.meral  crossed  the  Mondego,  marched  rapidly  on  the  moun- 
tains of  Acobar,  where  he  also  directed,  at  the  same  time,  the 
corps  of  Hill  and  Leith,  by  the  road  to  Espinoha.  He  thus 
hoped  to  cover  Coimbra  and  the  road  to  Lisbon,  by  taking 
position  with  his  united  forces  on  the  plateau  of  Busaco,  at 
the  summit  of  that  chain,  three  hundred  feet  above  the  sur- 
rounding valleys.  This  important  junction  was  effected  on 
the  twenty-sixth  of  September,  at  the  very  moment  that  the 
French  army  arrived  at  Busaco.  Ney,  who  was  the  first  to 
present  himself,  was  inclined,  it  is  said,  to  attack  immedi- 
ately, but  was  persuaded  to  await  (he  arrival  of  the  com- 
voL.  HI. — 15. 


226  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XYI. 

manJer-in-cbief.  It  is  asserted  that  the  junction  of  Hill 
and  Leith  was  not  then  effected,  nor  even  when  Massena 
made  liis  reconnoissance. ,  If  this  be  true,  the  delay  was  a 
deplorable  fatalitj'.  However,  the  heroes  of  Essling  and 
Genoa,  accustomed  in  the  Alps  and,  Apennines  not  to  fear 
rocks,  however  difficult  of  access,  determined  to  make  the 
attack  the  next  day,  although  the  union  of  the  enemy's 
forces  would  then  be  consummated. 

Battle  of  Busaco.—Tbere  were  only  two  roads  by  which  the 
English  could  be  reached,  that  by  the  convent  of  Busaco, 
and  that  by  San  Antonio  de  Cantaro.  The  sixth  corps  took 
the  first  road  in  deej)  columns  by  echelons,  the  rocky  escarp- 
ments not  permitting  them  to  attack  in  any  other  order,  or 
even  allowing  the  cannon  to  follow  the  infantry.  Reynier 
attacked,  in  the  same  way,  by  San  Antonio.  Our  troops 
ascended  the  heights  with  their  accustomed  impetuosity, 
but  were  exposed  to  a  most  horrible  fire.  After  driving  back 
the  enemy's  first  line  on  the  sloj^e,  they  reached  the  summit 
by  brigades,  but  out  of  breath  and  a  little  disordered  by 
their  vigorous  effort.  They  were  here  exposed  to  a  concen- 
tric fire  of  grape,  from  a  numerous  artillery,  and  of  mus- 
ketry from  the  enemy's  battalions  ;  and  charged  in  front  by 
fresh  troops,  and  in  flank  by  a  crowd  of  Portuguese,  they 
descended  the  mountains  with  a  sensible  loss  and  without 
inflicting  much  injury  on  the  enemy.  General  Simon  ^vas 
killed,  and  General  Ferrey  wounded  at  the  head  of  the 
column  of  the  sixth  corps.  The  intrepid  Foy  and  the  brave 
Graindorge,  who  led  Reynier's  corps,  were  severely  wounded, 
without  obtaining  any  better  success.  For  a  moment,  they 
deemed  themselves  successful,  when  Hill's  entire  corps, 
acting  as  a  reserve,  assailed  them,  and,  after  a  murderous 
combat,  drove  them  back  to  the  foot  of  the  mountain.  This 
butchery,  which  cost  us  six  or  seven  thousand  men,  Jiors-de- 
comhat,  was  the  more  to  be  regretted,  as  it  changed  the  rela- 


Ch.  XVI.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1810    IN    SPAIN.  227 

tivo  morale  of  the  two  armies,  and  might  have  been  avoided, 
either  by  making  the  attack  before  the  junction  of  Hill  and 
Leith,  or  by  manoeuvring  so  as  to  dislodge  the  enemy. 

Wassena  turns  the  Position  of  Wellington.— But  the  evil 
had  now  been  committed,  and  the  posjîion  of  Massena  was 
most  critical  ;  he  could  not  remain  without  provisions  at  the 
foot  of  the  mountain,  nor  could  he  retreat  in  the  face  of  an 
enemy  who  was  watching  all  his  movements.  To  repass  the 
Mondego,  to  act  on  the  left  bank,  was  also  •  impracticable, 
since  Wellington  had  a  direct  line  there,  by  which  he  could 
anticipate  him.  Fortunately,  a  peasant  pointed  out  to  Mas- 
sena a  road  two  leagues  further  north,  still  better  tlian  the 
one  he  had  attempted,  which  led  to  Coimbra  by  Avelans 
de  Cima  and  Soardo.  Wellington  had  assigned  the  defense 
of  this  post  to  the  Portuguese  corps  of  Trant  ;  but,  for  some 
reason  not  known,  that  corps  had  not  arrived.  Massena  took 
this  road  without  hesitation.  This  flank  movement,  executed 
between  the  English  army  and  the  sea  was  bold  and  auda- 
cious ;  but  Wellington,  satisfied  with  his  victory,  although 
a  passive  one  and  without  results,  preferred  to  regain  his 
intrenched  camp,  rather  than  to  venture  an  engagement  with 
our  troops  in  the  open  country,  where  he  might  be  seriously 
cut  up. 

Devastating  System  of  the  English  General.— The  French 
army  followed  him  by  Coimbra.  Here,  as  at  Viseu,  we 
found  no  inhabitants.  These  two  rich  and  flourishing  cities 
were  deserted  and  abandoned,  as  was  also  the  whole  country. 
The  unfortunate  inhabitants  had  been  forced  to  fly,  under 
pain  of  death  by  the  orders  of  the  English  general,  the 
regency  and  an  exasperated  clergy.  Wellington's  orders  of 
the  twenty-fourth  of  August,  directing  this  measure,  are  an 
historical  monument  of  this  cruel  war." 

*  To  lay  waste  a  coiintrj^  in  tliis  manner,  is  permitted  by  the  severe  rules  of 
war,  or,  in  other  words,  is  within  the  extreme  limits  established  by  tlie  laws  of 


228  LIFE      OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XYI. 

Thus  applying  to  a  country  mountainous,  difficult  of 
a.ccess,  and  possessing  but  little  grain,  the  precepts  given  by 
Lloyd  for  the  defense  of  England,  Wellington  had  trans- 
formed the  Avhole  country  from  Celorico  to  Lisbon,  into  one 
vast  artificial  desert.  Fortunately  for  us  this  vigorous  order 
had  not  been  literally  executed  ;  the  inhabitants  had  fled 
with  a  part  of  their  provisions,  but  not  having  the  means  of 
transportation,  they  had  buried  the  remainder  ;  a  part  of 
these  were  discovered  by  our  soldiers,  and,  although  an  insuffi- 
cient resource  for  the  entire  army,  they  served  as  a  means  of 
subsistence  for  some  weets. 

Lines  of  Torres  Vedras.— By  a  singular  fatuity  of  which 
there  is  no  other  examjjlc  in  all  the  continental  wars,  Mas- 
sena  did  not  learn  till  he  reached  Leyria,  the  existence  of 
these  formidable  lines  on  which  Wellington  had  been  labor- 
ing for  the  last  ten  months  !  Two  lines  of  redoubts,  the 
greater  j)art  of  which  were  closed  at  the  gorge  and  palisaded  ; 
and  thus  presenting  eighty-seven  separate  forts,  armed  with 
two  hundred  and  ninety  pieces  of  heavy  cannon,  offered  one 
of  the  most  formidable  positions  mentioned  in  the  annals 
of  modern  history  ;  a  third  line  serving  as  a  citadel  to  the 
other  two,  was  so  arranged  as  to  cover  an  embarkation  in 
case  the  others  were  forced.  Taking  refuge  in  this  redoubt- 
able asylum,  resting  on  the  sea  (which  for  the  English  alone 
was  a  good  base),  and  therefore  certain  of  provisions,  he 
could  brave  all  our  attacks.-''" 


war;  but  such  measures  are  justifiable  only  by  the  extreme  necessity  of  the 
case.  Vattel  characterizes  them,  as  "  savage  and  monstrous  excesses,  when 
committed  without  necessity."  "We  are  to  understand  by  tlie  word  necessity,  a 
mihtary  necessity,  or  great  military  advantage  to  be  gained  toward  accomplisli- 
ing  the  object  of  the  campaign  or  of  the  war.  The  laying  waste  of  a  district 
of  country,  or  the  destroying  of  a  city,  sometimes  produces  a  greater  result 
than  a  victory  gained.  Napoleon's  campaign  in  Russia  furnishes  a  striking 
illustration.  The  general  must  decide  according  to  the  circumstances  of  each 
particular  case.     Halkck's  Int.  Law,  and  Laws  of  War.     Ch.  xis.,  §  23. 

*  The   defenses  of  Torres  Vedras,  from  the  important  influence  which  they 


Cu.  XVI.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1810    IN     SPAIN  229 

Embarrassing  Position  of  Masscna.— Although  Massena 
was  no  more  fond  of  retreating  than  I  was,  still  he  did  not 
dare  to  risk  an  attack,  as  it  would  have  been  too  hazardous. 

had  upon  the  Peninsular  war,  deserve  a  more  full  description  than  tliat  given 
in  the  text.     We  copy  tlie  following  from  Napier  : 

"  The  lines  of  Torres  Yedras,"  ho  says,  "  consisted  of  three  distinct  ranges 
of  defense. 

"Tlie  first,  extending  from  Alliandra  ou  the  Tagus,  to  the  mouth  of  tlie 
Zizandro  on  tlie  sea-coast,  was,  following  the  inflections  of  tlie  hills,  twenty- 
nine  miles  long. 

"  The  second,  traced  at  a  distance  varying  from  six  to  ten  miles  in  rear  of 
the  first,  stretched  from  Quintellaon  the  Tagus  to  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Lorenza, 
being  twenty-four  miles  in  lengtli. 

"  The  third,  intended  to  cover  a  forced  embarkation,  extended  from  Passo- 
d'Arcos  on  the  Tagus,  to  the  tower  of  Junquera  on  the  coast.  Here  an  outer 
line,  con.structed  on  an  opening  of  three  tliousand  yards,  inclosed  an  intrenched 
camp  designed  to  cover  the  embarkation  with  fewer  troops,  should  tlie  opera- 
tion be  delayed  by  bad  weather;  within  the  second  camjo,  Fort  St.  Julians 
(whose  high  ramparts  and  deep  ditches  defied  an  escalade),  was  armed  and 
strengthened  to  enable  a  rear-guard  to  protect  both  itself  and  the  army. 

"  The  nearest  part  of  the  second  line  was  twenty -four  miles  from  these  works 
at  Passo-d'Arcos,  and  some  parts  of  the  first  line  were  two  long  marches  dis- 
tant ;  but  the  principal  routes  led  through  Lisbon,  where  measures  were  taken 
to  retard  the  enemy  and  give  time  for  the  embarkation. 

"  Of  these  stupendous  lines,  the  second,  whether  regarded  for  its  strength  or 
importance,  was  undoubtedly  the  principal  ;  the  others  were  only  appendages. 
the  one  as  a  final  place  of  refuge,  the  other  as  an  advanced  work  to  stem  the 
first  violence  of  the  enemy,  and  to  enable  the  army  to  take  up  its  ground  on 
the  second  line  without  hurry  or  pressure.  Massena  having,  however,  wasted 
the  summer  season  on  the  frontiers,  the  first  line  acquired  such  strength,  both 
from  labor  and  from  the  fall  of  rain,  that  Lord  "WeUington  resolved  to  abide  his 
opponent's  charge  there. 

"  The  ground  presented  to  the  French  being,  as  it  were,  divided  into  five 
parts  or  positions,  shall  be  described  in  succession  from  right  to  left. 

"1st.  From  Alhaudra  io  the  head  of  the  valley  of  Calandrix.  This  distance, 
of  about  five  miles,  was  a  continuous  and  lofty  ridge,  defended  by  tliirteen 
redoubts,  and  for  two  miles  rendered  inaccessible  by  a  scarp  fifteen  to  twenty 
feet  high,  executed  along  the  brow.  It  was  guarded  by  the  British  and  Portu- 
guese division  under  General  Hill,  and  flanked  from  the  Tagus  by  a  strong 
flotilla  of  gun-boats,  manned  by  Britisli  seamen. 

"  2d.  From  the  head  of  the  vale  of  Calandrix  to  the  Pe-de-Monie.  Tliis  posi- 
tion, also  five  miles  in  length,  consisted  of  two  salient  mountains  forming  the 
valley  of  Aruda,  that  town  being  exactly  in  the  mouth  of  the  pas.s.  Only 
three  feeble  redoubts,  totally  incapable  of  stopping  an  enemy  for  an  instant, 
were  constructed  here,  and  the  defense  of  the  ground  was  intrusted  to  General 
Crawfurd  and  the  light  division. 


230  LIFE    or     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XYL 

The  enemy  had  taken  at  Coimbra  some  four  thousand  of  our 
sick  and  wounded,  so  that  our  army  was  reduced  to  forty 
thousand  combatants,  while  the  enemy  numbered  more  than. 


"3d.  The  Monte  Agraca.  This  lofty  mouutaia  overtopped  the  adjacent 
country  in  such  a  manner,  that  from  its  summit  the  whole  of  the  first  line 
could  be  distinctly  observed.  The  right  was  separated  from  the  Aruda  position, 
by  a  deep  ravine  which  led  to  nothing;  the  left  overlooked  the  village  and 
valley  of  Zibreira  ;  the  centre  overhung  the  town  of  Sobral.  The  summit 
of  this  mountain  was  crowned  by  an  immense  redoubt,  mounting  twenty-five 
guns,  and  having  three  smaller  works,  containing  niueteeen  guns,  clustered 
around  it.  Tlie  garrisons,  amounting  to  two  thousand  men,  were  supplied  by 
Pack's  brigade  ;  and  on  the  reverse  of  the  position,  which  might  be  about  four 
miles  in  length,  the  fifth  division,  under  General  Leith,  was  posted  in  reserve. 

4th.  From  the  valky  of  Zcbreira  to  Torres  Vedras.  This  position,  seven  miles 
long,  was  at  first  without  works  ;  because  it  was  only  when  the  rains  had  set 
in,  that  the  resolution  to  defend  the  first  lino  permanently,  was  adopted.  But 
the  ground  being  rough  and  well-defined,  the  valley  in  front,  deep,  and  watered 
by  the  Zizandre,  now  become  a  considerable  river,  it  presented  a  fine  field  of 
battle  for  a  small  army.  The  first  and  fourth,  and  a  sixth  division  formed  of 
troops  just  arrived  from  England  and  from  Cadiz,  were  there  posted,  under  the 
immediate  command  of  Lord  "Wellington  himself;  whose  head-quarters  were 
fixed  at  Pedro  Negro,  near  the  Secorra,  a  rock,  on  which  a  telegraph  was 
erected,  communicating  with  every  part  of  the  lines. 

5th.  From  the  heights  of  Torres  Vadras  to  the  moxdh  of  the  Zizandre.  The 
right  flank  of  this  position  and  the  pass  in  front  of  the  town  of  Torres  Vedras  were 
secured,  first,  by  one  great  redoubt,  mounting  forty  guns  ;  secondly,  by  several 
smaller  forts,  judiciously  planted  so  as  to  command  all  the  approaches.  From 
these  works  to  the  sea  a  range  of  moderate  heights  were  crowned  with  small 
forts  ;  but  the  chief  defense  there,  after  the  rains  had  set  in,  was  to  be  found  in 
the  Zizandre,  which  was  not  only  unfordable,  but  overflowed  its  banks,  and 
formed  an  impassable  marsh.  A  paved  road,  parallel  to  the  foot  of  the  hills, 
ran  along  the  whole  front  ;  that  is,  from  Torres  Vedras,  by  Runa  Sobral  and 
Aruda,  to  Alhandra.  This  was  the  nature  of  the  first  line  of  defense  ;  the 
second  was  stih  more  formidable. 

"  1st.  From  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Lourenca  to  Mafra.  In  this  distance  of  seven 
miles,  there  was  a  range  of  hills  naturally  steep,  artificially  scarped,  and 
covered  by  a  deep,  and  in  many  parts  impracticable  ravine.  The  salient 
points  were  secured  by  forts,  which  flanked  and  commanded  the  few  accessible 
points  ;  but  as  this  line  was  extensive,  a  secondary  post  was  fortified  a  few 
miles  in  the  rear,  to  secure  a  road  leading  from  Ereceira  to  Cintra. 

"  2d.  On  the  right  of  the  above  line  the  Tapada,  or  royal  park  of  Mafra.  Here 
there  was  some  open  ground  for  an  attack.  Yet  it  was  strong,  and,  together 
with  the  pass  of  Mafra,  was  defended  by  a  system  of  fourteen  redoubts,  con- 
structed with  great  labor  and  care,  well  considered  with  respect  to  the  natural 
disposition  of  the  ground,  and,  in  some  degree,  connected  with  the  secondary 


Cn.  XVI.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1810    IN    SPAIN.  231 

sixty  tliousanJ.  Massena  sent  to  me,  by  General  Foy,  for 
orders  and  reènforcemeuts.  In  the  mean  time  he  hoped  to 
fatigue  his  adversary  by  his  jjerseverauce.  In  this  he  mis- 
post  spoken  of  above  ;  ia  front,  the  Sicrra-de-Chypre,  covered  with  redoubts, 
obstructed  all  approaches  to  Mafra  itself. 

"  3d.  From  the  Tapada  to  the  pass  of  Bucellas.  In  this  space  of  ten  or  twelve 
miles,  which  formed  the  middle  of  the  second  line,  the  country  is  choked  by 
the  Monte  Chique,  the  Cabeca,  or  head  of  wliicli,  is  in  the  centre  of,  and  over- 
topping, all  tlie  other  mountain  masses.  A  road,  conducted  along  a  chain  of 
liills,  high  and  salient,  but  less  bold  than  any  other  parts  of  the  line,  connected 
Mafra  with  the  Cabeca,  and  was  secured  by  a  number  of  foits.  The  country 
in  front  was  extremely  difiicult,  and  a  second  and  stronger  range  of  heights, 
parallel  to  and  behind  the  first,  offered  a  good  fighting  position,  which  could 
only  be  approached  with  artillery  by  the  connecting  road  in  front  ;  and  to  reach 
that,  either  the  Sierra-de-Chypre,  on  the  left,,  or  the  pass  of  the  Cabeca-de- 
Monte-Chique,  on  the  right,  must  have  been  carried.  Xow  the  works  cover- 
ing the  latter,  consisted  of  a  cluster  of  redoubts  constructed  on  the  inferior 
rocky  heads  in  advance  of  the  Cabeca,  and  completely  commanding  all  the 
approaches,  and  both  from  their  artificial  and  natural  strength,  nearly  impreg- 
nable to  open  force.  The  Cabeca  and  its  immediate  flanks  were  considered 
secure  in  their  natural  precipitous  strength  ;  and,  iu  like  manner,  the  ridges 
connecting  the  Cabeca  with  the  pass  of  Bucellas,  being  impregnable,  were  left 
untouched,  save  the  blocking  of  one  bad  mule  road  that  led  over  them. 

"  3d.  From  Bucellas  to  the  low  ground  about  the  Tagus.  The  pass  of  Bucellas 
was  difficult,  and  strongly  defended  by  redoubts  on  each  side.  A  ridge,  or 
rather  a  collection  of  impassable  rocks,  called  the  Sierra-de-Serves,  stretched  to 
the  right  for  two  miles  without  a  break,  and  then  died  away  by  gradual  slopes 
in  the  low  ground  about  the  Tagus.  These  declivities  and  the  flat  banks  of 
the  river  oftered  an  opening  two  miles  and  a  half  wide,  which  was  laboriously 
aud  carefully  strengthened  by  redoubts,  water-cuts,  and  retrenchments,  and 
connected  by  a  system  of  forts  with  the  heights  of  Alhandra  ;  but  it  was  the 
weakest  part  of  the  whole  hne  in  itself,  and  the  most  dangerous  from  its  prox- 
imity to  the  valleys  of  Calandrix  and  Aruda. 

There  were  five  roads  practicable  for  artillery  piercing  the  first  line  of  defense, 
namely,  two  at  Torres  Vedras,  two  at  Sobral,  and  one  at  Alhandra;  butas 
two  of  these  united  again  at  the  Cabeca,  there  were,  in  fact,  only  four  points 
of  passage  through  the  second  Hne,  that  is  to  say,  at  Mafra,  Monte-Chique, 
Bucellas,  and  Quintella  in  the  flat  ground.  The  aim  and  scope  of  all  the  works 
was  to  bar  tho.se  passes  and  to  strengthen  the  favorable  fighting  positions 
between  them,  without  impeding  the  movements  of  the  army.  Those  objects 
were  attained,  and  it  is  certain  that  the  loss  of  the  first  line  would  not  have  been 
injurious,  save  iu  reputation,  because  the  retreat  was  secure  upon  the  second 
and  stronger  line  ;  and  the  guns  of  the  first  were  all  inferior  calibre,  mounted 
on  common  truck-carriages,  and  consequently  immovable  and  useless  to  the 
enemy. 

"  The  movements  of  the  allies  were  free  and  unfettered  by  the  works.     The 


232  LIFE      OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XVI. 

calculated  ;  but  he  could  do  no  better  under  the  circum- 
stances. The  English  army,  having  two  hundred  vessels  at 
its  disposal,  had  always  an  abundance  ;  it  passed  five  months 
in  its  camp,  completing  its  intrenchments  and  exercising  and 
instructing  its  troops.  The  Portuguese  militia  were  here 
instructed  and  disciplined  till  they  rivaled  the  regulars  ;  so 
that  the  army  came  out  of  the  camp  more  formidable  than 
ever.  Massena,  on  the  contrary,  was  ruining  his  army  in 
order  to  subsist  it  ;  his  troops  were  divided  into  movable 
columns,  and  exposed  to  attacks  by  the  inhabitants  and  the 
Portuguese  partisans.  They  ravaged  the  country  through 
which  they  were  soon  to  make  their  retreat  ;  sickness,  daily 
combats,  and  assassinations,  diminished  their  numbers,  while 
the  obstacles  were  increasing  before  them.  In  a  word,  they 
were  so  situated  as  to  render  it  necessary  to  either  attack  the 
enemy  immediately  or  to  retreat.  Informed  of  these  circum- 
stances by  General  Foy,  I  advised  Massena  to  attack  tlie 
enemy  if  the  thing  was  practicable,  and  if  not,  to  keep  him 
within  his  lines.  I  promised  to  send  him  the  ninth  corps, 
under  Drouet,  which  had  just  entered  Spain,  and  gave  him 
hopes  of  being  seconded  by  Soult,  who  was  operating  on  the 
Guadiana.  Being  so  far  from  the  theatre  of  the  war,  I  could 
not  presume  to  give  any  definitive  orders,  and,  therefore,  left 

movemeuts  of  the  French  army  were  impeded  and  cramped  by  the  great 
Monte-Junta,  which,  rising  opposite  tlie  cjntre  of  the  first  hne,  sent  forth  a 
spur  called  the  Sierra-de-Baragueda  in  a  slanting  direction,  so  close  up  to  the 
heights  of  Torres  Vedras,  that  tlie  narrow  pass  of  Rufia  alone  separated  them. 
As  this  pass  was  commandtd  by  heavy  redoubts,  Massena  was  of  necessity 
obliged  to  dispose  his  forces  on  one  or  other  side  of  the  Baragueda,  and  bo 
could  not  transfer  his  army  to  either  without  danger;  because  the  Sierra, 
although  not  impassable,  was  difficult  ;  and  the  movement,  which  would 
require  time  and  arrangement,  could  always  be  overlooked  from  the  Monte- 
Agraca,  whence,  in  a  few  hours,  the  allied  forces  could  pour  down  upon  the 
head,  flank,  or  rear  of  the  French  while  on  the  march.  And  this  could  be 
done  with  the  utmost  rapidity,  because  communications  had  been  cut  by  the 
engineers  to  all  important  points  of  the  lines,  and  a  system  of  signals  was 
established,  by  which  orders  were  transmitted  from  the  centre  to  the  extremi- 
ties in  a  few  minutes." 


Ch.  XVI.]         CAMPAIGN     OF     1801     IN     SPAIN.  233 

Masscna  to  act  according  to  his  own  judgment.  In  the  mean 
time  Wellington  had  completed  his  works  and  armed  them 
with  additional  batteries,  while  his  force  had  been  increased 
by  fifteen  thousand  additional  English  and  Spanish  troops. 

There  was  but  one  means  left  by  which  we  could  operate 
against  Lisbon  ;  this  was  to  construct  a  bridge  at  Santarem, 
to  cover  it  with  a  strong  ttte-de-2:)ont,  draw  Soult  from  Bada- 
jos  on   Setuval,  and  to  bombard  Lisbon  from  the  heights  on 
the  opposite  bank  of  the  river.     To  accomjilish  this  object, 
there  was  required  not  only  great  activity  and  unity  of  action, 
but  also  means  which  we  did  not  possess.     Massena  fortified 
Punhete  near  the  mouth  of  the  Zezere,  and  devoted   all  his 
efforts  to  the  construction  of  a  bridge-equipage   that  would 
enable  him  to  manoeuvre  on  either  side  of  the  Tagus.     The 
pontoniers  and  sappers,  Avith  the  assistance  of  a  battalion  of 
sailors  which  he  had  with  the  army,  succeeded,  at  the  end  of 
six  weeks,  in  completing  this  task  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
commander-in-chief     But  these  equipages  had  now  become 
unnecessary,  for  Soult  did  not  appear  on  the   Tagus,  and 
Massena  could  not  venture  alone  to  attempt  so  perilous  a 
passage  in  the  presence  of  Hill  and  Romana.     It  is  evident 
that  if  Soult  had  reduced  Badajos  at  the  same  time  that 
Massena  took  Almeida,  and  the  two  armies  had  advanced  in 
concert  on  Lisbon  by  both  banks  of  the  Tagus,  the  chances 
of  success  would  have  been  greatly  in  our  favor.     But  with- 
out the  possession  of  Badajos,  and  without  a  suitable  bridge- 
equipage  on  the   Tagus,  it  is  riot  so  certain   that  Soult's 
cooperation    would   have    been   entirely    successful.      Even 
allowing  that  Soult's  march  in  Alemtejo  had  not  decided  the 
evacuation  of  Lisbon,  it  however  cannot  be  doubted  that 
that  march  would  have  effected  a  favorable  diversion,  and 
afforded  Massena  an  opportunity  to  attack  the  lines  of  Torres 
Vedras,  by  drawing  off  a  part  of  Wellington's  troops.     The 
bombardment  of  Lisbon  from  the  heights  of  Almada  might 


234  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ca.  XVI, 

have  caused  great  damage  to  the  city,  hut  could  hartlly  have 
induced  Wellington  to  abandon  his  formidable  can!}),  which 
was  situated  at  the  distance  of  four  leagues  from  the  city, 
and  out  of  the  reach  of  batteries  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Tagus. 

Sufferings  of  his  Army. — Modern  history  offers  no  example 
of  an  army  in  such  a  condition  as  that  of  Massena.  Placed 
two  hundred  leagues  from  its  own  frontiers,  in  the  midst  of 
two  warlike  and  insurgent  nations,  deprived  of  all  maritime 
means  of  subsistence  in  a  country  deserted  by  its  inhabitants, 
it  could  subsist  only  like  a  nomadic  horde,  devouring  every 
thing  within  the  reach  of  its  camp,  and  then  moving  to  some 
other  place.  In  all  preceding  wars,  an  army,  even  in  a  hostile 
country,  could  procure  provisions  by  paying  for  them  their 
weio-ht  in  gold.  Neutral  commerce,  avaricious  of  large  pro- 
fits, is  ever  ready  to  carry  its  grains  and  provisions  necessary 
for  the  support  of  life  wherever  the  chances  of  want  promise 
certain  gain.  But  in  our  contest,  so  great  was  the  prepon- 
derance of  the  English  marine,  and  so  stringent  and  arbitrary 
the  rules  which  this  tyrant  of  the  ocean  had  imposed  on  neu- 
trals, that  she  had  destroyed  all  neutral  rights  of  commerce 
and  liberty  of  the  seas  ;  and,  on  a  coast  of  eight  hundred 
leagues  in  extent,  not  a  single  coaster  had  ventured  to  make 
its  appearance. 

His  Junction  with  Drouct.  —  After  having  sojourned  a 
month  near  Alenquer  opposite  the  enemy's  lines,  Massena 
moved  toward  Santarem,  the  middle  of  November,  in  order 
to  facilitate  the  subsistence  of  his  army  which  he  drew  from 
the  valley  of  the  Zezere  ;  this  also  favored  his  junction  with 
Drouet  who  was  coming  by  Celorico  and  Castel  Franco. 
This  junction  was  effected  near  Leyria  on  the  twenty-sixth 
of  December.  Wellington,  reënforced  by  the  troops  of 
Eomana,  advanced  as  far  as  Cartaxo,  and  the  two  armies 
bticured  themselves  behind  their  intrenchments. 


Ch.  XVL]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1810     IN     SPAIN.  235 

Remarks  on  the  Position  of  Aflfairs. — It  was  certainly 
very  unfortunate  that  the  strength  of  this  position  was  such 
as  to  prevent  our  expelling  the  English  from  the  Peninsula 
by  a  single  decisive  blow  ;  but  the  situation  of  affairs  was 
such  as  to  leave  us  but  few  combinations  from  which  to 
choose.  It  may  bo  said  that  when  we  found  an  assault 
impossible  we  might  either  have  blockaded  his  lines  or  have 
manoeuvred  to  draw  him  into  the  interior  of  Spain.  But 
there  were  other  positions  on  the  frontier  of  Portugal  as 
strong  as  that  of  Torres  Yedras  ;  and  by  retiring  we  would 
merely  have  extended  the  sphere  of  his  activity  from  the 
Ebro  to  the  Guadalquiver.  A  larger  force  would  have  been 
necessary  to  hold  him  in  check  behind  the  Agueda  than  to 
observe  his  lines  ;  he  could  always  keep  the  field  with  advan- 
tage, against  troops  which  were  now  under  the  necessity  of 
extending  themselves  so  as  to  cover  the  immense  space 
between  Salamanca  and  Cadiz,  and  which  he  might  threaten 
on  any  part  of  this  line,  by  operating  from  his  intrenched 
camp,  either  to  the  right  or  to  the  left.  If  beaten,  he  could 
always  take  refuge  behind  the  works  of  Torres  Vedras  ;  so 
that,  under  any  circumstances,  this  would  be  the  point  from 
which  he  was  finally  to  be  driven.  As  we  now  held  him  at 
this  point,  it  was  evidently  our  policy  to  keep  him  there. 
Fifty  thousand  French  troops  holding  the  Anglo-Portuguese 
in  close  blockade,  would  demonstrate  the  incapability  of  that 
army's  delivering  the  Peninsula  ;  it  was  the  same  as  if  that 
army  did  not  exist,  if  we  deduct  the  offset  of  fifty  thousand 
men  from  our  forces,  or  what  was  the  same  thing,  add  that 
number  to  the  army  required  for  the  reduction  of  Spain. 
Some  unworthy  Frenchmen  who  have  undertaken  the  task 
of  undervaluing  my  glory,  in  order  to  elevate  to  the  clouds 
that  of  the  enemies  of  France,  and  to  make  Wellington  the 
man  of  Providence,  have  not  been  able  to  comprehend  this 
simple  question,  and  have  consequently  represented  Massena 


236  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.   XVI. 

as  an  imbecile  ;  and  me  as  a  madman,  who  lost  all  through 
his  violence  and  obstinacy. 

In  fine  we  may  lay  this  down  as  positive  ;  we  were  obliged 
either  to  attack  Wellington  two  days  after  our  arrival,  or  to 
act  precisely  as  we  did.  And  if  we  had  had  the  noeans  of 
supplying  our  army  in  their  position  in  this  devastated  and 
insurgent  country,  Wellington  would  never  have  left  his 
lines,  except  to  embark  his  troops  and  land  them  again  in 
some  other  point  of  the  Peninsula, 

Suchct's  brilliant  Guccess  in  Catalonia.  —  My  army  in 
Aragon  was  more  fortunate.  Having  returned  to  Saragossa 
in  triumph  after  the  victory  of  Santa  Maria  over  the  corps 
of  Blake,  Suchet  had  succeeded,  by  his  wise  administration, 
in  restoring  abundant  supplies  as  well  as  disci^Aine  among  his 
troops,  which  were  composed  of  different  nations  as  well  as 
new  levies.  He  regulated  the  pay  of  the  troops,  and  forbade 
any  person  in  this  army  becoming  a  charge  to  the  inhabitants, 
and,  what  was  still  more  extraordinary,  succeeded  in  reduc- 
ing to  quiet  submission  those  same  Aragonese  who  had 
exhibited  so  much  energy  and  ferocity  in  the  defense  of  Sara- 
gossa. Provided  with  every  thing  requisite  for  this  object, 
and  being  able  to  descend  the  Ebro  with  his  convoys,  he  was 
silently  preparing  to  attack  the  places  on  the  lower  Ebro, 
which  alone  would  decide  the  fate  of  Catalonia,  when  Joseph, 
in  marching  for  Andalusia,  directed  him  to  advance  to 
Valencia  in  order  to  support  that  movement.  The  king, 
relying  on  the  understanding  he  had  with  some  of  the  Valen- 
cians,  announced  that  the  gates  would  be  opened  at  our 
approach.  The  army  of  Aragon  moved,  the  early  part  of 
March,  in  two  columns  which  united  at  Murviedro  ;  it 
defeated  the  advanced  guard  of  the  Valencian  army,  captured 
nine  pieces  of  cannon,  and  occu{)ied  the  faubourgs  of  the 
city  ;  but  the  gates  did  not  open,  notwithstanding  a  sum- 
mons supported  by  threatening  demonstrations. 


Ch.  XVI.]  CAMPAIGN    CF     18  10     IN     SPAIK.  237 

Combat  of  Marîçalcf. — Convinced  that  this  enterprise  was 
immature,  Sachet  hastened  to  return  to  Saragossa  to  com- 
mence an  operation  from  which  he  hoped  greater  success,  and 
rapidly  completed  his  preparation  against  Lcrida.  On  the 
twelfth  of  April,  he  presented  himself  before  that  place,  and 
effected  its  investment.  He  did  not  open  the  trenches, 
because  he  had  received  information  of  the  approach  of  a 
corps  of  the  enemy  from  Tarragona  under  the  orders  of 
General  Henry  O'Donnel.  On  the  twenty-third,  this  general 
thought  to  surprise  our  troops  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Ebro, 
and  advanced  boldly  toward  the  tète-de-pont  of  Lerida,  by 
the  plains  of  Margalef.  The  garrison  of  the  place  at  the 
same  time  made  an  unsuccessful  effort  at  a  sortie  ;  and  while 
Greneral  Harispo  was  repelling  the  head  of  O'Donnel's  column, 
the  thirteenth  cuirassiers,  sustained  by  Musnier's  division, 
charged  the  first  Spanish  division  in  flank  and  forced  it,  after 
a  hot  combat,  to  lay  down  its  arms  ;  the  other  division  took 
to  flight.  The  enemy  lost  five  thousand  prisoners,  in  addi- 
tion to  those  killed  and  wounded. 

Siege  of  Lerida. — The  operations  of  the  siege  were  now 
begun  with  vigor.  The  trenches  were  opened  on  the  twenty- 
ninth  of  April,  and  on  the  seventh  of  May,  the  batteries 
opened  against  the  north  front  of  the  place.  The  assault 
was  made  on  the  thirteenth,  and,  the  city  and  bridge  carried 
by  the  bayonet.  In  the  mean  time  Suchet,  seeing  that  the 
garrison  took  refuge  in  the  citadel  directed  that  all  the  popu- 
lation should  be  driven  in  there  also.  By  driving  them  from 
street  to  street  and  from  house  to  house,  this  adroit  manoeu- 
vre succeeded.  The  citadel  became  filled  with  a  useless 
crowd,  who  not  only  consumed  their  provisions  but  also 
became  more  terrified  at  the  sight  of  our  shells  than  at  the 
fanatical  discourses  of  their  priests.  Embarrassed  and 
intimidated  by  this  useless  multitude,  the  governor  found 
himself  forced  to  capitulate.     General  Suchet  thus  avoided 


238  LIFE     or     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVI. 

a  second  siege,  which,  in  1807,  had  cost  the  Duke  of  Orleans 
twenty-five  days.  The  garrison  were  taken  jirisoners,  to  the 
number  of  seven  thousand  men.  We  found  in  the  place 
large  magazines,  and  one  hundred  and  five  pieces  of  cannon. 
The  occupation  of  Lerida  rendered  us  masters  of  the  vast 
and  fertile  plain  of  Urgel,  which  procured  us  great  resources 
for  provisioning  the  army."-''" 

Siege  of  Wequinenza. — The  siege  of  Mequinenza  was  un- 
dertaken immediately  after  that  of  Lerida.  It  was  necessary 
to  construct  a  road  across  the  mountains,  at  the  extremity 
of  which  this  fort  is  situated.  The  trenches  were  opened  on 
the  1st  of  June,  and  the  assault  made  on  the  8th,  when  the 
fort  capitulated.  We  took  there  fourteen  hundred  men,  and 
forty-five  pieces  of  cannon  ;  and,  what  was  most  important 
of  all,  made  ourselves  masters  of  the  navigation  of  the  Ebro 
from  Saragossa  to  Tortosa. 

Augereau's  Operations  in  Catalonia. — Butif  I  was  satisfied 
with  the  operations  of  Suchet,  the  submission  of  Aragon,  and 
the  taking  Lerida,  I  was  the  less  so  with  Augereau,  who  did 
nothing  in  Catalonia,  notwithstanding  the  advantages  he 
derived  from  the  possession  of  Gerona.  His  first  operation 
had  been  to  approach  Barcelona,  and  invest  Hostalrich  :  the 
Spaniards  made  useless  attempts  to  supply  this  fort,  and  the 
garrison  finally  took  advantage  of  the  negligence  of  the  in- 
vesting corps  to  efiect  their  escape.  The  taking  of  this  fort 
rendered  us  masters  of  the  road  so  indispensable  for  our  com- 
munications and  the  transportation  of  our  material.  But 
Augereau  seemed  to  derive  no  advantages  from  this  important 


*  The  conduct  of  Suchet  iu  driving  the  inhabitants  at  Lerida  into  the  citadel 
along  with  the  garrison,  can  be  justified  only  by  the  overruling  necessity  of 
the  ease.  It,  however,  was  not  contrary  to  the  laws  of  war.  It  is  a  singular 
circumstance  that  while  Alison  and  Napier  so  severely  condemn  Suchet's  con- 
duct on  this  occasion,  they  are  silent  in  regard  to  Wellington's  devastation  of 
the  country  in  front  of  Torres  Vedras.  Both  are  to  be  justified,  if  justified  at 
all,  upon  the  same  grounds, — the  necessities  of  the  war. 


Ch.  XVL]         campaign    of     1810    IN    SPAIN,  239 

acquisition.  He  made  demonstrations  in  the  direction  of 
Leridti,  wlieu  tliat  place  was  besieged  by  Suchet,  but  he  did 
not  carry  out  the  operation.  In  fact,  the  want  of  provisions, 
and  the  difficulty  of  communications,  added  to  the  general 
insurrection  of  the  province,  fettered  all  his  movements,  and 
rendered  them  dangerous.  I  neglected  nothing  in  my  power 
to  assist  him  :  a  great  convoy  which  I  sent  him  from  Pro- 
vence by  sea,  could  not  enter  Barcelona  ;  it  was  captured 
and  dispersed,  and  the  three  ships  of  the  line  which  escorted 
it,  had  to  run  ashore  to  avoid  being  taken  by  the  English. 
The  troops  of  Augereau  having  been  beaten  in  two  rencoun- 
ters, I  saw  plainly  that  the  conqueror  of  the  Mouga  and  of 
Castiglione,  was  not  suited  to  this  kind  of  war,  in  which 
talent  and  activity  were  more  requisite  than  courage.  I 
therefore  replaced  him  by  Macdonald.* 

SiCffC  of  Tortosa, — 'The  success  of  Suchet  induced  me  to 
intrust  him  with  an  important  operation,  on  which,  in  my 
opinion,  depended  the  reduction  of  Catalonia.  There  are 
only  two  great  roads  in  this  province,  the  one  running  from 

*  Napier,  in  speaking  of  the  siege  of  Lerida,  and  the  opportunity  presented 
to  the  Spaniards  to  attack  Suchet,  says  : 

'■  It  was  to  obviate  this  danger  that  Napoleon  directed  the  seventh  corps  to 
take  such  a  position  on  the  Lower  Ebro  as  would  keep  both  O'Donnel  and  the 
Valencians  in  check.  Augereau,  as  we  have  seen,  failed  to  do  this  ;  and  St. 
Cyr  asserts  that  the  seventh  corps  could  never  safely  venture  to  pass  the 
mountains,  and  enter  the  valley  of  the  Ebro.  On  the  other  hand,  Suchet  af- 
firms that  Napoleon's  instructions  could  have  been  obeyed  without  difficulty. 
St.  Cyr  himself,  under  somewhat  similar  circumstances,  blockaded  Tarragona 
for  a  mouth;  Augereau,  who  had  more  troops  and  fewer  enemies,  might  have 
done  the  same,  and  yet  spared  six  thousand  men  to  pass  the  mountains.  Su- 
chet would  then  have  been  tranquil  with  respect  to  O'Donnel,  would  have  had 
a  covering  army  to  protect  the  siege,  and  the  succors,  fed  from  the  resources 
of  Aragon,  would  have  relieved  Catalonia. 

"  Augereau  has  been  jurtified,  on  the  ground  that  the  blockade  of  Hostal- 
rich  would  have  been  raised  while  he  was  on  the  Ebro.  The  danger  of  this 
could  not  have  escaped  the  emperor,  yet  his  military  judgment,  unerring  in 
principle,  was  often  false  in  application,  because  men  measure  difficulties  by 
the  standard  of  their  own  capacity,  and  Napoleon's  standard  only  suited  the 
heroic  proportions.     Oue  thing  is,  however,  certain,  that  Catalonia  presented 


2-10  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XVI. 

Barcelona  to  Saragossa,  and  the  other  from  Perpignan  to 
Valencia,  by  Tarragona,  Tortosa  and  Peniscola,  all  of  which 
were  fortified  sea-ports.  It  was  important  for  us  to  get  pos- 
session of  this  direct  route,  so  as  at  the  same  time  to  cut  off 
tlie  communication  of  the  insurgents  with  the  sea,  and  to 
secure  ours  between  the  Ebro  and  France,  Suchet,  being 
charged  with  this  task,  preluded  it  by  the  siege  of  Tortosa^^ 
while  Macdonald,  acting  as  a  corps  of  observation,  was  to 
hold  in  check  the  hostile  divisions  which  were  scattered  among 
the  mountains,  from  Cerdagne  and  the  confines  of  Aragon  to 
the  limits  of  the  kingdom  of  Valencia.  All  the  upper  valleys 
of  Vic,  Manrcsa,  Cervera,  and  Puicerda,  however  often  passed 
over  by  our  columns,  still  remained  in  the  power  of  the 
Spaniards,  and  their  chiefs,  far  from  suffering  themselves  to 
be  discouraged  by  our  success  on  the  Ebro,  often  appeared  in 
a  threatening  attitude  in  the  French  Cerdagne,  at  the  gates 
of  Mont-Louis  and  in  the  Ampurdan. 

The  difficulty  of  di'awing  our  convoys  from  France  across 
a  country  so  full  of  obstacles,  rendered  all  the  operations  of 
our  troops  exceedingly  hazardous.  Having  collected  at  Lerida 
the  material  necessary  for  the  siege  of  Tortosa,  Suchet  re- 
solved to  hasten  this  operation,  for  fear  tliat  Macdonald  might 
not  be  able  to  hold,  for  a  long  time,  the  positions  necessary 
for  covering  this  siege.  He  opened  a  practicable  road  from 
Mequiuenza  and  Carpe  to  Batea  and  Gandcsa,  and  then 
established  himself  before  Tortosa,  the  last  of  the  month. 
But  the  army  of  Catalonia  was  not  ready  to  act  in  concert 


the  most  extraordinary  difficulties  to  the  invaders.  The  powerful  military  .or- 
ganization of  the  Migueletes  and  Somatenes. — the  well-arranged  system  of 
fortresses, — the  ruggedness  and  sterility  of  the  country, — the  ingenuity  and 
readiness  of  a  manufacturing  population  thrown  out  of  work, — and,  finally,  the 
aid  of  an  English  fleet,  combined  to  render  the  conquest  of  this  province  a 
gigantic  task.  Nevertheless,  the  French  made  progress,  each  step  planted 
slowly  indeed  and  with  pain,  but  firmly,  and  insuring  the  power  of  making 
another." 


Cil.  XVI  ]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1810     IN     SPAIN.  241 

with  that  of  Aragon.  Macdonald  hchl  an  interview  with  his 
colleague  at  Lcrida  near  the  end  of  August,  and  immediately 
afterwards  moved  Avith  his  corps  in  the  direction  of  Barce- 
lona and  Gerona,  to  meet  a  convoy  coming  from  France, 
which  was  necessary  for  the  combined  operations  with  Suchet. 
The  latter  now  regretted  having  so  soon  established  himself 
before  Tortosa,  but  fearing  the  influence  of  a  retrograde 
movement,  he  determined  to  continue  the  blockade  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Ebro.  During  this  interval,  a  continual 
contest  was  waged  against  the  Valencians  and  the  garrison, 
who  attempted  numerous  attacks  on  the  blockading  troops, 
or  against  the  enemy's  corps  from  Tarragona  or  the  camp  at 
Falcet  and  its  environs,  or  against  the  parties  which  were 
spread  along  the  Ebro  to  intercept  our  convoys  of  artillery. 
The  long-expected  cooperation  was  not  effected  until  the 
month  of  December.  Marshal  Macdonald  to  whom  Suchet 
had  given  Lerida  and  its  magazines,  established  himself  with 
the  main  body  of  his  forces  between  Tarrag(ma,  Tortosa,  and 
Mora,  and  one  of  his  divisions  passed  temporarily  under  the 
orders  of  Suchet,  to  take  part  in  the  siege.  Thus  reëuforced, 
this  general  invested  Tortosa  on  both  banks  of  the  river,  and 
occupied  the  hill  of  Alba  on  the  fifteenth  of  December.  The 
attack  was  directed  against  the  front  of  the  place  between 
the  Ebro  and  Fort  Orleans  inclusively.  The  works  of  the 
engineers  were  pushed  forward  with  extraordinary  rapidity, 
notwithstanding  the  sorties  of  the  garrison.  The  covered- 
way  was  crowned  on  the  first  of  January,  and  the  descent  of 
the  ditch  executed  at  the  same  time  that  the  work  was  bat- 
tered in  breach.  The  governor  proposed  a  capitulation, 
which  he  afterwards  hesitated  to  conclude,  although  ho  could 
not  have  been  ignorant  that  our  miners  were  about  to  attack 
the  body  of  the  place.  The  following  day  (January  2d), 
everything  was  prepared  early  for  the  assault.  The  white 
flag  reappeared,  although  neither  the  governor  nor  his  mes- 

VOL.  M. — 10. 


242  LIFE     OF     XAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVT. 

scngcr  presented  themselves.  The  negotiations  of  the  previous 
day  had  ah^eady  affected  the  garrison  so  that  they  advanced 
from  all  sides  to  the  glacis,  and  entered  into  conversation 
with  om-  soldiers.  Seizing  upon  this  opportunity  to  prevent 
a  us;4ess  effusion  of  blood,  General  Sucliet,  followed  by  some 
officers,  rode  to  the  first  group  of  Spaniards  and  caused  the 
barrier-gate  to  be  oi^ened  ;  seeing  some  officers  he  went  to 
them,  and  complained  of  the  hesitation  of  the  governor  and 
the  fate  to  which  he  exposed  the  city.  At  his  words  the 
cannoneers  left  their  pieces,  the  French  collected  on  the  ram- 
jDarts,  and  the  governor,  a  little  confused,  was  brought  before 
him,  and  the  capitulation  of  the  previous  day  was  concluded, 
signed,  and  executed  at  the  same  instant.  The  garrison 
numbering  over  eight  thousand  men  were  sent  into  France 
by  Saragossa,  as  jirisoners  of  war  ;  and  a  hundred  and  seventy- 
seven  2)ieces  of  artillery  were  found  in  the  place  and  cap- 
tured. Tiiis  conquest  separated  the  Valencians  from  the 
Catalans,  and,  by  this  division,  greatly  weakened  their  means 
of  defense.  No  sooner  was  Suchet  in  i)OSsession  of  Tortosa 
than  he  prepared  to  attack  Fort  St.  Philip  on  the  hill  of 
Belaguer.  General  Habert  made  a  successful  attempt  to 
carry  the  place  by  a  coup-de-main  :  our  voltigeurs  intimi- 
dated the  garrison,  scaled  the  walls,  and  took  the  fort.  This 
was  a  most  valuable  'point- d'appui  for  ulterior  operations 
against  Tarragona. 

General  Remarks  on  the  War. — Notwithstanding  these 
disasters,  the  Spanish  government  was  very  far  from  regard- 
ing their  cause  as  desperate.  The  Cortes  of  the  nation,  con- 
voked as  has  been  already  remarked,  at  the  moment  of  the 
dissolution  of  the  central  junta,  finally  assembled  at  Cadiz  in 
September,  1810.  From  the  spirit  manifested  by  this  assem- 
bly, it  was  evident  that  they  could  not  long  agree  with  the 
regency  :  in  fact  this  body  was  soon  dissolved,  and  a  new  one 
appointed  in  its  place,  at  the  head  of  which  figured  the  duke 


Ch.  XVI.]         CAMPAIGN    OF     1810    IN    SPAIN  243 

of  Infantado  and  General  Blake,  who,  like  Romana,  enjoyed 
more  popularity  than  his  colleagues,  without  being  any  more 
successful  in  his  military  operations.  Under  this  new  organi- 
zation, some  efforts  were  made  to  obtain  success  in  the  East 
under  the  protection  of  Tarragona  ;  in  the  South,  by  the  aid 
of  Carthagena,  Murcia,  and  Cadiz  ;  in  the  West,  by  means 
of  Badajos  and  Wellington's  army,  which  still  lay  behind 
their  intrenchments  at  Lisbon.  Eomana  had  here  joined  the 
English  general  with  a  force  of  seven  or  eight  thousand 
men. 

The  cabinet  of  London,  on  its  side,  encouraged  by  the  suc- 
cess of  its  arms  and  the  influence  which  the  appointment  of 
Wellesley  to  the  ministry  had  given  to  the  war  party,  ob- 
tained from  parliament  subsidies  for  the  succor  of  Spain  ! 
The  efforts  of  my  enemies  were  naturally  calculated  to  in- 
crease mine  also  :  and  after  the  success  of  Suchet  in  the  East, 
and  of  Soult  in  the  South,  I  hoped  to  see  the  resistance  of 
Spain  cease  sooner  or  later  :  this  war  did  not  give  me  much 
uneasiness,  for  I  had  resolved  to  be  still  more  obstinate  than 
the  Spaniards,  and  I  was  certain  of  ultimate  success.  The 
empire  was  strong  enough  to  sustain  such  a  contest,  with  the 
aid  of  its  powerful  allies,  without  being  exhausted  by  it. 
This  war  did  not  p  event  me  from  undertaking  such  enter- 
prises as  I  deemed  beneficial  to  the  prosperity  of  France.  I 
imj)roved  the  administration  of  the  government  ;  I  organized 
new  institutions  which  were  calculated  to  give  permanency 
to  the  empire  by  raising  up  a  generation  interested  in  sus- 
taining it.  Maritime  commerce  alone  was  wanting  to  revive 
the  prosperity  of  our  ports,  and  draw  upon  me  benedictions 
greater  than  any  other  mortal  ever  received. 

Bernadottc  elected  Prince  Royal  of  Sweden.— With  the 
exception  of  the  Peninsular  war,  France  enjoyed,  in  pro- 
found quiet,  the  fruits  of  my  labors.  My  Continental  System 
had   been  embraced   by   nearly   all   Europe,     Sweden  had 


244  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XYI. 

adopted  it  on  the  accession  of  Charles  XIII.  ;  this  prince, 
having  no  heirs,  had  adopted  the  Prince  of  Augustenbourg 
of  the  Holstein  branch,  which  connected  him,  at  the  same 
time,  with  the  houses  of  Eussia  and   Denmark.      But  no 
sooner  was  he  recognized  as  the  prince  royal  than  ho  died  a 
sudden   and   violent   death.      The   people   accused   General 
Fersen   of  this   act   and   massaci-ed   him   in   a  riot.     They 
required  a  successor  to  the  throne  of  Sweden,  and  thought 
to    strengthen  their  bonds  of   connection    with   France  by 
nominating  a  member  of  my  family.     Bernadotte  was  very 
remotely  connected  with  me  by  being  the  brother-in-law  of 
King  Joseph  ;  this  was  a  very  frail  bond  of  connection,  but, 
in  addition  to  it,  Bernadotte  had  gained  the  esteem  of  many 
Swedes  in   his   different   commands    in    Pomerania   and  at 
Eugen.    The  diet,  assembled  at  Oerebro,  jjroclaimed  him  the 
adopted  son  of  Charles  XIII.  and  prince  royal.     We  had 
not  been  on  good  terms  since  the  campaign  of  Wagram  ; 
although  I   did  not  provoke  his  nomination,  yet  I  readily 
gave  it  my  assent,  when  the  proposition  was  made  to  me, 
and  it  must  be  acknowledged  by  all  parties  that  he  was 
entirely  indebted  for  it  to  his  connection  with  my  brother. 
I  flattered  myself  that  if  he  did  not  have  for  me  the  devo- 
tion of  a  Seide,  he  would  at  least  remember  that  he  was  a 
Frenchman,  and  that  in  this  capacity  as  well  as  that  of  a 
Swede,  he  would  appreciate  the  value   of  the  alliance  with 
France,  since  all  the  kings  of  Sweden,  with  the  exception  of 
Gustavus  IV.,  had  followed  this  system  for  the  last  two  cen- 
turies.    But  I   was  deceived  ;    Bernadotte  retained  for  me 
the  rancor  of  the  eighteenth  Brumaire,  and  Sweden  was  less 
attached  to  me  under  him  than  it  would  have  been  under  a 
Swedish  prince      Even  supposing  that  my  policy  was  too 
rigorous,  and  that  he  left  my  system  to  return  to  a  neutrality 
toward  England,  I  was  far  from  expecting  to  see  him  at  the 
head  of  the  armies  of  the  enemy  at  a  time  when  we  were 


Cu.  XVI.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1810     IN     SPAIN.  245 

defending  the   national  independence  on  the  banks  of  the 
Rhine  and  even  on  the  soil  of  France."'-' 

Reunion  of  Holland.— Four   events,    equally   remarkable, 
signalized  the  year  1810  ;  the  first  was  the  donation  of  the 


*  Tho  course  pursued  by  Bernadotte  during  the  invasions  of  his  native 
country  in  1814  and  1815,  has  made  his  name  odious  in  France.  Although 
made  crown  prince  of  Sweden  tlirouglx  French  influence,  it  by  no  means  fol- 
lowed tliat  he  was  not  bound  to  do  every  thing  in  his  power  to  promote  the 
interests  of  his  adopted  country.  But  it  by  no  means  followed  that  the  inter- 
ests of  iho  two  were  incompatible,  or  that,  as  a  Swede  by  adoption,  ho  was 
bound  to  oppose  his  native  country  and  do  all  in  his  power  to  injure  the  man 
to  whom  lie  was  mainly  indebted  for  his  elevation.  History  Avill  judge  of  Ber- 
nadette by  his  cour.se  before,  as  well  as  after,  he  became  crown  prince  of 
Sweden. 

After  Napoleon's  return  from  Egypt,  Bernadotte,  while  pretending  great 
friendslnp,  was  engaged  in  various  intrigues  against  him.  These  were  after- 
ward discovered  and  their  author  was  at  one  time  disgraced  and  exiled.  But 
through  tho  influence  of  his  wife  and  his  brother-in-law,  Joseph  Bonaparte, 
Napoleon  forgave  and  restored  him  to  a  command.  He  afterward  made  him  a 
marshal  of  France  and  prince  of  Ponte-Corvo.  At  the  battle  of  Austerlitz,  his 
corps  did  good  service,  and  he  was  complimented  by  the  emperor.  But  in  the 
campaigns  of  1806  and  1807,  and  at  the  battle  of  TVagram,  his  course  was 
such  as  to  cause  him  to  be  several  times  reprimanded,  and  to  raise  strong  sus- 
picions of  his  good  faith.  Nevertheless,  his  connection  by  marriage  with  the 
Bonaparte  family,  caused  all  these  offenses  to  be  forgiven,  and  when  offered 
the  rank  of  crown  prince  of  Sweden,  Napoleon  not  only  gave  his  consent,  but 
gave  him  large  sums  of  money  as  an  outfit  for  his  new  position,  saj'ing  that  a 
prince  of  his  family  and  government,  should  not  appear  in  Sweden  as  a  beggar. 
Bernadotte  seemed  very  grateful  for  tho  compliment,  but  no  sooner  did  he  reach 
Sweden,  than  he  renewed  his  intrigues  against  Napoleon.  The  Swedes  elected 
Bernadotte  as  a  compliment  to  Bonaparte,  and  as  a  pledge  of  future  friendly 
relations,  and  it  was  so  regarded  by  Napoleon.  But  the  enemies  of  France  who 
influenced  tho  arrangement,  had  a  very  different  object  in  view. 

Bernadotte  had  always  been  more  popular  with  the  northern  and  German 
soldiers  than  with  the  French.  In  most  of  his  campaigns  he  had  commanded 
foreign  troops.  Neither  the  French  marshals  nor  the  French  troops  liked  him. 
This  was  particularly  the  case  after  the  campaign  of  Wagram.  At  the  same  time 
he  was  popular  with  the  allies,  and  on  every  occasion  courted  their  good-will. 
He  moreover  sought  the  friend.ship  of  Fouché  and  other  old  republican  enemies 
of  Napoleon.  These  facts  should  have  been  sufficient  for  the  emperor  to  distrust 
him  "Where  a  general  is  popular  with  the  enemies  of  a  government  either  at 
liome  or  abroad,  there  is  good  cau?e  to  distrust  his  loyalty  to  that  government. 
It  is  now  incontestable  that  while  Bernadotte  was  serving  under  Napoleon,  he 
was  already  intriguing  for  his  overthrow,  and  the  restoration  of  the  Bourbons, 
conduct  which  can  be  justified  in  no  possible  way. 


246  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XYI. 

grand-duchy  of  Frankfort,  to  Prince  Eugene,  in  reversion  at 
the  death  of  the  Prince  Primate.  If  I  should  have  a  second 
son  I  projected  giving  him  the  crown  of  Italy  and  Rome  ; 
but  Europe,  not  knowing  my  intentions,  did  not  understand 
the  object  of  this  new  arrangement,  and  supposed  that  I 
intended  Germany,  or  at  least  the  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine,  for  my  adopted  son.  A  still  more  imjoortant  affair  was 
the  re-annexation  to  the  Erencli  Empire  of  Holland  and  the 
mouths  of  the  Ems,  of  the  Weser  and  of  the  Elbe,  as  far  as 
Lubec. 

The  contest  with  England  daily  becoming  more  compli- 
cated by  the  chances  of  the  Avar  in  Spain,  I  looked  around 
me  for  means  to  force  the  cabinet  of  St.  James  to  dispositions 
more  jjacific,  and  adopted  the  project  of  annexing  territory 
to  the  empire  as  a  means  of  retrocession  to  be  oiFered  as  an 
inducement  for  i)eace.  Of  all  those  who  were  the  temporary 
victims  of  the  Continental  System,  none  complained  more 
than  the  Dutch.  This  nation,  whose  industrious,  specu- 
lating, and  enterprising  character,  rendered  its  prosperity 
dependent  on  the  advantages  of  commerce,  could  not  submit 
to  our  maritime  code  without  the  ruin  of  these  interests.  It 
was  necessary  to  close  our  eyes  to  the  daily  infractions  of  this 
code  committed  by  the  inhabitants,  or  to  restore  to  the  sea 
the  land  which  they  had  conquered,  and  still  defended  with 
so  much  care  and  so  many  sacrifices.  My  brother  Louis  had 
not  hesitated  to  espouse  the  interests  of  the  Batavian  com- 
merce ;  he  felt  that  he  could  not  have  the  love  of  his  jieople 
unless  he  acted  with  them  and  for  them.  He  published  my 
decrees,  but  openly  allowed  them  to  be  violated.  This  state 
of  things  was  destroying  my  system.  Of  what  use  was  it 
that  I  had  conquered  the  coast  of  Europe,  and  closed  its 
ports  to  the  English,  if  the  members  of  my  own  family  were 
to  become  the  brokers  of  the  enemy's  commerce  ">  My  repre- 
sentations of  this  abuse  not  producing  the  desired  effect,  I 


Ch.  xvt.]      campaign   or   isio   in  Spain.  247 

was  forced  to  interdict  all  importation  into  Holland  :  my 
brother  retaliated  by  interdicting  the  admission  of  all  French 
merchandise  into  his  kingdom.  This  manner  of  governing 
Holland  did  not  at  all  suit  my  policy  :  by  taking  the  helm 
of  the  government  myself,  I  might  direct  its  resources  wholly 
towards  my  object.  Holland  would  suffer  by  it  for  some 
years,  perhaps  ten  or  twenty,  but  it  would  be  amply  repaid 
for  these  sacrifices,  if  we  should  succeed. 

(oiiscqucHt  Aie^otiatious  with  England. — Independently 
of  these  powerful  considerations,  I  wished  to  prove  to  England 
that  in  the  course  which  she  forced  me  to  pursue,  every  year 
in  which  she  delayed  to  make  peace,  would  lead  to  the  ag- 
grandizement of  my  empire  :  no  power  in  Europe  was  now 
prepared  to  oppose  my  project.  Nevertheless,  before  deciding 
on  it,  I  resolved  to  make  one  more  effort  to  negotiate  i;)eace 
with  the  cabinet  of  London. 

My  brother  Louis  came  to  Paris,  in  the  early  part  of  1810. 
After  declaring  to  him  that  he  had  carried  out  my  intentions 
in  Holland  even  less  than  the  old  Batavian  government,  I 
assured  him  that  I  would  allow  no  deviation  from  the  system 
I  had  formed  against  England,  and  hinted  to  him  the  possi- 
bility of  re-annexation.  I  gave  him  to  understand  that  the 
only  means  of  avoiding  the  overthrow  of  his  throne,  was  to 
induce  England  to  make  peace.  In  accordance  with  these 
instructions,  Louis  informed  his  ministers  of  the  danger 
which  threatened  Holland  ;  and  directed  them  to  send  a 
reliable  man  to  England  to  induce  the  cabinet  of  London  to 
enter  into  negotiations  in  order  to  avoid  a  catastrophe  equally 
injurious  to  both  countries.  He  solicited  that  government 
to  make  some  modification  in  its  maritime  code  which  mi^ht 
be  the  first  step  towards  a  treaty  of  j)eace. 

The  Marquis  of  Wellesley  was  at  this  time  minister  of 
foreign  affairs  ;  and  M.  Labouchère,  who  was  charged  with 
this  important  embassy,  failed  to  effect  any  negotiations.    A 


248  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON,  [Cn.  XVI. 

singular  circumstance  came  to  light  during  this  discussion, 
Fouche,  tormented  with  the  spirit  of  intrigue  which  formed 
a  part  of  his  composition,  had  also  attempted,  on  his  own 
account,  to  open  negotiations  for  peace  with  England,  the 
hases  of  which  did  not  agree  with  the  assurances  given  by 
Labouchere.  Wellesley  made  this  a  pretext  f  »r  rejecting 
projDositions  which  he  accused  of  being  insincere.  The 
brother  of  Wellington  was  the  most  decided  advocate  for  the 
continuance  of  the  war  :  he  carried  his  hatred  of  me  to  the 
extent  of  wishing  to  emancipate  the  Irish  Catholics,  not  only 
to  dispose  of  the  English  troops  necessary  for  guarding  that 
island,  but  also  to  embody  the  Irish  militia  itself  He  thus 
hoped  to  send  fifty  thousand  of  these  Irish  troops  to  his 
brother  in  Spain,  so  as  to  push  the  war  with  vigor,  and  to 
attach  to  his  party  the  religious  opinion  of  Spain,  by  showing 
them  an  entire  army  of  Catholics  under  British  colors.  I  do 
not  mention  these  things  as  matters  of  reproach  or  blame 
against  an  English  minister,  but  merely  as  a  proof  that  be- 
tween me  and  the  men  who  had  resolved  upon  possessing  the 
trident  of  the  seas,  or  the  sceptre  of  the  world,  there  was 
little  possibility  of  a  treaty  of  peace  :  it  was  necessary  that 
one  of  these  two  jmrties  should  succumb  to  the  othc  i. 

Informed  by  the  English  of  Fouché's  intrigue,  I  replaced 
him  in  ofl&ce  by  Savary  ;  but  instead  of  bringing  him  to 
trial,  as  he  deserved,  I  sent  him  away  in  a  sort  of  disgrace 
as  governor  of  the  Roman  states.  However,  in  order  to  giv»; 
the  English  ministry  time  for  reflection,  I  determined  to 
postpone  the  reunion  of  Holland,  and  to  try  another  means 
which  would  lead  to  the  same  result  in  case  the  cabinet  of 
St.  James  remained  inflexible.  I  therefore  concluded,  in 
March,  a  treaty  with  Louis,  by  which  he  ceded  to  me  Zealand 
and  Dutch  Brabant  to  the  first  arm  of  the  Meuse,  and  con- 
sented to  the  establishment  of  the  French  customs  in  his 
kingdom.     This  condition,  so  severe  upon  the  interests  of  the 


Ch.  XVL]  campaign    of     1810    IN     SPAIN.  249 

Dutch,  was  near  effecting  a  revolt  ;  the  suite  of  my  ambassa- 
dor was  insulted  ;  and  I  therefore  resolved  to  end  the  matter 
by  sending  into  HolUmd  a  corps  of  twenty  thousand  men. 
My  brother  hesitated  whether  he  should  not  imitate  the 
example  of  the  Kegent  of  Portugal,  by  retiring  to  Batavia  ; 
but  was  persuadad  from  it  by  General  Tarayre,  the  com- 
mandant of  his  guard  ;  he  abdicated  and  retired  to  Austria. 
On  the  ninth  of  July,  I  declared  the  reunion  of  Holland  to 
the  French  empire,  but  this  reunion  was  not  consummated  by 
a  senatus-consultum,  till  the  thirteenth  of  December,  when 
the  silence  of  the  English  government  proved  that  she  would 
not  be  influenced  by  the  ruin  of  her  ancient  allies. 

Annexation  of  the  Mouths  of  the  Ems,  the  Elhe  and 
the  Wcser.— In  order  to  complete  this  great  measure,  I  also 
decreed  the  reannexation  of  Oldenburg  and  a  part  of  West- 
phalia as  far  as  Lubec,  including  the  cities  of  Hamburg  and 
Bremen.  The  object  of  this  measure  was  to  put  an  end  to 
the  illicit  commerce  which  was  liere  carried  on.  The  Endish 
had  got  possession  of  the  island  of  Heligoland  belonging  to 
the  Danes,  and  situated  some  leagues  from  the  coast  of  Hol- 
stein.  Although  of  limited  extent,  this  island  had  been 
transformed  into  an  immense  magazine,  where  the  coasters 
of  the  Baltic  and  the  North  Sea  supplied  themselves  with 
English  and  colonial  merchandise.  This  was  a  sufficient 
motive  to  justify  a  military  occupation  of  the  country,  but 
not  for  its  formal  annexation  to  the  empire.  I,  however, 
did  not  intend  to  retain  this  as  a  permanent  acquisition,  but 
to  restore  it  as  soon  as  I  could  torce  England  to  confine  her- 
self within  the  limits  of  moderation.  It  was  evident  that, 
after  the  restoration  of  the  independence  of  Holland,  the 
departments  beyond  that  country  could  no  longer  remain  as 
French  provinces.  In  the  mean  time,  I  would  destroy  these 
nests  of  smugglers  of  English  goods,  augment  my  maritime 
means,  and  my  Continental  System,  and,  by  gaining  a  foot- 


250  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XVI, 

ing  in  the  Baltic,  increase  my  influence  over  Denir.ark  and 
Sweden.  But  in  order  to  connect  these  departments  of  the 
Ems,  the  Weser  and  the  Elbe  to  the  empire,  I  had  also 
decreed  the  annexation  of  the  states  of  the  Duke  of  Olden- 
bm'g,  the  brother-in-law  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia.  It  was 
to  be  expected  that  the  Emperor  Alexander  would  demand 
an  explanation  for  so  high  handed  an  act  of  authority.  As 
we  were  already  punctilious  and  formal  in  explanations,  there 
was  reason  to  believe  that  if  he  did  not  ol)ject  to  the  reunion 
of  Holland  and  the  Haiiseatic  towns,  he  would  at  least  expect 
some  explanation  for  this  encroachment  on  the  states  of  his 
sister. 

IVapolcon's  Tour  in  Holland, — In  the  mean  time  I  sought 
to  deceive  Euroj)e  respecting  my  real  projects,  and  to  give  an 
idea  of  my  confidence  and  security.  Not  being  able  to 
i-estore  to  the  Belgians  and  the  Dutch  the  advantages  of 
maritime  commerce,  I  thought  to  turn  their  attention  to 
works  of  internal  improvement,  and  to  dazzle  them  with  the 
spectacle  of  my  glory,  by  visiting  their  provinces.  No  time 
in  my  whole  career  was  employed  to  greater  advantage  than 
this  tour.  I  inspected  the  superb  works  of  Antwerp,  and 
encouraged  the  commerce  of  Amsterdam  to  still  sustain  with 
firmness  the  last  efforts  of  a  contest  which  would  finally  give 
liberty  to  all.  I  proved  to  them  that  by  my  perseverance 
and  vast  solicitude,  we  might  construct  twenty-five  large  ves- 
sels 2)er  annum,  so  that  in  six  years  I  should  have  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  ships  of  the  line  at  Genoa,  Venice,  Toulon, 
Brest,  Cherbourg,  Antwerp,  and  the  Texel,  and  that  if  the 
continent  would  continue  to  second  my  efibrts,  we  would 
soon  restore  the  freedom  of  the  seas.  Canals,  roads,  and 
public  works  of  all  kinds  were  equally  the  objects  of  my 
solicitude.  I  employed  numerous  Spanish  prisoners  in  the 
construction  of  the  canal  of  Napoleon,  which  was  to  con- 
nect the  Soane  with  the  Rhine,  and  the  Mediterranean  with 


Ch.  XYI.]        campaign    of     1810    IN     SPAIN.  251 

the  North  Sea.  In  order  to  complete  this  work,  I  ordered 
the  opening  of  the  canal  of  the  North,  which  connected  the 
navigation  of  the  Rhine  with  Hamburg,  and  thence,  by 
Lubec,  with  the  Baltic  sea  ;  important  works  calcuhited  to 
secm-e,  intime  of  war,  the  transportation  of  our  products  into 
the  north  of  Europe,  and,  in  return,  the  products  of  the 
-north  necessary  for  the  navy.  The  canal  of  St.  Quint  in, 
which  Louis  XVI.  had  abandoned  on  account  of  the  difli- 
culties  of  its  construction,  was  completed,  and  immense  tun- 
nels, securing  the  navigation  of  the  Scheldt  to  the  Seine  by 
the  Oise,  proved  to  Belgium  and  France  that,  to  me,  nothing 
was  impossible  which  was  calculated  to  promote  their 
prosperity. 

Scnatiis-CoHSultiiRi  on  the  Incorporation  of  Home. — 
I,  at  this  time,  had  some  difficulties  with  the  Pope  ;  although 
wholly  at  my  discretion  at  Savona,  the  pontiff  was  firmly 
opposed  to  all  reconciliation.  The  principles  which  he  mani- 
fested in  his  bull  of  excommunication,  showed  that,  althoujih 
a  prisoner,  he  still  arrogated  to  himself  the  right  to  dispose 
of  thrones.  It  was  necessary  to  oppose  to  these  pretensions 
solemn  acts  of  state  calculated  to  destroy  their  effect.  The 
senate  accomplished  this  object  by  the  act  of  February  17th, 
1810,  which  contained  the  following  stipulations  : 

1st.  The  Roman  States  were  to  form  two  departments, 
and  be  entitled  to  be  represented  by  seven  deputies  in  the 
legislative  body  ; 

2d.  Rome  was  to  be  regarded  as  the  second  city  of  the 
empire  ; 

3d.  The  Prince-Imperial  was  to  bear  the  title  of  King  of 
Rome  ; 

4th.  Rome  was  to  have  a  resident  imperial  prince  holding 
there  the  court  of  the  empire  ; 

5th.  The  emperors  were  to  be  crowned  at  Paris,  and  also 
at  Rome  ; 


252  LIFE    OF    NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XVI. 

6th.  All  sovereignty  was  declared  incompatible  with  the 
spiritual  authority  in  the  interior  of  the  empire  ; 

7th.  On  their  exaltation,  the  Popes  were  to  take  an  oath 
never  to  act  contrary  to  the  four  propositions  of  the  Gallican 
Church  ; 

8th.  These  propositions  were  declared  common  to  all  the 
churches  of  the  empire. 

The  remaining  articles  established  a  palace  for  the  Pope  at 
Paris,  and  another  at  Rome  ;  fixed  his  salary  at  two  millions 
per  annum  ;  and  directed  the  expenses  of  the  Sacred  College 
and  of  the  Propaganda,  to  be  paid  from  the  imperial  treasury. 
Conformably  to  these  measures,  all  the  archives  of  the  Vati- 
can were  to  be  transferred  to  Paris.  The  grand  j^^'oject  of 
making  this  city  the  cajntal  of  Catholic  Europe  was  half 
accomplished  :  I  would  hy  the  same  act  reinforce  the 
empire  tvith  all  theocratic  influence,  and  free  religion  of 
all  ultramontane  Jesuitism.  Europ>e  loould  have  been  for 
ever  secured  from  rcligioiis  fanaticisin  :  the  piwe  religion 
of  the  early  Christians  ivould  only  have  been  tJie  more  vene- 
rated, and  the  more  useful  both  to  the  people  and  to  their 
governments. 

The  profession  of  these  doctrines  so  conservative  of  the 
rights  of  the  throne,  was  not  of  a  nature  calculated  to  calm 
the  hostility  of  the  Pope,  who,  not  being  able  to  defend  his 
temporal  power,  attemj^ted  to  revive  the  absolute  privileges 
of  the  Holy  See.  I  was  excommunicated,  and  my  nomina- 
tions to  the  vacant  sees,  not  confirmed  :  the  canonical  insti- 
tution was  refused.  Being  thus  engaged  in  a  new  kind  of 
warfare,  I  appointed  for  my  guide  an  ecclesiastic  council 
composed  of  the  most  worthy  prelates,  among  whom  figured 
the  Cardinal  Maury,  and  the  bishop  of  Nantes.  As  the  Pope 
persisted  in  refusing  the  canonical  institution,  I  was  obliged 
to  provide  for  the  vacant  sees  by  spiritual  administrators, 
designated  by  the  name  of  bishops  cajnfidaires.     Pius  VII. 


Ch.  XVI.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1810     IN     SPAIN.  253 

forbade  their  exercising  the  office,  and  appointed  vicars  apos- 
tolic in  their  places.  Such  an  act  of  authority,  establishing 
in  my  empire  a  power  superior  to  my  own,  was  well  cal- 
culated to  irritate  me  ;  the  cardinals  who  instigated  this 
assumption  of  authority  were  conducted  to  Vincennes,  and 
also  P.  Fontana,  one  of  the  members  of  my  council. 

Council  of  Paris.— This  state  of  schism  could  not  long  con- 
tinue. To  make  an  end  of  the  matter,  I  assembled,  in  the 
early  part  of  1811,  a  council  of  the  bishops  of  France;  the 
ostensible  object  of  this  council  was  to  provide  for  the  canon- 
ical institutions,  but  in  reality  I  wished  to  establish  an  eccle- 
siastic authority  superior  to  that  of  the  Pope,  in  order  that 
the  one  might  counterbalance  the  other.  My  new  ecclesiastic 
council,  feeling  the  necessity  of  a  reconciliation  with  the 
Holy  See,  sent  a  solemn  deputation  to  him  at  Savona,  to  ask 
his  blessing,  and  to  offer  a  reconciliation.  The  Pope,  being 
free  from  his  perfidious  counselors,  and  influenced  solely  by 
his  own  philanthropic  feeling,  promised  the  institution,  and 
authorized  the  council.  It  assembled  on  the  ninth  of  July, 
1811.  The  bishops  did  not  comprehend  my  policy,  and 
declined  the  very  power  which  they  had  so  often  sought. 
They  declared  themselves  incompetent.  I  was  under  the 
necessity  of  immediately  dissolving  this  council,  to  avoid  the 
appearance  of  yielding  the  point.  A  second  council,  which 
was  assembled  only  to  pronounce  on  the  canonical  institu- 
tion, decided  it.  The  Pope  sanctioned  their  resolutions,  and 
sent  me  letters  of  reconciliation. 

Religious  Fanaticism.— Nevertheless,  the  impression  which 
I  wished  to  avoid  had  been  made.  The  zeal  of  devotees 
became  more  active  than  ever  ;  a  little  church  which  had 
ventured  to  form  itself  even  in  France,  after  I  had  been 
crowned  by  the  Pope,  and  which  then  put  itself  above  the 
pontiff  whose  authority  it  contested,  had  again  lallied  itself 
to  the  Pope  as  soon  as  it  thought  he  could  be  made  to  serve 


254  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch   XVI. 

its  own  ambitious  views.  This  churcli  again  raised  the  ban- 
ners of  opposition,  as  soon  as  he  appeared  to  yield  to  my 
ascendancy.  Thus,  in  the  nineteenth  century,  France  also 
had  her  fanatics  ;  and  if  we  are  astonished  at  the  apostolic 
junta  of  Spain,  what  shall  we  say  of  this  ultra  catholic  sect, 
in  the  very  bosom  of  the  most  enlightened  nation  !  At  its 
voice  the  Jesuits  resumed  their  activity  ;  it  was  a  secret 
action,  but  quick,  active  and  powerful  against  me.  Notwith- 
standing all  my  jirecautions,  these  devotees  succeeded  in 
communicating  with  Savona,  and  in  receiving  instructions 
from  that  place.  The  Trappists  of  Fribourg  served  as  the 
agents  in  this  corresijondence  ;  they  j)rinted  pamphlets 
among  themselves  and  circulated  them,  from  curate  to 
curate,  throughout  the  whole  empire.  The  focus  of  these 
troubles  had  ramifications  in  France,  Sw^itzerland,  Italy,  and 
Spain.  The  clergy,  the  malcontents  of  all  kinds,  the  par- 
tisans of  the  old  regime,  were  everywhere  intriguing  against 
my  authority  and  seeking  to  embarrass  my  administration. 
They  no  longer  appeared  in  the  shape  of  conspirators  ;  they 
had  borrowed  the  banners  of  the  church,  the  most  formidable 
of  all  against  the  throne  ;  they  fought  with  its  thunders, 
and  not  with  cannon  ;  they  had  their  secret  signs  and  rally- 
ing words.  It  was  a  kind  of  orthodox  masonry,  whose 
compact  structure  and  polished  surface  presented  nothing  by 
•which  I  could  grasp  it.  It  attained  its  object  the  more 
securely  as  it  could  not  be  attacked  without  the  appearance 
of  religious  persecution.  To  act  by  force  against  disarmed 
men,  would  have  given  them  the  character  of  martyrs. 

Continuation  of  the  War  between  Rnssia  and  Turkey. — 
While  I  was  extending  the  limits  of  my  empire  from  the 
Tiber  to  the  Baltic,  the  Russians  were  slowly  operating  in 
the  Balkan  and  in  Eoumelia.  The  campaign  of  1810,  had 
been  active  at  the  mouth  of  the  Danube.  General  Kamen- 
ski  (the  younger),  had  succeeded  Bagration  in  the  command  ; 


Cil.  XVI.]  C  A  M  r  A  I  G  N    OF    1  8  1  0    I  X    SPAIN.  255 

he  Avas  a  man  in  tlic  flower  of  life,  well-informed,  but  with- 
out experience.  A  fine  army  of  one  hundred  and  forty-three 
"battalions,  one  hundred  and  twenty-two  squadrons,  and 
twenty-seven  regiments  of  Cossacks,  forming  a  line  of  one 
hundred  thousand  combatants,  constituted  a  force  more  con- 
siderable than  Russia  had  ever  before  sent  against  the  Otto- 
man empire.  This  seemed  sufiScient  to  march  to  Constan- 
tinople ;  I  would  have  asked  no  more  to  deliver  it  from  the 
Bosphorus  to  Moscow. 

Kamenski    resolved    to  direct   his  efforts   by  Hirsova  on 
Shumla,  while,  on  his  right,  forces  were  directed  to  besiege 
Silistria  and  Roudschouck.     Bazardjik   was  carried  after  a 
vigorous  resistance,  and  Silistria,  Tourtonkai  and  Rasgrad 
also  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Russians.     While  these  cities 
were  falling  before   the   enemy^    the   grand-vizir  remained, 
with  Ottoman  gravity,  in  his  camp  at  Shumla.     Kamenski 
advanced  to  this  place  on  the  twenty-second  of  June.     An 
attempt  was  made  to  storm  this  fortified  city  from  the  rocky 
heights  above,  but  it  proved  unsuccessful.     The  place  was 
now  invested,  but  as  the  Turks   succeeded  in  introducing  a 
large  convoy  by  the  road  to  Constantinople,  all  hopes  of  starv- 
ing out  the  garrison  were  at  an  end.     Raising  the  invest- 
ment of  Shumla,  and  leaving  his  brother  with  thirty  thou- 
sand   combatants    in    observation    before    the    grand-vizir 
Kamenski  joined  in  the  siege  of  Roudschouck  with  twelve 
thousand  men.     Without  waiting  to  breach  the  walls  of  the 
place,  an  assault,  or  rather  an  escalade,  was  ordered  on  the 
fourth  of  August,  but,  after  a  useless  loss  of  eight  thousand 
men  killed  and  wounded,  the  attempt  was  given  up,  and 
Kamenski    resolved    to   proceed    more   methodically.      The 
Seraskier  of  Sophia  attempted  to  raise  this  siege  with  an 
army  of    thirty  thousand   men,  but  was   met  and    totally 
defeated  at  Batin  on  the  seventh  of  September.     The  cap- 
ture of   Sistow  was  the  immediate  result  of  this  victory. 


256  LIFE     or     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XYI. 

Being  reënforced  by  a  new  division  under  General  Suwarrow 
(the  younger),  the  Russian  general  renewed  the  sieges  of 
Roudscliouck  and  Giorgevo,  which  are  situated  on  the 
Danube  almost  in  the  same  way  as  Mayence  and  Cassel  on 
the  Rhine.  The  sides  of  the  two  cities  bordering  the  river 
were  not  fortified,  and  the  Russians,  by  getting  possession  of 
the  island  which  divides  the  river  at  this  point,  succeeded  in 
cutting  off  all  communication  between  them,  and  finally 
forced  them  to  surrender.  After  having  also  reduced  Nicopoli 
and  Loweza,  near  the  end  of  October,  the  Russian  army  went 
into  winter-quarters. 

In  Servia,  Czerni-Georges  also  defeated  the  Turks  on  the 
Dwina.  In  Asia,  Tormassof  took  Soukoum-Kalé  and  Soud- 
jouk-Kale  ;  a  landing  was  also  attempted  near  Trebisond, 
but  without  result.  Notwithstanding  these  successes,  I  saw 
that  this  war  was  advancing  but  slowly  and  at  great  cost, 
both  in  blood  and  treasure.  As  my  relations  with  Russia 
seemed  on  the  point  of  changing,  I  was  not  displeased  at  the 
slow  progress  of  its  arms  against  the  Turks,  for,  in  case  of 
difficulty  with  that  power,  the  Ottomans  would  make  a  use- 
ful diversion  in  my  favor. 


CHAPTER    XVII. 

CAMPAIGN   OF   1811;— CONTINU ATIOISr  OF  THE   PENINSULAR 

WAR. 

General  Review  of  the  Foreign  Relationg  of  France — Faulty  Relations  with 
Prussia — Proposed  Alliance — New  Difficulties   with  Russia — Prospects    of 

closing  the  War  in  Spain — Dissensions  between  Joseph  and   my  Generals 

New  Cortes  to  be  assembled  at  Madrid — Critical  Situation  of  Massena— Soult 
marches  on  Badajoz  and  Olivenza — Siege  of  Badajoz — Remarks  on  the  Ope- 
rations of  Soult — Attempt  to  raise  the  Siege  of  Cadiz — Affair  of  Chiclana 

Retreat  of  the  Allies — Soult  marches  to  the  Support  of  Victor Massena 

evacuates  Portugal — Battle  of  Fuente  di  Honor — Massena  retires  to  Sala- 
manca— Remarks  on  Massena's  Retreat — Beresford  threatens   Badajoz He 

captures  OUvenza  and  lays  Siege  to  Badajoz — Soult  marclies  to  its  Succor 

Battle  of  Albuera — Napoleon  directs  the  Junction  of  Soult  and  Marmont 

Welhngton  renews  the  Siege  of  Badajoz— He  is  again  forced  to  retire  into 
Portugal — Operations  of  the  Spaniards  in  Andalusia — They  are  defeated  by 
Soult — "Wellington  and  Marmont  near  Cuidad  Rodrigo — Hill  surprises  Gi- 
rard— Suchet  on  the  Ebro — Figueras  surprised  by  the  Catalans — Suchet  pre- 
pares to  attack  Tarragona — Memorable  Siege  of  that  City — Further  Opera- 
tions of  Suchet — He   prepares  to   attack  Valencia — Siege  of  Saguntum 

Battle  of  Saguntum — "nvestment  of  Valencia — Siege  of  that  Place — Reduc- 
tion of  Peniscola  and  Gandia — Remarks  on  Soult's  Operations  in  the  South 

Winter-campaign  of  "Welhngton  in  Estremadura — He  captures  Ciudad  Ro- 
drigo and  Badajoz — Remarks  on  these  Operations — Insurrection  in  Spanish 
America — General  State  of  Affairs  in  Spain — Continuation  of  the  "War  be- 
tween Russia  and  Turkey. 

Foreign  Relations  of  France. — Notwithstanding  our  suc- 
cess in  Aragon  and  Andalusia,  and  the  retreat  of  the 
Anglo-Spaniards  under  the  walls  of  Lisbon  and  Cadiz,  the 
position  of  Europe  was  far  from  offering  the  result  which  I 
had  hoped  from  the  treaty  of  Tilsit,  and  especially  from  my 
marriage.  While  I  was  seeking  to  interdict  the  English 
commerce  from  the  North  Sea  and  the  Baltic,  they  opened  a 
vast  outlet  on  the  American  continent,  and,  by  the  insurrec- 
tion of  America,  inundated  the  Peninsula  ;  they  reduced  the 

VOL.  III. — 17. 


258  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XVII. 

islands  of  France  and  of  Bourbon,  after  a  long  blockade  and 
a  formal  attack  which  the  inhabitants  sustained  with  great 
glory  ;  they  also  took  possession  of  Amboin,  and  even  of 
Batavia.  Equally  fortunate  in  the  West  Indies,  they  cap- 
tured Guadaloupe,  St.  Eustacia,  and  St.  Martin.  For  more 
than  two  years  St.  Domingo  had  been  lost  to  us,  and  divided 
between  the  black  empire  of  Christophe  and  Dessalines,  and 
the  mulatto  republic  of  Pethion  and  Boyer.  Our  only  pos- 
session here  was  Martinique  ;  all  our  colonial  hopes  had  long 
since  been  destroyed. 

On  the  other  hand  ray  federative  system  seemed  to  embrace 
the  whole  European  continent  :  I  was  now  connected  with 
Austria  by  the  ties  of  blood  ;  but  she  had  entered  into  my 
system  as  a  power  of  the  first  rank,  without  any  alliance 
offensive  or  defensive.  My  temporary  connections  with  Rus- 
sia were  weakened  ;  Prussia  had  made  at  Tilsit  only  a 
nominal  peace  ;  Spain  had  escaped  from  my  hands  to  throw 
herself  into  the  front  rank  of  my  enemies.  I  ruled  on  the 
Vistula,  but  tlie  country  between  that  river  and  the  Rhine 
was  exasperated  against  me  ;  the  South  had  risen  in  mass, 
and  from  the  North  a  violent  storm  had  threatened  my 
Empire. 

Faulty  Relations  with  Prnssia. — My  whole  system  was 
defective,  because  I  had  alienated  Prussia,  when  I  might  so 
easily  have  attached  her  to  me,  and  when  her  geographical 
position  was  most  advantageous  for  restoring  the  kingdom 
of  Poland,  and  paralyzing  the  power  of  Austria.  Possessing 
Dantzic  and  Graudentz  on  one  side,  and  Schweidnitz  and 
Glatzon  the  other,  Prussia  formed  the  corner-stone  on  which 
might  have  been  based  all  my  operations,  either  against  Bo- 
hemia or  Lithuania.  With  the  aid  of  Prussia,  Saxony,  Ba- 
varia, and  the  kingdom  of  Italy,  I  might  have  embraced 
Austria  like  a  new  Anteus,  and  after  having  reduced  it  to 
the  impossibility  of  injuring  me,  I  might  have  dictated  law 


Cn.  XVII]         CAMPAIGN     OF     1811     IN     SPAIN.  259 

to  the  North.  But  the  fault  of  1806  was  now  irreparable  ; 
being  placed  in  a  false  position  towards  Frederick  William 
and  his  nation,  without  the  ability  of  now  gaining  their  good 
will,  it  was  necessary  to  chain  them  to  my  car.  The  rising 
generation  of  Prussia,  brought  up  in  the  school  of  adversity, 
with  a  liberal,  solid  and  patriotic  education,  had  imbibed  as 
strong  a  hatred  for  the  destroyer  of  the  public  liberties,  as 
for  the  con(][ucror  who  had  destroyed  the  heritage  of  the  great 
Frederick,  It  was  not  enough  that  some  represented  me  as 
a  Tarquin  to  these  new  Brutuses,  and  others  invoked  the 
names  of  the  first  sons  of  Teuton  in  favor  of  Germanic 
liberty  ;  all  the  living  interests  of  commerce  were  raised  up 
against  me.  I  was,  according  to  their  representations,  a  new 
Gengiskhan,  who  swept  over  Europe  to  bind  it  in  chains, 
without  any  real  utility  to  France,  or  advantage  to  my 
crown,  and  against  all  the  interests  of  other  nations.  Secret 
societies,  under  the  title  of  Fédérés  de  la  Vertu,  daily  made 
proselytes  ;  and  the  resistance  of  Spain  encouraged  them  in 
their  projects  to  throw  off  the  yoke.  If  their  efforts  had 
failed  in  1809,  it  was  only  a  motive  for  additional  precaution 
in  their  future  projects.  The  skillful  artificer  of  this  con- 
spiracy was  only  waiting  for  a  favorable  moment  to  bring  it 
out  into  action  ;  he  was  watching  for  the  opportune  moment 
to  light  up  the  general  conflagration,  whose  progress  and 
result  no  one  could  predict. 

The  King  proposes  an  Alliance  with  France.— It  was 
under  these  circumstances  that  the  king  of  Prussia  proposed 
to  me  an  alliance  offensive  and  defensive.  I  eluded  erivinsr  a 
direct  answer  to  this  offer,  which,  under  other  circumstances, 
I  would  have  accejited  with  eagerness,  because  I  did  not  wish 
to  give  offense  to  Krussia  by  a  treaty  which  could  only  have 
had  reference  to  that  power  ;  moreover,  the  alliance  would 
merely  have  given  me  Frederick  William,  for  his  people 
would  have  been  none  the  less  hostile  to  me  ;  in  fine,  I  was 


260  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.   XVII. 

quite  certain  to  find  the  disposition  of  the  king  the  same 
when  the  time  should  arrive  for  using  this  alHance.  If  the 
Prussians  hated  me  I  recijjrocated  their  dislike,  and  instead 
of  wishing  to  bind  myself  by  a  treaty  which  would  have 
been  beneficial  to  them,  I  would  have  been  delighted  to 
injure  them  ;  for  our  hatred  had  arrived  at  that  pitch  when 
reconciliation  seemed  impossible.  All  these  circumstances 
prove  at  least  the  following  truths  : 

1st.  That  after  the  great  coalition  of  1805,  the  idea  of 
becoming  preponderant  in  Europe  by  my  federative  system 
was  legitimate  and  natural. 

2d.  That  to  succeed  in  this  object  it  was  necessary  to 
attach  to  myself,  by  benefits  conferred,  a  population  of 
twelve  or  fifteen  millions  in  the  north  of  Europe,  and  that, 
in  default  of  Austria,  who  had  been  stripped  at  Campo- 
Formio,  Luneville  aiyl  Presbourg,  of  a  portion  of  her  terri- 
tory, Prussia  vs^as  the  only  power  who  could  satisfy  this 
condition. 

3d.  That  if  the  passions  which  divided  us  in  1806,  have 
been  as  fatal  to  France  as  to  Prussia,  and  if  I  initiated  this 
division  by  my  negotiation  with  Lauderdale  in  relation  to 
Hanover,  it  is  not  the  less  true  that  our  enmity  rose  more 
from  the  inconsiderate  exaltation  of  the  Prussians  against 
me  in  1806,  than  from  all  other  causes. 

4th.  That  after  that  fatal  war,  I  was  never  in  position  to 
find  a7i  ally  of  twelve  or  ffteen  millions  of  people,  who 
dei'ived  their  prosperity  from  me,  and  ivas  thtts  irrevocably 
attached  to  my  cause  ;  and 

5th.  That  for  want  of  such  an  auxiliary,  I  was  obliged  to 
connect  myself  with  Austria,  although  she  was  far  from 
being  attached  to  me  by  any  benefits  which  I  had  conferred 
on  her. 

New  Difficulties  with  Russia. — In  the  mean  time  a  storm 
was  beginning  to  rise  in  the  North.     The  obligation  of  main- 


Cil.  XYII.]       CAMPAIGN     OF     1811     IN     SPAIN  261 

taining  the  Continental  System  led  to  numerous  difficulties 
with  Russia,  difficulties  which  were  daily  increasing  ;  she 
was  in  want  of  manufactured  articles,  which,  brought  over 
land,  were  sold  at  exorbitant  prices  ;  while  the  products  of 
her  own  soil,  being  of  too  bulky  a  nature  to  be  transported 
otherwise  than  by  water,  encumbered  the  ports  of  the  empire 
without  finding  sale,  even  at  the  lowest  prices.  I,  neverthe- 
less, insisted  that  all  which  had  touched  the  English  soil  or 
which  had  submitted  to  her  visit,  should  be  prohibited  ;  in 
the  eyes  of  the  Russians  this  rigor  was  an  absurdity,  but  it 
was  indispensable  to  the  success  of  the  system.  There  was  a 
moment  when  the  silks  of  France  found  their  way  into  Lon- 
don by  the  Archangel  and  the  Frozen  Ocean.  Afterward, 
however,  the  contraband  system  was  regularly  organized  ;  I 
had  foreseen  this,  because  the  Russian  government  could  not 
well  watch  her  whole  coast,  and  it  was  too  much  interested 
in  allowing  contraband  to  have  done  so,  had  it  been  i)ossible  ; 
but  as  it  is  always  easier  to  pass  free  jiorts  thaa  those  which 
are  closed,  the  amount  of  contraband  merchandise  was  less 
than  what  would  have  been  introduced  through  the  same 
ports,  if  they  had  been  free.  I,  therefore,  partly  accom- 
plished my  object.  I,  nevertheless,  complained  to  Russia  of 
these  violations  of  the  treaty  ;  she  justified  herself,  punished 
the  smugglers,  but  the  smuggling  itself  was  continued. 
These  complaints  and  rejoinders  were  mutually  calculated  to 
irritate  ;  and  it  was  evident  that  this  state  of  things  could 
not  long  continue. 

In  fact,  our  relations  had  not  been  very  amicable  since  my 
alliance  with  Austria.  It  Avas  evident  to  Russia,  from  the 
moment  that  this  alliance  was  contracted,  that  she  must 
either  lose  her  rank  and  influence  in  Europe,  or  fight  ;  she  was 
too  powerful  to  consent  to  the  former,  and  therefore  deter- 
mined to  risk  the  result  of  a  war.  The  annexation  of  Hol- 
land  and   Lubeck,  giving   me   footing   on  the  Baltic,  and 


2G2  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON  [Cn.  XVII. 

especially  the  augmentation  of  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  were 
sufficient  ostensible  causes  for  declarinoc  war  ajrainst  me.* 

I  therefore  had  good  reason  to  expect  the  coolness  Avhich 
soon  manifested  itself  in  my  relations  with  the  court  of  St. 
Petersburg  :  they  refused  to  prohibit  their  ports  to  neutrals 
loaded  with  colonial  goods  for  English  commerce  ;  they  com- 
plained, and  with  justice,  of  the  occupation  of  Oldenburg  ; 
finally,  on  the  thirtieth  of  December,  1810,  they  imposed  on 
French  commerce  a  series  of  prohibitions,  which  put  us  on 
about  the  same  footing  as  the  English.  It  was,  therefore, 
evident  that  hostilities  must  ensue  between  us,  fur  we  were 
both  ready  for  the  contest  :  the  affairs  of  Spain  gave  me 
about  the  same  occupation  as  those  of  Turkey  gave  to 
Russia. 

Prospects  of  closic^  the  War  in  Spain.— The  campaign 
of  1811  in  the  Peninsula  was  begun  under  the  most  favorable 
auspices.  If  the  exj)editions  against  Portugal  and  Cadiz  had 
not  entirely  attained  the  object  I  had  proposed,  the  success 
of  Suchet  on  the  Ebro,  and  of  Soult  in  Andalusia  had  com- 
pensated for  this  disappointment,  which  might  be  only  tem- 
porary. It  was  natural  to  suppose  that  after  having  reduced 
the  provinces  of  the  East  and  South,  they  would  unite  all 
their  forces  towards  Estremadura  for  the  expulsion  of  the 
English. 

Dissensions  continued  to  exist  between  the  different  par- 
ties ;  the  proceedings  of  the  Cortes  were  opposed  both  by  the 
apostolic  junta  and  by  the  grandees.  The  regency,  at  the 
head  of  which  was  placed  the  Duke  de  I'lnfantado,  did  not 
agree  with  the  pn  jects  of  the  Spanish  reformers  ;  and  it  was 
possible  that,  in  time,  the  dissenters  would  unite  with  the 
party  of  King  Joseph. 

*  Jomini  here  combats  with  much  warmth  the  opinions  of  Mr.  Fain  on  the 
causes  of  the  rupture  with  Russia.  As  the  discussion  is  repeated  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  next  chapter  the  contents  of  this  article  have  been  shghtly  con- 
densed. 


Ch.  XVII.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     ISII     IN    SPAIN.  263 

Dissensions  between  Joseph  and  my  Generals.— Unfor- 
tunately, the  best  understanding  did  not,  at  tliis  time,  exist 
between  my  brother  and  my  generals.  Joseph,  dissatisfied 
with  seeing  his  authority  daily  jiassing  into  the  hands  of  my 
lieutenants,  sent  me,  by  the  Marquis  of  Almenara,  his  formal 
abdication,  if  I  persisted  in  making  the  chiefs  of  the  French 
army  independent  of  his  authority.  A  party  was  formed  in 
his  favor  even  in  the  Cortes,  and  he  deceived  himself  into 
the  belief  that  by  warmly  espousing  the  interests  of  the 
Spaniards,  he  would  so  increase  the  number  of  his  partisans 
as  to  end  the  war,  and  dispense  with  the  further  assistance 
of  my  troops. 

Napoleon  advises  the  assembling  of  new  Cortes  at  Mad- 
rid.— I  had  induced  ray  brother  to  treat  with  the  Cortes  of 
Cadiz  ;  but  from  what  I  had  now  learned  of  their  composi- 
tion and  debates,  I  was  convinced  that  they  could  not  long 
enjoy  the  consideration  of  men  of  reflection,  who  were  really 
more  numerous  in  Spain  than  has  been  supposed.  I  flattered 
myself  with  the  hope  that  we  might  oppose  to  this  collection 
of  fanatics,  an  assembly  of  intelligent  men  whose  public 
deliberations,  being  circulated  throughout  the  kingdom, 
might  gradually  calm  the  effervescence  of  the  Spaniards,  by 
enlightening  them  with  these  solemn  debates  on  the  general 
interests  of  the  nation,  and  by  giving  them  assurances  on  the 
future  destiny  of  the  monarchy,  and  my  intentions  respect- 
ing it. 

Josej)h  adopted  this  advice  ;  but  the  order  for  the  con- 
vocation of  this  assembly  was  not  transmitted  to  the  pro- 
vinces till  the  middle  of  the  following  year,  the  battle  of 
Salamanca  having  then  rendered  it  illusory. 

This  delay  was  not  the  least  error  in  the  administration  of 
my  brother  :  it  did  not  require  a  whole  year  to  promulgate 
a  decree  with  the  necessary  instructions  for  conducting  the 
elections.     It  is  now  impossible  to  say  positively  what  would 


264  LIFE     or     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XYU. 

have  Lec'u  the  result  of  such  an  assembly  ;  but  I  am  i^ev- 
suaded  that  it  would  have  improved  our  aiFairs,  and  accele- 
rated our  reconciliation  with  the  Cortes  of  Cadiz,  of  which 
we  shall  speak  hereafter. 

CrJtifal  Situation  of  Massena.— Massena,  after  having  laid 
five  months  before  the  lines  of  Torres  Vedras,  and  exhausted 
all  the  resources  of  patience,  resignation  and  obstinacy,  saw 
the  critical  moment  approaching  when  he  must  either  fight 
or  retreat.  His  troops  had  thus  far  supported  themselves  by 
prodigies  of  industry,  activity  and  individual  bravery  ;  but 
they  had  now  ravaged  the  country  for  fifty  leagues  round, 
and  there  was  no  further  resource  ;  moreover,  the  soldiers, 
by  being  habituated  to  this  organized  marauding,  had  dis- 
solved the  bonds  of  discipline.  While  this  system  of  sub- 
sistence was  occupying  the  attention  of  our  army,  Welling- 
ton had  not  once  attempted  to  trouble  us,  although  his  forces 
had  been  increased  in  December,  by  reenforcements  from 
Sicily,  England  and  Malta,  to  forty  thousand  English  and 
forty  thousand  Portuguese  regulars,  exclusive  of  the  several 
corps  of  Ordonanzas,  who  acted  on  our  rear.* 

In  truth,  he  himself  was  not  without  anxiety  respecting 
his  provisions,  for  if  the  supplies  of  his  own  army  were 
abundant,  the  numerous  population  of  Lisbon,  doubled  by 
the  forced  emigration  from  the  country,  suffered  much  from 
famine,  and  could  obtain  supplies  only  by  sea.  England  was 
obliged  to  provide  for  these  wants,  and  succeeded  by  her 
activity  and  money.     But  so  considerable  was  the  crowd  col- 


*  Jommi  says,  that  an  English  pamphlet  published  at  the  time  in  London, 
estimates  the  forces  of  Wellrngton,  at  forty  thousand  Anglo-Hanoverians,  forty- 
five  thousand  regular  Portuguese,  and  thirty-five  thousand  militia.  M.  de 
Montverran,  estimates  the  Anglo- Portuguese  regulars  at  one  hundred  thousand 
and  the  militia  at  fifty  thousand.  Napier,  who  is  the  most  reliable  authority 
in  this  matter,  gives  the  total  English  and  Portuguese  cavalry  and  infantry  on 
the  first  of  October,  1811,  at  ninety-two  thousand,  of  which,  over  fifty-eight 
thousand  were  for  duty.     The  artillery  force  is  not  included. 


Ch.  XVII.]        CAMPAIGN     OF     1811     IN     SPAIN.  2G5 

lected  behind  the  lines  of  Torres  Vedras,  that  a  horrihlo 
epidemic  broke  out  during  the  winter,  and  carried  off,  it  is 
said,  more  than  one  hundred  thousand  persons  : — the  deplor- 
able result  of  the  rigor  with  which  the  English  general  had 
ordered  the  depopulation  of  the  surrounding  country  ! 

Soult  marches  on  Badajos  and  ©livcaza.— The  double 
motive  of  seconding  Massena  by  the  left  bank  of  the  Tagus, 
and  of  delivering  the  armies  of  Portugal  and  Andalusia  from 
the  important  and  troublesome  influence  of  the  fortifications 
of  Badajos,  had  induced  me  to  advise  Soult  to  turn  his  whole 
attention  in  the  direction  of  the  Guadiana  ;  he  himself  felt 
too  deeply  interested  in  repairing  the  precious  time  which  he 
had  lost,  to  neglect  any  longer  the  reduction  of  this  place. 
After  augmenting  his  reserves  (consisting  of  the  ancient 
division  of  Dessolles  and  the  cavalry  division  of  Latour- 
Maubourg)  with  all  possible  reënforcements,  he  directed  it 
with  Mortier's  corps  on  Olivenza,  leaving  Sebastiani  to 
observe  the  army  of  Murcia  and  Gibraltar,  and  Victor  to 
contine  the  blockade  of  Cadiz,  watch  Tarifa,  and  guard 
Seville. 

The  corps  of  Ballesteros  and  Mendizabal,  being  too  weak 
to  hold  out  against  the  twenty  thousand  troops  which  Soult 
was  bringing  against  them,  took  refuge  in  the  mountains  ; 
the  latter  imprudently  threw  four  thousand  men  into  Olivenza, 
without  provisions  ;  and  when  attacked  by  Soult,  the  garri- 
son, in  less  than  ten  days  (January  22d,)  were  compelled  to 
lay  down  their  arms.  The  siege-equipage  having  in  the 
mean  time  arrived  from  Seville,  it  was  immediately  directed 
against  Badajos. 

Siege  of  Badajos. — This  city  was  then,  by  its  position,  the 
most  important  place  of  arms  in  the  theatre  of  the  war  ;  it 
served  as  the  principal  arsenal  of  the  Spaniards  in  Estrema- 
dura,  and  the  base  of  all  the  enterprises  of  the  combined 
forces  against  the  centre  of  the  monarchy  ;  it  contained  a 


266  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XVII. 

garrison  of  ten  thousand  men  under  the  orders  of  the  brave 
Manecho,  who  was  determined  to  resist  whatever  efforts  the 
French  might  direct  against  him.  Mortier  was  charged  with 
the  investment  of  the  place  ;  while  they  pressed,  with  great 
activity,  the  arrival  of  the  enormous  equipage  indispensable 
for  beginning  the  siege.  Komana,  who  had  joined  Welling- 
ton on  the  Tagus,  on  hearing  the  danger  which  threatened 
his  lieutenants  on  the  Guadiana,  was  about  marching  to  their 
succor,  when  he  died  at  Cartaxo,  the  twenty-third  of  January, 
from  apoplexy.  Mendizabal,  who  was  apj)ointed  to  succeed 
him,  advanced  at  the  head  of  ten  thousand  men  to  deliver 
Badajos. 

Soult's  position  now  became  embarrassing.  While  all  his 
convoys  of  provisions  and  munitions  were  coming  fi'om 
Seville  across  the  rough  and  inhospitable  country  of  the 
Sierra-d'Arroche,  he  was  forced  to  send  out  detachments  to 
protect  its  arrival  and  reconnoitre  on  his  flanks,  so  that  he 
had  only  fifteen  thousand  combatants  left  to  form  and  cover 
the  siege.  The  Spaniards,  emboldened  by  the  arrival  of  re- 
enforcements  which  increased  their  numbers  to  more  than 
twenty  thousand  men,  made  a  general  sortie  against  the 
trenches.  After  a  temporary  success,  they  were  forced  to 
retire  again  within  the  place.  Fearful  of  exhausting  the 
magazines  of  the  garrison,  and  perhaps  of  being  invested  if 
he  remained  in  the  city,  Mendizabel  determined  to  encamp 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Guadiana,  behind  the  Gehora,  three 
hundred  toises  from  Fort  San  Christoval.  Snult  immediately 
conceived  the  audacious  project  of  passing  the  Guadiana  in 
two  columns,  on  the  night  of  the  nineteenth  of  February,  so 
as  to  crush  the  right  flank  of  the  enemy  which  rested  on  the 
fort,  and  to  turn  the  opposite  wing  with  three  thousand  horse 
under  General  Latour-Maubourg.  These  dispositions  were 
executed  with  rare  accuracy  and  crowned  with  complete  suc- 
cess.    Girard's  division  assailed  the  right  of  the   Spaniards, 


Ch.  XVII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1811     IN     SPAIN.  2G7 

and  precipitated  them  into  the  half-ruined  lines  of  Berwick  ; 
it  thus  cut  off  all  retreat  on  the  tête-de-pont,  while  Latour- 
Maubourfr  turned  their  left  and  took  the  line  in  reverse, 

o 

Mendizabel  escaped  to  Elvas  with  only  a  thousand  men  ;  as 
many  more  fell  on  the  field  of  battle,  and  eight  thousand 
were  taken  prisoners. 

Governor  Monecho,  instead  of  being  discouraged  by  thia 
disaster,  prepared  to  imitate  the  example  of  Saragossa  and 
Gerona  ;  but  he  was  killed  some  days  after  on  the  rampart 
where  he  was  directing  a  sortie,  and  his  successor,  being  in 
want  of  provisions,  or  perhaps  being  of  a  less  determined 
character,  capitulated  the  eleventh  of  March  with  a  garrison 
of  nine  thousand  men. 

Remarks  on  the  Operations  of  Soult.— Thus  in  less  than 
two  months,  Soult  had  destroyed  or  captured  more  of  the 
enemy  than  he  himself  had  combatants  on  his  departure 
from  Seville,  and  had  reduced  two  important  places.  The 
departure  of  Massena  from  Portugal  at  the  very  time  that 
Badajos  fell,  did  not  allow  him  to  reap  the  fruits  of  this  suc- 
cess ;  and  some  hypercritics  have  taken  occasion  to  blame 
the  time  consumed  in  a  regular  attack  of  that  place.  They 
pretend  that  Soult  should  have  marched  on  Abrantes,  with- 
out stop})ing  to  take  a  city,  which,  a  year  later,  he  did  not 
hesitate  to  leave  behind  him.  The  reproach  is  more  specious 
than  just.  It  is  true  that  Massena,  thus  seconded,  might 
have  crossed  the  Tagus,  and  avoided  a  difficult  retreat,  have 
threatened  Lisbon  from  the  heights  of  Almada,  have  sub- 
sisted his  troops  some  months  in  Alemtejo,  and  fought 
Wellington  with  advantage,  if  he  had  presented  himself. 
But  was  this  project  without  its  dangers  ?  If  Wellington, 
ascending  the  right  bank  of  the  Tagus,  had  destroyed  our 
bridge-equipages,  would  he  not  have  manoeuvred  at  his  ease 
into  the  heart  of  Castik',  and  destroyed  all  our  establish- 
ments at  the  north  of  Sierra  Morena  ?    Against  whom  could 


2G8  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIL 

the  united  forces  of  Massena  and  Soult  have  been  employed  ? 
Of  what  use  had  been  this  imposing  union  on  the  plains  of 
Evora  ?  Would  they  not  have  been  under  the  necessity  of 
marching  in  all  haste  to  the  succor  of  Joseph,  Madrid,  and 
Castile,  as  in  1812  ?  Moreover,  Soult  having  left  two  of 
his  corps  in  Andalusia,  could  not  penetrate,  with  the  third 
alone,  into  the  midst  of  the  whole  army  of  Wellington  and 
Romana,  leaving  behind  him  garrisons  as  numerous  as  his 
own   corps-d'armée. 

It  is  true  that  after  the  surrender  of  Olivenza  on  the 
twenty-second  of  January,  with  four  thousand  men,  it  was 
possible  to  march  direct  by  Jurumenha  to  Abrantes,  but 
what  would  have  been  the  result  ?  Would  he  not  have  been 
crushed  by  the  superior  forces  of  Hill  and  Romana,  who  were 
certain  of  being  sustained,  if  necessary,  by  Wellington's 
corps-de-hataiUe  ?  No  movement  could  have  been  better, 
if  Soult  had  had  his  whole  fifty  thousand  men,  and  felt  cer- 
tain that  his  march  would  have  induced  Wellington  to  leave 
the  right  bank  of  the  Tagus,  and  the  lines  of  Torres- Vedras, 
and  receive  a  decisive  battle  in  Alemtejo  against  the  two 
French  armies  united.  But  was  such  a  step  at  all  probable, 
considering  the  character  and  manifest  interest  of  the  English 
general  ?  Soult  did  much  better  to  reduce  Badajos  than  to 
run  off  on  such  Quixotic  adventures. 

It  was  in  the  beginning  of  1810,  and  not  at  this  period, 
that  a  concentrated  movement  of  the  two  should  have  been 
made  to  bombard  Lisbon,  and  attack  the  enemy  before  the 
completion  of  the  lines  of  Torres- Vedras,  and  of  the  defensive 
system  of  Wellington. 

In  March,  1811,  things  had  changed  :  it  no  longer  appeared 
reasonable  to  evacuate  the  lines  of  Cadiz,  abandon  three 
hundred  pieces  of  canon,  and  give  up  Seville,  Grenada,  Cor- 
dova, and  Malaga  to  the  regency,  in  order  to  march  into 
Alemtejo,  without  the  slightest  hope  of  bringing  Wellington 


Ca  XVII.]         CAMPAIGN     OF     1811     IN     SPAIN 


269 


to  a  decisive  battle.  To  leave  an  enemy,  equal,  in  numbers, 
master  of  the  right  bank  of  the  Tagus,  and,  in  a  consider- 
able degree,  on  our  line  of  retreat,  would  have  been  a  hazard- 
ous manœuvre  in  an  ordinary  war,  with  a  neutral  population, 
but  in  a  national  war,  where  a  vast  kingdom  was  to  be 
reduced,  the  operation  was  the  more  rash,  as  it  would  have 
required  the  evacuation  of  a  considerable  portion  of  the  con- 
quered country. 

Attempt  to  raise  the  Siege  of  Cadiz.— The  events  which 
actually  occurred  in  the  early  part  of  March,  proves  the  cor- 
rectness of  these  views,  and  the  extent  of  the  obstacles  which 
we  would  have  encountered.  Hardly  had  Soult  reached 
Badajos  when  he  heard  that  Victor  and  the  first  corps  were 
seriously  assailed  before  Cadiz.  Generals  Graham,  La  Pena, 
and  Zayas,  wishing  to  profit  by  the  departure  of  Soult  for 
Estremadura,  thought  to  raise  the  siege  of  Cadiz,  by  landing 
at  Tarifa,  and  taking  our  lines  in  reverse.  Ten  thousand 
Spaniards,  and  six  thousand  English  were  thus  to  act  in  con- 
cert with  a  sortie  of  six  or  seven  thousand  men  from  the 
Island  of  Leon,  while  Ballesteros,  crossing  the  Rio  Tinto  at 
Niebla,  threatened  Seville. 

Affair  of  Chiclana.— After  a  fatiguing  march,  the  troops 
of  Graham  and  La  Rena  left  Conil,  on  the  morning  of  the 
fifth  of  March,  directing  themselves  along  the  coast  on  the 
heights  of  Chiclana.  Victor,  forced  to  leave  Villatte  with 
two  thousand  men  to  guard  his  lines,  had  thought  it  prudent 
to  also  establish  some  battalions  at  Medina  Sidonla,  for  recon- 
noitring in  the  direction  of  Gibraltar,  so  that  he  could  unite 
only  seven  thousand  men  under  Ruffin  and  Levai.  With 
this  handful  of  men,  he  had  no  other  course  than  to  fall  on 
the  enemy's  right  and  rear,  and  drive  them  into  the  sea,  by 
cutting  them  off  from  the  heights  of  Barrosa,  where  he 
threw  the  brigade  of  Ruffin.  General  Graham  saw  the  dan- 
ger to  which  he  was  exposed,  and  attacked  with  impetuosity 


270  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVII. 

the  Frencli  columns,  which,  astonished  at  so  much  vigor,  fell 
back.  General  Levai,  charged  with  the  double  task  of  sus- 
taining Kuffin,  and  maintaining  his  communications  with 
Villatte,  could  not  join  in  the  engagement  till  his  colleague 
had  been  mortally  wounded  and  his  troops  driven  back  ;  he 
fought  in  an  olive  wood  with  firmness,  and  retired  in  good 
order  to  the  heights  of  Cliiclana.  Thinking  that  Villatte 
might  be  surrounded  before  Cadiz,  Victor  ordered  him  to 
join  the  main  body,  thus  leaving  the  enemy  at  liberty  to 
open  his  communications  with  the  island  of  Leon. 

During  this  time  the  main  body  of  La  Pena's  forces  had 
remained  near  the  l^Nvn  of  Barmeja,  undecided  whether  to 
advance  on  the  canal  of  iSanti  Petri,  or  to  return  to  the  sup- 
port of  Graham.  Zayas,  on  his  side,  favored  by  the  squail- 
ron  of  Admiral  Keith,  had  landed  near  Puerto-Real  and 
Santa  Maria,  and  gained  possession  of  a  redoubt,  without 
any  other  result.  The  combat  did  much  honor  to  the  En- 
glish general  and  his  infantry  ;  but  it  must  be  confessed  that 
the  English,  sustained  by  one  Spanish  brigade,  had  more 
battalions  engaged  on  the  decisive  point  than  the  French, 
the  troops  of  RufiSn  and  Levai,  not  being  both  engaged  at 
the  same  time. 

Retreat  of  the  Allies. — The  position  of  Victor  was  a  criti- 
cal one  ;  hj  was  hesitating  Avhether  to  retreat  on  Seville  or 
to  give  battle  with  his  united  forces  behind  Puerto-Eeal, 
when  his  reconnoitring  parties  announced  that  the  enemy  was 
retiring  into  the  island  of  Leon.  An  impenetrable  mystery 
still  covers  the  action  of  Graham.  It  is  true  that  his 
infantry  had  suffered  cruelly  and  had  reason  to  complain  of 
La  Pena  for  not  having  joined  him  and  completed  the  vic- 
tory ;  on  the  other  side,  Sebastiani,  on  hearing  his  debarka- 
tion, had  assembled  troops  on  the  Guadiaro,  and  might 
restore  the  chances  in  favor  of  the  French.  Nevertheless, 
the  English  general  was  victorious,  and,  on  the  sixth  and 


Ch.  XYIT.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1811     IN     SPAIN.  271 

seventh,  might  have  brought  La  Pcna  into  action  before  Ihe 
arrival  of  Sebastiani  ;  it  is  therefore  impossible  to  conceive 
the  motive  of  his  retreat, ■"••■ 

Soiilt  marches  to  the  Support  of  Victor,  —  Soiilt,  on 
hearing  at  Badajos  the  first  result  of  this  contest,  left  to  Mor- 
tier the  care  of  reducing  Campo  Mayor  and  Albuquerque, 
and  took,  in  haste,  the  road  to  Seville,  with  some  battalions 
of  the  reserve.  He  there  learned  at  the  same  time  the  dan- 
ger of  his  lieutenant  and  his  fortunate  escape  ;  and  also  that 
Darricaud  had  arrested  Ballcstcros  at  Niebla.  Nevertheless, 
the  arrival  of  the  general-in-chief  at  Seville  was  not  useless  ; 
for  a  few  days  afterward,  the  Spanish  government,  not  dis- 
couraged by  the  ill-success  of  this  enterjjrise,  again  pushed 
forward  the  corps  of  Lardizabal  and  Ballesteros,  on  the  capi- 
tal of  Andalusia  ;  General  Maranzin  forced  the  first  to 
reëmbark  at  Moguer,  and  afterward  completely  defeated  the 
second  at  Frenejal,  on  the  twelfth  of  April. 

In  the  mean  time  a  more  threatening  storm  was  rising 
in  the  direction  of  Badajos.  Mortier,  after  the  reduction  of 
Canipo  Mayor  and  Albuquerque,  was  expecting  to  quietly 
enjoy  his  conquests,  when  he  heard  of  Massena's  retreat  from 
Portugal,  and  the  approach  of  a  considerable  portion  of 
Wellington's  army. 

Massena  evacuates  Portugal.— Massena,  whose  critical 
position  we  have  already  described,  had  but  two  courses  from 
which  to  choose — to  see  his  army  perish  by  famine  and  the 
arms  of  the  Anglo-Portuguese,  or  to  resign  himself  to  the 
humiliation  of  a  voluntary  retreat.  This  retreat  was  ren- 
dered difficult  from  the  nature  of  the  country,  the  general 

*  Jomini's  remarks  on  this  battle  are  based  on  the  supposition  that  Graham 
was  in  chief  command,  and  that  La  Pena  was  subject  to  his  orders.  On  the 
contrary,  La  Pena  was  the  rauking  officer,  and  Graham  had  consented  to  obey 
his  orders.  The  conduct  of  the  Spanish  general  on  this  occasion  was  highly 
censurable.  For  a  full  account  of  these  operations,  the  reader  is  referred  to 
Napier,  who  entirely  exculpates  Graham.     He  calls  it  the  battle  of  Barosa. 


272  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON,  [Cii.  XVII. 

insurrection  of  the  inhabitants,  the  absolute  destitution  of 
his  army,  and  the  numerical  superiority  of  the  enemy. 
Massena  might  direct  his  retreat  by  Coimbra,  by  the  valley 
of  the  Zezere  on  Sabugal,  or  by  that  of  Castel-Franco.  He 
had  also  the  means  of  floating  his  bridge-equipage  down  the 
Zezere  into  the  ïagus,  of  crossing  this  river,  and  of  march- 
ing by  Purtalcgro  on  Badajos.  He  had  been  advised  to  this 
last  course,  but  the  fear  that  Hill  might  dispute  the  passage 
of  the  Tagus  had  deterred  him  from  it.  He  had  not  time  to 
attempt  the  operation,  for  if  unsuccessful,  he  would  have 
exposed  his  army.  The  road  by  Castel-Franco  was  too  diffi- 
cult, and,  moreover,  ran  across  a  steiile  country.  Massena 
decided  to  take  the  same  road  by  which  he  had  advanced, 
fearing  that  those  by  Sabugal  and  Castel-Franco  might  not 
offer  the  same  facilities  for  his  material. 

Thus  far  the  conduct  of  Massena  had  been  without 
reproach  ;  he  had  shown  all  the  tenacity  which  formed  so 
prominent  a  trait  of  his  character  ;  but  he  suddenly  seemed 
to  act  without  any  well-digested  project.  The  Coimbra 
road,  running  at  first  from  south  to  north  and  inclining  to 
the  east  along  the  Mondego,  forms  a  right-anglud  triangle,  of 
which  the  road  from  Espinhal  to  Punte-Murcella  by  the 
slope  of  the  Estrella  mountains  is  the  hypothenuse.  This 
cross  road  was,  therefore,  much  shorter  than  the  grand  route, 
and  we  might  have  been  anticipated  on  the  Alva  if  it  had 
been  left  uncovered.  The  corps-de-hataille  and  the  material 
took  the  Coimbra  road,  while  the  rear-guard  followed  this 
cross  road.  The  second  corps  under  Eeynier,  was  directed 
by  this  route. 

Massena  remained  at  Pombal,  either  to  impose  on  the 
enemy,  or  with  the  design  of  really  accepting  battle  ;  the 
fault  of  this  dehiy  is,  however,  attributed  to  his  lieutenants, 
who  asked  for  more  time  to  rally  their  troops  and  tM|uipages, 
and  regulate  the  order  of  their  movement  ;  in  the  mean  time 


Ch.  XVII  ]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1811     IN    SPAIN.  273 

the  enemy  manœuvred  by  his  light  to  precede  him  on  the 
Ceira.  To  this  first  contre-temps  was  soon  added  a  second. 
On  hearino;  that  the  English  had  reinforced  the  garrison  of 
Coimhra,  and  were  marching  in  that  direction  another  corps 
which  had  been  landed  at  Figueras,  and  not  venturing  to 
risk  an  attack  on  that  city  witli  an  enemy  close  on  his  rear, 
Massena  decided  to  turn  aside  by  Miranda-del-Corvo.  This 
information  was  false,  and  there  is  every  reason  to  believe 
that  he  might  easily  have  forced  Coimbra.  This  fatal  reso- 
lution tended  to  break  the  morale  of  his  troops,  and  to 
introduce  disorder  in  their  movements.  Forced  to  return 
toward  the  enemy,  he  was  near  being  anticipated  on  the 
Ceira  and  seriously  cut  to  pieces  at  Foz-d'Aronce,  where  a 
panic  terror  got  possession  of  the  best  regiments  of  his 
lear  guard.  The  firmness  of  Ney  at  the  head  of  the  rear 
brigade,  saved  the  army  from  total  rout.  Thus  closely 
})ressed,  he  finally  reached  the  sources  of  the  Mondego,  but 
in  a  situation  truly  deplorable.  The  stragglers  who  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  English,  inspired  them  with  respect  for  the 
heroic  firmness  of  their  adversaries,  by  showing  the  condition 
to  which  famine  had  reduced  them. 

On  reaching  Celorico,  Massena  resolved  to  retire  on  Guarda  ; 
the  hope  of  maintaining  hilnself  in  this  intermediate  posi- 
tion by  the  aid  of  the  troops  with  which  Soult  and  Joseph 
might  act  between  the  Tagus  and  the  Guadiana,  and  the 
advantage  of  putting  himself  into  more  immediate  contact 
with  Madrid  and  Seville,  militated  strangely  in  favor  of  this 
project.  But  Ney  flatly  refused  to  comply,  directing  the 
inarch  of  his  own  army  on  Almeida,  where  he  could  more 
easily  find  shelter,  provisions,  and  time  to  reorganize  his 
troops.  The  general-in-chief,  irritated  by  a  refusal  which 
compromised  his  authority,  deemed  it  his  duty  to  order  that 
marshal  to  leave  the  army,  in  order  to  reestablish  subordination 
by  an  example  of  severity  against  one  of  his  highest  officers. 

^'OL.    111. — 18, 


274  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIL 

Wellington  closely  pursued  the  army  in  the  new  direction 
which  it  had  taken  ;  after  a  warm  combat  near  Sabugal 
between  the  enemy  and  Reynier's  corps,  this  army  decided  to 
regain  Ciudad-Rodrigo,  both  to  avoid  disastrous  engage- 
ments, and  to  put  an  end  to  the  frightful  want  of  provisions 
from  which  they  were  still  suffering.  Massena  afterward 
retired  to  Salmanaca,  the  better  to  accomplish  this  object 
and  recover  his  troops  from  their  fatigues. 

Battle  of  Fucnte  di  Honore— This  new  retreat  proved 
that  Ney  was  right  in  opinion,  though  censurable  for  the 
manner  of  his  conduct.  By  the  circuit  which  our  army  had 
taken,  so  much  time  was  lost  that  the  enemy  had  preceded 
us  to  Almeida,  and  immediately  invested  the  place  which 
had  been  dismantled  during  Massena's  operations  before  Lis- 
bon, and  which  we  had  not  been  able  to  occupy  since  his 
retreat.  The  brave  General  Brenier  commanded  here  ;  but 
being  unexpectedly  invested,  he  was  without  a  supply  of 
jjrovisions  :  the  place  must  now  be  revictualed  or  lost. 
Massena,  who  had  found  in  Estremadura  some  reënforce- 
ments  for  his  regiments,  and  a  tine  cavalry  division  of  my 
guard,  finally  determined  to  advance  to  its  relief,  with  the 
apparent  resolution  of  revenging  his  affront.  Wellington 
placed  himself  in  advance  of  the  Coa  to  cover  the  siege. 
This  river,  Avhich  is  a  considerable  stream,  runs  through  a 
deep  ravine  with  high  and  very  steep  banks.  With  such  a 
ravine  in  his  rear,  the  position  of  the  English  general,  though 
advantageous  by  the  difficulties  in  front,  would  have  become 
fatal  in  case  of  a  reverse.  His  left,  composed  of  two  divi- 
sions, was  lodged  in  the  ruins  of  Concepcion,  which  place 
had  been  captured  ;  the  centre,  composed  of  a  single  English 
division,  held  the  plateau  of  Almeida  ;  the  main  body,  com- 
posed of  three  strong  divisions,  occupied  the  plateau  of 
Fuente  di  Honore.  A  Spanish  corps  covered  the  riglit  flank 
at  Naval-di-Avar,  near  the  head  of  the  ravine  of  Duas-Casas 


Ch.  XVII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1811     IN    SPAIN.  275 

where  tlie  heights,  being  less  elevated  and  less  steep,  offered 
a  more  easy  access.  Loison,  who  had  taken  the  command 
of  Ney's  corps,  burning  to  wipe  off  the  disgrace  of  a  retreat, 
unhesitatingly  ordered  the  attack  on  the  third  of  May.  He 
had  only  reconnoitered  the  position  of  the  English  directly 
in  his  front,  and  made  his  attack  on  this  point,  as  if  he 
feared  they  might  escape  him,  if  he  delayed  to  manœuvre. 
In  a  word  he  took  the  bull  by  the  horns,  without  waiting 
for  Massena's  orders. 

The  sixth  corps  succeeded  in  carrying  the  lower  part  of 
Fuente  di  Honore  ;  but  three  English  divisions,  formed  in 
rear  of  the  village  on  a  slope  which  was  difficult  of  access, 
and  defended  by  iifty  pieces  of  cannon,  repelled  all  their 
efforts  against  the  upper  post.  As  at  Brisac,  they  fought 
against  the  main  body  of  the  English  forces  in  close  column, 
and  were  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  whole  line,  with- 
out the  slightest  result,  Massena,  after  reconnoitering  the 
enemy's  position,  directed  different  dispositions  for  the  fol- 
lowing day  ;  he  ordered  the  sixth  corps  to  the  left,  to  fall  on 
Naval-di-Avar,  and  force  the  English  right  in  concert  with 
the  cavalry  of  Montbrun  and  the  guard  ;  while  the  ninth 
corps  attacked  Fuente  di  Honore,  and  the  second  corps  un- 
der Reynier  held  in  check  the  enemy's  left  from  Almeida  to 
Concepcion. 

Although  these  dispositions  were  defective,  in  as  much  as 
too  many  forces  were  employed  in  observation,  and  the  flank 
movement  to  our  left  Avas  executed  in  full  view  of  the  enemy, 
they  were  nevertheless  crowned  with  success.  The  sixth 
corps  carried  Posabella,  drove  back  the  enemy's  flankers,  and 
forced  the  Spanish  corps  into  an  eccentric  retreat  :  Mont- 
brun overthrew  the  Anglo-Portuguese  cavalry,  and  hotly 
pursued  it  to  a  distance  from  the  line.  The  seventh  English 
division  at  the  centre  which  had  marched  parallel  to  our  left, 
seeing  its  first  brigade  driven  back,  held  firm  with  the  second 


276  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XVII. 

which  had  distinguished  itself  by  its  immovable  firmness. 
It  required  but  one  more  effort  to  drive  back  the  enemy's 
left  on  the  ravine  of  the  Cpa.  The  soldiers  of  the  sixth  corps 
were  the  same  who  three  years  before  had  precipitated  them- 
selves into  Friedland  against  adversaries  more  numerous  and 
not  less  formidable.  A  charge  like  that  which  Ney  executed 
on  Bagration's  corps  in  1807,  would  inevitably  have  destroyed 
the  army  of  Wellington  ;  but  Ney  no  longer  commanded 
these  men,  and  they  were  no  longer  animated  by  his  presence. 
Instead  of  falling  on  the  half  beaten  enemy,  our  left  halted, 
and  the  chiefs  hesitated  how  to  act  :  Massena  who  remained 
at  the  centre  was  absent  from  the  decisive  point  ;  the 
Spaniards  had  time  to  rejoin  Wellington's  right  by  a  detour; 
the  English  reserve  came  to  the  support  of  this  wing  which 
formed  en  j^otcjice,  and  j)rcsented  a  front  of  iron  at  a  ])oint 
where  the  plateau  forms  a  defile  difficult  of  access  in  front. 
The  favorable  moment  had  now  escaped  ;  and  Massena,  who, 
instead  of  supporting  his  left,  had  made  vain  efforts  to  carry 
Fuente  di  Honore  at  the  centre,  came  to  this  point  too  late, 
and  saw  himself  forced  to  renounce  his  project. 

Although  Massena  had  committed  a  real  fault  in  not  him- 
self takinsr  the  direction  of  the  wing  which  was  to  strike  the 
decisive  blow,  it  must  be  confessed  that  fortune  was  against 
him  in  this  battle  ;  General  Loison,  who  commanded  the 
sixth  corps,  was  to  be  replaced  by  Marmont,  and  recalled  to 
Paris  ;  he  was  aware  of  this,  and  did  not  display  the  same 
zeal  which  he  had  exhibited  on  a  hundred  other  occasions. 
The  ninth  corps  which  attacked  Fuente  di  Honore,  was  going 
to  join  the  army  of  Andalusia,  of  which  it  formed  a  part  : 
finally  the  dispute  between  Ney  and  Massena  had  rendered 
the  latter  unjîopular  with  the  soldiers  ;  there  was  neither 
unity  nor  enthusiasm  in  their  attacks.* 

*  Napier  says:  "Both  sides  claimed  the  victory.  The  French,  because  they 
won  the  passage  at  Poco  Yelho,  cleared  the-  wood,  turned  our  right  flank, . 


Cil.  XVII.J  CAMPAIGN     OF     1811    IN     SPAIN.  277 

Massena  retires  to  Salamanfa.— The  Prince  of  Essling 
disliked  to  return  to  Salamanca  and  sacrifice  the  brave  gar- 
rison of  Almeida.  A  few  brave  men  offered  to  penetrate 
into  the  place  ;  one  of  these  succeeded  in  passing  the  English 
and  Spanish  lines  amidst  a  shower  of  bullets,  and  gaining 
the  ditches  of  the  fort.  He  took  an  order  to  Brenier  to 
attempt  to  cut  his  way  through.  Having  completed  the 
preparations  for  blowing  up  the  place,  the  garrison  set  fire  to 
the  trains  of  the  mines  which  were  to  destroy  the  ramparts, 
and  taking  advantage  of  the  darkness,  threw  themselves  upon 
the  least  guarded  point  of  the  camp  of  the  besiegers  ;  placed 

obliged  the  cavalry  to  retire,  and  forced  Lord  Wellington  to  relinquish  three 
miles  of  ground,  and  to  change  his  front.  The  English,  because  the  village  of 
Fuentes  so  often  attacked,  was  successfully  defended,  and  because  the  principal 
object  (the  covering  the  blockade  of  Almeida)  was  attained. 

"  Certain  it  is,  that  Massena  at  first  gained  great  advantages.  Napoleon 
would  have  made  them  fatal!  but  it  is  also  certain  that,  with  an  overwhehnino- 
cavalry,  on  ground  particularly  suitable  to  that  arm,  the  Prince  of  E^slin- 
having,  as  it  were,  indicated  all  the  errors  of  the  English  general's  position" 
stopped  short  at  the  very  moment  when  he  should  have  spruno-  forward  By 
some  this  has  been  attributed  to  extreme  negligence,  by  others  to  dis-ust  at 
being  superseded  by  Marmont;  but  the  true  reason  seems  to  be,  that  discord 
in  his  army  had  arisen  to  actual  insubordination.  The  imperial  guards  would 
not  charge  at  his  order— Junot  did  not  second  him  cordially-Loison  dis- 
regarded his  instructions-Drouet  sought  to  spare  his  own  divisions  in  the 
fight,  and  Reynier  remained  perfectly  inactive.  Thus  the  machinery  of  battle 
was  shaken,  and  would  not  work. 

"General  Pelet  censures  Lord  Wellington  for  not  sending  his  cavalry  against 
Reynier  after  the  second  position  was  taken  up.  He  asserts  that  any  dano-er, 
on  that  side,  would  have  forced  the  French  to  retreat.  This  criticism  is,  how- 
ever, unsustainable,  being  based  on  the  notion  that  the  allies  had  fifty  thou- 
sand men  in  the  field,  whereas,  including  Sanchez  Partida,  they  had  not  thirty- 
five  thousand.  It  may  be,  with  more  justice,  objected  to  Massena  that  he  did 
not  launch  some  of  his  numerous  horsemen,  by  the  bridge  of  Secerias,  or 
Sabugal,  against  Guarda  and  Celorico,  to  destroy  the  magazines,  cut  the  com- 
munication, and  capture  the  mules  and  other  means  of  transport  belonging  to 
the  allied  army.  The  vice  of  the  English  general's  position  would  then  have 
been  clearly  exposed,  for,  although  the  second  regiment  of  German  hussars  was 
on  the  march  from  Lisbon,  it  had  not  passed  Coimbra  at  this  period,  and  could 
not  have  protected  the  depots.  But  it  can  never  be  too  often  repeated  that 
war,  however  adorned  by  splendid  strokes  of  skill,  is  commonlv  a  series  of 
errors  and  accidents.  All  the  operations,  on  both  sides,  for  six  weeks,  fur- 
nished illustrutious  of  this  truth." 


278  LIFE     or     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVII. 

between  the  bayonets  of  the  enemy  and  a  volcano  ready  to 
explode  in  his  rear,  Brenier  directed  his  movement  so  well  as 
to  drive  every  thing  before  him  and  reach  the  Coa  at  the 
very  moment  that  a  cor ps-d' armée  had  advanced  to  receive 
him.  He  effected  his  junction  amidst  the  acclamations  of 
the  army.  This  feat  of  arms  not  less  glorious  than  a  victory, 
deserves  to  be  recorded  on  tlie  pages  of  history. 

Remarks  on  Massena's  Retreat.— Although  Massena's  re- 
treat from  Portugal  had  been  attended  with  some  sad  results, 
it  is  certain  that  these  might  have  been  worse.  If  it  had 
been  delayed  two  days  longer,  it  might  have  resulted  in  the 
entire  ruin  of  his  army.*  Its  most  injurious  efiect  was  the 
reaction  produced  on  the  public  mind  of  the  Spaniards  ;  the 
approach  of  Wellington  relighted  the  flames  of  insurrection. 
The  guerillas  of  Porlier,  Mina,  Empécinado,  Longa,  &c., 
kept  our  troops  continually  on  the  alert,  carried  off  our  best 
escorted  convoys,  and  spread  terror  amongst  the  inhabitants 
of  the  cities  which  were  most  disposed  to  give  in  their  sub- 
mission. Nevertheless,  the  armed  regulars  of  the  Cortes 
which  w^ere  recruited  with  great  difficulty,  were  neither  more 
formidable,  nor  more  disciplined  ;  they  were  bands  of  soldiers 
without  exjierience  ;  and  I  would  still  have  had  the  means 
of  overcoming  these  obstacles,  if  my  relations  with  Russia 
had  allowed  me  to  direct  all  the  efforts  of  my  empire  against 
Wellington,  and  expel  him  from  his  last  refuge. 

Bercsford  threatens  Badajos. — The  English  general,  when 
he  had  heard  of  the  fall  of  Badajos,  and  the  subsequent  dis- 

*  Napier  says:  "  Massena  entered  Portugal  with  sixty-five  thousand  men, 
his  reénforceiiients  wliils  at  Santarem  were  about  ten  thousand,  and  he 
repassed  the  frontier  with  forty-five  thousand  :  hence  the  invasion  of  Portugal 
cost  him  about  thirty  thousand  men,  of  which  fourteen  thousand  might  have 
f.Uen  by  the  sword  or  been  taken.  Not  more  than  six  thousand  were  lost 
during  tlie  retreat;  but  had  Lord  Wellinfjton,  unrestrained  by  political  consid- 
erations, attacked  him  vigorously  at  Redinha,  Condeixa,  Casal  Nova,  and 
Miranda-de-Corvo,  half  the  French  army  would  have  been  lost.  It  is  unques- 
tionable tliat  a  retreating  army  should  fight  as  little  as  possible." 


Cil.  XVII.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1  S  1  1     IN     SPAIN.  279 

asters  of  tlic  Spaniards,  and  Avas  convinced  that  Massena 
would  return  to  Estremadura  without  giving  battle,  deter- 
mined to  turn  his  attention  to  Soult.  For  this  purjiose  he 
had  detached  General  Beresford  with  three  divisions  of 
Anglo-Portuguese,  which  left  the  main  army  at  the  heights 
of  Villa- Velha,  and,  on  the  twentieth  of  March,  directed 
themselves  l\v  Portalegro  on  Elvas.  His  vanguard  reached 
Campo-Mayor,  on  the  twenty-third  of  March,  at  the  very 
time  that  Mortier  had  directed  the  evacuation  and  dismant- 
ling of  the  place.  Latour-Maubourg  had  not  time  to  com- 
plete this  operation,  and  v/ith  difficulty  saved  his  convoy. 
Mortier,  who  had  some  days  before  been  recalled  to  France, 
now  resigned  the  command  of  the  fifth  corps  to  this  general  ; 
the  circumstances  were  critical,  and  there  seemed  but  one 
course  to  pursue — to  throw  a  garrison  into  Badajos  and 
march  toward  Seville  for  reënforcements.  Accordingly 
Latour-Maubourg,  left  a  garrison  of  two  thousand  five  hun- 
dred men  in  Badajos,  and  a  detachment  of  four  hundred  in 
Olivenza  to  attract  the  enemy's  attention  toward  this  paltry 
town,  while,  with  the  remaining  nine  thousand  combatants, 
he  retired  in  good  order  on  Llerena. 

lie  captures  Olivcuza  and  lays  Siege  to  Badajos.— On 
learning  his  superiority  over  his  adversaries,  Beresford  formed 
a  junction  with  the  troops  of  Castanos  and  Ballesteros,  and 
decided  to  cross  the  Guadiana.  He  left  an  entire  division  to 
act  against  Olivenza,  directed  another  against  Badajos,  and 
pursued  the  fifth  corps  with  eighteen  thousand  men  on  Zafra, 
Usagre  and  Fuente-de-Cantos,  but  soon  returned  toward 
Elvas,  when  the  fall  of  Olivenza  gave  him  the  means  of  con- 
tinuing the  offensive,  or  of  directing  his  efforts  against  Badajos. 
Wellington  came  in  person  to  preside  at  this  siege  ;  having 
reconnoitred  the  place  with  his  lieutenant,  he  directed  its 
investment,  which,  after  a  delay  of  some  days  from  rains, 
took  place  on  the  third  of  May.     Having  assisted  at  the 


280  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XV;i. 

opening  of  the  trenches,  he  departed  on  the  seventh,  for  his 
army  which  was  still  opposed  to  Massena  on  the  Agueda. 

Soult  comes  to  tbc  Succor  of  that  Place— Soult,  on  his 
side,  was  too  much  disquieted  by  these  events  to  remain 
inactive  ;  but  to  succor  Badajos  required  an  army  of  at  least 
thirty  thousand  men,  and  to  collect  this  number  of  troops 
required  the  evacuation  of  his  important  positions  in  Anda- 
lusia. To  present  himself,  on  the  contrary,  with  inferior 
forces  on  the  Guadiana,  was  to  release  at  the  same  time 
Badajos,  Seville,  and  Grenada.  Soult  did  every  thing  in  his 
power  to  avoid  these  two  dangers.  He  succeeded  in  forming 
two  strong  brigades  of  Sebastiani's  corps,  from  the  different 
commands  in  the  interior  and  the  reserve.  Immediately 
after  the  union  of  these  forces  and  the  necessary  matei'ial,  he 
left  Seville  on  the  tenth  of  May,  and  having  joined  General 
Latour-Maubourg  at  Fuente-de-Cantos  on  the  thirteenth,  he 
presented  himself  at  Santa  Maria  on  the  fifteenth,  within 
six  leagues  of  Badajos,  at  the  head  of  eighteen  thousand  foot 
and  five  thousand  horse. 

Battle  of  Albuera. — Although  the  enemy's  forces  was 
reported  at  thirty-six  thousand,  Soult  did  not  believe  that  he 
would  give  battle  before  the  arrival  of  a  reenforcement  of 
ten  thousand  Spaniards,  which  Blake  was  to  bring  fi'om 
Murcia  by  the  mouth  of  the  Giiadiana.  Soult,  however, 
afterward  learned  that  this  junction  had  just  taken  place, 
and  in  reconnoitering,  he  fimnd  the  Anglo-Spaniards  drawn 
up  on  the  plateau  of  Albuera  ;  having  examined  their  posi- 
tion the  marshal  did  not  hesitate  to  make  the  attack. 

There  was  every  reason  for  this  resolution  ;  he  could  not 
expect  any  further  reenforcement  s  without  raising  the  block- 
ade of  Cadiz,  and  withdrawing  all  his  forces  from  Anda- 
lusia ;  whereas  he  supposed  that  the  enemy  were  still  wait- 
ing for  the  junction  of  ten  thousand  Spanish  troops. 
Moreover,  Badajos  was  not  well  supplied  with  provisions. 


Ch.  XVII.]         CAMTAIGN     OF     1811     IN     SPAIN.  281 

and  tlie  sooner  he  raised  the  Llockadc  the  less  liable  would  he 
be  to  lose  the  place  and  the  garrison.  The  enemy's  left  was 
supported  on  the  village  of  Albuera,  the  right  and  centre 
being  prolonged  on  a  chain  of  heights  which  were  steep  on 
the  side  toward  the  French,  but  of  a  gentle  slope  on  the 
opposite  side.  This  local  advantage  was  more  than  counter- 
balanced by  a  serious  fault  of  j)Osition,  the  line  of  battle 
being  formed  on  the  jDrolongation  of  the  road  to  Olivenza, 
which  was  Beresford's  only  line  of  retreat  in  case  of  defeat. 
The  least  success  on  the  enemy's  right  wing  would  be  deci- 
sive, and  necessarily  secure  the  loss  of  the  left  and  centre 
which  would  be  thrown  back  on  Badajos.  It  is  true  that  the 
English  had  thrown  temporary  bridges  across  the  river  near 
this  place  ;  but  in  case  of  our  success  the  garrison,  with  the 
aid  of  the  army,  would  be  most  likely  to  render  the  passage 
disastrous. 

Soult's  plan  of  attack  was  to  make  a  feint  by  his  right 
against  the  village  of  Albuera,  on  the  morning  of  the  six- 
teenth, in  order  to  draw  the  attention  of  Beresford  on  this 
point,  at  the  moment  when  the  mass  of  our  forces  were  fall- 
ing on  the  right  of  the  English  and  carrying  their  line  of 
retreat.  The  plan  was  skillfully  formed,  but  unfortunately, 
it  failed  in  the  execution.  Godinot  debouched  against 
Albuera  too  late  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  English, 
while  the  principal  attack  moved  with  too  much  precipita- 
tion ;  for  Godinot  had  hardly  reached  this  village,  when 
Girard  crossed  the  rivulet  with  the  fifth  corps,  and  precipita- 
ted himself  at  the  head  of  his  two  divisions  in  deep  columns 
on  the  right  of  Beresfofd. 

The  first  line  of  the  English  yielded  to  this  vigorous  effort  ; 
but  being  soon  sustained  by  three  brigades  of  leserve,  it 
opposed  a  murderous  fire  of  musketry  to  our  cohnnns,  to 
which  only  the  first  battalion  of  each  column  could  reply. 
The  same  cause  which  had  proved  fatal  at  Vimiera,  Busaco, 


282  LIFE     or     NAPOLEON. 


[Ch.  XVIL 


and  Fuente-di-HoDore,  was  still  more  disastrous  on  tliis  occa- 
sion.     The  troops  of  Girard  fought  with  the  utmost  bravery 
imder  the  direction  of  this  valiant  officer  ;  but  it  was  in  vain 
that  Brayer,  Maransin^  and  the  chief-of-staff— the  impassible 
Gazan — were  wounded  at  the  head  of  their  brave  men  ;  noth- 
ing could  counterbalance  theefifectof  a  false  position;  disorder 
already  began  to  make  its  aj^pearance.    Girard  now  attempted 
to  deploy  his  columns   under  the  enemy's  fire  of  grape  and 
ball  ;   the  movement  could  only  be  effected  by  the  flank,  thus 
exposing  our  men  to  the  concentric  fire  of  the  English  mus- 
ketry and  cannon.     Our  two  massive  columns  experience  the 
same  fate  as  the  famous  Anglo-Hanoverian  column  of  Fon- 
tenoy  ;   the  different  regiments  became  mingled  together  and 
fsoon  form  a  confused  mass  ;  retreat  is  now  attempted  ;  but 
the    difficulties  of   recrossing    the    stream   which    they   had 
passed  in  the  morning,  renders  the  disorder  complete.     For- 
tunately, Soult  brought  up  the  reserve  in  time  to  sustain  the 
combat  and  arrest  the  success  of  the  enemy.     This  circum- 
stance relieves  our  troops  for  a  moment,  but  does  not  restore 
victory.    Tliis  brigade  drawn  away  by  the  debris  of  Girard,  and 
partially  broken  by  the  eneijiy's  fire,  and  discouraged  by  the 
death  of  its  chief,  General  Werlé,  also  beats  a  retreat,  which, 
however,  is  conducted  in  better  order.     The  French  artillery, 
concentrated   on  this  point,  was  now   unmasked,  and  by  its 
admirable   conduct  arrested  the  advance  of  the  English,  by 
sowing  death  in  their  ranks.     Godinot  still  held  fast  in  the 
village  of  Albuera,  but  this  was  a  secondary  jioint  and  its 
occupation  no  longer  of  any  use.     Two  hours  after  the  en- 
gagement commenced,  the  victory  was  decided,  and  Soult  led 
back  the  wreck  of  his  army  into  the  position  which  it  had 
occupied  in  the  morning. 

This  murderous  combat,  costing  us  one-third  of  the  troops 
engaged,  that  is  a  loss  of  six  thousand  men  out  of  twenty 
thousand  combatants,  ought  to  have  decided  for  ever  the 


Ch.  XYIL]  campaign     of     1811    in     SPAIN.  283 

superiority  of  infantry  deployed  in  line  and  well- practiced  in 
firing,  over  troops  drawn  up  in  very  deep  columns.  But  foil- 
ing to  profit  by  experience,  we  afterwards  made  still  further 
proof  of  tliis  truth.  After  such  a  check,  the  only  course  left 
for  Soult  to  pursue,  was  to  approach  Seville,  and  rally  on 
him  all  his  disposable  troops. 

After  an  unfortunate  cavalry  combat  at  Usagre,  brought 
about  by  the  ill-directed  impetuosity  of  General  Bron,  Soult 
took  up  his  position  at  Llerena. "'■'•■ 

*  Napier's  criticism  on  the  battle  of  Albiiera  is  worthy  the  attention  of  the 
military  reader.     We  give  the  following  extract  ; 

'■  No  general  ever  gained  a  great  battle  with  so  little  increase  of  military 
reputation  as  Marshal  Beresford.  His  personal  intrepidity  and  strength,  quali- 
ties so  attractive  for  the  multitude,  were  conspicuously  displayed,  yet  the  breath 
of  his  own  army  withered  his  laurels,  aud  his  triumph  was  disputed  by  the 
very  soldiers  who  followed  his  car.  Their  censures  have  been  reiterated,  with- 
out change  and  without  abatement,  even  to  this  hour  ;  and  a  close  examina- 
tion of  his  operations,  while  it  detects  many  ill-founded  objections,  and  others 
tainted  with  malice,  leaves  little  doubt  that  the  general  feeling  was  right.' 

"When  he  had  passed  the  Guardiana,  and  driven  the  fifth  corps  upon  Gua- 
dalcanal, the  delay  that  intervened,  before  he  invested  Badajos,  was  unjustly 
attributsd  to  him  ;  it  was  Lord  Wellington's  order,  resulting  from  the  tardiness 
of  the  Spanish  generals,  that  paralyzed  his  operations. 

"  But  when  the  time  for  action  arrived,  the  want  of  concert  in  the  invest- 
ment, and  the  ill-matured  attack  on  San  Christoval  belonged  to  Beresford's 
arrangements;  and  he  is  especially  responsible  in  reputation  for  the  latter,  be- 
cause Captain  Squire  earnestly  warned  him  of  the  inevitable  result,  and  his 
words  were  unheeded. 

"During  the  progress  of  the  siege,  either  the  want  of  correct  intelligence,  or 
a  blunted  judgment,  misled  the  marshal.  It  was  remarked  that,  at  all  times, 
he  too  readily  believed  the  idle  tales  of  distress  and  difQculties  m  the  French 
armies,  with  which  the  spies  generally,  and  the  deserters  always,  interlarded 
their  information;  thus  ho  was  incredulous  of  Soult 's  enterprise,  and  that 
ofiScer  was  actiially  over  the  Morena  before  the  orders  were  given  to  commence 
the  main  attack  of  the  Castle  of  Badajos.  However,  the  firmness  with  which 
Beresford  resisted  the  importunities  of  the  engineers  to  continue  the  siege,  and 
the  quick  and  orderly  removal  of  the  stores  and  battering-train,  were  alike 
remarkable  and  praiseworthy.  It  would  have  been  happy  if  he  had  shown  as 
much  magnanimity  in  what  followed. 

"  When  he  met  Blake  and  Castaiios  at  Yalverde,  the  alternative  of  fighting 
or  retiring  behind  the  Guadiana  was  the  subject  of  consideration.  The  Spanish 
generals  were  both  in  favor  of  giving  battle.  Blake,  who  could  not  retire  the 
way  he  had  i'.rrived,  without  danger  of  having  his  march  intercepted,  was  par; 


284  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIL 

Napoleon  directs  the  Junction  of  Soult  and  illarmont. — 

But  seeing  the  inefficiency  of  Soult's  measures  to  restore 
matters,  I  myself  directed  my  attention  to  the  ajiplication  of 
more  efficacious  remedies.  As  soon  as  I  heard  of  these  events 
I  directed  the  march  of  the  ninth  corps,  composed  of  the 
fourth  battahons  of  each  division  of  Soult's  army,  and  which 
had  gone  to  the  assistance  of  Massena  in  Portugal.  This 
corj)s,  reduced  to  eight  thousand  men,  succeeded  in  gaining 
the  camp  of  Llerena,  and  in  supplying  the  losses  in  Soult's 
army.  But  this  reënforcement  was  not  sufficient  ;  I  there- 
fore directed  Marmont,  who  had  just  succeeded  Massena  in 

ticularly  earnest  to  fight,  affirming  that  his  troops,  who  were  already  in  a 
miserable  state,  would  disperse  entirely  if  they  were  obliged  to  enter  Portugal 
Castanos  was  of  the  same  opinion.  Beresford  also  argued  that  it  was  unwise 
to  relinquish  the  hope  of  taking  Badajos,  and  ungenerous  to  desert  the  people 
of  Estremadura  ;  that  a  retreat  would  endanger  Elvas,  lay  open  the  Alemtejo, 
and  encourage  the  enemy  to  push  his  incursions  further,  which  he  could  safely 
do,  having  such  a  fortress  as  Badajos  with  its  bridge  over  the  Guadiana,  in  his 
rear.  A  battle  must  then  be  fought  in  the  Alemtejo,  with  fewer  troops  and 
after  a  dispiriting  retreat  ;  there  was  also  a  greater  scarcity  of  food  in  the 
Portuguese  than  in  the  Spanish  province,  and  finally,  as  the  weather  was 
menacing,  the  Guadiana  might  again  rise  before  the  stores  were  carried  over, 
when  the  latter  must  be  abandoned,  or  the  army  endangered  to  protect  their 
passage. 

"  But  these  plausible  reasons  were  but  a  mask.  The  true  cause  why  the 
English  general  adopted  Blake's  proposals  was  the  impatient  temper  of  the 
British  troops.  None  of  them  had  been  engaged  in  the  late  battles  under  Lord 
Wellington.  At  Busaco  the  regiments  of  the  fourth  division  were  idle  specta- 
tors on  the  left,  as  those  of  the  second  division  were  on  the  right,  while  the 
action  was  in  the  centre.  During  Massena's  retreat  they  had  not  been  em- 
ployed under  fire,  and  the  combats  of  Sabugal  anl  Fucntes  Onore  had  been 
fought  without  them.  Thus  a  burning  thirst  f  jr  battle  was  general,  and 
Beresford  had  not  the  art  either  of  concdiating  or  of  exacting  the  confidence 
of  his  troops.  It  is  certain  that  if  he  had  retreated,  a  very  violent  and  unjust 
clamor  would  have  been  raised  against  him.  and  this  was  so  strongly  and  un- 
ceremoniously represented  to  him,  by  an  officer  on  his  own  staff,  that  he  gave 
way.  These  are  what  may  bo  termed  the  moral  obstacles  of  war.  Such  men 
as  Lord  Wellington  or  Sn-  John  MT:)re  can  stride  over  them,  but  to  second- 
rate  minds  they  are  insuperable.  Practice  and  study  may  make  a  good  gen- 
eral as  far  as  the  handling  of  troops  and  the  designing  of  a  campaign,  but  that 
ascendency  of  spirit  which  leads  the  wise,  and  controls  the  insolence  of  folly, 
is  a  rare  gift  of  nature." 


Ch.  XVII.]       CAMPAIGN    OF     1811     IN    SPAIN.  285 

the  coraiiianel  of  the  army  of  Portugal,  to  manœuvre  by  his 
left  on  the  Tagus,  so  as  to  connect  himself  more  intimately 
with  Soult,  and  to  operate  in  concert  with  him  for  the  relief 
of  Badajos. 

Welliu^ton  renews  the  Siege  of  Badajos.— Wellington  on 
his  side,  deemed  it  necessary,  notwithstanding  the  success  of 
Beresford  at  Albuera,  to  march  with  the  main  body  of  his 
army  on  tiie  Guadiana,  leaving  General  Spencer  with  eighteen 
thousand  Anglo-Portuguese  in  observation  near  Sabugal. 
This  resolution,  influenced  by  the  importance  of  Badajos  and 
the  probability  that  Soult  would  collect  the  army  of  Anda- 
lusia to  revenge  the  check  he  had  suffered,  merits  the  appro- 
bation of  all  judges  of  military  operations. 

All  the  preparations  being  completed,  and  the  parallel 
opened,  on  the  second  of  June,  the  siege  of  Badajos  was 
pushed  with  all  possible  vigor.  The  English  established 
their  batteries  on  a  rock,  and  for  want  of  earth  they  used 
sacks  of  wool  for  forming  the  epaulements  of  their  works, — 
an  operation  of  rare  occurrence  in  the  history  of  sieges. ■•'■■  The 
siege  of  Badajos  is  also  remarkable  for  furnishing  full  proof 
of  the  superiority  of  iron  cannon  over  those  of  brass,  the 
latter  becoming  sooner  heated,  and  consequently  not  sustain- 
ing so  rapid  and  continuous  a  fire.  The  intrepid  Philippon 
defended  the  j^lace  with  valor  and  intelligence  ;  while  the 
siege  was  pressed  with  no  less  energy  by  Wellington.  Im- 
patient at  the  slow  progress  of  the  siege,  and  learning  the 
movements  of  our  troops  preparatory  to  the  relief  of  the 
place,  the  English  general  directed  an  assault  to  be  made  on 
Fort  San  Christoval,  which  is  situated  on  an  eminence  on 
the  right  of  the  Guadiana  ;  but  the  attack  was  repelled  with 
a  considerable  and  useless  loss  of  life  on  the  part  of  the 
assailants. 

*  The  use  of  bales  of  cotton  at  New  Orleans  by  General  Jackson  is  a  paral- 
lel case. 


286  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON,  [Ch.  XVIL 

He  is   again  forced  to  retire  into  Portugal.— Marmont 

had  but  just  relieved  Massena  iu  the  command  of  the  aiTny 
of  Portugal,  after  the  battle  of  Fucnte-di-Honore,  when  he 
received  orders  to  unite  with  Soult  ftir  the  succor  of  Badajos. 
On  hearing  that  Wellington  had  moved  in  that  direction, 
leaving  behind  him  only  the  corps  of  Spencer,  Marmont 
marched  with  two  divisions  on  the  upper  valley  of  the  Coa 
to  reprovision  Ciudad-Kodrigo,  and  mask  the  movement 
which  the  rest  of  the  array  was  executing  at  the  same  time 
by  Placencia  on  Almaraz.  This  marshal  soon  took  the  same 
road  and  advanced  on  Merida,  while  Soult,  hearing  of  this 
movement,  left  Llercna  and  moved  toward  Almendralejo,  in 
order  to  open  the  communication.  This  important  junction 
was  effected  on  the  seventeenth  of  June,  and  the  two  armies, 
numbering  from  fifty-five  to  sixty  thousand  combatants, 
advanced  against  the  enemy.  But  Wellington,  ahvays 
anxious  to  hazard  nothing,  had  raised  the  siege  of  Badajos 
on  the  night  of  the  sixteenth,  (after  having  vainly  attempted 
a  second  assault  on  the  side  of  the  citadel),  and  retired  into 
Portugal  by  Olivenza  and  Campo-Mayor. 

It  would,  of  course,  have  been  imprudent  for  Wellington 
to  remain  at  Albuera  while  Marmont  was  advancing  from 
Albuquerque  on  Badajos  ;  but  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  a 
reason  why  the  English  general  did  not  throw  himself  by 
Campo-Mayor  on  Albuquerque  against  Marmont,  in  concert 
with  Spencer,  who  had  advanced  from  Almeida  parallel  with 
the  Duke  of  Ragusa.  If  Wellington  had  manoeuvred  as  I 
did  at  Castiglione,  he  would  have  successively  beaten  Mar- 
mont and  Soult,  as  I  did  Wurmser  and  Quasdanowich. 
Badajos  would,  perhaps,  have  been  succored  as  Mantua  was 
in  1796,  but  victory  would  soon  have  reestablished  the  allies 
within  its  walls. 

Operations  of  tlie  Spanish  in  Andalusia.  —  Soult's  with- 
drawal of  the  mass  of  his  forces  from  Andalusia,  in  order  to 


Ch.  XVIT.]  campaign    of     1811     IN"    SPAIN.  287 

maintain  himself  at  Llerena  after  the  defeat  of  Albiiera,  had 
decided  the  Spanish  generals  to  attempt  to  crush  our  scat- 
tered detachments  and  reconquer  that  province.  Cadiz, 
Seville,  and  Grenada  were  the  first  objects  of  their  attention. 
Encouraged  by  the  success  at  Albuera,  Blake  descended  on 
the  lower  Guuliana,  near  Moguer,  and  attempted  to  carry 
the  post  of  Niebla  which  covered  the  passage  of  the  Rio 
Tinto  and  Siîville  ;  but  the  noble  defense  of  a  Swiss  battalion 
defeated  all  his  eiforts,  Ballesteros  at  the  same  time  man- 
oeuvred on  the  left  of  the  Guadalquiver,  and  threw  himself 
into  the  mountains  of  Ronda,  to  raise  these  ferocious  moun- 
taineers, and  cut  off  all  communication  between  Seville  and 
Grenada  ;  a  multitude  of  partisans  soon  inundated  the 
environs  of  Seville  and  were  reënforced  by  all  the  malcon- 
tents of  the  province.  General  Danicaud  took  refuge  in  a 
monastery,  and  found  himself  blockaded  in  the  capital, 
Sebastiani's  corps  had  been  reduced,  by  the  troops  sent  to  the 
succor  of  Badajos,  to  seven  or  eight  thousand  men  who  were 
scattered  in  Malaga,  Grenada,  and  Jaen  ;  so  that  instead  of 
being  able  to  march  to  the  relief  of  Darricaud,  he  found 
himself  shut  up  in  Grenada  by  a  multitude  of  insurgents, 
who  were  sustained  by  troops  from  the  army  of  Murcia  or 
from  Ballesteros. 

They  arc  defeated  by  Soiilt.  — The  junction  of  our 
armies,  and  Wellington's  retreat  into  Portugal,  changed  the 
face  of  affairs  in  Andalusia.  Soult  now  hastened  to  carry 
his  reserve,  under  Godinot  and  Latour-Maubourg,  to  the 
assistance  of  his  cantonments.  Blake,  after  his  unsuccessful 
attempt  at  the  escalade  of  Niebla,  menaced  by  the  return  of 
our  forces,  reëmbarked  at  Ayaraonte  for  Cadiz  ;  Ballesteros 
took  refuge  in  the  mountains  of  Ronda.  Having  thus 
delivered  Seville,  Soult  had  now  to  succor  Sebastiani's  corps, 
which  was  exposed  to  a  threatening  storm  near  Grenada. 
The  regency  of  Cadiz,  without  being  discouraged  at  their 


288  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XVII. 

unsuccessful  efforts  against  Sault's  right,  directed  Blake,  in 
concert  with  the  corps  of  Murcia,  to  make  a  simiUir  attempt 
against  the  left.  Having  formed  a  junction  with  the  corps 
of  Murcia  at  Baza,  Blake  now  found  himself  at  the  head  of 
eighteen  or  twenty  thousand  good  troops.  Soult  marched 
ag;iinst  him  hy  Gruadix,  and  encountered  him  at  the  Venta-de- 
Bahul,  in  a  position  apparently  impregnahle.  The  marshal 
was  to  approach  him  in  front  with  tho  fourth  corps,  and  the 
cavalry  of  Latour-Maubourg,  while  that  of  Godinot,  coming 
from  Jean  by  Meda,  would  take  him  in  reverse.  The  attack 
took  place  on  the  ninth  of  August  ;  but  Gndinot,  instead 
of  imitating  the  example  of  Ney  at  Friedland  and  Riche- 
panse  at  Hohenlinden,  feared  to  throw  himself  in  the  midst 
of  the  enemy,  and  moved  round  by  Baza.  Blake  now  per- 
ceived his  danger  and  hastened  to  retreat  on  L)ica,  hotly 
pursued  by  Soult.  Having  returned  to  Seville,  the  marshal 
directed  his  attention  to  Gibraltar,  where  Ballesteros  was 
threatening  our  communications  with  the  blockading  corps 
of  Cadiz.  Godiaot,  who  had  been  detached  against  him, 
drove  him  back  on  the  camp  of  St.  R  ^quo.  On  the 
approach  of  three  brigades  of  Soult,  Ballesteros  evacuated 
this  position  and  took  refuge  under  the  cannon  of  Gibraltar. 
The  enemy  now  landed  at  Tarifa  to  disengage  Ballesteros. 
Godiuot  marched  against  this  city,  but  after  a  useless  loss  of 
many  brave  men,  he  fell  back  again  on  Seville  ;  where,  being 
warmly  blamed  by  Soult,  he  committed  suicide.  Ballesteros 
returned  to  St.  Roque  and  resumed  the  offensive  ;  but  Levai 
soon  forced  him  to  again  seek  refuge  under  the  fire  of  the 
English  at  Gibraltar.  As  the  enemy  from  his  position  at 
Tarifa,  continued  to  threaten  our  corps  at  Cadiz  and  our 
cantonments  from  Gibraltar  to  the  Guadiaro  and  Ronda, 
Levai  received  orders  to  reduce  that  place.  He  arrived  there 
with  some  siege  pieces,  and  opened  the  trenches  on  the  twenty- 


Ch.  XVII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF    1811     IN    SPAIN.  289 

fifth  of  December  ;  after  an  unsuccessful  assault,  be  received 
orders  to  abandon  the  enterprise. 

Operations  of  Wellington  and  Marmont  near  Ciudad 
Rodrigo. — In  the  mean  time  the  army  of  Marmont,  return- 
ing from  Badajos  towards  Salamanca,  bad  encountered  ene- 
mies still  more  dangerous  than  those  of  Soult.  Wellington, 
on  bis  return  towards  Almeida,  bad  invested  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 
on  the  fifth  of  September,  and  was  waiting  the  arrival  of  his 
siege  artillery,  which  bad  been  ordered  from  Lisbon  by  Oporto 
and  the  Douro.  This  place  was  the  key  of  our  positions  in 
Estremadura.  Marmont  had  left  one  of  his  divisions  near 
Alcantara  to  communicate  with  the  fifth  corps  which  remained 
on  the  Guadiana,  to  guard  the  space  between  Olivenza  and 
the  mountains  of  Caceres.  Having  decided  to  succor  Ciudad 
Rodrigo,  Marmont  recalled  this  division,  and  also  opened  a 
communication  with  the  army  of  the  North  of  Spain.  This 
army  bad  passed  under  the  orders  of  Greneral  Dorsenne  after 
the  departure  of  Marshal  Bessieres,  who  brought  back  to 
France  a  part  of  the  guard  destined  for  the  army  of  Russia. 
This  general  bad  been  operating  between  the  Douro,  Astorga, 
and  the  mountains  of  Asturias,  in  order  to  second  General 
Bonnet,  and  drive  the  army  of  Galicia  into  '  the  mountains 
of  Lugo. 

Marmont  and  Dorsenne  effected  their  junction  at  Tamames 
on  the  twenty-second  of  September  ;  their  united  forces 
advanced  to  the  succor  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  ;  Wellington  fell 
back  with  his  advanced  corps  on  Guinaldo.  Marmont  now 
presented  himself  before  this  intrenched  camp,  but  Welling- 
ton withdrew  his  forces  to  Sabugal  ;  and  the  former,  proud 
of  having  bis  offer  of  battle  declined  by  the  enemy,  and 
deeming  it  proper  not  to  pursue  him  further  into  these  deso- 
late and  inaccessible  countries,  established  his  army  in  can- 
tonments, to  give  his  troops  some  repose.  He  received 
orders,  however,  a  few  days  after,  to  detach  a  thousand  men 

VvL.   11  ■. — 19. 


290  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIT. 

under  General  Montbrun,  to  second  the  enterprise  of  Suchet 
on  Valencia. 

Hill  surprises  the  Division  of  Girardi— The  valley  of  the 
Tagus  being  stripped  of  its  defense  by  Marniont,  in  order  to  offer 
battle  to  Wellington,  the  English  right,  under  Hill,  profited 
by  this  circumstance  to  attack  the  divisions  of  the  fifth  corps 
which  had  remained  between  the  Tagus  and  the  Guadian;i  ; 
he  surprised  a  brigade  of  Girard's  division  at  Aroyo  de  Moli- 
nos,  and  was  on  the  point  of  capturing  that  general  himself 
with  all  his  troops.  Girard,  however,  saved  himself  by  a 
great  detour  on  Merida,  where  he  crossed  the  Guadiana,  but, 
for  want  of  proper  precautions,  lost  a  thousand  men.  A 
series  of  uninterrupted  successess,  and  the  security  which 
they  had  formerly  enjoyed  in  the  cantonments  of  Germany 
and  Italy,  had  rendered  our  troops  careless  of  their  laurels, 
and  all  our  corps-d'armée  had  some  loss  of  this  kind,  which 
was  to  b:  attributed  to  an  excess  of  self-confidence.  This 
event  was  the  only  one  of  importance  that  occurred  in  the 
West  during  the  autumn  ;  if  we  except  the  operations  of 
the  divisions  of  Biscay,  Navarre,  and  Castile,  against  the 
guerillas  of  Porlier,  Mina,  and  Empecinado.* 

*  Napier  g-ives  a  detailed  account  of  the  operation;?  of  the  armies  of  Mar- 
mont  and  Wellington  about  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  and  closes  with  the  following 
observations  : 

"1st.  Lord  "Wellington's  position  behind  Soita  has  been  noticed  by  two 
recent  authors.  The  one  condemns  the  imprudence  of  offering  battle  on  ground 
whence  there  was  no  retreat  ;  the  other  intimates  that  it  was  assumed  in  con- 
tempt of  the  adversary's  prowess.  This  last  appears  a  mere  shift  to  evade  what 
was  not  understood,  for  if  Lord  Wellington  had  despised  Marmont,  he  would 
have  fought  him  beyond  the  Agueda.  But  sixty  thousand  French  soldiers 
were  never  to  be  despised,  neither  was  Wellington  a  man  to  put  an  army  in 
jeopardy  from  an  overweening  confidence  ;  and  it  is  not  difficult  to  show  that 
his  position  was  chosen  well,  without  imprudence,  and  without  presumption. 

"The  space  between  the  Sierra  de  Mesas  and  the  Coa  was  less  than  six 
miles,  and  the  part  open  to  attack-  was  very  much  reduced  by  the  rugged  bed 
of  a  torrent  which  covered  the  left.  Forty  thousand  men  were  quite  able  to 
defend  this  line,  which  was  scarcely  more  than  one-third  of  their  full  front; 
and  as  the  roads  were  bad,  the  country  hilly  and   much  broken  with  woods 


Ch.  XVir.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1811     IN     SPAIN.  291. 

Operations  of  Siichct  on  the  Ebro.— Our  affairs  succeeded 
better  in  the  East.  Suchet,  who  had  returned  to  Saragossa 
after    the    taking  of  Tortosa,    arranged    with    Guilleminot, 

and  ravines,  the  superiority  of  tlio  enemy's  liorse  and  guns  would  liave  availed 
him  little.  L  trd  Wellington  had  a  right  to  bo  bold  agaiust  an  adversary  who 
had  not  molested  him  at  Guinaldo,  and  it  is  always  of  importance  to  show  a 
menacing  front.  It  was  also  certain  that  great  combinations  must  have  been 
made  by  Marmont,  before  he  could  light  a  general  battle  on  such  ground  ;  it 
■was  equally  certain  that  ho  could  only  havo  a  few  days'  provisions  with  his 
army,  and  that  the  neighborhood  could  not  supply  h\m.  It;  was,  therefore, 
reasonable  to  expect  that  he  would  retire  rather  than  fight,  and  he  did  so. 

"  Let  us,  however,  take  the  other  side,  and  suppose  that  Marmoat  was  pre- 
pared and  resolute  to  bring  on  a  great  battle.  Tlie  position  behind  Soita 
would  still  have  been  good.  The  French  were  indeed  too  strong  to  be  fought 
witii  on  a  plain,  yet  not  strong  enough  to  warrant  a  retreat  indicating  fear; 
hence  the  allies  had  retired  slowly  for  three  d.iys,  each  day  engaged,  and  the 
enemy's  powerful  horse  and  artillery  was  always  close  upon  their  rear.  Kow 
the  bed  of  the  Coa,  which  was  extremely  rugged,  furnished  only  a  few  points 
for  crossing,  of  which  the  principal  were,  the  ford  of  Serraleira  behind  the  right 
of  the  allies;  the  ford  of  Rapoulha  do  Coa,  behind  their  left;  and  the  bridge 
of  Sabugal,  behind  their  centre.  The  ways  to  tliose  points  were  narrow,  and 
the  passage  of  the  river,  wi:h  all  the  baggage,  could  not  have  been  easily 
effected  in  fice  of  an  enemy  without  some  loss  and  perhaps  dishonor:  and  had 
Lord  Wellington  been  unable  to  hold  his  position  in  a  battle,  the  difficulty  of 
passing  the  river  would  not  havo  been  very  much  increased,  because  his  in- 
cumbrances would  all  havo  been  at  the  other  side,  and  there  was  a  second 
range  of  heights  half  a  mile  in  front  of  Sabugal  favorable  for  a  rear  guard.  The 
position  of  Soita  appears  therefore  to  have  been  chosen  with  good  judgment 
in  regard  to  the  immediate  object  of  opposing  the  enemy;  but  it  is  certain 
that  the  battering-train,  then  between  Pinhel  and  Villa  Ponte,  Avas  completely 
exposed  to  the  enemy.  Marmont,  however,  had  not  sufficiently  considered 
bis  enterprise,  and  knew  not  where  or  how  to  strike. 

"  2d.  The  position  of  Aldea  Ponte  was  equally  well  chosen.  Had  the  allies 
retreated  at  once  from  Guinaldo,  to  Soita,  baggag3  and  stores  would  have  been 
lost,  and  the  retrograde  movement  have  had  the  appearance  of  a  flight;  the 
road  from  Payo  would  have  been  uncovered,  and  the  junction  of  the  fifth  divi- 
Bion  endangered.  But  in  the  position  taken  up,  the  points  of  junction  of  all 
the  roads  were  occupied,  and  as  each  point  was  strong  in  itself,  it  was  not 
difficult  for  a  quick-sighted  general,  perfectly  acquainted  with  tlie  country,  and 
having  excellent  troops,  to  check  the  heads  of  the  enemy's  columns,  until  the 
baggage  had  gained  a  sufficient  offing,  and  the  fifth  division  had  taken  its 
place  in  line. 

"3d..  The  position  at  Guinaldo  was  very  different  from  the  others.  The 
previous  intrenching  of  it  proved  Lord  Wellington's  foresight,  and  he  remained 
there  thirty-six  hours,  that  is,  from  mid-day  of  the  twenty-fifth  until  midnight 
of  the  twenty-sixth,  which  proved  his  firmness.     It  is  said  that  Sir  George 


292  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON,  [Cn.  XVIL 

Macdonald's  chief  of  staff,  the  means  of  securing  the  siege  of 
Tarragona  :  it  was  agreed  between  them  that  Macdonald's 
corps  should  conduct  the  siege,  while  Suchet  both  reënforced 

Murray  advised  him  to  abandon  it  in  the  night  of  the  twenty-fifth,  and  that 
arrangements  were  actually  made  in  that  view,  yet  anxious  for  the  safety  of 
the  light  division,  he  would  not  stir.  The  object  was  certainly  one  of  an  impor- 
tance sufficient  to  justify  the  resolution,  but  the  resolution  itself  was  one  of 
those  daring  strokes  of  genius  which  the  ordinary  rules  of  art  were  never  made 
to  control.  The  position  was  contracted,  of  no  great  natural  strength  in  front, 
and  easily  to  be  turned  ;  the  intrenchmcnts  constructed  were  only  a  few  breast- 
works and  two  weak  field  redoubts,  open  in  rear,  and  without  palisades  ;  not 
more  than  fourteen  thousand  British  and  Portuguese  troops  were  in  line,  and 
sixty  thousand  French  veterans  with  a  hundred  pieces  of  artillery  were  before 
them  !  When  Marmont  heard  of  the  escape  of  the  light  division,  and  discov- 
ered the  deceit,  he  prophetically  exclaimed,  alluding  to  Napoleon's  fortune, 
'■^  And  WellingtoTcs  star,  it  also  is  bright  T 

"4th.  The  positions  of  Aldea  Ponte  and  Soita  are  to  be  commended,  tliat  at 
Gruinaldo  to  bo  admired  rather  than  imitated,  but  the  preceding  operations  are 
censurable.  The  country  immediately  beyond  Ciudad  Rodrigo  ofiered  no  cover- 
ing position  for  a  siege  or  blockade  ;  and  the  sudden  floods,  to  which  the 
Agueda  is  subject,  rendered  the  communications  with  the  left  bank  precarious. 
Nor  though  bridges  had  been  secured,  could  Wellington  have  ventured  to 
encamp  round  the  place  with  lines  of  contravallation  and  circumvallation,  on 
both  sides  of  the  river  ;.  because  Marmont's  army  would  then  have  advanced 
from  Placencia  to  Castello  Branco,  having  seized  the  passage  over  the  Tagus  at 
Villa  Velha,  and.  in  concert  with  the  fifth  corp%  endangered  the  safety  of  Hill. 
This  would  have  obliged  the  allies  to  quit  their  intrenched  camp,  and  Dorsenne 
could  then  have  revictualled  the  place.  It  was,  therefore,  necessary  to  hold  a 
strong  central  position  with  respect  to  Marmont  and  Dorsenne,  to  keep  both  in 
check  while  separate,  and  to  appose  them  when  united.  This  position  was  on 
the  Coa,  and  as  Salamanca  or  Bejar,  the  nearest  points  where  convoys  could  be 
collected  for  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  were  from  fifty  to  sixty  miles  distant,  Lord  Wel- 
lington's object,  namely,  the  forcing  the  French  to  assemble  in  large  bodies 
without  any  adequate  result,  could  be,  and  was  obtained  by  a  distant  as  well  as 
by  a  close  investment. 

"  So  far  all  was  well  calculated,  but  when  Marmont  and  Dorsenne  arrived 
with  sixty  thousand  men  at  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  the  aspect  of  affairs  entirely 
changed,  and  as  the  English  general  could  not  dispute  the  entrance  of  the  con- 
voy, he  should  have  concentrated  his  army  at  once  behind  Guinaldo.  Instead 
of  doing  this,  he  kept  it  extended  on  a  line  of  many  miles,  and  the  right  wing 
separated  from  the  centre  by  a  difficult  river.  In  his  dispatch,  he  saj's,  that, 
from  some  uncertainty  in  his  estimate  of  the  enemy's  numbers,  it  was  necessary 
to  ascertain  their  exact  strength  by  actual  observation  ;  but  this  is  rather  an 
excuse  than  a  valid  reason,  because,  for  this  object,  which  could  be  obtained 
by  other  means,  he  risked  the  loss  of  his  whole  army,  and  violated  two  vital 
rules  of  war  which  forbid — 


Ch.  XYTI.]      campaign    of    1811    IN    SPAIN.  293 

and  covered  his  operations.  Guillerainot  came  to  me  at 
Paris  to  ask  for  the  means  of  pushing  this  siege  with  vigor  : 
but  I  i^referred  intrusting  this  enterprise  to  Suchet,  who  had 

"  1st.  The  parceling  of  an  army  before  a  concentrated  enemy. 

"  2d.  The  fixing  of  your  own  point  of  concentration  within  the  enemy's 
reach. 

"Now  Lord  Welhngton's  position  on  the  twenty- fourtli  and  twenty-fifth, 
extended  from  the  ford  of  the  Vadillo  on  the  right  of  the  Agueda,  to  Marialva 
on  the  Azava;  tlio  distance  either  from  tlie  Vadillo,  or  Marialva,  to  Guinaldo, 
was  as  great  as  that  from  Ciudad  to  Guinaldo,  and  by  worse  roads  ;  and  the 
distance  from  Ciudad  to  Elbodou  was  as  nothing,  compared  to  the  distance  of 
the  wings  from  the  same  place.  Wherefore,  when  Montbrun  attacked,  at  Elbo- 
don,  the  allies'  wings  were  cut  off,  and  the  escape  of  the  third  and  light  divi- 
sions, and  of  the  troops  at  Pastores,  was  a  matter  of  fortune  and  gallantry, 
rather  than  of  generalship  ;  that  is,  in  the  enlarged  sense  of  the  last  word,  for 
it  can  not  be  denied  that  the  actual  movements  of  the  troops  were  conducted 
with  consummate  skill. 

But  what  if  Marmont,  instead  of  being  drawn  by  circumstances  into  a  series 
of  ill-combined,  and  partial  attacks,  had  previously  made  dispositions  for  a  great 
battle  ?  He  certainly  knew,  through  the  garrison,  the  real  situation  of  the 
allies,  and  he  also  knew  of  the  camp  at  Guinaldo,  which  being  on  their  line  of 
retreat  was  the  important  point.  If  he  had  issued  from  the  fortress  before  day- 
break on  the  twenty-fifth,  with  the  whole  or  even  half  of  his  forces,  he  could 
have  reached  Campillo  in  two  hours  with  one  column,  while  another  fell  on  the 
position  at  Pastores  and  Elbodon  ;  the  third  division,  thus  attacked,  would  have 
been  enveloped  and  captured,  or  broken  and  driven  over  the  Agueda.  by  the 
ford  of  Zamara,  and  would  have  been  irretrievably  separated  from  Guinaldo. 
And  if  this  division  had  even  reached  Guinaldo,  the  French  army  would  have 
arrived  with  it  in  such  overwhelming  numbers,  that  the  fourth  division  could 
not  have  restored  the  battle;  meanwhile  a  few  thousand  men  thrown  across 
the  ford  of  Caros  near  Robleda,  would  have  sufiSced  to  keep  the  light  division 
at  bay,  because  the  channel  of  the  Robleda  torrent,  over  which  their  retreat 
lay,  was  a  very  deep  and  rugged  ravine.  The  centre  being  broken  the  French 
could,  at  choice,  have  either  surrounded  the  liglit  division,  or  directed  the  mass 
of  their  forces  against  the  reserves,  and  then  the  left  wing  under  Graham  would 
have  had  to  retreat  from  the  Azava  over  the  plains  toward  Almeida. 

"It  may  be  said  that  all  the  French  were  not  up  on  the  twenty-fifth,  but 
they  might  have  been  so,  and  as  Lord  Wellington  was  resolved  to  see  their 
number  he  would  have  been  in  the  same  position  the  twenty-sixth.  It  is,  how- 
ever, sufficient  to  remark  that  the  allies,  exclusive  of  the  fifth  division,  which 
was  at  Payo,  did  not  exceed  thirty-five  thousand  men  of  all  arms  ;  that  they 
were  on  an  irregular  line  of  at  least  twenty  miles,  and  mostly  in  an  open  coun- 
try; that  at  no  point  were  the  troops  more  than  eight,  and  at  the  principal 
point,  namely,  Pastores,  only  three  miles,  from  a  fortress  from  whence  sixty 
thousand  infantry  and  six  thousand  cavalry,  with  one  hundred  and  twenty 
guns  were  ready  to  issue.     Finally  the  point  of  concentration  at  Guinaldo  was 


294  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON  [Cii.  XVIL 

thus  far  perfectly  accomplished  my  wishes  ;  I,  therefore, 
decided  that  the  army  of  Aragon  should  form  a  new  siege- 
park  of  the  artillery  of  Lerida  and  Tortosa,  and  attack 
Tarragona  ;  I  also  ordered  this  army  to  he  reënforced  hy  a 
Trench  and  Italian  division  of  the  army  of  Catalonia.  But 
hardly  had  they  hegan  to  execute  these  new  dispositions, 
when  Marshal  Macdonald  returned  from  Lerida  to  Barcelona, 
and  announced  that  Figueras  had  just  heen  surprised  by  the 
Spaniards. 

The  Catalans  take  Figueras.— The  junta  and  the  captain- 
general  of  Catalonia,  encouraged  hy  the  success  of  their  petty 
operations,  and  certain  of  the  assistance  of  the  inhabitants 
of  the  cities  against  which  they  might  operate,  now  redoubled 

only  twelve  miles  from  that  fortress.  The  alhes  escaped  because  their  adver- 
Bary  was  bUnd  !  Lord  ■\Velliugtoii's  conduct  at  Guinaldo  was  above  rules,  but 
at  Elbodoii  it  was  against  rules,  which  is  just  the  diflerenco  between  genius 
and  error. 

"4th.  In  these  operations  Marmont  gave  proof  that  as  a  general  he  was 
rather  shining  than  great.  He  was  in  error  throughout.  Before  he  com- 
menced liis  marcli,  he  had  desired  Girard  to  advance  on  the  side  of  the  Alein- 
tejo.  assuring  him  that  the  whole  of  the  allied  army,  and  even  the  Spanish 
troops  under  Castanos,  had  crossed  the  Tagus  to  operate  against  Eodrigo  ;  but 
in  fact  only  one  brigade  of  Ilill's  corps  had  moved,  and  Girard  would  have 
been  destroyed,  if,  fortunately  for  him,  the  allies  had  not  intercepted  the  ori- 
gmal  and  duplicate  of  the  letter  containing  this  false  information. 

''  5th.  When  Marmont  brought  his  convoy  mto  Ciudad,  it  would  appear  he 
had  no  intention  of  fighling,  but  tempted  by  the  false  position  of  the  alhes, 
and  angry  at  the  repulse  of  his  cavalry  on  the  Lower  Azava,  he  turned  his 
scouting  troops  into  columns  of  attack.  And  yet  ho  permitted  his  adversary 
to  throw  dust  m  his  eyes  for  thirty-six  hours  at  Guinaldo  :  and  at  Aldea  Ponte 
his  attack  was  a  useless  waste  of  men,  because  tliero  was  no  local  advantage 
offered,  and  he  did  not  intend  a  great  battle. 

"  6th.  The  loss  incurred  m  the  different  combats  was  not  great.  About 
three  hiuidred  men  and  officers  fell  on  the  part  of  the  alhes,  and  on  that  of  the 
French  rather  more,  because  of  the  fire  of  the  squares  and  artillery  at  Elbodon. 
But  the  movements  during  the  three  days  were  full  of  mterest,  and  instruction, 
and  diversified  also  by  brilliant  examples  of  heroism.  Ridge's  daring  charge 
has  been  already  noticed,  and  it  was  in  one  of  the  cavalry  rencounters,  that  a 
French  officer  in  the  act  of  striking  at  the  gallant  Felton  Harvey  of  the  Four- 
teenth Dragoons  perceived  that  he  had  only  one  arm,  and  with  a  rapid 
movement  brought  down  his  sword  into  a  salute,  and  passed  on." 


Ch.  XVII.J  campaign    of     1811     IN     SPAIN.  295 

their  activity  and  audacity,  in  hopes  of  wearying  out  our 
patience,  and  forcing  us  finally  to  evacuate  the  province. 
O'Donnel  had  already  fallen,  with  his  united  forces,  on  an 
isolated  brigade  at  the  Abisbal  and  captured  it,  without  the 
army's  being  able  to  save  it. 

While  Macdonald  was  concentrating  his  forces  towards 
the  Ebro  for  the  projected  expedition,  General  Cauipo-Verde, 
on  the  nidit  of  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  of  March, 
attempted  to  surprise  Fort  Montejouy.  Maurice  Matthieu 
allowed  the  enemy's  grenadici's  to  descend  into  the  ditch,  and 
then  opened  upon  them  a  fire  of  grape  and  musketry.  Eight 
hundred  men  were  killed  in  the  ditches,  while  others  took  to 
flight,  but  were  pursued  by  a  sortie  party,  and  several  hun- 
dreds brought  back  prisoners.  This  reception,  however,  did 
not  entirely  discourage  the  enemy  :  a  few  weeks  after,  a 
troop  of  Jfzf/Me^e^s  surprised  General  Guillot  in  the  city  of 
Figueras,  and  got  possession  of  the  citadel  by  a  coup-de- 
main. 

On  hearing  of  these  events,  Macdonald  renounced  his  pro- 
jects and  returned  in  haste  to  Gerona,  in  order  to  invest 
Figueras,  before  the  Spaniards  could  provision  the  detach- 
ment which  had  been  thrown  into  that  place.  General 
Baraguay  d'Hilliers  left  Gerona  with  all  the  forces  which  he 
could  collect  in  Upper  Catalonia,  but  he  could  not  prevent 
Campo- Verde  from  reënforcing  the  place  with  three  thousand 
men,  although  he  had  defeated  him  on  the  third  of  May. 
Macdonald  informed  General  Suchet  of  this  event,  in- 
sisted  on  the  return  of  the  two  divisions  which  he  had  lent 
him,  and  even  asked  for  his  assistance  with  the  army  of 
Aragon. 

Preparations  of  Suchet  to  attack  Taragona.— But  Suchet 
very  properly  refused  to  comply  with  this  demand,  deeming 
it  useless  to  collect  so  many  troops  for  a  simple  blockade, 
and  in  a  part  of  the  country  destitute  of  resources  :  he  even 


296  LIFE     or    NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XVII. 

considered  it  dangerous  to  remove  his  active  forces  from  the 
important  valley  of  the  Ebro,  at  a  moment  when  the  enemy, 
multiplying  his  efforts  around  Tarragona,  might  become  the 
assailant,  and  take  from  us  not  only  a  part  of  Catalonia,  but 
also  of  Aragon.  In  fact,  at  the  moment  when  the  junta 
placed  a  garrison  of  twelve  thousand  chosen  men  in  Tarra- 
gona, and  General  Contreras,  former  director  of  the  artillery 
school  of  Segovia,  and  a  man  of  skill  and  energy,  was  making 
every  disposition  for  a  long  resistance,  Campo-Verde  collected 
an  army  of  twenty  thousand  men  between  that  city  and  Ge- 
rona,  and  the  corps  of  Valencia  and  the  partisans  of  Navarre 
were  prej)aring  to  disquiet  the  garrisons  left  by  Suchet  in 
Aragon. 

Notwithstanding  the  unexpected  loss  of  Figueras,  the 
vigor  of  the  enemy's  preparations  and  the  imperfect  state  of 
his  own,  Suchet  formed  his  resolution  without  hesitation. 
After  consulting  his  chiefs  of  engineers,  artillery,  and  ad- 
ministration, examining  his  resources,  and  calculating  his 
forces,  and  leaving  in  Aragon  troops  necessary  for  maintain- 
ing our  establishments  there,  he  sent  to  Tortosa  orders  for 
forming  the  siege-park,  and  directing  it  by  Balaguer  on 
Cambrils,  established  magazines  of  provisions,  and  secured 
the  means  of  transportation  to  Caspe  and  Mora  :  finally,  he 
marched  with  all  his  disposable  forces  on  Lerida,  where  he 
rallied  the  divisions  of  Freyre  and  Palombini,  and,  instead 
of  marching  in  the  direction  of  Figueras,  moved  rapidly  on 
Tarragona,  and  invested  the  place  on  the  fourth  of  May. 
This  resolution  was  a  wise  one,  and  was  crowned  with  the 
most  haj^py  result  :  Campo-Verde,  not  knowing  whether  he 
ought  to  deliver  a  place  which  was  simply  blockaded,  or  fly 
to  the  assistance  of  one  which  was  more  seriously  attacked, 
did  neither  one  thing  nor  the  other  ;  and  Contreras,  instead 
of  completing  his  means  of  defense,  saw  his  resources  and  his 
troops  daily  diminish. 


Cir.  XVII.]        CAMPAIGN    OF    ISll    IN    SPAIN.  297 

Memorable  Siei?e  of  that  City. — Tarragona,  strong  in  its 
natural  position  and  by  its  ancient  uefenses,  had  been  con- 
nected by  a  line  of  new  works  with  the  port  and  lower  town. 
Mount  Olivo,  which  had  been  fortified,  covered  the  ap- 
proaches on  one  side  ;  while  on  the  other  the  sea  always 
furnished  them  the  means  of  succor  or  retreat.  An  English 
fleet,  carrying  two  thousand  troops,  Avas  lying  in  the  harbor 
for  this  purpose,  to  annoy  the  flank  of  the  besieging  army. 
But  Suchet  commenced  by  establishing  a  strong  redoubt  on 
the  shore,  from  which,  with  a  few  mortars,  he  soon  drove 
the  shipping  to  a  distance,  and  then  directed  his  attack  upon 
Mount  Olivo. 

But  this  last  was  a  difficult  operation,  for  the  trenches  had 
to  be  constructed  on  a  bare  rock,  and  against  a  numerous 
garrison  which  was  daily  renewed,  and  which  disputed  the 
ground  inch  by  inch.  Wo  lost  in  these  combats  General 
Salm  and  numerous  officers  and  soldiers  killed  or  wounded. 
When  the  batteries  had  breached  the  walls  of  the  fort,  an 
assault  was  made,  on  the  night  of  the  twenty-ninth  of  May, 
at  the  moment  when  a  detachment  from  the  city  had  come 
to  relievo  the  garrison  of  the  place.  This  circumstance, 
instead  of  being  favorable  to  the  defense,  was  decidedly 
injurious,  by  crowding  within  a  small  space  a  greater  number 
of  men  than  could  be  employed  to  advantage.  The  fort  Avas 
carried,  and  the  enemy  lost  one  hundred  and  eighty  men 
killed  or  taken  prisoners.  Suchet  now  resolved  to  push  his 
attack  by  the  Francoli  against  the  lower  town,  as  he  would 
thus  separate  the  main  defenses  of  the  place  from  the  port, 
and  at  the  same  time  cut  off  all  succor  from  the  garrison  and 
all  means  of  retreat.  The  works  Avere,  consequently,  pushed 
with  great  vigor  ;  a  second  assault  was  made,  on  the  seventh 
of  June,  against  Fort  Francoli  ;  a  third,  on  the  fourteenth, 
against  the  bastion  of  the  Chanoines  ;  a  f  )urth,  on  the 
twenty-first,  against  Fort  Koyal,  and  the  remainder  of  tho 


298  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XVII. 

lower  town.  These  several  successes  greatly  increased  the 
ardor  of  our  soldiers  ;  for  without  the  stimulus  wliich  the 
success  of  one  night  gave  to  the  perils  of  the  following  day, 
they  must  have  yielded  to  the  fatigues  of  the  siege  and  the 
heat  of  the  weather.  The  works  were  not  only  of  a  fa- 
tiguing character,  but  required  incessant  labor  ;  cliosen  sharp- 
shooters were  continually  occupied  in  the  trenches  tiring  upon 
the  cannoneers  of  the  jjlace,  while  the  garrison,  on  its  side, 
kept  up  an  incessant  fire  on  our  batteries  ;  for  fifty-four  days 
there  was  one  continual  engagement,  like  a  long  continued 
battle.  The  governor,  astonished  at  so  much  jierseverance, 
and  despaii'ing  of  any  assistance  from  the  Spanish  army, 
which  lay  inactive  in  the  field,  wrote  to  the  junta  that  he 
could  not  answer  any  longer  for  the  place  if  they  did  not 
send  him  succor.  Campo- Verde,  who  had  failed  in  his 
attempt  to  succor  Figueras,  now  yielded  to  the  solicitations 
of  the  junta  and  of  Contreras,  and  approached  Tarragona, 
at  the  moment  when  Ave  had  opened  the  third  parallel  and 
established  our  breaching  batteries  against  the  body  of  the 
place.  Our  firmness  imposed  on  him,  and  he  retired  without 
any  effort  to  raise  the  siege,  although  his  attack  would  have 
placed  us  between  two  fires.  The  English  Colonel  Skerret, 
landed  from  the  fleet  for  the  purpose  of  reenforcing  the  gar- 
rison with  his  two  thousand  troops,  but,  on  seeing  that  the 
taking  of  the  lower  town  would  cut  off  his  line  of  retreat, 
he  renounced  his  project.  The  garrison,  therefore,  after  a 
momentary  hope  of  being  delivered,  saw  itself  abandoned  to 
its  fate. 

The  moment  seemed  favorable  for  a  final  blow.  On  the 
twenty-eighth  of  June,  Suchet  deemed  the  breach  j^ractica- 
ble,  and  threw  against  the  ramparts  of  Tarragona  sixteen 
companies  of  the  elite,  commanded  by  General  Hal)ert,  and 
supported  by  numerous  reserves.  A  most  furious  contest 
followed  ;  but  nothing  could  arrest  the  impetuosity  of  our 


Cil.  XYIL]  AMPAIGN     OF     18  11     IN     SPAIN.  299 

soldiers  ;  a  bloody  combat  was  waged  on  the  ramparts,  in 
the  streets,  and  even  in  the  houses  ;  it  ended  in  the  massacre 
of  a  part  of  the  garrison.  The  remainder,  to  the  number  of 
ten  thousand,  cut  off  from  retreat  by  sea,  attempted  in  vain 
to  escape  by  the  gate  of  Barcelona  ;  but  being  pursued,  sur- 
rounded, and  driven  upon  the  shore,  they  finally  laid  down 
their  arms.  The  Governor,  Contreras,  wounded  with  a 
bayonet,  surrendered  with  all  his  staff  ;  three  hundred  and 
twenty-two  pieces  of  cannon  fell  into  our  hands.  The  sack 
of  this  unfortunate  city  was  the  inevitable  result  of  such  a 
resistance.  Party  spirit,  the  deplorable  infirmity  of  human 
nature,  has  made  every  effort  to  detract  from  the  glory  which 
the  French  arms  won  on  this  occasion,  by  unworthy  decla- 
mations against  our  brave  men,  because  some  excesses  suc- 
ceeded to  an  assault  without  example  in  the  history  of  the 
war.  Where  have  these  philanthropic  writers  seen  cities 
taken  after  five  separate  assaults,  without  any  loss  to  the 
inhabitants,  especially  when  these  inhabitants  join  with  the 
garrison  iu  the  defense  of  their  ramparts.'* 

*  The  accounts  which  were  at  first  puWished  of  this  affair  by  Enghsh 
writers  were  exceedingly  unjust  to  Sucliet  and  his  officers.  The  resistance  of 
the  inhabitants  after  the  breach  was  carried,  necessardy  led  to  numerous  ex- 
cesses on  botli  sides  ;  but  these  were  stopped  as  soon  as  possible  under  the 
circumstances. 

The  following  is  Napier's  account  of  the  final  assault  : 

"  At  five  o'clock  in  the  evening,  the  French  fire  suddenly  ceased,  and  fifteen 
hundred  men  led  by  General  Habert  passing  out  from  the  parallel,  went  at  full 
speed  up  against  the  breach:  twelve  hundred  under  General  Ficartier  followed 
in  support.  General  Montmarie  led  a  brigade  round  the  left,  to  the  bastion  of 
Rosario,  with  a  view  to  break  the  gates  there  during  the  assault,  and  thus 
penetrating,  to  turn  the  interior  defense  of  the  Rarabla.  Harispe  took  post  on 
the  Barcelona  road,  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  garrison. 
"  The  columns  of  attack  had  to  pass  over  an  open  space  of  more  than  a  hun- 
dred yards  before  they  could  reach  the  foot  of  the  breach  ;  and  when  within 
twenty  yards  of  it,  the  hedge  of  aloes  obliged  them  to  turn  to  the  right,  and 
left,  under  a  terrible  fire  of  musketry  and  of  grape,  which  the  Spaniards,  who 
were  crowding  on  the  breach  with  apparent,  desperation,  poured  unceasingly 
upon  them.  The  destruction  was  great,  the  head  of  the  French  column  got 
into  confusion,  gave  back,  and  was  beginning  to  fly,  when  the  reserves  rushed 


300  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XYII. 

Further  Operations    of   Luchet. — The  fall  of  Tarragona 

produced  the  same  effect  in  Catalonia  as  that  of  Saragossa 
in  Aragon.  To  make  this  influence  still  more  decisive,  Suchet 
inarched  rapidly  on  Barcelona  and  Vich.  This  movement 
served  both  to  cooperate  with  the  blockade  of  Figueras,  and 
to  favor  a  project  which  ho  had  formed  against  Mont  Serrât. 


up,  and  a  great  many  officers  coming  forward  in  a  body,  ronewod  the  attack. 
At  that  moment  one  Bianchini,  an  Italian  soldier,  who  had  obtained  leave  to 
join  the  column  as  a  volunteer,  and  whoso  white  clothes,  amidst  tlie  blue  uni- 
forms of  the  French,  gave  him  a  supernatural  appearance,  went  forth  alone  from 
the  ranks,  and  gliding  silently  and  sternly  up  the  breach,  notwithstanding  many 
wounds,  reached  the  top,  and  there  fell  dead.  Then  the  multitude  bounded 
forward  with  a  shout,  the  first  line  of  the  Spaniards  fled,  and  the  ramparts  were 
darkened  by  the  following  masses  of  tho  French. 

'•  Meanwhile  Montmarie's  sappers  cut  away  the  palisades  at  Rosario,  and  his 
light  troops  finding  a  rope  h:inging  from  tho  wall,  mounted  by  it,  at  the  mo- 
ment when  the  assailants  at  the  broach  broke  the  Spanish  reserves  with  one 
shock,  and  poured  into  the  town  like  a  devastating  torrent.  At  the  Rambla 
a  momentary  stand  was  nideed  made,  but  the  impulse  of  victory  was  too  strong 
to  be  longer  resisted,  and  a  dreadful  scene  of  slaug'.iter  and  violence  ensued. 
Citizens  and  soldiers,  maddened  with  fear,  rushed  out  in  crowds  by  the  Barce- 
lona gate,  while  others,  throwing  themselves  over  the  ramparts,  made  for  the 
landing-places  within  the  Milagro  ;  but  that  way  also  had  been  intercepted  by 
General  Rogniat  with  his  sappers,  and  then  numbers  throwing  themselves  down 
the  steep  rocks  were  dashed  to  pieces,  while  they  who  gained  the  shore  were 
still  exposed  to  the  sword  of  the  enemy.  Those  that  went  out  by  the  Barce- 
lona gate  were  met  by  Harispe's  men,  and  some  being  killed,  tlie  rest,  three 
thousand  in  number,  were  made  prisoners.  But  within  the  town  all  was 
horror  ;  fire  had  been  set  to  many  houses  ;  Gonzales,  fighting  manfully,  was 
killed;  Contreras,  wounded  with  the  stroke  of  a  bayonet,  was  oidy  saved  by  a 
French  officer  ;  and  though  the  hospitals  were  respected  by  the  soldiers,  in 
every  other  part  their  fury  was  unbounded.  When  the  assault  first  com- 
menced, the  ship-launches  had  come  close  into  tho  Milagro,  and  now  saved 
some  of  tho  fugitives,  but  their  guns  swept  the  open  space  beyond,  killing 
friends  and  enemies,  as,  mixed  together,  they  rushed  to  tho  shore  ;  and  the 
French  dragoons,  passing  through  the  flaming  streets  at  a  trot,  rode  upon  the 
fugitives,  sabring  those  who  had  outstripped  the  infantry.  In  every  quarter 
there  was  great  rage  nrd  oruelt}',  and  although  most  of  tho  women  and  chil- 
dren had,  during  the  .--iege,  been  removed  from  Tarragona  by  the  English  ship- 
ping, and  though  the  uc.est  citizens  had  all  gone  to  Sitjos,  this  assault  was 
memorable  as  a  day  of  blood.  Only  seven  or  eight  hundred  miserable  crea- 
tures, principally  soldiers,  escaped  on  board  the  vessels;  nine  thousand,  in- 
cluding the  sick  and  wounded,  were  made  prisoners  ;  more  than  five  thousand 
persons  were  slain,  aud  a  great  part  of  the  city  was  reduced  to  ashes.'' 


Cil.  XVII.]         CAMPAIGN     OF     1811     IX     SPAIN.  301 

Leaving  Ilariopc's  division  in  Ihc  environs  of  Vicli,  lie  re- 
turned to  organize  the  garrisons  and  government  of  Tarra- 
gona and  Tortosa  ;  then,  directing  the  mass  of  liis  forces  on 
Lerida  as  though  he  intended  to  remain  in  Aragon,  he 
marched  with  a  detached  division  on  Igualada,  while  Greneral 
Harispe,  on  the  appointed  day,  executed  a  similar  movement. 
He  thus  enveloped  and  attacked  the  celebrated  mountain  of 
Serrât,  where  the  Baron  of  Eroles  had  intrenched  himself  in 
a  position  reputed  impregnable.  The  redoubts  and  convent 
were  turned  and  carried  ;  the  Sjianiards  effected  their  escape 
across  the  23recipices. 

We  established  a  garrison  in  this  defensive  point,  which 
completed  the  reduction  of  southern  Catalonia. 

He  is  made  Marshal. — Fully  satisfied  with  the  operations 
of  Suchet,  I  sent  him  the  bâton  of  Marshal  of  France,  and 
gave  him  the  command  of  southern  Catalonia  ;  Macdonald 
was  called  to  the  army  of  Eussia  which  was  organizing,  and 
the  command  of  the  corps  of  occupation  of  Upper  Catalonia 
was  given  to  General  Decaen.  This  officer  had  served  with 
distinction  in  the  army  of  Moreau  in  1800,  and  at  the  jDcace 
of  Amiens  was  appointed  governor  of  our  jiublic  possessions 
in  India, 'which  he  had  defended  with  all  the  means  in  his 
power. 

He  prepares  to  attack  Talencia. — The  resistance  of  the 
Catalans  was  now  weakened  ;  Andalusia  was  reduced,  and  I 
thought  that  if  we  should  succeed  in  reducing  Valencia  and 
Murcia,  wo  might  unite  all  our  means  against  Wellington. 
No  one  was  more  capable  than  Suchet  of  directing  the  im- 
portant operations  in  the  East  ;  I  therefore  ordered  him  to 
take  Valencia. 

His  preparations  were  made  with  wisdom  ;  he  deemed  it 
necessary  to  strike  a  sudden  and  decisive  blow,  so  as  not  to 
exhaust  the  provinces  from  which  he  was  to  draw  his 
resources  ;  while  at  the  same  time  he  might  envelop  and 


302  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON  [Ch.  XVII. 

capture  tlie  army  which  the  enemy  had  assembled  for  the 
defense  of  that  place. 

To  accomplish  this  double  object  the  army  of  Aragon 
required  reënforcements,  having  been  considerably  reduced 
by  the  severe  operations  of  the  sieges  it  had  carried  on,  and 
by  the  detachments  required  f  jr  the  new  garrison  ;  but  while 
strongly  soliciting  reënforcements,  Suchet  prepared  to  obey 
my  orders  ;  he  rapidly  collected  his  disposable  forces,  and  oa 
the  twentieth  of  September,  marched  before  Saguntum. 

Sie^c  of  Saguntum. — At  four  leagues  from  Valencia,  and 
at  the  junction  of  the  roads  to  that  city  from  Saragossa  by 
Terruel  and  from  Barcelona  by  Tortosa,  lie  the  ancient  and 
numerous  ruins  of  the  celebrated  Saguntum,  which  is  situa- 
ted on  a  steep  and  isolated  rock  above  the  town  and  the  river 
of  Murviedro.  Some  recent  works  had  strengthened  this 
post  sufficiently  to  intercept  the  passage.  It  was  large 
enough  to  receive  a  garrison  of  two  or  three  thousand  men, 
and  to  reduce  it  required  a  regular  siege.  Valencia  had  also 
been  covered  by  a  vast  line  of  intrenchments  in  front  of  the 
enciente  of  the  place  ;  its  bridges  had  been  cut,  its  faubourgs 
raised,  and  a  good  intrenched  camp  behind  the  Guadalaviar 
secured  the  defense  of  the  place,  which  the  regency  had 
intrusted  to  General  Blake.  To  his  title  of  captain-general 
were  added  unlimited  powers,  and  the  command  of  all  the 
Spanish  forces  in  the  east  of  the  Peninsula.  These  forces 
were  composed  of  the  remains  of  the  old  regiments  of  the 
line.  Blake  had  stationed  General  Andriani  at  Saguntum, 
while  he  himself  remained  in  his  intrenched  camp  watching 
our  movements. 

On  arriving  before  Saguntum,  Marshal  Suchet  immediately 
occupied  Murviedro  ;  and,  as  a  part  of  the  enciente  of 
Saguntum  appeared  incomplete,  he  directed  an  escalade  to 
be  attempted  in  the  night,  in  hopes  of  avoiding  a  siege  ;  but 
the  enemy  was  on  the  alert  and  repelled  our  columns.     It  was 


Cn.  XVIT.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1811     IN     SPAIN.  303 

now  neccssaiy  to  cstaLlisli  batteries  on  tlie  only  accessible 
Bide  of  the  mountain  ;  Lut  there  "was  no  earth  here  except 
what  was  carried  by  our  troops,  and  the  plunging  fire  of  the 
fort  rendered  our  trenches  scarcely  tenable.  A  breach  was 
opened  on  the  eighteenth  of  October,  and  an  assault  at- 
tempted ;  but  the  steep  rock  and  the  obstinate  resistance  of 
the  Spaniards  rendered  this  attempt  also  unsuccessful.  The 
batteries  were  now  doubled  and  established  nearer  the  place, 
and  every  thing  ])repared  for  renewing  the  attack,  when 
General  Blake  left  his  intrenchments  in  order  to  succor  the 
place,  and  on  the  twenty-fifth  of  October  offered  us  battle. 

Battle  of  Sagimtiim. — To  take  from  the  enemy  the  moral 
advantage  of  the  initiative,  Suchet  resolved  to  march  against 
him,  leaving  some  battalions  to  continue  the  siege.  Blake's 
line  extended  from  the  heights  of  Puch  toward  the  two  little 
mountains  of  Germanel.  He  charged  with  vigor  by  the  road 
and  gained  possession  of  a  height  on  which  we  had  placed 
some  field-pieces.  Suchet  at  this  moment  discovered  that 
the  enemy  had  too  much  extended  his  front  in  order  to 
manœuvre  by  both  wings.  In  imitation  of  my  movements 
at  Eiivoli  and  Austerlitz,  he  ordered  a  rapid  attack  on  the 
Spanish  centre,  pierced  it  and  pat  to  flight  the  left  wing  ; 
the  right  sustained  an  obstinate  combat  on  the  heights  of 
Puch  ;  but  was  finally  forced  to  yield,  and  retreated  with 
the  others  in  disorder  to  Valencia,  in  full  view  of  the  English 
squadron  and  the  garrison  who  remained  impassible  specta- 
tors of  the  battle.  Saguntum  capitulated  the  next  day, 
surrendering  to  us  nineteen  pieces  of  cannon,  and  two  tliou- 
.sand  five  hundred  men.  We  had  taken  in  the  battle  four 
thousand  prisoners,  four  stand  of  colors,  and  twelve  pieces  of 
cannon.  Nothing  now  prevented  our  march  on  Valencia  ; 
Oropesa  was  in  our  power  ;  Peniscola  was  masked,  but  still 
held  out. 

Investment  of  Valencia. — But  Suchet  now  waited  for  the 


304  LIFE     or    NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVII. 

promised  reënforcements,  and  did  not  yet  approach  Valencia  ; 
during  the  month  of  November,  he  defeated  the  two  corps 
of  the  enemy  which  showed  themselves,  one  in  advance  of 
Gaudalaviar  near  Betera,  and  the  other  on  the  road  to 
Segorbia.  Near  the  middle  of  December,  he  was  informed 
that  General  lieille  was  bringing  him  a  French  and  an  Italian 
division  from  Pampeluna  by  Terruel,  and  that  Marshal  Mar- 
mont  had  received  orders,  at  the  same  time,  to  detach  a  divi- 
sion across  Castile  on  Valencia.  He  immediately  made  his 
dispositions  to. manoeuvre  against  Blake.  These  dispositions 
bear  the  stamp  of  a  skillful  and  experienced  coicp-d'œil. 
Seeing  that  the  enemy's  forces  were  extended  in  their  lines 
from  Manisses  to  the  sea-shore,  and  that  Valencia  was  too  far 
from  the  water  to  favor  an  embarkation,  for  which,  however, 
no  preparations  had  been  made,  he  deemed  that  a  successful 
attack  against  their  left,  would  be  decisive.  Their  only  line 
of  retreat  was  on  Alicante,  which  however  could  bo  reached 
by  the  French  before  them. 

The  corps  of  General  Reille  having  arrived,  three  divisions 
of  cavalry  crossed  the  river,  on  the  twenty-sixth  of  Decem- 
ber, two  leagues  above  the  city  ;  while  on  the  left  bank  the 
whole  camp  of  Blake  from  Manisses  to  the  sea-shore  was 
attacked  in  front.  This  attack  gave  place  to  a  warm  and 
bloody  combat  ;  but  in  the  mean  time  the  marshal  had 
passed  the  river,  gained  the  extreme  left  of  the  enemy, 
defeated  and  driven  back  all  the  troops  whicli  were  succes- 
sively brought  to  oppose  him,  so  that  the  whole  Spanish 
army  found  itself  driven  within  the  fortifications  of  Valencia, 
excejjt  a  corps  which  escaped  between  Albufera  and  the  sea, 
and  which  was  jmrsued  to  St.  Philip. 

Siege  of  that  Place. — The  siege  commenced  immediately 
after  the  investment.  Under  the  circumstances,  it  could  not 
be  of  long  duration  ;  the  exterior  évidente,  being  a  mere  field- 
work  of  earth,  and  having  too  much  development  for  a  regu- 


Gh.  XVII.]  CA5IPAIGN     OF     1811     IN    SPA.IN.  305 

lar  defense,  was  aLancloned  after  eight  days'  resistance,  with 
eighty  jjieccs  of  cannon.  Blake,  shut  up  in  Valencia,  now 
attempted  a  sortie,  but  only  a  small  column  under  cover  of 
the  night  escaped  into  the  mountains.  Shells  were  now 
thrown  into  the  city  in  order  to  intimidate  the  inhabitants  ; 
and  Blake,  being  summoned  to  surrender  and  threatened  with 
the  fate  of  Tarragona,  if  he  exposed  this  rich  city  to  the 
consequences  of  an  assault,  finally  capitulated  on  the  ninth 
of  January,  surrendering  to  us  himself  and  staff,  his  army 
of  nineteen  thousand  men,  twenty-one  stand  of  colors,  three 
hundred  and  seventy-four  pieces  of  cannon,  besides  immense 
magazines  and  military  munitions.  The  Spanish  general  did 
not  sustain  on  this  occasion  the  reputation  which  he  had 
previously  acquired  ;  to  surrender  a  city  in  order  to  save  it 
is  certainly  an  act  of  weakness  ;  but  to  surrender  it  with  an 
army  within  its  walls  is  an  act  of  cowardice. 

Rediictiou  of  Pcniscola  and  Gandia.— Suchet  employed 
three  days  in  establishing  order  within  the  city,  and  afterward 
moved  the  mass  of  his  forces  in  the  direction  of  Alicante. 
On  the  eleventh  of  January,  he  learned  of  General  Mont- 
bruu's  march  on  this  point  with  the  division  from  Portugal, 
and  recommended  this  general  to  return  immediately  to  Mar- 
mont,  his  assistance  being  no  longer  required.  Montbrun, 
being  disgusted  with  marching  entirely  across  Spain  for  no 
purpose,  and  not  wishing  to  return  without  doing  something, 
presented  himself  before  Alicante,  and  threatened  to  bombard 
the  place.  But  as  the  Spaniards  did  not  allow  themselves  to 
be  imposed  on  by  the  few  howitzers  which  he  carried  in  his 
train,  he  resumed  his  march  to  Estremadura,  where  his 
absence  had  been  disastrous  to  Marmont.  Soon  after  this 
the  capture  of  Peniscola  and  Gandia  completed  the  submis- 
sion of  the  kingdom  of  Valencia. "'•'■ 

*  Napier's  observations  on  these  events  are  brief  and  instructive. 
"  1st.  The  events  whicli  led  to  llie  capiiulati(ju  of  Valencia,  were  but  a  con- 
VOL.  I  I. — 20. 


306  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEO>î.  [Cn .  XV.I. 

So  many  successes  merited  a  recompense  auJ  an  encour- 
agement ;  I  therefore  conferred  on  Suchet  the  title  of  Duke 
of  Albufera,  and  gave  to  his  army  a  donation  of  two  hundred 
millions  of  francs,  levied  on  the  provinces  which  they  had 
conquered  with  so  much  glory.* 

Remarks  on  Sonlt's  Opcriations  in  the  South. — These 
events  formed  a  contrast  with  what  was  jiassing  in  the  rest 
of  the  Peninsula  ;  nevertheless,  it  must  he  said  in  Soult's 
praise,  that  he  had  skillfully  maintained  himself  in  his  deli- 
cate position.  Arrested  in  front  by  two  impregnable  cities — 
Cadiz  and  Gibraltar — one  of  which  served  as  the  focus  of  the 

tinuation  of  those  faults  which  had  before  ruined  the  Spanish  cause  in  every 
Ijart  of  the  Peninsula,  namely,  the  neglect  of  all  good  military  usages,  and  the 
mania  for  fighting  great  battles  with  bad  troops. 

"  2d.  Blake  needed  not  to  have  fought  a  serious  action  during  any  part  of 
the  campaign.  He  miglit  have  succored  Saguntum  without  a  dangerous  bat- 
tle, and  might  have  retreated  in  safety  behind  the  Guadalaviar  ;  he  might  have 
dc'fended  that  river  without  risking  his  whole  army,  and  then  have  retreated 
bdhind  the  Xucar.  He  should  never  have  shut  up  his  army  in  Valencia,  but 
having  done  so  he  should  never  have  capitulated.  Eighteen  thousand  men, 
well  conducted,  could  always  have  broken  through  the  thin  circle  of  invest- 
ment, drawn  by  Suchet,  especially  as  the  Spaniards  had  the  power  of  opera- 
tmg  on  both  banks  of  the  river.  But  the  campaign  was  one  huge  error 
throughout,  and  was  pithily  summed  up  in  one  sentence  by  the  Duke  of  "Wel- 
lington. Being  accused  by  the  regency  at  Cadiz  of  having  caused  the  catas- 
trophe, by  permitting  the  army  of  the  Xorlh  and  that  of  Portugal  to  send  re- 
enforcements  to  Suchet,  he  replied  thus — '  The  misfortunes  of  Valencia  are  to 
be  attributed  to  Blake's  ignorance  of  his  profession,  and  to  Mahi's  cowardice 
and  treachery.'  " 

*  Napier  says  of  this  general  : 

"  On  the  fourteenth  of  January,  Suchet  made  his  triumphal  entry  into 
Valencia,  having  completed  a  series  of  campaigns  in  which  the  feebleness  of 
his  adversaries  somewhat  diminished  his  glory,  but  in  which  his  own  activity 
and  skill,  were  not  the  less  conspicious.  Napoleon  created  him  Duke  of  Albu- 
fera,  and  his  civil  administration  was  strictly  in  unison  with  his  conduct  in  the 
field,  that  is  to  say,  vigorous  and  prudent.  He  arrested  all  dangerous  persons, 
especially  the  friars,  and  sent  them  to  France,  and  he  rigorously  deprived  the 
people  of  their  military  resources  ;  but  he  proportioned  his  demands  to  their 
real  ability,  kept  his  troops  in  perfect  discipline,  was  careful  not  to  cfiend  tiie 
citizens  by  violating  their  customs,  or  shocking  their  religious  prejudices,  and 
endeavored,  as  much  as  possible,  to  govern  through  the  native  authorities. 
The  archbishop  and  many  of  the  clergy  aided  him,  and  the  submission  of  the 
people  was  secured." 


Cil.  XVII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF    1811     IN    SPAIN.  307 

whole  Spanish  resistance  ;  menaced  on  the  left  by  the  army  of 
Murcia,  and  in  rear  by  Wellington  and  Badajos,  he  had,  never- 
theless, extricated  himself  by  his  activity.  Viewed,  however, 
in  their  strategic  relations,  his  operations  were  open  to  criti- 
cisms ;  he  should  have  operated  more  on  his  wings,  espe- 
cially by  the  right.  On  learning  the  affair  of  Chiclana,  I 
had  recommended  him  to  attach  less  importance  to  the  occu- 
pation of  the  territory,  and  to  concentrate  all  his  attention 
on  Cadiz,  Seville  and  Badajos,  the  occupation  of  Malaga  and 
Grenada,  being  only  accessories  which  could  be  accomplished 
by  movable  columns.  But  the  hope  of  preserving  these 
superb  jjrovinces  induced  him  to  not  abandon  them.  He 
thus  had  a  hundred  leagues  of  territory  to  protect  against 
indefatigable  guerillas  and  organized  forces,  which,  having 
nothing  to  cover,  could  concentrate  any  where  and  operate 
in  any  direction,  while  any  movement  of  Soult's  forces 
seriously  interfered  with  his  occupation  of  the  conquered 
pro-vinces. 

Taking;  all  things  into  consideration,  our  affairs  in  the 
Peninsula  had  been  improved  during  this  campaign,  notwith- 
standing the  unfortunate  retreat  from  Portugal.  There 
seemed  no  doubt  that,  if  successful  in  my  enterprise  against 
Russia,  I  might  soon  terminate  the  war  in  Spain  by  going 
there  myself.  But  the  events  of  1812,  and  the  double  disas- 
ter of  Moscow  and  Salamanca,  entirely  changed  the  face  of 
aftairs,  and  broke  the  double  sceptre  of  Charles  Y.  and  of 
Charlemagne. 

Winter  Campaign  of  Wellington  in  Estremadura.— The 
satisfaction  which  I  derived  from  the  brilliant  successes  of  Tar- 
ragona, Saguntum  and  Valencia,  was  destined  to  be  of  short 
duration.  It  has  already  been  said,  that,  after  the  momen- 
tary junction  of  Soult  and  Marmont  for  the  relief  of  Bada- 
jos, these  two  armies  had  again  separated,  the  former  return- 
ing to  Andalusia,  and  the  latter  to  Ciudad-Kodrigo,  where 


308  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVII. 

Wellington  was  threatening  a  serious  attack.  I  had  in  the 
mean  time  taken  efficacious  measures  for  the  reënforcement 
of  my  army  ;  on  hearing  the  news  of  Massena's  retreat,  and 
the  events  of  Chiclana  and  Albuera,  I  had  sent  into  Spain 
all  the  troops  which  I  could  spare  without  seriously  interfer- 
ing with  my  preparations  against  Russia.  A  corps  of  reserve, 
formed  in  old  Castile  under  Count  Dorsenne,  was  ordered  to 
march  on  Salamanca  to  second  Marmont,  while  their  place  in 
the  north  was  temporarily  supplied  by  the  detachments 
destined  for  the  reënforcement  of  the  regiments  of  the 
difierent  arms. 

By  the  aid  of  these  jjowerful  reënforcements,  Marmont  had 
no  difficulty  in  raising  the  siege  of  Ciudad-Rodrigo.  Wel- 
lington was  not  a  man  to  engage  his  troops  unless  the  chances 
were  in  his  favor.  He  retreated  to  the  impregnable  position 
of  Guinaldo  and  Sabugal.  Marmont's  advance  to  offer  him 
battle,  and  his  retirement  to  his  own  cantonments,  when  a 
battle  was  declined  by  the  English  ;  and  finally  his  detach- 
ment of  Montbrun's  division  in  the  direction  of  Alicante  to 
second  Suchet,  have  already  been  mentioned.  Wellington 
who  was  promptly  informed  of  all  our  movements,  deter- 
mined to  profit  by  the  detachment  of  Montbrun,  and  the 
retirement  of  Marmont's  troops  into  their  cantonments,  to 
strike  some  decisive  blows  in  Estramadura. 

My  lieutenant  had  supposed  that  his  adversary  would  not 
attempt  a  campaign  at  a  season  of  the  year  which  is  always 
exceedingly  rigorous  in  this  latitude,  especially  among  the 
mountains,  and  consequently  he  was  not  prepared  to  repel 
his  attack. 

He  captures  Ciudad-Rodrigo  and  Badajos.— But  notwith- 
standing the  great  depth  of  the  snow,  the  cold  was  not  so 
great  as  to  prevent  the  English  army,  which  was  abundantly 
supplied  with  every  thing,  from  taking  the  field.  Welling- 
ton passed  the  Agueda  on  the  eighth  of  January,  approached 


Ch.  XVII.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1811     IN     SPAIN.  309 

Ciudad-Rodrigo,  and  pushed  forward  the  siege  so  that  two 
breaches  were  made  practicable  by  the  twenty-first.  The 
masonry  of  the  body  of  the  place  was  uncovered,  so  as  to 
expose  it  to  be  breached  by  the  English  artillery,  which  threw 
against  it  solid  sliot  of  large  size  and  ninety-six  pounder  shells 
fired  horizontally  from  iron  carronades.  The  assault  was 
made  the  next  day,  and  sustained  by  the  garrison  with  a 
bravery  worthy  of  a  better  fate  ;  the  place,  however,  was 
carried,  and  the  garrison  of  seventeen  hundred  men  taken 
prisoners.  Marmont,  who  in  the  mean  time  had  laid  quiet 
in  his  cantonments,  advanced  toward  Salamanca  a  few  days 
after  the  capture  of  Ciudad-Rodrigo  ;  but  the  English  had 
in  the  mean  time  repaired  the  breaches  and  garrisoned  the 
place.  This  loss  was  the  more  to  be  regretted  as  Marmont 
had  no  means  of  carrying  on  a  siege. 

Wellington  now  retired  behind  the  Agueda,  passed  the 
Guadiana  the  sixteenth  of  March,  and  appeared  before  Bad- 
ajos.  It  was  hardly  to  be  supposed  that  Soult  would  be  as 
dilatory  in  securing  this  j^lace,  as  Marmont  had  been  in 
relieving  Ciudad-Rodrigo.  Wellington's  project  was  based 
on  the  possibility  of  carrying  Fort  Picurina,  02)ening  the 
second  parallel  at  its  base  and  breaching  the  masonry  in  the 
same  way  as  at  Ciudad-Rodrigo.  The  place  was  defended 
by  four  thousand  men  under  the  same  Philippon  who  had 
covered  himself  with  so  much  glory  in  the  first  siege.  Fort 
Picurina  was  attacked  on  the  night  of  the  twenty-fourth  and 
twenty-fifth  of  March,  and,  after  a  heavy  bombardment, 
carried  without  opposition  ;  the  second  parallel  was  immedi- 
ately established  and  the  breach  batteries  opened  with  so 
much  success,  that,  on  the  fifth  of  April,  three  large  breaches 
were  made  practicable  ;  the  assault  was  made  the  next  day. 
Two  divisions  assailed  the  breaches,  while  two  others 
attempted  an  escalade  on  the  oj)posite  side  toward  the 
castle  ;    the   latter,   however,   was   intended    as   a   feint   to 


310  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVII. 

divide  the  attention  of  the  garrison  rather  than  with  any 
expectation  of  success  on  this  point. 

The  attention  of  the  commandant  and  of  the  garrison,  was 
wholly  directed  toward  the  side  of  the  breaches  ;  all  their 
preparations  were  made  with  skill,  and  the  English  after  two 
murderous  assaults  saw  themselves  forced  to  retreat.  But, 
by  a  most  unexpected  chance,  the  columns  which  were  to 
attempt  an  escalade  on  the  opposite  side,  which  had  been 
deemed  invulnerable,  succeeded  in  making  a  lodgment  on  the 
rampart,  and  in  suddenly  assailing  our  brave  men  who  had 
just  covered  themselves  with  so  much  glory.  A  severe  com- 
bat was  engaged  hand  to  hand  ;  but  as  the  enemj'-  had 
already  penetrated  in  considerable  numbers  and  as  our  men 
fought  without  order  or  concert,  the  garrison  was  finally 
forced  to  surrender.  The  brave  Philippon  was  above  all  sus- 
picion ;  but  cither  his  measures  were  not  well  taken  or  one 
of  his  officers  failed  in  his  duty.  If  he  had  had  a  suitable 
and  well-disposed  reserve,  it  is  probable  that  this  misfortune 
would  not  have  happened.  The  English,  however,  lost  two 
hundred  officers  and  three  thousand  four  hundred  men  killed 
and  wounded,  which  is  an  incontestable  j)roof  of  the  vigor 
and  brilliancy  of  the  defense. 

Soult  arrived  the  next  day  at  the  head  of  his  army,  and, 
on  hearing  the  fate  of  the  place,  fell  back  on  Seville,  which 
place  had  again  been  threatened  by  the  Spaniards  during  his 
absence. 

Remarks  on  these  Operations! — The  loss  of  these  two 
places,  which  covered  the  centre  of  our  immense  line  of  oper- 
ations from  Bayonne  to  Cadiz,  was  a  bad  omen.  Marmont, 
supposing  that  Soult  had  sufficient  forces  for  the  protection 
of  Badajos  without  his  assistance,  as  in  the  first  siege,  had 
preferred  to  remain,  and  seek  to  repair  the  affront  which  he 
himself  had  just  received.  He  consequently  invested  Ciudad- 
Bodrigo  and  Almeida,  and  then  advanced  into  Portugal  as 


Ch.  XVII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1811     IN     SPAIN.  311 

far  as  Castel-Franco.  He  intended  either  to  destroy  the 
bridge  of  Villa-Ucha,  or  to  pass  the  river  at  that  place  and 
cooperate  with  Soult  in  the  rescue  of  Budajos,  by  threaten- 
ing Wellington's  line  of  retreat.  If  this  movement  had 
been  concerted  with  Soult,  it  would  have  been  wise  ;  but, 
being  isolated,  it  could  effect  nothing.  On  hearing  that 
Badajos  had  fallen,  and  that  his  adversary  was  returning 
upon  the  Tagus,  Marmont  again  fell  back  upon  his  depots. 

Insurrcctioa  in  Spanisb  America.— Many  other  memor- 
able events  occurred  in  1811  ;  the  insurrection  of  Spanish 
America  by  Miranda,  the  creation  of  the  Eepnblic  of  Ven- 
ezuela and  Carraccas,  the  preliminary  acts  of  the  independence 
of  Mexico  and  Peru,  announced  in  all  parts  of  this  hemisphere 
the  dawn  of  a  new  political  era.  A  formidable  counterpoise 
was  forming  in  the  new  world,  and  threatening  the  overthrow 
of  the  colonial  system  of  the  Europeans.  Europe  was  at 
this  time  so  occupied  with  me,  that  it  could  give  but  little 
attention  to  these  important  events,  which  were  calculated 
to  eventually  effect  a  comj)lete  revolution  in  the  maritime, 
commercial,  and  political  affairs  of  the  old  world. 

General  State  of  Affairs  in  Spain.— The  loss  of  Ciudad- 
Kodrigo  and  Badajos  annoyed  me,  less  by  the  real  impor- 
tance of  the  places  themselves,  than  by  the  talent  displayed 
by  my  new  adversary  in  their  capture,  and  the  manifest  negli- 
gence of  my  lieutenants  in  obeying  my  instructions.  I  had 
directed  the  two  marshals  to  furnish  these  places  w^ith  suffi- 
cient garrisons  and  provisions  for  six  months  ;  Marmont,  in 
particular,  was  inexcusable  for  leaving  Ciudad-Kodrigo  with 
too  feeble  a  garrison.  I  felt  these  reverses  the  more  sensibly, 
as  I  was  on  the  eve  of  my  expedition  against  Kussia.  For- 
tunately, Suchet's  successes  amply  compensated  for  these 
disasters,  and  I  flattered  myself  that  after  disposing  of  the 
enemy  in  the  east  of  Spain  and  north  of  Europe,  I  would  be 
able  to  take  my  revenge  by  concentrating  all  our  means  for  a 


312  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEOIs'.  [Cu.  XVil. 

decisive  blow  against  tlie  English  in  the  Peninsula.  Many 
skillful  judges,  however,  are  of  opinion  that  I  would  have 
done  better  to  repair  to  Spain  myself,  recapture  our  lost 
fortresses,  and  drive  Wellington  from  the  Peninsula,  rather 
than  to  engage  in  the  expedition  to  Kussia.  I  will  explain 
hereafter  the  reasons  which  decided  my  course. 

CoQtiiiiiation  of  the  War  between  Russia  and  Turkey.— 
The  events  of  the  latter  part  of  the  campaign  of  1811  in 
Turkey,  were  not  calculated  to  authorize  me  to  hope  as  much 
from  this  diversion  as  I  had  previously  expected.  I  was  not 
ignorant  of  the  famous  Roman  maxim,  never  to  undertake 
two  loars  at  the  same  time.  If  Sj^ain  furnished  occupation 
for  a  half  of  my  army,  Turkey  also  occupied  one  hundred 
thousand  Russians. 

Kamenski,  being  reenforccd  during  the  winter  by  twenty- 
five  thousand  recruits,  took  Loweza  in  the  month  of  Feb- 
ruary, the  Turks  having  lost  in  its  defense  four  thousand 
men  killed  and  prisoners.  The  Emperor  Alexander  now 
ordered  five  divisions  of  this  army  to  return  to  the  frontiers 
of  Poland,  and  Kutusof,  on  the  death  of  Kamenski,  took 
command  of  the  remaining  fifty  thousand.  After  several 
undecisive  battles,  this  general  dismantled  the  Avorks  which 
had  cost  his  predecessor  so  much  blood,  and  retired  behind 
the  Danube.  The  Vizir  passed  the  Danube  above  Roud- 
schouck,  but  found  himself  opposed  to  a  line  of  field-works 
which  Kutusof  had  constructed  to  intercept  his  advance. 
Seeing  himself  opposed  in  front  by  a  well-defended  line  of 
fortifications,  with  the  Danube  and  the  corps  of  Markof  in 
his  rear,  the  Vizir  abandoned  his  army  and  efiected  his  escape 
in  a  boat.  Ismael-Bey  had  crossed  the  river  at  Widden,  but 
on  seeing  that  Zass  had  also  erected  a  line  of  intrenchments 
to  prevent  his  advance,  he  retired  behind  the  Danube.  Rus- 
sia profited  by  the  perilous  position  of  the  Vizir's  army  to 
negotiate  for  peace,  which  had  now   become  necessary  on 


Cil.  XVII.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1811     IN     SPAIN.  313 

account  of  mysterious  2)reparations  in  the  north.  An  armis- 
tice was  conckuled  ;  and,  during  the  negotiations  for  peace, 
the  remains  of  the  army  of  the  Vizir  capitulated,  and  were 
carried  prisoners  into  Eussia.  I  hoped  to  intercept  these 
negotiations  by  declaring  war  against  Russia  ;  but  unfor- 
tunately Sebastiani,  who  enjoyed  the  full  confidence  of  the 
Turks,  had  left  Constantinople,  and  the  Sultan,  whose 
capital  he  had  saved  in  1807,  had  perished,  the  victim  of 
fanaticism  and  anarchy.  My  new  minister,  Latour-Mau- 
bourg,  neglected  nothing  to  carry  out  my  instructions,  but  he 
had  not  the  same  title  to  the  confidence  of  the  Ottomans. 
Informed  by  my  enemies  of  the  stipulations  of  Erfurth,  and 
by  Austria  of  the  project  of  partition,  the  Turks  abandoned 
themselves  without  reserve  to  the  counsels  of  England.  The 
British  minister  became  all  powerful  with  the  divan,  and 
every  effort  was  resorted  to  to  induce  it  to  make  peace  with 
Eussia  ;  while  I  sought  to  prevent  this  consummation  by  a 
declaration  of  war  against  the  enemy  of  the  Porte. 

The  campaign  against  Persia  had  been  attended  with  suc- 
cess ;  the  Eussians,  who  had  for  three  years  been  in  posses- 
sion of  Anapa,  captured  the  allies'  camp  at  Ascholkalaki  on 
the  seventeenth  of  September,  1810,  and  carried  their  vic- 
torious banners  to  the  walls  of  Poti  and  the  mouth  of  the 
Euphrates  ;  while  in  the  east,  they  pushed  their  success 
along  the  borders  of  the  Caspian  Sea  to  the  walls  of 
Lankaran.  This  war  was  for  them  a  relaxation  rather  than 
a  serious  diversion. 

It  is  time  to  turn  from  these  distant  countries  to  the 
grand  enterprise  which  was  to  put  Europe  at  my  feet,  or  to 
wholly  ruin  the  immense  edifice  which  I  had  erected  with  so 
much  care  and  labor. 


CHAPTER  XVIIL 

WAR  OF   1812,  OR  CAMPAIGN  IN  RUSSIA. 

Part  I. — Advance  to  Moscow. 

Causes  of  the  "War  with  Russia — Opinions  of  Napoleon's  Counselors — Military 
Chances  of  Succe=is — Negotiations  with  Russia— Fruits  of  the  Continental 
Sj'Stem — Occupation  of  Swedish  Pomerania — Alliance  with  Prussia — Pacific 
Proposals  to  the  Emperor  Alexander — Offensive  and  Defensive  Alliance  with 
Austria — Result  of  the  Negotiations  with  Russia — Proposals  of  Peace  to 
England — Ultimatum  of  Russia — Napoleon  repairs  to  Dresden — Return  of 
Narbonne — Pradfs  Mission  to  Warsaw — Ligneui's  Mission  to  Sweden — Pre- 
parations for  opening  the  Campaign — Diversion  of  the  Turks — Dispositions 
of  the  Russian  Army — Its  Organization — French  and  Allied  Arm}' — Plans  of 
Napoleon — Passage  of  the  Niémen — The  Russians  retreat  on  Drissa — Napo- 
leon's Delay  at  Wilna — Mission  of  Balaschof — Reply  of  Napoleon — Poland- 
War  between  England  and  the  United  States — Operations  against  Bagration 
— Napoleon  advances  on  Polotsk — Camp  of  Drissa — Alexander  retires  to  St. 
Petersburg — Operations  of  Barclay — Combats  of  Ostrowno — Operations  of 
Bagration — Affair  of  Mohilew — Halt  at  Witepsk — Operations  of  Napoleon's 
Wings — Tormassof  defeats  the  Saxons — Operations  of  Oudmot — Turkey, 
Sweden  and  England — Council  of  War — Barclay  takes  the  Offensive — Napo- 
leon's March  on  Smolensk — Battles  of  Smolensk — Retreat  of  Barclay — 
Results  of  the  Campaign — Ney  passes  the  Dnieper — Hazardous  March  of 
Barclay — Pursuit  of  Ney  and  Murat — Battle  of  Valoutina — Retreat  of  the 
Russians — Position  of  Napoleon — Battle  of  Gorodeczno — Affairs  of  Polotsk 
— Napoleon  resolves  to  advance  —  Character  of  the  Country — New  Gener- 
alissimo of  the  Russian  Armies — Preparations  for  Battle — Position  of  the 
Enemy — Plan  of  Attack — Battle  of  Borodino  or  the  Moscowa — Remarks  ou 
this  Battle — Napoleon  enters  Mosco\\' — The  Russians  burn  the  City — New 
Projects  of  Napoleon — The  Russians  march  on  Taroutina — Embarrassing 
Position  of  the  French. 

Causes  of  the  War  with  Russia. — The  great  enterprise 
■which  was  to  decide  the  fate  of  Europe,  or  rather  the  empire 
of  the  world,  was  preparing  amid  songs  of  victory.  The 
cannon  on  the  tower  of  London,  were  announcing  the  success 
of  Wellington  at  Ciudad-Rodrigo  and  Badajos;  while  the 


Ch.  XVIII.]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA 


315 


Eussicins  were  celebrating  the  success  of  Kutusof  on  the 
Danube,  and  the  French  were  consolhig  themselves  with  the 
victories  of  Suchet  at  Valencia.  Negotiations  still  continued 
with  Russia,  but  the  discussion  of  merely  incidental  ques- 
tions tended  to  embarrass,  rather  than  clear  up  the  main 
causes  of  the  dispute. 

I  have  already  partially  explained  the  motives  which  drew 
the  two  countries  into  this  war.  It  is  not  exactly  true  that 
the  Eussian  and  French  cabinets  were  in  favor  of  war,  while 
the  two  Emperors  were  opposed  to  it,  for  it  is  well  known 
that  Alexander  constituted  his  own  cabinet,  while  I  directed 
that  of  the  Tuileries.  The  alleged  motives  of  the  war,  on 
both  sides,  were  pretexts  ;  the  real  objects  were  different. 
It  must  be  confessed,  however,  that  if  the  two  sovereigns  had 
consulted  their  own  individual  wishes,  they  would  have  pre- 
fered  to  avoid,  or  at  least  to  postpone,  this  contest.  But, 
unfortunately,  the  interests  at  stake  were  so  great  that  such 
a  result  was  scarcely  possible  ;  to  attempt  any  thing  like  a 
permanent  reconciliation,  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  go 
back  to  the  treaty  of  Vienna  in  1809,  and  to  the  union  of 
the  mouths  of  the  Weser,  the  Elbe,  and  the  Trave  with  the 
French  Empire. 

I  had  long  felt  that  this  war  was  inevitable,  but  I  wished  to 
postpone  it  till  a  favorable  opportunity  occurred  for  carrying 
it  on.*  It  was,  in  my  opinion,  the  only  means  of  terminating 
for  ever,  the  contest  to  which  I  devoted  my  life.  It  was 
evident  to  the  most  simple,  that  Eussia  was  too  powerful  to 
ever  adhere  to  the  European  system  of  which  France  was  the 

*  The  reader  will  not  find  in  tliia  chapter  the  exact  impartia:lity  which  char- 
acterizes the  preceding  portions  of  this  work.  It  would  be  too  much  to  expect 
that  Jomiui's  opinion  of  this  war  should  not  be  somewhat  discolored  by  his 
attachment  to  the  cause,  as  well  as  to  the  person  of  the  Emperor  Alexander. 
Nevertheless,  it  must  be  admitted,  that  tliese  opinions  arc  expressed  with  a 
moderation  and  candor  seldom  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  those  who  were 
opposed  to  Napoleon. 


316  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XVIII. 

pivot.  My  edifice  liad  risen  too  high  for  its  base  ;  Russia 
pressed  witli  all  her  immense  weight  upon  its  summit  ;  Alex- 
ander, younger  than  myself  and  full  of  energy,  would  pro- 
bably outlive  me,  and  on  my  death  the  French  Empire  would 
be  dismembered.  It  was,  therefore,  necessary  to  jJace  Rus- 
sia in  such  a  condition  that  she  could  not  destroy  the  unity 
of  my  system,  and  to'  give  new  political  boundaries  to  my 
frontiers  sufficiently  strong  to  resist  the  weight  of  the  entire 
jiower  of  the  Czars.  Such  an  attempt  would  require  not 
only  the  strength  of  my  own  empire,  but  also  that  of  my 
allies.  It  was  not  without  its  dangers  ;  but  at  the  same 
time  there  were,  at  least,  many  chances  of  success  ;  and, 
moreover,  it  was  the  only  means  of  consolidating  my  work. 

To  render  this  plan  successful,  it  was  necessary  to  recon- 
struct Poland,  and  to  comj^el  the  Russians  to  accept  the  new 
frontiers  thus  traced  with  the  point  of  the  sword.  Russia 
might  then  renew  her  alliance  with  Eno;land  without  danger 
to  my  empire,  which  would  be  separated  from  the  power  of 
the  Czars  by  an  immense  extent  of  country  and  a  guard  of 
two  hundred  thousand  men.  Our  success  would,  therefore, 
not  only  consolidate  the  present,  but  also  serve  as  a  sure 
guarantee  of  the  future.  This  would  be  my  last  war,  and 
decide  the  political  fate  of  Europe.  Some  have  attributed 
to  me  the  project  of  marching  into  India  through  Persia.  I 
do  not  deny  having  thought  of  the  possibility  of  sending  an 
exjjedition  there  ;  but  it  would  have  been  only  a  secondary 
object,  totally  subordinate  to  such  arrangements  as  Ave  might 
make  with  the  cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg.  I  had  no  idea  of 
going  there  in  person.  No  great  force  was  required  to  destroy 
the  monstrous  edifice  of  the  English  comj^any  ;  twenty  thou- 
sand good  soldiers,  a  large  number  of  officers,  a  little  money, 
and  a  good  understanding  with  the  Mahratta  chiefs,  would 
have  been  sufficient  to  accomplish  this  object. 

The  essential  base  of  my  project  was  the  resurrection  of 


Ch.  XYIIL]  invasion    of    RUSSIA,  317 

Poland,  a  subject  as  delicate  to  treat  upon  with  Austria  as 
with  Russia.  It  was  necessary  to  guarantee  Galicia  to  the 
former,  or  to  offer  her  ample  indemnities  in  Italy  and  Ger- 
many. But  this  was  to  abandon  possessions  useful,  certain, 
and  contiguous  to  ray  empire,  for  distant  and  uncertain 
acquisitions, — a  sacrifice  which  I  made  dependent  on  the 
success  of  the  war.  It  was  so  arranged  in  the  secret  articles 
of  the  treaty  with  Austria.  I  knew  that  a  formal  proclama- 
tion of  the  reëstablishment  of  Poland  would  form  an  insur- 
mountable obstacle  to  any  arrangement  with  Russia  ;  if  I 
took  away  from  her,  by  a  public  act,  Lithuania,  Podolia,  and 
Volhynia,  it  made  it  necessary  to  carry  on  the  war  till  the 
cession  should  be  sanctioned  by  a  treaty  of  peace,  and  at 
the  same  time  announce  to  Alexander  that  he  must  conquer 
or  die.  In  attacking  a  colossal  power  like  Russia,  it  would 
have  been  madness  to  destroy  in  advance  all  chance  of  a 
reconciliation,  and  to  disjjose  of  provinces  which  were  as  yet 
unconquered.  All  that  I  could  do  was  to  prepare  this  eman- 
cipation and  to  tranquillize  Austria,  reserving  to  myself  the 
right  to  exchange  the  remainder  of  Galicia  for  the  Illyrian 
provinces  ;  this  was  to  admit  the  principle  of  the  future 
reunion  of  ancient  Poland  into  one  consolidated  power  ; 
which  would  have  been  an  immense  step  in  favor  of  the 
Pules,  but  they  did  not  appreciate  it,  and  a  hundred  pam- 
phlets have  reproached  me  with  having  sacrificed  them  to  my 
own  private  views  and  interests.  This  project  was  the  cause 
of  all  my  disasters,  and  posterity  will  blame  me  for  having 
undertaken  it  ;  but,  even  now,  I  do  not  well  see  how  the  war 
could  have  been  avoided,  and  I  preferred  conducting  it  myself 
to  leaving  it  for  my  successor. 

If  it  had  depended  on  me  to  determine  the  time  of  this 
war  with  Russia,  every  thing  continuing  as  had  been  arranged 
at  Tilsit,  I  should  certainly  have  delayed  it  for  two  or  three 
years,  (ill  I  could  end  the  war  in  Spain.     But  in  these  three 


318  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XVIII. 

years,  Russia  might  entirely  destroy  my  Continental  System 
^-the  ruling  motive  of  my  policy.  If  she  should  augment 
her  forces  and  overthrow  my  power  in  the  north  of  Grermany, 
while  I  was  personally  engaged  in  Spain,  I  should  lose  more 
than  I  gained  by  postponing  the  war.  It  seemed  better  to 
delay  for  a  couple  of  years  the  termination  of  the  war  in 
Spain  ;  for  by  this  time  the  grand  question  of  the  north 
would  be  settled,  and  we  might  then  definitely  arrange  the 
affairs  of  the  south.  By  sending  an  annual  reënforcemcnt 
of  twenty-five  thousand  recruits  to  my  army  in  Sjiain,  I 
hoped  to  enable  it  to  maintain  its  present  position  in  the 
defensive  ;  this  was  all  I'  required.  The  question  was,  there- 
fore, reduced  to  these  two  j)oints  :  "  If  I  first  directed  my 
efforts  to  the  north,  the  south  could  give  me  no  serious  cause 
for  fear  ;  but  if  I  first  went  to  the  south,  the  north  might 
rise  and  render  the  condition  of  affairs  still  more  doubtful 
than  in  3809.  By  deferring  the  subjugation  of  Spain  for  two 
years,  I  was  merely  prolonging  a  guerilla  war  which  could 
have  no  dangerous  consequences  ;  but  by  deferring  for  two 
years  the  war  in  the  north,  I  could  gain  no  advantage  which 
would  be  decisive  in  determining  the  main  question  at  issue  ; 
even  had  I  become  master  of  Lisbon,  Cadiz,  Carthagena, 
and  Oporto,  it  would  still  have  been  necessary  to  hold  them 
militarily,  and  no  additional  troops  could  have  been  drawn 
from  the  army  of  occupation  in  Spain  to  march  against  Rus- 
sia ;  whereas,  in  the  mean  time,  the  English  policy,  dom- 
inant at  St.  Petersburg  and  Stockholm,  might  have  reached 
Berlin  ;  it  might  even  have  shaken  Vienna  at  the  moment 
when  I  was  attacking  Torres  Vedras." 

I  held  Prussia  by  her  propositions  of  an  alliance.  Fear, 
my  marriage,  and  the  hope  of  gaining  new  indemnities,  gave 
me  a  temporary  assurance  of  Austria  ;  Sweden  still  hesi- 
tated ;  although  Bernadotte  and  myself  were  not  the  besf, 
of  friends,  still  he  was  a  Frenchman,  and  the  interests  of 


Cil.  XV  m.]  INVASION    OF     RUSSIA.  319 

Sweden  and  France  had  been  identical  for  a  century  past  ; 
witli  our  aid,  lie  might  reconquer  Finland  and  restore  it  to 
his  kingdom.  The  rather  abrupt  occupation  of  Pomerania 
was  indeed  a  tenjporary  grief,  but  not  one  for  which  the 
Swedish  interests  should  be  sacrificed,  or  still  less  the  French 
sentiments  of  this  government.  I  had  every  reason  to  believe 
that  I  had  only  to  show  to  Sweden  the  road  to  Abo  and 
Sweaborg,  to  make  certain  of  her  cooperation  !  Turkey  had 
recently  sustained  reverses  and  entered  into  a  treaty  ;  but 
there  was  no  reason  to  think  that  when  the  Porte  should  be 
certain  of  our  armaments  against  Russia,  it  would  not  resume 
a  hostile  attitude  toward  that  power. 

By  deferring  this  enterprise  in  order  to  go  myself  to  the 
Spanish  Peninsula,  I  might  lose  all  these  advantages  ;  and 
the  new  chances  of  the  war  might  change  my  doubtful  allies 
into  open  enemies,  and  render  the  others  but  lukewarm  in 
their  friendship.  Independently  of  these  motives  I  had  full 
confidence  in  the  issue  of  this  war, — a  confidence  which  was 
authorized  by  all  the  preceding  events  of  ray  history. 

Opinions  of  IVapoleon's  Counselors. — But  there  was  no 
want  of  objections  to  my  project  ;  if  many  of  the  public 
functionaries  and  generals  whom  I  consulted  adopted  my 
opinion,  by  far  the  greatest  number  recoiled  from  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  enterprise.  The  grand-usher,  Caulaincourt, 
who  had  recently  been  ambassador  to  the  court  of  Russia, 
was  not  the  least  ardent  in  opposing  it.  He  endeavored  to 
demonstrate  that  it  was  authorized  neither  by  interest  nor 
necessity,  and  drew  a  frightful  picture  of  the  obstacles  which 
the  climate  and  the  immense  extent  of  the  Russian  Empire 
would  oppose  to  our  success.  He  represented  the  advantage 
which  the  Russian  soldier,  inured  to  that  rigorous  climate, 
would  have  over  our  southern  soldiers,  one  half  of  whom 
would  encumber  our  hospitals  before  the  termination  of  the 
enterprise.     Even  the  Muscovite  horses,  by  their  half  savage 


320  LIFE      or     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XYIII. 

training,  would  be  found  superior  to  those  of  Germany  and 
Normandy,  which  were  accustomed  to  an  abundant  and 
regular  supply  of  food,  and  were,  therefore,  less  titted  for  the 
fatigues  and  privations  of  such  an  enterprise.  The  severe 
discipline,  the  impassible  character,  the  constancy  and  firm- 
ness of  those  soldiers  who  have  no  country  or  friends  but 
their  colors,  give  to  the  Russian  army  a  solidity  which  is 
elsewhere  sought  for  in  vain.  Of  course  they  are  subject, 
like  ourselves,  to  the  chances  of  war  ;  but  with  them  sick- 
ness is  more  rare  than  with  any  other  army  ;  desertion  is 
with  them  unknown  ;  and  the  dispersion  of  organized  corps 
is  prevented  by  an  instinct  which  makes  them  huddle  together 
like  sheep  in  case  of  danger, — an  instinct  originating  partly 
in  the  docile  character  and  severe  discipline  of  the  soldier, 
and  partly  in  the  habit  of  never  separating  from  their  colors, 
which  they  had  formed  in  their  wars  with  the  Tuiks,  where 
every  straggler  was  certain  to  be  cut  off  by  the  enemy's 
cavalr}'.  The  grand  master  of  ceremonies,  M.  de  Segur,  who 
had  been  the  French  ambassador  to  Russia  in  the  reign  of 
Catherine,  and  who  was  the  author  of  the  advantageous 
commercial  treaty  of  1787,  supported  with  all  his  eloquence 
the  party  that  opposed  the  war  ;  Duroc  also  joined  in  the 
opposition. 

Those  of  my  counselors  who  approved  the  enterprise, 
said  :  "  If  we  neglect  to  profit  by  the  ascendency  of  the 
Emperor  Napoleon  over  his  adversaries,  and  the  military 
superiority  which  he  has  exhibited  in  all  his  battles,  from 
the  Niémen  to  the  Nile  ; — if  we  now  defer  taking  from 
Russia  the  power  to  injure  us,  who  will  dare,  after  Napoleon's 
death  to  oppose  the  efforts  of  that  empire  to  destroy  his 
work  ?  What  captain  can  be  found  capable  of  sustaining, 
with  a  French  army,  the  feeble  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  against 
which  Austria  herself  will  then  conspire,  the  alliance  of  that 
power  being  entirely  dependent  on  the  life  of  the  emperor  ? 


Ch.  XVIII.j  INVASION    OF     RUSSIA.  321 

Austria  has  too  many  losses  to  repair,  and  too  many  injuries 
to  avenge,  not  to  turn  against  us  on  his  death.  Why  should 
we  defer  consolidating  this  immense  edifice  and  placing  it  on 
an  immovable  base,  now  that  there  is  a  fit  occasion  ?  It  is 
no  augmentation  of  this  power  that  is  sought,  but  merely  a 
consolidation  of  that  which  exists  and  a  guarantee  of  the 
future.  What  is  now  required  to  comj^lete  this  glorious 
edifice  ?  Would  not  a  second  Friedland  on  the  fields  of 
Wilna  suffice  ?  And  are  we  not  certain  of  victory,  if  we 
but  look  at  the  past,  and  consider  the  numerous  phalanxes 
that  march  under  our  colors  T' 

To  these  arguments  the  opponents  of  the  war  replied  : 
"  Who  will  compel  the  Kussians  to  give  us  battle  in  the 
old  Polish  provinces,  when  it  is  evidently  their  interest  to 
fight  only  on  the  Dwina  ?  Lithuania  is  little  better  than 
the  deserts  of  Asia.  Unlike  Courland  and  Samogitia,  it  is 
covered  with  vast  forests  and  marshes,  and  human  habita- 
tions are  there  as  scarce  as  cultivated  fields.  The  enemy  can 
surrender  to  us  such  provinces,  without  in  the  least  compro- 
mising his  safety  ;  we  shall  be  as  ill-at-jase  in  the  marshes 
of  the  Beresina,  the  Lcpel,  and  thePripetz,  as  in  the  mud  of 
PuUusk  and  Ostrok-nka.  Obstacles  will  multiply  in  our  way 
if  the  enemy,  led  by  a  second  Fabius,  only  temporizes,  and 
falls  back  on  the  centre  of  his  power  and  resources.  The 
first  war  of  1807  owed  its  success,  in  a  considerable  degree,  to 
the  numerous  cities  and  immense  resources  of  old  Prussia  ; 
it  wasDantzic,  Elbing,  Thorn,  Braunsberg,  Osterode,  Allen- 
stein,  Eylau,  Grustadt,  Holland,  Bischofswerder,  the  Island 
of  Nogat,  that  enabled  us  to  support  an  army  of  a  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  men.  But  the  hamlets  of  Lithuania, 
peopled  by  miserable  Jews,  can  furnish  us  no  supplies  for  our 
troops,  our  hosi)itals  or  depots  ;  cantonments  will  there  be 
nothing  better  than  miserable  bivouacs.  Will  it  be  prudent 
to  throw  our  army  into  these  distant  deserts,  across  countries 

V'.L.    III.— 21. 


322  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XVIIf. 

made  insurgent  by  this  invasion,  or  by  the  ravages  of  pre- 
ceding campaigns  ? — to  support  our  base  on  Prussia  ah'eady 
humiliated  and  trodden  upon  ?  Is  it  wise  to  trace  a  line  of 
operations  five  hundred  leagues  in  extent  tbrough  a  hostile 
country,  where  the  embers  of  ill-extinguished  fires  are  ready 
to  burst  forth  into  a  volcano  ?  And  during  all  this  long  and 
perilous  enterprise,  shall  we  leave  France  exposed  to  the 
attacks  of  her  enemies,  and  endanger  her  security  and  inter- 
nal tranquillity,  by  again  rousing  from  sleep  the  tiger  of 
party  spirit?" 

Military  Chances  of  Success.— All  these  arguments  were 
not  sufficient  to  deter  mo  from  the  enterprise.  I  could  not 
dispute  the  existence  of  numerous  obstacles,  but  my  genius 
consisted  in  comj)rehending  the  difficulties  of  an  affair,  and 
in  seeing,  at  the  same  time,  the  means  by  which  these  diffi- 
culties could  be  overcome.  I  must  confess,  however,  that 
fifteen  years  of  uninterrupted  success  had  made  me  over- 
confident in  my  own  resources.  I  saw  all  the  obstacles,  but 
I  did  not  attach  to  them  sufficient  importance.  I  was  not 
ignorant  that  Russia,  based  on  the  Frozen  Ocean,  and  the 
deserts  of  Great  Tartary,  was  difficult  to  subjugate,  and  that 
it  would  be  impossible  to  pursue  her  army  and  her  govern- 
ment, if  they  should  retreat  before  our  eagles  to  the  Oural  ; 
but,  at  the  same  time,  I  was  aware  that  the  very  extent  of 
her  empire  rendered  it  the  more  dependent  on  the  centre  of 
its  vitality,  and  that  this  source,  or  centre  of  vitality,  was 
Moscow,  St.  Petersburg,  and  the  army. 

I  held  the  Russian  army  in  the  highest  estimation  ;  and 
if  the  contrary  opinions  are  drawn  from  my  bulletins  and  the 
3Ioniteur,  it  must  be  remembered  that  such  expressions  were 
intended  for  a  particular  object.  But  the  greater  my  estima- 
tion of  that  army,  the  more  was  I  convinced  that  it  consti- 
tuted the  real  strength  of  Russia.  I  thought  that  the  self- 
esteem  of  the  Russians  would  not  sufier  them  to  evacuate 


Ch.  XVIII.]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  323 

Lithuania  without  a  general  battle  ;  and  if  I  could  gain,  at 
Wilna,  Smolensk,  or  Witepsk,  a  victory  like  that  of  Fried- 
land,  all  Europe  would  be  at  my  disposal.  Could  I  ever 
give  battle  with  a  greater  object,  where  the  probabilities  of 
success  were  so  positive,  or  the  results  of  that  success  so  im- 
mense ?  I  had  decided  the  fate  of  Europe  at  Austerlitz  and 
Fricdland,  with  eighty  thousand  men,  and  now  was  it  not 
still  more  probable  that,  with  four  hundred  and  fifty  thou- 
sand, I  Avould  definitely  fix  that  destiny  ?  Even  if  the  first 
battle  should  be  undecisive,  like  that  of  Eylau,  and  I  should 
lose  an  equal  number  of  brave  men  without  result,  would  I 
not  still  have  an  army  of  four  hundred  thousand  men  with 
which  to  retrieve  a  fortune  which  had  attended  me  for  the 
last  twenty  years  ? 

With  so  many  probabilities  in  my  favor,  ought  I  to  leave 
to  my  successor  the  task  of  sustaining,  on  the  Vistula,  an 
imperfectly  organized  Poland,  and  to  contend,  at  the  same 
time,  with  England  and  the  other  powers  who,  at  my  death, 
would  attempt  the  restoration  of  the  Bourbons  ?  Un- 
doubtedly it  would  have  been  better  to  leave  to  my  son  the 
chance  of  this  uncertain  contest  in  the  North,  than  the  des- 
tiny which  I  finally  bequeathed  him  ;  but,  in  judging  of  my 
conduct  in  this  case,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  all  the  chances 
which  militated  in  my  favor.  I  certainly  deemed  the  result 
less  doubtful,  with  Austria  and  Prussia  on  my  side,  than  it 
was  at  Eylau  in  1807,  when  Austria  might  have  fallen  on 
my  rear,  between  the  Elbe  and  the  Oder,  have  revived  the 
sinking  courage  of  the  Prussians,  and  cut  off  all  hopes  of 
retreat.  Now,  based  on  Dantzic,  Graudentz,  Modlin,  and 
Warsaw,  and  at  the  head  of  the  armies  of  all  Europe,  how 
could  I  anticipate  such  a  result  ! 

With  respect  to  the  other  objections  to  the  war,  I  will  add 
that  I  felt  very  little  apprehension  from  party  spirit  in 
France  ;  that  I  expected  to  direct  the  afïiiirs  of  the  empire 


324  LIFE     OF    NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XVIII. 

from  my  head-quarters,  as  in  my  preceding  wars  ;  the  Em- 
press assisting  in  my  councils  ;  that  the  whole  nation,  being 
organized  into  three  bans  or  classes,  would  give  for  the  first 
ha7i  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men  in  the  flower  of 
their  age,  who,  formed  into  cohorts,  and  disciplined  in  the 
cadres  or  skeletons  detached  from  the  line,  would  supply  the 
places  of  veterans  in  guarding  our  fortifications,  our  harbors, 
and  the  interior  of  France.  I  had  nothino;  to  fear  from  Ger- 
man}',  since  I  took  with  me  the  élite  corps  of  Austria  and 
Prussia  ;  and  I  had  no  apprehensions  of  another  maritime 
expedition  by  the  English,  who  were  sufficiently  occupied  in 
Spain,  and  not  disposed  to  repeat  the  disasters  of  Antwerp. 
With  respect  to  provisions,  I  could  purchase  an  abundance 
of  grain  of  the  Poles,  and  deposit  it  at  Dantzic  ;  and,  in  re- 
turn for  this  money,  the  Poles  would  furnish  me  fifty  thou- 
sand good  soldiers  ;  beef  could  be  procured  in  Galicia  ;  and 
I  could  organize  twenty  new  battalions  of  the  provision  train 
to  increase  our  means  of  transportation.  "■•'•"  Prussia  had  owed 
us  several  millions  since  the  treaty  of  Tilsit,  and  would  pay 
us  in  the  magazines  which  she  had  laid  up  :  thus  affording 
me  a  year's  supply  of  provisions  in  the  rear  of  my  army.  I 
had  no  desire  to  imitate  Cambyses,  or  the  Emperor  Julian, 
or  Crassus  ;  all  my  measures  were  adopted  with  care,  and 
every  possible  precaution  taken  to  provide  against  disasters 
like  theirs.  It  was  possible  that  I  might  be  defeated,  and 
forced  to  fall  back  on  the  Vistula  ;  but  I  regarded  this  as 
the  extent  of  the  evil  which  could  hapj^cn  to  me.  The 
chances  of  the  enterprise  being  decidedly  in  my  favor,  I  had 
only  to  determine  whether  the  proper  time  had  come  for 
its  commencement,  or  whether  it  could  be  any  longer  post- 
poned. 

*  Battalions  of  military  equipages  were  organized  after  the  battle  of  Ejlau, 
the  caissons  being  arranged  and  drawn  like  a  train  of  artillery. 


Ch.  XVIII.J  invasion      of    RUSSIA.  325 

Nes^otiations  with  Russia.— Tims  far,  our  discussions  witli 
Kussia  had  been  limited  to  vague  complaints  and  imperfect 
explanations,  while  both  parties  were  collecting  troops. 
Causes  of  complaint  were  not  wanting,  but  they  were  rather 
alluded  to,  than  pressed  for  negotiation,  each  party  fearing 
to  hasten  a  rupture,  which  might  be  so  important  in  its  con- 
sequences, and  which  there  Avere  so  many  reasons  for  post- 
poning. I  only  knew  that  Eussia  complained  of  the  increase 
of  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  of  the  additions  made  to  my 
empire,  and  especially  of  the  annexation  of  Oldenburg  :  she 
desired  Dantzic  in  exchange  for  that  principality,  but  she 
did  not  say  positively  what  were  her  views  with  respect  to 
Poland,  leaving  me  to  infer  that  nothing  but  the  literal 
execution  of  the  treaty  of  Tilsit  would  satisfy  her.  On  my 
side,  I  complained  of  the  infractions  of  the  Continental  Sys- 
tem, of  new  laws  calculated  to  injure  French  commerce,  and 
of  the  raising  of  new  troops. 

Fruits  of  the  Continental  System.— If  Russia  had  con- 
sented to  adhere  to  the  Continental  System,  I  could  have 
asked  nothing  better  than  the  continuance  of  our  friendly 
relations  ;  for  the  fruits  of  this  system  were  beginning  to 
ajipear.  The  distress  of  the  English  manufactories  was 
manifesting  itself  in  the  rising  of  the  workmen  against  the 
use  of  machinery,  and  the  sufferings  of  this  class  of  men 
were  becoming  matters  of  serious  importance.  In  the  Par- 
liament, even  Brougham  declared  the  British  Orders  in 
Council  to  be  the  cause  of  the  public  distress.  Notes  of  the 
Bank  of  England  had  considerably  depreciated  in  value,  and 
the  exchange  on  London  had  fallen  to  seventy  per  cent.  It 
was  too  much  to  expect  me  to  renounce  this  system,  just  as 
I  was  beginning  to  reap  its  fruits.  If  my  adherence  to  this 
system  should  produce  an  alliance  between  Hussia  and 
Eno-land,  this  was  unavoidable,  for  war  was  preferable  to  its 
renunciation.    By  this  war  I  hoped  to  accomplish  two  objects 


326  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

at  the  same  time  :  first,  to  effect  the  reëstablishmeut  of 
Poland,  and  second,  to  force  the  return  of  Russia  to  the  Con- 
tinental System.  I  flattered  myself  that  the  Cabinet  of  St. 
Petersburg,  surprised  at  the  numerous  forces  which  I  would 
bring  into  the  field,  at  a  time  when  it  supposed  my  means 
were  exhausted,  would  yield  to  my  conditions,  and  that  all 
our  difficulties  would  be  compromised.  But  matters  had 
gone  too  far  to  be  easily  arranged  :  I  might  consent  to  ab- 
stain from  any  cooperation  in  the  restoration  of  Poland,  but 
to  place  things  on  the  footing  agreed  upon  at  Tilsit  was 
difficult,  after  the  annexation  of  Galicia. 

Occupation  of  Swedish  Pomerania. — While  we  were  dis- 
cussing these  causes  of  mutual  complaint,  circumstances 
occurred  which  were  calculated  to  increase  them.  The 
English  depot  on  the  rock  of  Heligoland  had  become  one  of 
the  richest  bazaars  of  the  old  world — a  real  political  and  mili- 
tary arsenal.  Colonial  merchandise  from  this  place  found  its 
w^ay  into  the  north  under  the  neutral  flag  of  America,  and 
on  the  coast  between  Holland  and  Lubec  by  the  little  con- 
traband coasters.  The  occupation  of  the  Hanseatic  cities 
had  closed  all  the  commercial  avenues  ;  but  the  port  of 
Stralsund  and  Swedish  Pomerania,  notwithstanding  the  offi- 
cial declarations  of  the  cabinet  of  Stockholm,  still  carried  on 
a  considerable  fraudulent  traffic.  I  was  not  more  pleased 
with  the  political  course  of  Bernadotte  than  with  this 
clandestine  commerce,  and  I  consequently  ordered  Davoust 
to  occupy  Pomerania  in  the  early  part  of  January.  It  would 
have  been  perfectly  absurd  for  me  to  induce  Russia,  Den- 
mark, Prussia,  Austria  and  Spain  to  close  their  ports,  while 
contraband  articles  were  admitted  into  the  ports  of  Sweden, 
a  country  which  was  entirely  at  our  discretion.  Bernadotte, 
irritated  at  this  measure,  sought  the  support  of  Russia,  and 
complained  at  the  court  of  St.  Petersburg  of  an  aggression 
which   his   own  conduct   had   provoked.      Considering   the 


Cil.  XVIII.]  INVASION    OF     RUSSIA.  327 

existing  relations  between  France  and  Russia,  this  step  was 
calculated  to  produce  a  sensation.  The  Emperor  Alexander, 
who,  since  1809,  had  been  persuaded  that  I  designed  to 
attack  hhn,  regarded  this  as  preliminary  to  the  opening  of 
hostilities.  In  the  unsettled  state  of  our  affairs,  1  had 
deemed  it  necessary  to  increase  the  garrison  of  Dantzic  to 
twenty  thousand  men,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  reenforce 
those  of  Stettin,  Custrin  and  Glogau.  These  measures  in 
the  eyes  of  Russia,  were  so  many  additional  proofs  of  hos- 
tility, and  only  tended  to  aggravate  the  wound  which  had 
already  been  inflicted  by  the  augmentation  of  the  Duchy  of 
Warsaw,  and  the  annexation  of  Oldenburg. 

Alliance  with  Prussia,— While  my  propositions  and  the 
responses  of  Russia  were  being  exchanged,  and  it  was 
announced  at  St.  Petersburg,  that  Count  Nesselrode  was 
about  to  be  sent  to  France  with  new  proposals,  I  directed 
my  attention  to  forming  the  alliance  with  Prussia,  which  had 
been  offered  to  me  a  year  before.  It  has  been  said  by  some: 
that,  not  being  able  to  fully  trust  this  power,  I  ought  to  have 
overthrown  the  monarchy  of  the  Great  Frederick,  which 
was  already  surrounded  by  my  troops.  This  opinion,  though 
specious,  is  not  entirely  correct.  Frederick  William  had 
always  exhibited  a  character  of  perfect  rectitude  ;  and  if  the 
humiliation  of  the  peace  of  Tilsit  had  incited  him  against 
me,  it  was,  nevertheless,  possible  to  induce  him  to  enter  fully 
into  my  system,  by  showing  him  the  possibility  of  the  res- 
toration of  his  kingdom  to  what  it  was  in  1806.  If  he  had 
more  to  hope  from  me  than  from  my  enemies,  he  might 
attach  himself  sincerely  to  my  cause.  The  army  and  people 
might  not  have  been  so  easily  persuaded  ;  nevertheless,  they 
also  would  have  been  attached  to  my  cause  by  the  plan  proposed 
in  1806  by  Jomini,  that  is,  by  giving  to  Prussia,  either  the 
kingdom  of  Poland  or  the  Presidency  of  the  Confederation 
of  the  Rhine,  with  indemnities.     The  former  would  pi'obably 


328  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVITI. 

have  been  the  most  wise  ;  for  if  it  had  not  Leen  so  advan- 
tageous as  the  complete  reëstablishment  of  the  throne  of 
Sobieski,  it  would,  nevertheless,  have  been  preferable  to  an 
imperfect  restoration  of  Poland,  surrounded  by  enemies 
anxious  for  a  new  partition.  This  would  have  been  a  strong 
inducement  to  Prussia  to  remain  fiiithful  to  my  cause,  and 
would  have  afforded  to  the  Poles  hopes  of  a  better  future.  The 
king  of  Saxony  could  have  been  easily  indemnified.  If  I 
had  fdllowed  the  advice  to  destroy  Prussia  at  the  beginning 
of  hostilities,  it  would  have  required  one  hundred  thousand 
soldiers  to  guard  the  monarchy  ;  moreover,  I  might  have 
found  a  German  Vendée  in  the  mountains  of  Silesia,  and  the 
forests  of  La  Marche.  I  took  a  middle  course  ;  to  attach  the 
king  to  my  cause  by  hopes  of  indemnities  in  Courland,  and 
at  the  same  time  to  observe  his  country  with  a  reserve  of 
fifty  thousand  men,  which  would  supply  my  array  with 
recruits  and  guard  my  magazines.  The  fear  of  doing  too 
much  for  a  country  which  was  ill-disposed  toward  me,  pre- 
vented me  from  giving  ample  satisfaction  to  the  cabinet  of 
Berlin  ;  and  the  fear  of  embarrassing  myself  with  new 
enemies,  prevented  me  from  acting  in  a  hostile  manner 
toward  her.  It  was,  however,  no  small  advantage  to  obtain 
from  a  country  ready  to  join  the  ranks  of  the  enemy,  an 
auxiliary  force  of  twenty  thousand  men  and  abundant  sup- 
plies ;  and  I  hoped  that  my  victories  would  soon  attach  them 
firmly  to  my  cause.  I  therefore,  directed  the  Duke  of  Bas- 
sano  to  negotiate  with  Krusemarck,  on  the  proposals  of  the 
cabinet  of  Berlin  ;  the  affair  was  soon  arranged  and  the 
treaty  signed,  on  the  twenty-sixth  of  February.  Frederick 
William  made  numerous  efforts  to  arrange  the  difficulties 
between  France  and  Russia,  but  his  efforts  produced  no 
effect. 

Pacific  Mission  of  fzernitscheff.— As  soon  as  I  had  com- 
pleted this  alliance  with  the  cabinet  of  Berlin,  I  resolved  to 


Ch.  XVIir.]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  329 

mako  a  final  cfFort  to  arrange  our  difficulties  with  Russia  and 
thus  avoid  war.  As  the  discussions  of  our  ambassadors  led 
to  no  satisfactory  result,  and  the  promised  mission  of  Count 
Kesselrode  had  Leen  postponed,  I  called  Colonel  Czernits- 
chefif,  the  aidc-dc-camjj  of  the  Emperor  Alexander,  who  had 
resided  near  my  court  since  the  campaign  of  1809,  and 
directed  him  to  bear  to  his  master  the  following  projjosals  for 
a  pacific  arrangement  of  our  differences,  viz.  :  /  cwi  ready  to 
agree  to  make  no  further  increase  to  the  Duchy  of  Warsaiv, 
and  to  give  an  indemnity  for  Oldenburg  ;  but  as  I  have 
occujncd  that  country  solely  for  the  lyurpose  of  cutting  off  all 
clandestine  communication  loith  England,  I  can  not  concede 
Dantzic  which  woidd  soon  become  an  English  eutrejwt  /  I 
offer  in  exchange  Erfurth  and  its  territory.  Finally,  if  the 
emperor  will  adhere  to  the  Continental  System,  I  will  give 
my  assent  to  the  system  of  licenses  to  Bussian  merchants, 
provided  the  new  commercial  laws  against  France  arc  modi- 
fed  by  a  new  treaty. 

With  these  propositions  Czernitscheff  took  also  the  returns 
of  our  troops  which  he  obtained  through  the  treachery  of  one 
of  the  clerks  of  the  war-office  ;  this  was  important  informa- 
tion for  the  Emperor  Alexander,  but  information  which  he 
would  probably  have  soon  obtained  from  other  sources,  had 
it  not  been  procured  by  Czernitscheff,  so  difficult  is  it  to 
conceal   such  matters   from   the   diplomatic    agents   of    an 

enemy. 
Offensive  and  defensive  Alliance  witli   Austria.  — In  the 

mean  time,  Austria  signed  a  treaty  of  alhance  more  close 
than  that  of  our  family  relations.  My  political  position 
made  me  feel  the  importance  of  connecting  this  power  more 
closely  to  my  enterprise,  for  I  was  well  aware  that  my  mar- 
riage would  not  prevent  her  from  an  armed  mediation,  as 
soon  as  I  had  penetrated  into  the  interior  of  Russia.  The 
cabinet  of  Vienna   anticipated   my   wishes   by   voluntarily 


330  LIFE     or     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XVIII. 

offering  to  share  with  me  the  chances  of  the  war  ;  it  pro- 
posed oven  more  than  I  could  have  ventured  to  aslc^  and  the 
treaty  was  signed  on  the  fourteenth  of  March. 

Result  of  the  Mission  of  fzernitscheff. — Czcrnitschcfif  had 
reached  St.  Petersburg  on  tlie  tenth  of  March  ;  but  the  Em- 
joeror  Alexander  did  not  find  in  my  proposals  anything  to 
induce  hira  to  change  the  course  of  conduct  v.hich  he  had 
marked  out  to  himself.""''"  A  whole  month  passed  without 
any  response  being  made  to  these  propositions.  To  the 
natural  distrust  of  my  pacific  intentions  caused  by  the  affairs 
of  Poland,  and  Oldenburg,  and  the  increase  of  the  garrison 
of  Dantzic,  was,  at  this  time,  added  one  of  those  inti'igues 
tu  which  the  Russian  court  is  so  often  subject.  Alexander's 
most  intimate  counselor  was  suddenly  arrested  and  banished 
to  Siberia,  on  the  charge  of  a  connection  with  me  and  my 
ministers.  These  charges  were  afterwards  found  to  bo  utterly 
false,  and  the  minister  was  appointed  governor  of  Siberia, — 
a  rej)aration  as  honorable  to  the  monarch  as  to  his  counselor. 
It  is  probable  that  this  intrigue  of  a  coterie  had  some  little 
influence  on  external  politics,  but  for  less  than  was  supposed 
at  the  time.  The  causes  which  have  already  been  mentioned 
were  sufficient  to  determine  the  course  of  the  Emperor 
Alexander,  without  attributing  it  to  any  influence  of  petty 
coteries. 

Proposals  of  Peace  to  England.— While  the  Cabinet  of 
St.  Petersburg  were  deliberating  on  my  propositions,  I 
opened  negotiations  with  England,  Strong  in  the  advan- 
tageous position  in  which  I  was  now  placed  by  my  alliances 
with  Austria  and  Prussia,  I  nevertheless  wished,  before 
throwing  down  the  gauntlet  and  again  drawing  the  sword,  to 
make  a  final  appeal  to  England.  She  was  the  first  cause  of 
my  contest  in  the   north,  and,  if  I  could  treat  with  her,  I 

*  The  atitbor  here  repeats  tlie  causes  of  the  war  as  g-iven  at  the  beginning 
of  the  chapter — a  repetition  which  is  omitted  in  the  translation. 


Cil.  XYIII  ]  INVASION     OF    RUSSIA.  331 

miglit  renounce  my  Continental  System,  and  give  up  my  plan 
of  the  restoration  of  Poland.  I  therefore  directed  the  duke 
of  Bassano  to  dispatch,  on  the  seventeenth  of  April,  a  note 
to  Lord  Castlereagh  with  proposals  of  peace. 

Our  colonial  différences  had  been  swallowed  up  in  the  im- 
mense naval  superiority  of  England,  and  in  important  con- 
tinental questions.  All  our  present  difficulties  had  reference 
to  Spain,  Portugal,  and  the  Two  Sicilies.  I  proposed  to 
2-)roclaim  the  independence  of  Spain  under  the  reigning 
dynasty,  to  restore  Portugal  to  the  House  of  Braganza,  to 
leave  Naples  to  Murat,  and  Sicily  to  Ferdinand.  It  seemed 
easy  to  decide  these  questions,  which  were  nevertheless  as 
important  to  England  as  to  us.  To  propose  to  the  Cabinet 
of  London  to  recognize  Joseph,  when  Wellington  had  taken 
Ciudad-Rodrigo  and  Badajos,  and  when  a  war  with  Kussia 
promised  still  more  important  successes,  was  to  risk  the 
chance  of  a  refusal.  Castlereagh  naturally  asked  whether  I 
meant  by  the  reigning  dynasty  in  Spain,  my  brother  Joseph 
or  Ferdinand  VIL  ?  If  it  was  imj^ossihle  for  the  Prince 
Regent  to  recognize  the  former,  it  was  equally  difficult  for 
me  to  consent  to  the  restoration  of  the  latter.  It  has  been 
absurdly  said  that  the  peace  of  the  world  at  this  time  de- 
pended upon  the  simple  question  of  Josejph  or  Ferdinand, 
and  that  my  decision  was  influenced  by  the  interests  of  my 
brother.  The  real  question  to  be  decided  in  the  recognition 
of  Ferdinand,  was,  whether  Spain  should  belong  to  us  or  to 
England.  To  recognize  that  prince  in  1812,  after  refusing 
to  do  so  in  1808,  and  after  keeping  him  captive  for  some 
years,  would  have  placed  Spain  more  decidedly  than  ever  in 
the  ranks  of  my  enemies.  It  was  not  as  the  brother  of  Jo- 
seph, but  as  the  chief  of  the  French  nation  and  of  its  inter- 
ests, that  I  opposed  the  return  of  Ferdinand.  To  have  no 
more  Pyrenees,  \i  was  necessary  that  none  of  my  enemies 
should  occupy  the  throne  of  Spain.     It  is  an  unjust  accusa- 


332  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

tion  to  charge  me  with  precipitating  France  into  an  inter- 
minable war,  for  the  sake  of  my  own  family  interests  ;  and 
this  charge  of  nepotism  is  the  more  absurd  as  Joseph  had 
never  given  any  convincing  proofs  of  his  attachment  to  my 
interests,  and  as  I  knew  very  well  that  Philip  V.  had  declared 
war  against  the  successor  of  Louis  XIV  ,  ten  years  after  the 
latter  had  compromised  the  existence  of  France  in  order  to 
place  Philip  on  the  Spanish  throne. 

Ultimatum  of  Russia. — The  messenger  who  brought  the 
response  of  Castlereagh,  was  preceded  only  a  few  hours  by 
the  messenger  who  brought  the  ultimatum  of  Russia  (April 
24th.)  Prince  Kourakin,  the  chargé,  demanded  the  evacua- 
tion of  Prussia  and  the  places  of  the  Oder,  the  reduction 
of  the  garrison  of  Dantzic,  the  conclusion  of  an  arrangement 
with  Sweden,  and  the  evacuation  of  Pomerania.  On  these 
conditions  Russia  would  agree  to  cut  off  all  direct  relations 
with  England,  but  would  not  discontinue  this  intercourse 
through  neutrals  ;  commercial  licenses  would  be  given  to 
Russian  merchants,  the  same  as  was  given  in  France  ;  the 
Russian  custom-house  duties  would  be  modified  for  the 
advantage  of  French  commerce  ;  and  pacific  negotiations 
would  be  entered  into  to  fix  upon  an  indemnity  for  Olden- 
burg, 

These  conditions  were  in  themselves  less  objectionable  than 
the  manner  in  which  they  were  proposed,  that  is,  as  an  idti- 
matum.  They  certainly  formed  a  striking  contrast  with  my 
political  jjosition  after  the  important  alliances  which  I  had 
just  formed  with  Austria  and  Prussia  ;  but  in  examining 
them  at  this  day  dispassionately,  I  must  confess  that  they 
were  the  natural  result  of  the  position  of  Russia  since  1807. 
It  was  a  harsh  requisition  on  the  part  of  the  Emperor  Alex- 
ander to  ask  that  I  should  retract  the  donation  of  Galicia  to 
the  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  and  restore  to  Holland  and  the 
mouths   of    the   Weser   their    independence,    although    the 


Ch.  XViri.]  INVASION    OF    RUSSIA.  333 

tenure  of  our  treaties  authorized  this  demand.     To  require,  for 
the  security  of  his  empire,  the  evacuation  of  Prussia  was  moder- 
ate on  his  part;  hut  to  demand  this  evacuation  as  a  prelimi- 
nary to  any  definitive  arrangement,  was  to  draw  around  me  the 
circle  of  Popilius  and  suhject  me  to  a  gratuitous  humiliation. 
The   evacuation  of  the    Prussian    fortresses    was   a    most 
serious  matter  :     By  such  a  measure   I  should  have  thrown 
Prussia  into  the  ranks  of  my  enemies  ;  Frederick  William 
would  have  unhesitatingly  thrown  himself  into  the  arms  of 
Alexander.     He  had  already  oifered  to  do  so,  in  1811,  if  the 
Russians  would  take  the   offensive  and  advance   upon   the 
Oder.     This   circumstance  was  sufficient  to  prove  that  the 
moment  I  surrendered  the  Prussian  fortresses,  she  would  join 
the  ranks  of  the  enemy.     Moreover,  I  should  thereby  com- 
promise  the    Duchy   of    Warsaw   whicli  would    have    been 
invaded  and  desti-oyed  in  fifteen  days.     It  may  be  said  that 
as  Prussia  was  now  my  ally  this  fear  was  chimerical  ;  but 
the  motives  of  this  alliance  having  ceased,   of    course    the 
policy  of  the  cabinet  of  Berlin  would  have  changed.     It  is 
possible  that  Alexander,  satisfied  with  some  modifications  in 
his  maritime   system,  would  not  have   taken  advantage  of 
the  evacuation    of  Prussia  to  regain  his  superiority  in   the 
north  ;  it  is  possible  that  he  would  have  been  satisfied  with 
the  restoration  of  his  commerce  and  the  tranquillity  of  his 
empire,  and  the  increase  of  his  territories  by  Finland  and 
several   districts   of    Poland  ;    while,    on    the   other  hand, 
he  could  have  occupied  the  Turkish  Principalities  which  he 
so  reasonably  desired  to  possess  :     But  what  guarantee  had 
I  that  he  would  be  thus  moderate,  and  that  Prussia,  with 
his  assistance,  would  not  rekindle  the  flames  of  war  ?     Per- 
haps it  was  my  misfortune  on  this  occasion  to  have  been  too 
thoughtful  of  the  future,  and  to  have  been  too  cautious  in 
the  arrangement  of  existing  differences. 

With  respect  to  the  Du  diy  of  Warsaw,  it  had  now  become 


334  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON,  [Cii.  XVIII. 

almost  impossible  for  me  to  restore  things  to  the  footing 
agreed  ujxjn  at  Tilsit  ;  to  revoke  the  annexation  of  Galicia 
would  have  given  the  death  hlow  to  Poland.  Russia  did 
not  peremptorily  demand  this,  hut  it  was  evident  that  noth- 
ing short  of  this  would  entirely  satisfy  her. 

But,  as  has  already  been  said,  it  was  less  the  character  of 
the  demands  of  Kourakin,  than  the  manner  in  which  they 
were  made  that  astonished  mo.  If  they  had  proposed  a 
definitive  treaty  in  which  the  evacuation  of  Prussia  had 
been  stipulated  as  an  indemnity  for  sacrifices  specified  in  the 
same  treaty,  I  might  have  accepted  the  proposal  ;  but  to 
make  this  a  condition  preliminary  to  any  arrangement  of  our 
differences,  was  to  place  me  in  the  condition  of  a  man  chal- 
lenged to  a  duel  and  required  to  beg  the  pardon  of  his 
antagonist  before  entering  into  any  explanation  of  the  cause 
of  the  quarrel.  This  course  was  so  contrary  to  the  usual 
urbanity  of  the  Emperor  Alexander,  that  I  could  not  help 
thinking  that  some  intrigue  had  caused  so  comiilete  a  change 
in  his  character  and  manner  of  acting.  Anxious  to  obtain 
some  direct  explanation  from  him,  I  resolved  to  dispatch 
M.  de  Narbonne,  on  a  special  mission  to  Russia.  This  ancient 
courtier,  reputed  for  his  agreeable  and  captivating  manners, 
had  sufficient  finesse  and  penetration  to  qualify  him  for  so 
delicate  a  mission.  He  received  orders  to  repair  to  St.  Peters- 
buro-  on  the  twenty-sixth  of  April  ;  the  pretext  of  his  jour- 
ney was  to  communicate  to  the  emperor  the  nature  of  my 
recent  negotiation  with  England,  while  its  real  object  was  to 
penetrate  the  mystery  of  Alexander's  recent  conduct,  and  to 
ascertain  if  there  were  any  means  of  inducing  him  to  adhere 
to  the  Continental  System. 

Napoleon  repairs  to  Dresden.— In  the  mean  time  my  army 
had  been  on  the  march  for  two  months  ;  it  had  crossed  the 
Prussian  territory  and  was  already  on  the  Oder.  The  time 
had  now  come  to  give  the  finishing  hand  to  my  preparations. 


Ch.  XVIII.]  invasion    of    RUSSIA.  335 

I  set  out  fur  Dresden,  where  I  had  aj)})ointed  to  meet  my 
father-in-liw,  the  King  of  Prussia,  and  the  several  German 
princes,  who  marched  under  our  banners.  Never  had  my 
superioiity  heen  disj)layed  in  an  assembly  so  august  and 
never,  since  the  middle  ages,  had  there  been  so  imposing  a 
meeting  of  sovereigns.  Who  could  have  believed  that  two 
years  after,  the  same  sovereigns,  assembled  at  Vienna,  would 
have  put  me  under  the  ban  of  nations  ?  .  .  .  Nothin"- 
was  neglected  that  could  increase  the  splendor  of  this  assem- 
bly. The  élite  of  the  Parisian  theatres  were  there  ;  and 
fêtes,  concerts,  and  plays,  served  as  a  prelude  to  the  great 
tragedy  which  we  were  preparing  to  act 

It  is  the  present  object  to  explain  my  political  and  mili- 
tary acts,  rather  than  to  describe  the  splendor  of  courts,  or 
the  anecdotes  and  adventures  of  the  salons.  I  can  not  how- 
ever, omit  to  mention  the  interview  between  Maria-Louisa 
and  her  father, — the  first  since  her  marriage.  He  had  sent 
her  to  my  court  as  an  expiatory  victim  ;  he  found  her  radiant 
with  satisfaction  and  glory,  and  proud  of  my  power,  which 
had  placed  her  on  the  first  throne  in  the  universe, — not  an 
usurped  throne — as  some  fools  have  asserted,  but  a  throne 
erected  by  my  genius  and  my  sword.  Animated  by  senti- 
ments very  different  from  those  of  his  son-in-law,  this  proud 
descendant  of  the  courts  of  Hapsburg,  perceived  none  of  that 
glory  with  which  I  illumined  the  brow  of  his  daughter  ;  but 
told  her  with  transport,  that  as  I  was  a  descendant  of  the 
Princess  of  Treviso,  she  need  not  blush  at  having  given  me 
her  hand  !  !  !  I  left  him  the  petty  satisfaction  of  believing 
the  doubtful  genealogies  which  his  courtiers  had  discovered 
in  old  parchments,  convinced  myself  that  if  there  were  really 
any  descendants  of  (he  Bonaparte  who  once  reigned  at  Tre- 
viso, they  would  one  day  pride  themselves  less  in  being  his 
descendants,  than  in  being  mine.*'' 
*  Napoleou,  in  the  St.  Helena  Memoirs,  discusses  this  reputed  genealogy,  show- 


336  LIFE    or     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  xyiii. 

I  learned  at  Dresden  that  the  Enipci'or  Alexander  had  left 
liis  capital  to  repair  to  Wilna.  I\,.:-ing  that  Narbonne 
might  he  too  late  to  meet  him,  I  directed  to  Marct  a  letter 
for  Lauriston^  mj  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  charging 
him  to  repair  to  the  emperor  with  all  possible  haste,  and  to 
endeavor  to  revive  his  former  sentiments  of  friendship  for  me, 
and  to  discover  the  true  cause  of  his  change — a  change  which 
I  then  attributed  more  to  petty  intrigues  than  to  considera- 
tions of  high  political  policy.  Less  credit  is  due  to  these 
pacific  measures  on  my  part  than  has  been  attributed  to 
them  by  my  friends  ;  but  they  were  nevertheless  sincere  : 
for,  if  I  could  have  induced  Alexander,  by  an  advantageous 
treaty  of  commerce,  to  maintain  the  Continental  System, 
and  thus  avoid  a  war,  I  could  instantly  fly  to  Spain  :  and, 
in  case  of  refusal,  I  could  then  pursue  the  enterprise  which 
I  had  undertaken,  as  my  troops,  which  had  been  collected 
from  the  four  corners  of  Europe,  were  already  assembling  on 
the  Vistula. 

Return  of  Narbonne. — I  waited  with  impatience  for  the 
return  of  Narbonne,  who  at  length  arrived  on  tlie  twenty- 
eighth  of  May.  He  had  found  the  Emperor  Alexander  at 
Wilna,  who  exhibited  neither  a  spirit  of  boasting  nor  of 
apprehension,  but  refused  to  add  to,  or  to  retrench  in  any 
respect,  the  proposals  made  by  Kourakin.  AVar  was  there- 
fore inevitable. 

Pradt's  Mission  to  Warsaw. —  The  news  received  from 
Wilna  announced  that  the  Emperor  of  Kussia  was  seeking 
to  attach  to  himself  the  Poles  of  the  Kussian  provinces  by 
benefits  and  conciliatoiy  measures.  It  was,  therefore,  more 
urgent  than  ever  that  I  should  immediately  act  upon  my 
project  of  declaring  the  independence  of  Poland.     Towards 

ing  that  he  did  not  attach  to  it  the  slightest  importance.  The  discussion,  how- 
over,  is  interesting  to  those  who  nttach  importance  to  such  investigations,  or 
their  results. 


Crf.  XVIIL]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  337 

the  cikI  of  1811,  I  had  designed  sending  Talleyrand  to  War- 
saw, to  arrange  with  the  Polish  provinces  the  necessary 
measures  for  the  restoration  of  their  country.  Since  the 
reprimand  which  I. gave  him  on  my  return  from  Spain,  he 
had  had  no  connection  with  the  affairs  of  state,  hut  was 
burning  to  be  again  employed.  This  mission  was  one  of 
cunning  and  intrigue,  and  well-suited  to  his  talent.  But 
the  vindictive  diplomatist,  charmed  at  having  an  opportunity 
to  thwart  my  jirojects,  took  the  first  opportunity  to  divulge 
them  to  the  Court  of  Vienna,  where,  of  all  places,  he  ought 
to  have  been  the  most  careful  to  conceal  them.  I  could 
hardly  restrain  my  indignation  at  such  a  procedure,  which 
was  in  reality  high-treason  against  the  interests  of  France. 
I  was  on  the  point  of  pronouncing  his  exile  ;  but  as  he  had 
been  intrusted  with  the  most  important  secrets  of  state,  it 
would  have  been  necessary  to  condemn  him  to  death  or  to 
imprisonment  for  life  :  tliis  I  was  unwilling  to  do.  The 
excitement  caused  by  these  developments  of  Talleyrand, 
forced  me  to  postjione  the  mission  till  after  the  alliance  with 
Austria.  I  finally  charged  M.  de  Pradt,  Archbislioj)  of 
Mechlin,  with  it.  He  was  a  man  more  ambitious  than 
shrewd,  and  still  more  vain  than  ambitious.  He  had,  how- 
ever, eloquence  and  a  poetical  imagination,  and  I  hoped  that 
he  would  bo  able  to  rouse  the  enthusiasm  of  the  Polish  na- 
tion. I  unbosomed  to- him  that  I  hoped  to  gain  two  battles, 
and  dictate  jjeace  at  Moscow  ;  but  that,  if  the  war  was  pro- 
longed, I  would  leave  the  Poles  an  auxiliary  force  of  one  hun- 
dred thousand  men  with  which  they  could  themselves  complete 
their  work  of  restoration.  It  was  imjDortant  to  excite  their 
patriotism  to  the  highest  degree,  and  to  determine  them  to 
make  the  greatest  sacrifices  ;  for  it  was  for  their  existence 
that  I  had  taken  up  arms."* 

'''  Dominique  Dufour  de  Pradt,  known  as  Abbé  De  Pradt,  was  born  in  the 
1  rovince  of  Auvergne,  in  1759,  and  early  entered  tlie  elmreli  under  the  patron- 
voL.  Ill, — 22 


338  LIFE     OF    NAPOLEOK.  [Ch.  XVITI. 

Mission  of  Ligncul  to  Sweden.  —  I  left  Dresden,  the 
twenty-ninth  of  May,  to  reach,  by  Posen,  the  head-quarters 
of  my  army  at  Thorn.     Hardly  had  I   left   the   capital  of 

age  of  the  Archbishop  of  Rouen.  In  the  early  part  of  the  revolution  he  took  a 
prominent  position  in  politics,  and  was  elected  deputy  to  the  States-General. 
He  opposed  the  revolution,  and  fled  from  France  among  the  first  emigres.  He 
became  a  strong  partisan  of  the  Bourbon  cause  in  Europe,  and  during  his  exile 
published  anonj'mously  several  books  and  pamphlets  against  the  government 
of  his  own  country.  Considering  the  hopes  of  the  Bourbons  destroyed  by  the 
eighteenth  Brumaire,  he  applied  througli  his  relative.  General  Duroc,  for  per- 
mission to  return  to  France,  which,  tlirough  Duroc's  influence,  was  granted  by 
Napoleon,  who  afterwards  appouited  him  his  First  Almoner,  and  afterwards 
made  him  Archbishop  of  Mechlin. 

By  his  talents  as  a  Avriter,  and  his  great  conversational  powers,  he  at  one 
time  acquired  considerable  influence  with  the  emperor,  but  was  much  disliked 
by  the  generals  on  account  of  liis  sycophancy  and  character  for  intrigue. 
Having  successfully  filled  several  unimportant  missions.  Napoleon  selected  him 
in  1812,  as  his  agent  or  ambassador  to  Warsaw.  Either  through  incapacity, 
or,  as  it  was  charged,  a  desire  to  keep  on  good  terms  with  Austria  and  Prus- 
sia, he  accomplished  none  of  the  objects  of  his  mission,  and,  on  Napoleon's 
return  from  Moscow,  was  dismissed  and  sent  back  to  France. 

Napoleon,  at  St.  Helena,  thus  speaks  of  him  :  "  The  Abba  did  not  fulfil  at 
Warsaw  any  of  the  objects  which  had  been  intended.  On  the  contrary,  he  did 
a  great  deal  of  mischief.  Reports  against  him  poured  in  from  every  quarter. 
Even  the  young  men,  the  clerks  attached  to  the  embassy,  were  surprised  at  his 
conduct,  and  went  so  far  as  to  accuse  him  of  maintaining  an  understanding 
with  the  enemy,  which  I  by  no  means  believed.  But  he  certainly  had  a  long 
talk  with  me,  which  he  misrepresents,  as  might  have  been  expected;  and  it 
was  at  the  very  moment  when  he  was  delivering  a  long,  prosy  speech,  which 
appeared  to  mo  a  mere  string  of  absurdity  and  nnpertinence,  that  I  scrawled 
on  the  corner  of  the  chimney-piece  the  order  to  withdraw  him  from  his  em- 
bassy, and  to  send  him,  as  soon  as  possible,  to  France  ;  a  circumstance  which 
was  the  cause  of  a  good  deal  of  merriment  at  the  time,  and  which  the  Abbé 
seems  very  desirous  of  concealing." 

On  his  return  to  France,  the  Abbé  commenced  his  intrigues  for  the  restora- 
tion of  the  Bourbons,  but  so  adroitly  as  to  escape  prosecution.  In  1814,  when 
the  allies  reached  the  vicinity  of  Paris,  he  resumed  all  his  activity,  and  excelled 
even  the  ultra-royalists  in  bitterness  against  Napoleon. 

An  anecdote  is  related  of  his  interview  with  Caulaiueourt  at  the  gate  of  the 
Court  of  the  allied  sovereigns,  around  which  the  priest  was  hovering,  and  rub- 
bing his  hands  with  delight  at  the  news  of  the  abdication.  After  vainly  seek- 
ing to  obtain  more  favorable  terms,  Caulaincourt  was  retiring  in  deep  dejection 
when  he  encountered  the  Abbé  at  the  door.  The  latter  made  some  insulting 
remarks  in  regard  to  the  foil  of  his  former  patron,  when  the  Duke,  losing  all 
self-control,  seized  the  sycophantic  and  ungrateful  priest  by  the  collar,  and, 
after  almost  shaking  the  breath  out  of  his  body,  turned  him  around  upon  his 


Ch.  XVIir.]  INVASION    OF      RUSSIA.  339 

Frederick-Augustus  when  M.  Ligncul  returned  there  from 
Stockholm.  He  was  an  intimate  friend  of  Bernadette  whom 
I  had  sent  to  arrange  our  difficulties  with  Sweden.  He 
reported  that  the  Prince-Royal  was  ready  to  forget  all  that 
had  passed,  and  join  my  banners  ;  but  that  he  required  a 
subsidy  to  aid  him  in  carrying  on  the  war,  and  Norway  as 
an  indemnity  for  the  sacrifices  made  by  Sweden  !  I  was  not 
in  the  situation,  nor  the  humor,  to  purchase  a  doubtful  ally 
at  the  expense  of  one  that  had  always  proved  itself  faithful. 
A  Swedish  diversion  by  Torneo  could  not  have  sufficient  in- 
fluence upon  the  great  question  at  issue  to  induce  me  to 
subscribe  to  conditions  which  were  calculated  only  to  incite 
my  anger. 

Preparations  for  openinjc  tlic  Campaign.  —  Thoroughly 
persuaded  of  the  immense  importance  of  the  contest  in  which 
I  was  about  to  engage,  I  had  assembled  the  most  numerous 
army  that  had  ever  fought  in  Europe.  The  great  invasions 
of  the  Cimbrians  and  Huns  have  never  jiresented  a  mass  of 
combatants  like  that  of  the  army  of  1812.  Reënforced  by 
the  troops  of  Prussia,  Austria,  and  the  Princes  of  the  Con- 
federation, I  had,  in  April  and  May,  an  army  of  nearly  half 
a  million  of  men,  crossing  Prussia  and  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw 
to  their  rendezvous  on  the  Niémen.  I  hoped  that  the  Rus- 
sians would  defend  Lithuania,  and  I  felt  certain  of  gaining" 
the  battle,  if  they  would  accept  one  ;  but  those  who  think 
that  I  had  previously  determined,  any  further  than  this,  on 
my  plan  of  campaign,  are  in  error:  my  operations  were  to 
depend  upon  those  of  the  enemy. 

Diversion  of  the  Turks.— I  had  counted  on   a  powerful 

heels  like  a  top,  and  then  contemptuously  turning  his  back  upon  him,  walked 
away.  The  Abbé  did  not  easily  forget  this  rude  pirouette,  and  it  required  the 
balm  of  many  honors  from  the  restored  Bourbons  to  sootiie  his  wounded  pride. 
He  was  a  voluminous  writer,  but  diffuse  and  inaccurate,  utterly  disre.^arding 
the  facts  of  history  and  geography,  whenever  it  suited  his  purpose  to  mis- 
stale  them. 


340  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON  [Ch.  XVIII. 

diversion  of  the  Turks  ;  and  as  soon  as  the  treaty  of  alliance 
with  Austria  had  guaranteed  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire,  *I  directed  Andréossi,  my  ambassador  at  Vienna,  to 
repair  to  Constantinople  for  the  purpose  of  forming  an 
alliance  there,  and  of  arranging  a  common  plan  of  operations. 
He  M'as  retained  a  long  time  upon  the  frontier  waiting  the 
firman  of  the  Grand-Seignior,  and  had  hardly  reached  the 
capital  when  I  crossed  the  Niémen.  It  was  now  too  late  : 
the  gold  of  England  and  the  intrigues  of  the  Morouzzi  had 
corrupted  the  divan,  and  even  the  vizir  ;  and  these  igno- 
rant disciples  of  Mahomet  made  peace  at  the  very  moment 
when  they  might  have  rejjaired  the  losses  of  a  century  of 
disastrous  wars.  This  peace  was  signed  on  the  twenty-fifth 
of  May,  at  the  Russian  head-quarters  at  Bucharest,  and  was 
not  known  when  I  crossed  the  Niémen.  Some  have  at- 
tempted to  justify  the  course  of  tlie  Turks  at  my  expense, 
and  have  accused  me  of  wishing  to  sacrifice  them.  The 
affairs  of  Sj^ain  forced  me  to  abandon  the  Mussulman  inter- 
ests at  Erfurth,  in  order  to  conciliate  Russia  ;  but  now 
when  I  was  about  to  strike  at  the  heart  of  this  rival  empire, 
I  necessarily  became  the  natural  ally  of  the  Turks.  It 
required  no  great  genius  to  comprehend  this  truth,  and  to 
profit  by  the  occasion  which  I  offered  them  of  regaining  at  a 
single  blow  all  that  they  had  lost  since  the  reign  of  Peter  the 
Great.  It  was  not  to  gratify  me  that  they  were  to  renew  the 
war,  but  for  their  own  manifest  interest.  On  the  contrary, 
they  signed  a  disgraceful  peace,  yielding  Bessarabia  at  the 
most  favorable  moment  ever  presented  for  cariying  on  the 
war  with  certain  chances  of  success.  I  evidently  relied  too 
much  on  the  Turks  pursuing  their  own  manifest  interest  ; 
for,  if  I  had  known  the  influence  of  their  petty  intrigues,  I 
might  have  scattered  two  or  three  millions  of  francs  among 
the  counselors  of  Mahmoud,  and  have  thus  obtained  a  diver- 
sion of  a  hundred  thousand  Turks  on  the  Dnieper.     I,  at  one 


Ch.  XVIII.l  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  341 

time,  thought  of  sending  the  Viceroy  of  Italy  with  an  army 
by  the  Illyrian  provinces  on  Servia.  in  order  to  act  in  concert 
with  that  of  the  Turks.  By  this  means  I  hoped  to  encourage 
them,  and  destroy  the  impression  which  had  been  produced 
by  ray  temporary  alliance  with  Russia.  Sebastiani  had  nego- 
tiated, in  1807,  the  passage  of  a  corps  of  twenty-five  thousand 
men  ;  but  now  I  would  have  sent  fifty  thousand.  Unfor- 
tunately times  had  changed,  and  the  difficulty  of  arranging 
such  an  operation  with  these  barbarians  induced  me  to 
renounce  a  project  which  would  have  secured  a  powerful 
diversion  for  the  invasion  of  Podolia. 

Dispositions  of  the  Russian  Army.— If  I  had  previously 
formed  a  definitive  plan  of  campaign,  the  present  dispositions 
of  the  Russians  would  have  forced  me  to  deviate  from  it,  for 
how  could  I  have  supposed  it  possible  that  the  Russian  army 
would  remain  divided  and  scattered  along  their  entire  fron- 
tier ?  They  had  organized  their  forces  into  separate  armies  : 
The  first,  commanded  by  General  Barclay,  about  a  hundred 
and  thirty  thousand  strong  (exclusive  of  Platuf's  Cossacks), 
was  cantoned  behind  the  Niémen  from  Rossieny  to  Lida  : 
Wittgenstein,  on  the  right  near  Rossieny  ;  Bagawouth,  be- 
tween Wilia  and  that  city  ;  TuczkofF  at  Troki  ;  the  fourth 
corps  at  Olkeniki  on  the  road  to  Merecz  ;  Doctorof  at  Lida  ; 
the  guards  and  reserves  about  Wilna  ;  with  the  light  troops 
bordering  the  Niémen.  The  second,  commanded  by  Prince 
Bagration,  fifty  thousand  strong,  was  cantoned  in  the  en- 
virons of  Wolkowisk,  opposite  the  gap  between  the  Niémen 
and  the  Bug.  A  third,  commanded  by  General  Tomassof, 
forty  thousand  combatants,  was  in  rear  of  the  Bug  in  the 
environs  of  Loutsk.  Platof  with  his  Cossacks  was  opposite 
Grodno.  There  Avas  a  great  difference  of  opinion  among  the 
Russian  generals.  Admiral  Tchichagof,  who  had  succeeded 
Kutusof  in  Moldavia,  had  thought  to  penetrate  by  Servia 
and  the  valley  of  the  Danube  into  Illyria  and  Italy  :  Prince 


342  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIIL 

Bagration  wished  to  invade  the  Diicliy  of  Warsaw,  dissolve 
tlie  Polish  army,  destroy  our  establishments,  and  dispute  the 
country  between  the  Vistula  and  the  Niémen  :  Barclay 
wished  to  await  the  enemy  :  Fuhl  wished  to  allow  us  to 
advance  into  Lithuania,  to  fall  back  wpon  Drissa,  and  act  on 
our  flanks  with  the  armies  of  Bagration  and  Tormassof,  one 
on  th3  Bug,  and  the  other  on  the  Pinsk.  They  were  still 
discussing  these  projects  when  my  army  was  collecting  from 
all  directions  on  the  Niémen,  like  a  threatening  tempest.  My 
forces  were  crossing  old  Prussia  about  the  middle  of  June. 
I  passed  successively  in  review  in  the  environs  of  Konigs- 
berg,  Insterburg,  and  Gumbinnen  the  splendid  troops  which 
were  collecting  from  all  directions,  and  concentrated  my 
principal  mass  on  Wilkowisk  and  Kowno. 

Organization  of  the  Russian  Army. — The  following  was 
the  composition  of  the  Russian  armies  in  this  campaign  : 

I.    THE    ARMY    OF    B  A  ECLAT.  Cossack 

hats.  sqds.   regU. 

1st  corps,  commanded  by   Wittgenstein;    division   of  Berg, 

Sazonof^  and  Kakowskoi .     28  16  3 

2d  "  "  iJagraiooMtt  ;  divisions  of  Olsousief, 
and  Prince  Eugene  of  Wurtem- 
berg    . 24  8 

3d         "  "  Touczkof;     divisions    of    Kanow- 

nitzin  and  Strogonof. 26  6 

4lh        "  "  Sfhouwalof  and    Osttrman  ;    divi- 

sions   of   Tschaglokof  and  Bach- 

metief. 22  8 

5th       "  "  Grand-Duke  Oonstantine ;    guards 

and    reserves,     under    Yermolof, 
Depreradowich  and  Galitzin.  ...      26  20 

6th        "  "  Doctorof;  divisions  of  Kopsewicz 

and  Likatschef 24  8 

Cavalry,  1st  corps  under  Ouwarof 24 

2d       "         "      Korf 24 

3d       "         "       Pahlen , 24 

Platof 's  Cossacks ^^_ 14 

Total     150         138         17 

Making  in  all  about  one  hundred  and  thirty-eight  thousand 
men,  of  whom  ei<rht  thousand  were  Cossacks  under  Platof. 


Ch.  XVIII.]  INVASION    OF     RUSSIA.  343 

II.    ARMY    OF   BAGRATION. 

bats.         sqds.     regts. 
7th  corps  under  Raefsky  ;  Paskiewicz,  Kolubakin,  and  Was- 

siltchikof 24  8 

8tli       •■         "     Borosdin  ;   Prince  Charles  of  Mechlenberg, 

AVarrusof,  and  Newerowski 22  20 

Cavalry,  4th  corps  under  Siewers 24 

Cossacks 9 

Total     46  52  9 

This  army  numbered  from  forty-five  to  fifty  thousand  men. 

III.     ARMY    OF  TORMASSOF. 

b.ats.  sqds.     regts. 

Corps  of  Kamenski  ;  divisions  of  Schorbalof 18  8 

"         Markof;   two  divisions 24  8 

"         Sakeu  ;  divisions  of  Sorokia  and  Laskin 12  24 

Cavalry  of  Lambert 36 

Cossacks 9 

Total     54  76  9 

Making  in  all  about  forty  thousand  men. 

IV.  ARMY  OF  ADMIRAL  TCHICHAGOF. 

bats.  sqds. 

Division  of  Langeron, 12  8 

"        "lessen 12  8 

"    Woinof 11  12 

"        "    Servia 9  8 

Corps  of  SabanoeÇ  in  observation 9  8 

Total     53         44 
V.     CORPS  OF   FINLAND, 16  bats.  03  sqds. 

This  organization  was  changed  towards  the  close  of  the 
campaign.  The  army  of  Wittgenstein  united  to  the  corps 
of  Finland,  was  composed  of  three  corps,  seventy-five  batta- 
lions and  thirty-eight  squadrons  ;  while  Tchichagof's  army 
was  composed  of  six  corps,  one  hundred  and  two  battalions, 
and  one  hundred  and  sixteen  squadrons. 

French  and  Allied  Army. — The  following  was  the  organi- 
zation of  the  French  and  allied  army  in  this  campaign  : 


344  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVI I Î. 

Old  Guard  undor  L-fi hre        i    divisions  of  Lnborde,  Curial,   Raquet, 

Young  Guard  nnder  Ilortier  )         and  Clarapède  ;  cavalry  of  Woither      40,000 

"ist  corps  under  Davoust ;  divisions  of  Gudin,  Friant,  Morand,    Des- 

saix,    and    Compans  ;    cavalry    of  Domuerc,    Castel, 

and  Corbineau 70,000 

2d       "         "        Oudinot  ;  divisions  of  Legrand,  Verdier,  and  Merle; 

cavalry  of  Doumerc,  Castel,  and  Corbineau 42,000 

3d       "         "      Key;  divisions  of  Ledru,  Rozant,  Marchand,  and  the 

"Wurtemburgers  ;  cavalry  of  Wolworth,  and  Mounier      40,000 
4th      "         "       The    Viceroy   {Eugène)';  divisions  of  Broussier,    Del- 

zons,  Levchi,  and  Pino  ;  cavalry  of  Guyon 45,000 

5th     "      (Poles),  under  Poftfatowsfcî  ;  divisions  of  Zayouskeck,  Dons- 

drowsky,  and  Kniascwich  ;  cavalry  of  Kamensky. . .      35,000 
6th     "      (Bavarians),  under  St.  Cyr  ;  divisions  of  "Wrede,  Deroi,  and 

Lieben 22,000 

7th     "      (Saxons),  under   Reynier ;  divisions  of  Lecoq,    and  Funk; 

cavalry  of  Gableutz     16,000 

8th     "      (Westphalians),    under  Junot  ;    divisions   of  W'arrcau  and 

Ochs;  cavalry  of  Wolff 16,000 

9th      "     under  Belluno  ;    divisions   of    Paitcuneaux,    Daeudels,    and 

Girard  ;  cavalry  of  Delaitro  and  Fournier 32,000 

loth    "         "      Macdonald;  composed  of  the  troops  of  Yorck,  Moes- 

senbach,  and  Grandjean 32,000 

11th   "     (Reserve),  under  Augereau  ;  divisions  of  Heudelet,  Loison, 

Durutte,  Destres,  and  Morand  ;  cavalry  of  Cavoignac      50,000 
Cavalry,  1st  corps,   under  Nansouty  ;    Bruyères,    St.  Germain,    and 

Volence 12,000 

2d       "  "         Montbrn7i  :  Pajol,  "Wathier,  and  Defrance.      10,000 

3d       "  "         Grouchy  ;    Chartel,    Doumerc,    and    La- 

houssaye 7,700 

4th      "  "         La(our-^faubo^trg  ;  Haswiecky  and  Lorgcs        8,000 

Austrian  Contingent  under  Schwarfzenberg  ;    Frimont,    Bianchi,    Sie- 

genthal,  and  Trautcuberg 32,000 

Total     509,700 

These  numbers  exhibit  the  army  organization,  rather  than 
the  forces  which  actually  made  the  campaign.  Abont  four 
hundred  and  eighty  thousand  crossed  Prussia,  but  not  more 
than  three  hundred  and  forty  thousand  advanced  on  the 
Dwina.  Changes  were  also  made  in  some  of  the  corps  : 
Doumerc  was  detached  from  Grouchy  to  Oudinot  with  a 
division  of  cuirassiers. 

Napoleon  determines  to  pierce  the  Enemy's  Centre.— 
Time  is  all-important  in  war,  as  is  also  the  faculty  of  profit- 


Ch.  XVIIl.J  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  345 

ing  by  the  faults  of  an  enemy.  The  Russians  being  divided 
into  separate  and  distant  corps,  it  seemed  possible  to  take 
them  en  Jlagra7it  dcUt.  But  as  they  had  never  in  their 
former  wars  followed  this  fatal  system  of  extended  lines  of 
isolated  bodies,  I  was  led  to  believe  that  the  extension  had 
been  made  merely  for  the  i)ur23ose  of  subsistence,  and  that 
they  would  hasten  to  concentrate,  on  the  ajiproach  of  our 
troops.  AVhcn,  however,  I  learned  that  nothing  of  this  kind 
was  done,  I  deemed  it  of  the  greatest  importance  to  antici- 
pate any  such  movements.  I  resolved  to  cross  the  Niémen 
at  Kowno,  a  salient  j)oint  extremely  favorable  to  my  project. 
It  was  necessary  to  strike  quickly  and  promptly,  without 
waiting  fur  our  magazines,  which  were  coming  slowly  from 
Dantzio  by  the  Curish  Ilaff  to  Konigsberg  ;  I,  tlierefore 
directed  my  troops  to  take  with  them  provisions  for  fifteen 
days  in  their  march  across  the  territories  of  Prussia.  This 
rigorous,  but  necessary  measure,  led  to  a  multitude  of  ex- 
cesseSj  by  wliich  Prussia  most  severely  suffered.  This  coun- 
try, rich  in  horses,  was  completely  stripped  of  these  animals 
under  the  pretext  of  transporting  these  provisions,  the  greater 
part  of  which,  accumulated  in  immense  parks,  two  or  three 
days'  march  from  the  columns,  could  not  keep  pace  witli  the 
troops,  and  fell  a  jirey  to  the  teamsters. 

In  ord(;r  to  derive  the  utmost  advantage  from  my  great 
superiority  of  forces,  I  formed  the  project  of  attacking  the 
enemy  along  his  entire  front,  taking  care,  however,  to  direct 
my  pi'incijjal  efiort  upon  the  decisive  point.  For  this  pur- 
pose my  army  was  divided  into  three  grand  masses.  The 
principal  one,  two  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  strong, 
under  my  own  innnediate  orders,  v.'as  to  attack  the  first  Rus- 
sian army  and  pierce  the  centre  of  their  line  ;  the  King  of 
Westphalia,  with  sixty-five  thousand  men,  forming  my  right, 
was  to  act  against  the  army  of  Prince  Bagration  ;  the  vice- 
roy, with  seventy  thousand  combatants,  was  to  throw  him- 


346  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cif.  XVIII. 

self  between  these  two  Russian  armies,  to  j^revent  their 
union  ;  while,  on  the  left,  Macdonald,  at  the  head  of  some 
thirty  thousand  men,  mostly  Prussians,  received  orders  to 
take  the  road  to  Kiga. 

It  was  a  great  operation  to  concentrate,  at  the  exact  time 
and  place,  forces  so  formidable  and  which  had  been  brought 
from  Pomerania,  Mayence,  Paris,  Boulogne,  Valladolid, 
Milan,  and  even  from  Naples  ;  to  firm  such  an  a.ssemblage 
in  the  forests  of  the  Niémen,  required  not  a  little  care  and 
foresight  in  directing  the  march  of  the  columns,  and  in 
arranging  supplies  for  an  army  whose  horses  alone  numbered 
two  hundred  thousand,  and  whose  carriages  numbered  not 
less  than  twenty  thousand.  We  might  here,  without  exag- 
geration, use  the  hyperbole  emjtloyed  to  describe  the  army 
of  Xerxes  ;  after  its  ^jassage,  they  endeavored  to  find  the 
countries  xohich  it  had  ixtssed  over  I 

Passage  of  the  Nicmeil.— On  the  twenty-fourth  of  June, 
I  passed  the  Niémen  near  Kowno,  on  three  bridges  constructed, 
in  a  few"  hours,  by  General  Eble  ;  the  Russians  did  not  o^^pose 
this  passage.  It  would  be  difficult  to  describe  my  feelings 
at  that  moment.  My  splendid  phalanxes  now  trod  the  soil 
of  Russia,  which  no  enemy  had  ventured  to  touch,  since  the 
time  of  Peter  the  Great,  and,  if  the  war  should  prove  suc- 
cessful, all  Europe  would  be  irrevocably  subject  to  my  power  ! 
There  was  something  gigantic  in  our  enterprise,  which  struck 
us  all  ;  it  was  said  that,  like  the  Titans,  we  were  going  to 
scale  the  walls  of  Heaven  ;  but  we  were  far  from  foreseeing 
that  their  fate  was  also  to  be  ours  ! 

I  advanced  on  the  road  to  Wilna  and  Trocki,  at  the  head 
of  the  corps  of  Davoust,  the  cavalry  of  Murat,  and  my 
guards.  On  my  right,  Eugene  passed  to  Piloni  and  was  to 
direct  himself  on  Roudnicki  ;  on  the  left,  Oudinot  marched 
by  the  left  of  the  Wilia  and  Janowo  ;  he  attacked,  at  Devel- 


Ch.  XVIII.]  invasion    of    RUSSIA.  347 

towno,  the  rear  guard  of  Wittgenstein,  coming  from  Keidoni, 
and  took  several  hundred  prisoners. 

Retreat  of  the  Russians  on  Drissa. — Barclay  had  col- 
lected at  Wilna  only  two  corps  and  the  guards  ;  ho  seemed, 
for  a  moment,  to  wish  to  defend  the  advantageous  position 
of  Trocki,  in  order  to  concentrate  the  army  about  Wilna. 
But  he  soon  saw  the  critical  nature  of  his  pusiiion.  If  he 
I'eraained  at  Wilna,  ho  would,  with  seventy  thousand  men, 
have  to  contend  with  the  mass  of  my  army  ;  if  he  joined 
Bagawouth  and  Wittgenstein  on  the  right  of  the  Wilia,  he 
might  be  cut  off  on  his  left,  which  was  extended  to  Lida  ; 
if  he  fell  back  on  the  road  to  Polotsk,  his  right  would  be 
greatly  exposed.  He  had  no  other  course  than  to  pass  the 
Wilia,  to  burn  the  bridges  and  to  destroy  the  magazines 
which  had  been  collected  at  great  expense,  so  as  to  gain 
Nementschin  and  march  by  Swenziany  on  Drissa,  in  order  to 
rally  his  army  there,  under  the  protection  of  the  intrenched 
camp.  The  left,  and  especially  Doctorof,  had  to  make  a 
forced  march  to  gain,  from  Lida,  the  road  to  Michaeliski, 
and  to  rejoin  him,  if  the  thing  was  still  possible.  Bagration 
was  to  maicli  from  his  side  on  the  Dwina  from  Slonim,  by 
Wileika  or  Minsk. 

I  entered  Wilna  on  the  twenty-eighth  of  June,  at  the 
head  of  my  guards,  the  cavalry  and  the  first  corjjs-d' armée  ; 
my  first  attention  was  naturally  directed  to  the  military 
operations  resulting  from  my  combinations  to  pierce  the 
enemy's  centre,  and  afterward,  to  fall  upon  his  wings.  The 
King  of  Westphalia,  who  had  reached  Grodno,  toward  the 
end  of  June,  followed  the  traces  of  Bagration.  The  viceroy, 
who  had  passed  the  Niémen  at  Piloni,  being  delayed  by  the 
bad  roads  and  the  difficult  nature  of  the  country,  sought  to 
gain  Roudnicki.  Being  uncertain  whether  he  wouUl  succeed 
in  anticipating  the  enemy,  I  thought  to  make  sure  of  this, 
by  pushing  Davoust  on  Minsk,  with  two  divisions  of  infantry. 


348  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON  [Ch.  XYIII. 

and  his  light  cavaliy,  sustained  by  Grouchy's  cor[is  of  cavahy  ; 
he  reached  the  road  to  Smolensko  before  the  enemy.  Swart- 
zenberg,  who  was  in  the  direction  of  Slonim,  would  gain  the 
extreme  left  of  Bagration.  Murat,  with  two  divisions  of 
Davoust's  corps  and  his  reserve  of  cavalry,  put  himself  on 
the  traces  of  Barclay  on  Swenziany,  followed  by  Ney. 
Morand's  division  and  the  corj)S  of  Nansouty,  directed  their 
march  on  Michaeliski,  in  order  to  form  a  cor])S  intermediate 
between  Murat  and  Davoust.  Finally,  Oudinot  pursued 
Wittgenstein  on  the  road  to  Dunaburg,  and  Macdonald  drove 
the  flying  enemy  on  Mittau  and  Eiga.  My  army,  thus 
divided,  pursued  the  enemy  in  every  direction. 

Doctorof,  in  seeking  to  gain  Ozmiana,  found  there  the  light 
cavalry  of  Davoust.  Being  called  by  Barclay  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Drissa,  he  was  near  falling  into  the  midst  of  the 
columns  of  the  King  of  Naples.  The  Russian  general,  how- 
ever, marched  witli  so  much  rapidity,  that  he  succeeded  in 
gaining  Swir  before  us.  The  similarity  of  his  name  to  that 
of  General  Dorakof,  who  commanded  a  brigade  of  light 
cavalry  in  the  army  of  Bagration,  deceived  our  columns 
which  had  been  directed  to  intercept  him.  Nevertheless,  it 
must  be  confessed,  that  he  very  skillfully  extricated  himself 
from  his  difficult  situation. 

When  I  saw  the  Bussian  armies  falling  back  in  ail  direc- 
tions, I  began  to  have  some  fears  of  the  possibility  of  bring- 
ing them  to  a  general  action  ;  still  I  hoped  to  envelope  Ba- 
gration, and  afterward  to  overthrow  Barclay,  if  he  should 
attempt  for  an  instant  to  hold  out  alone.  His  absurd  retreat 
on  the  Lower  Dwina,  revived  my  hopes  ;  lie  evidently  wished 
to  manœuvre,  like  Benningsen  in  1S07  ;  he  threw  himself  in 
a  false  direction  where  I  might  readily  find  him  after  having 
destroyed  his  colleague.  If  they  should  both  retreat  to  the 
Boiysthenese,  T  would  pursue  them,  and  thus  disengage 
Poland  ;  at  Smolensko,  I  would  determine  upon  my  subse- 


Ch.  XYIII.]  invasion    of    RUSSIA.  349 

quent  operations.  I  had  already  announced  my  intention  of 
halting  at  that  2)lace,  if  the  enemy  should  escape  me  unhurt. 
I  had  a  double  motive  in  giving  publicity  to  this  intention — 
to  encourage  my  own  forces,  by  giving  them  some  fixed  j^oint 
of  termination  for  their  severe  privations,  and  perpetual 
marching,  and  to  induce  the  Kussians  to  risk  a  battle  to  pre- 
vent my  thus  forming  a  j^ermancnt  establisment  in  the  very 
heart  of  their  empire. 

Napoleon's  Delay  at  Wilna. — I  remained  at  Wilna  for 
fifteen  days  ;  some  have  regarded  this  delay  as  an  error.  I 
had  sufficient  motives  for  it.  jlU  the  first  place,  I  wished  to 
learn  the  result  of  the  operations  directed  against  the  enemy's 
columns  on  my  right  and  against  the  army  of  Bagration  ; 
secondly,  to  make  arrangements  for  bringing  up  our  maga- 
zines from  Konigsberg  ;  thirdly,  to  organize  a  provisional 
government  in  Lithuania  ;  and  fourthly,  to  give  time  to  the 
viceroy  and  the  Bavarians  to  join  us  and  put  themselves  in 
line  on  the  Dvvina.* 

Our  entrance  into  Lithuania  had  been  attended  by  unfavor- 
able circumstances  ;  our  horses  could  get  no  other  forage  than 
green  rye,  and  were  continually  exposed  to  the  most  terrible 
rains  ;  our  artillery  horses  perished  by  entire  teams  ;  one 
hundred  pieces  of  cannon  and  five  hundred  caissons  were  left 
without  draught-animals  ;  the  suburbs  of  Wilna  were  encum- 
bered with  f^ur  or  five  thousand  dead  horses  !  The  diffi- 
culties of  procuring  provisions,  and  the  disorders  of  a  rapid 
passage  of  three  hundred  thousand  men,  had  occasioned  a 
multitude  of  stragglers  ;  these  already  numbered  more  than 
thirty  thousand.  All  these  circumstances  rendered  a  short 
delay  necessary  in  order  to  regulate  affairs. 

Mission  of  lialaschof. — A  few  days  after  our  entrance  into 
Wilna,  the  Emperor  Alexander  sent  me  General  Balaschof, 

*  Jomini  thinks  there  may  have  been  other,  and  still  more  important  causes 
for  this  delay,  which  are  not  known. 


350  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON  [Ch.  XVIII. 

his  aid-de-carap  and  minister  of  police,  a  man  who  had  been 
pointed  out  to  me  as  one  of  the  warmest  partisans  of  the 
Enghsh  alliance.  He  brought  the  resj)onse  to  the  advances 
of  Lauriston.  The  emperor  announced  his  disposition  to 
adhere  to  the  Continental  System,  and  to  arrange  the  other 
points  of  dispute  ;  but  he  required,  as  a  preliminary  step  to 
any  arrangement,  that  we  should  first  retire  behind  the 
Niémen,  being  resolved  to  conquer  or  die,  rather  than  to 
negotiate,  so  long  as  a  foreign  soldier  stood  upon  his  territory. 
There  was  certainly  greatness  in  this  resolution,  at  a  moment 
when  the  chances  appeared  evidently  in  my  favor  ! 

Response  of  Napoleon. — I  gave  Balaschof  to  understand 
that  I  could  not  renounce  the  fruits  of  my  manœuvres  and 
go  back,  without  some  positive  certainty  of  peace.  Bagra- 
tion  was  cut  off  and  pursued,  and  I  hoped  to  destroy  him  ; 
it  was  manifestly  f  )r  my  interest  to  push  forward  to  the 
Dwina,  where  I  could  better  discuss  our  affairs  and  require 
guarantees.  In  fact  I  attributed  this  mission  of  Balaschof 
mainly  to  a  desire  to  gain  time  in  order  to  unite  the  scattered 
Russian  forces,  and  I  permitted  him  to  see  that  I  regarded 
it  in  that  light. 

Some  have  thought  that  if  Balaschof  had  arrived  eight 
days  sooner,  he  would  have  negotiated  a  peace  ;  that  the 
Russians  would  have  retired  behind  the  Dwina  while  I 
remained  behind  the  Niémen,  making  Wilna  neutral  ;  that 
new  combinations  would  here  have  been  formed  that  would 
have  changed  the  face  of  the  world.  These  are  mere  con- 
jectures. There  is  little  reaso,n  to  believe  that  the  Russians 
would  have  consented  to  evacuate  Lithuania,  with  four  hun- 
dred thousand  hostile  troops  on  the  Niémen,  nor  is  it  at  all 
probable  that  Alexander  and  myself  could  have  come  to  an 
understanding  respecting  the  principal  causes  of  our  differ- 
ence. The  treaty  of  Vienna  had  so  destroyed  his  confidence 
that  my  most  sincere  promises  seemed  to  him  mere  lures, 


Ch.  XVIII.]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA  351 

and  liis  distrust  liad  been  still  further  augmented  by  the 
intrigues  which  I  have  already  mentioned.  Be  this  as  it 
may,  the  return  of  Balaschof  to  Drissa,  instead  of  tending 
to  a  jiacific  arrangement,  became  a  kind  of  signal  for  an 
unrelenting  war.  Reports  which  reached  me  in  my  exile 
have  led  mc  to  believe  that  he  exaggerated  to  the  Emperor 
Alexander  the  expressions  which  I  used  on  that  occasion.  I 
do  not  know  that  these  reports  were  well  founded,  but  I 
suppose  that  this  adventure,  and  the  affair  of  Speranski, 
tended  to  fan,  in  the  mind  of  Alexander,  the  hatred  against 
me  which  influenced  all  his  conduct,  and  which  he  was  flxr 
from  exhibiting  after  our  intercourse  at  Tilsit  and  Erfuth. 

The  Re-csîaî>lishment  of  Poland  proclaimed.  —  I  also 
received  at  Wilna  the  deputation  of  the  kingdom  of  Poland. 
My  ambassador,  Pradt,  had  experienced  very  little  difficulty 
in  inducing  them  to  the  decisive  stej),  of  themselves  pro- 
claiming the  restoration  of  their  country.  The  Diet  pro- 
claimed the  reëstablishmcnt  of  the  Polish  Confederation  ;  but 
they  confined  themselves  to  mere  declarations  ;  the  provinces 
occupied  by  the  Russians  did  not  act,  and  they  all  limited 
themselves  to  the  tardy  levy  of  some  Lithuanian  regiments, 
and  the  sending  to  Wilna  of  an  executive  commission  of  the 
kingdom,  for  the  organization  of  the  province.  I  could  not 
make  a  formal  and  definitive  reco2:nition  of  the  kinodom 
without  offending  Austria,  and  without  destroying  the  last 
hope  of  a  reconciliation  with  Russia.  I,  however,  promised 
to  interest  myself  in  its  fate,  when  I  should  make  a  treaty 
of  peace;  it  was  not  prudent,  under  the  circumstances,  for 
me  to  promise  more,  although  I  was  determined  to  do  every 
thing  in  my  power  to  efifect  this  reëstablishmcnt.* 


*.Tlie  following  is  Thiers'  account  of  Napoleon's  reply  to  the  Polish  deputa- 
tion at  Wilnn,  and  its  effect: 

"Gentlemen,"  he  said  in  reply  to  the  address  of  the  deputation,  "  Gentle- 
ujea,  deputies  of  the  Confederation  of  Poland,  I  have  listened  with  much  inter- 


352  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

War  between  England  and  the  United  States.— Another 
event  of  consiJembie  importance  occuiTed  during  ray  stay  at 
Wilna, — the  declaration  of  war  between  the  United  States 

est  to  all  that  j-ou  have  just  addressed  to  me  !  Poles,  I  should  have  thought 
and  acted  in  your  place  as  you  have  done  ;  I  should  have  acted  as  you  have 
acted  in  the  assembly  at  Warsaw.  The  love  of  country  is  the  first  virtue  of 
civilized  humanity. 

"  In  my  position  I  have  many  interests  to  conciliate,  many  duties  to  fulfill. 
Had  I  reigned  ni  the  time  of  the  first,  the  second,  or  the  third  divsion  of 
Poland,  I  would  have  armed  all  my  people  in  your  support.  As  soon  as 
victory  enabled  me  to  restore  your  ancient  law^s  to  your  capital  and  a  portion 
of  your  provinces,  I  eagerly  seized  the  opportunity. 

"  I  love  your  nation.  During  sixteen  years  I  have  been  accustomed  to  see 
its  soldiers  fighting  by  my  siJa,  on  the  battle-fields  of  Italy  and  Spain. 

"  I  applaud  all  that  you  have  done  ;  I  sanction  the  efforts  which  you  have 
made  ;  all  that  I  can  do  to  second  them  I  will  do. 

"  If  j-our  efforts  be  unanimous  you  may  well  hope  to  succîcd  i:i  compelling 
your  enemies  to  recognize  your  rights  ;  bat  in  these  distant  and  vast  countries 
it  is  on  the  unanimous  efforts  of  their  peoples  alone  that  such  hopes  of  success 
can  be  founded. 

"  I  addressed  you  in  the  same  terms  on  my  first  appearance  in  Poland.  I 
must  add,  that  I  have  guaranteed  to  the  Emperor  of  Austria  the  integrity  of 
his  states,  and  that  I  cannot  authorize  any  manœuvre  or  movement  tending  to 
disturb  him  in  the  peaceable  possession  of  wliat  remains  to  him  of  the  Polish 
provinces.  But  let  Lithuania,  Samogitia,  Witobsk,  Polotsk,  Mohilew,  Vol- 
hynia,  the  Ukraine,  and  Podolia,  be  animated  with  the  same  spirit  which  I 
have  found  to  exist  in  Great  Poland,  and  Providence  will  crown  with  success 
the  sanctity  of  your  cause,  and  will  recompense  you  for  that  devotion  to  your 
country  which  renders  you  so  interesting,  and  has  given  you  so  many  claims 
upon  my  esteem  and  protection,  upon  which,  in  all  circumstances,  you  may 
always  rely." 

This  address  had  no  particularly  unfavorable  effect  on  the  Polish  deputies, 
for  they  were  previously  aware  that  Napoleon  entertained  the  sentiments 
which  it  expressed,  but  its  effect  at  Wilna,  in  spite  of  the  enthusiasm  caused 
by  the  presence  of  the  victorious  French  troops,  was  most  disastrous. 

"How  can  Napoleon,"  said  the  Lithuanians,  "demand  that  we  should  lavish 
our  blood,  and  our  resources  in  his  service,  when  he  is  unwilling  ou  his  part, 
to  declare  the  reconstitution  of  the  kingdom  of  Poland  ?  And  what  withholds 
him  from  this  course  ?  Prussia  is  at  his  feet  ;  Austria  is  dependent  on  his 
will,  and  might  readily,  moreover,  be  recompensed  by  Illyria;  and  Russia  is 
already  flying  before  his  armies.  Is  it  the  truth,  that  he  is  not  willing  to 
restore  us  to  existence  as  a  nation  ?  Is  it  the  truth,  that  he  has  come  here 
only  to  gain  a  victcry  over  the  Russians,  intending  then  to  retreat  without 
having  effected  anything  with  regard  to  us.  save  having  added  half  a  million 
of  Poles  to  the  Grand  Duchy,  and  exposed  the  greater  number  of  us  to  exile 
and  sequestration?"     To  these  doubts  it  was  replied,  that  Napoleon  was  in  a 


Oh.  XYIIL]  INVASION       OF     RUSSIA.  353 

and  Great  Britian.  Annoyed  by  the  execution  of  the  British 
Orders  in  Council,  as  well  as  by  our  system  of  reprisals,  the 
United  States  had  obtained  from  me  a  promise  of  withdraw- 
ing so  much  of  the  decrees  of  Berlin  and  Milan  as  affected 
the  Americans  ;  the  cabinet  of  London  refused  to  modify 
their  system,  and  continued  their  hostile  acts,  till,  at  last, 
the  Americans  became  indignant  and,  on  the  nineteenth  of 
June,  proclaimed  war.-'' 

If  I  had  not  already  begun  the  war  with  Russia,  this  new 
event  might  have  had  a  most  important  influence  upon  the 
destinies  of  the  world.  A  ministerial  revolution  had  already 
occurred  in  England  ;  Perceval  had  been  assassinated  by  a 
man  partially  insane,  on  the  eleventh  of  May  ;  his  death  did 
not  necessarily  bring  with  it  any  political  combinations  ;  but 
under  such  circumstances,  it  was  possible  that  he  would  have 
been  replaced  by  a  minister  less  hostile  to  me.  In  fact,  how- 
ever, a  war  with  the  United  States  was  not  deemed  of  suffi- 
cient importance  to  counterbalance  the  advantages  to  be 
gained  from  the  successes  of  Wellington  and  the  war  with 
Russia,  or  to  incline  the  ambitious  cabinet  of  London  to  a 
more  pacific  policy.  The  new  ministry,  at  the  head  of  which 
was  Lord  Liverpool,  witli  Castlereagh  for  foreign  affairs, 
Bathurst,  Harrowby,  etc.,  pursued  the  same  policy  as  that 
which  preceded  it.  Things  had  now  gone  too  far  to  expect 
any  change  before  the  close  of  the  campaign. 

Operations  against  Bagration.— These    unfruitful    diplo- 

delicato  position,  that  it  was  absolutely  necessary  that  he  should  act  with  cau- 
tion, but  that  it  was  easy  to  see  through  his  caution,  that  his  real  intention 
was  to  reconstitute  Poland,  should  he  be  seriously  aided  ; — that  it  was  neces- 
sary, therefore,  for  the  Polish  people  to  rise  en  masse,  and  furnish  him  with 
the  means  of  accomplishing  the  undertaking  upon  which  he  had  entered.  But 
the  party  which  held  these  latter  opinions  was  by  far  the  least  numerous,  and 
the  large  body  of  people  made  Napoleon's  caution  an  excuse  for  want  of 
energy,  avarice,  and  selfish  calculations." 

=-  The  act  declaring  hostilities  passed  on  the  eighteenth,  and  the  proclamatiou 
of  the  president  was  signed,  oa  the  ninotcentii  of  Juno,  1812. 
VOL.  III. — 23. 


354  LIFE      OF      NAPOLEO::.  [Cil.   XVIII. 

ma  tic  discussions,  however,  produced  no  influence  upon  mili- 
tary operations.  The  army  of  Barclay  having  taken  refuge 
in  the  camp  of  Drissa,  I  directed  my  attention  to  the  army 
of  Bagration.  Davoust,  who  was  at  Minsk  with  two  divi- 
sions, would  be  ready  to  attack  him  in  front,  while  the  King 
of  Westphalia,  who  entered  Grodno  the  thirtieth  of  June, 
with  the  Poles  and  Westphalians,  and  the  Saxons  marching 
to  join,  making  in  all  sixty-five  thousand  men,  attacked  him 
in  rear,  seconded  by  Schwartzenberg,  who  in  reality  belonged 
to  the  centre,  but  was  now  on  the  right,  marching  by  Prou- 
jani  on  Slonim,  Prince  Bagration,  hearing  at  Walkowisk 
of  the  passage  of  the  Niémen,  and  the  intention  of  concen- 
trating the  army  in  the  environs  of  Wilna,  at  first  deter- 
mined to  take  the  road  to  that  city  by  Mosty,  so  as  to  act 
in  conformity  with  the  plan  of  operations  formed  previous 
to  the  campaign  ;  but  the  order  to  march  on  the  Dwina 
induced  him  to  take  the  road  to  Nowogrodeck  and  Nicolajeff 
so  as  to  gain  Vileika.  Davoust  having  already  preceded  him, 
he  was  obliged  to  fall  back  by  Mir,  whence  he  marched  again 
in  the  direction  of  Minsk  by  Kaidanow.  This  was  a  faulty 
movement  ;  for  Davoust  was  ready  to  enter  Minsk  before 
him.  When  he  learned  this  fact,  he  fell  back  again  to  the 
south-east,  so  as  to  reach  Neswije  before  the  Poles  ;  he 
arrived  there  on  the  eighth.  Jerome  left  Grodno  on  the  first 
of  July,  and  did  not  reach  Bielitza  till  the  seventh.  His 
march  was  a  difficult  one,  but  unnecessarily  slow.  His 
advanced  guard  of  Poles  having  passed  the  Niémen  a  second 
time  at  Bielitza,  advanced  on  Mir,  where  their  cavalry,  on 
the  ninth  and  tenth,  had  two  engagements  with  Platof  and 
Wassiltchikof,  in  which  they  fought  bravely  but  experienced 
considerable  loss.  Davoust  had  reached  Minsk  on  the  eighth, 
but  not  knowing  the  position  of  the  enemy  he  did  not  ven- 
ture to  march  on  Igumen,  lest  he  might  open  the  passage  of 
Minsk,  nor  upon  Kaidanow  or  Glutzk  for  fear  that  Bagration 


Ch.  XVIIL]  invasion    OF    RUSSIA.  355 

might  take  him  in  rear.  On  the  eleventh  of  July,  the  latter 
decided  to  take  the  road  to  Bobrouisk,  and  Davoust  being 
still  at  Minsk,  that  prince  found  himself  relieved  from  his 
embarrass  ment. 

Dissatisfied  with  the  slow  movements  of  Jerome,  I  ordered 
Davoust  to  take  command  of  all  his  army  and  to  march  on 
Mohilew,  which  he  might  reach  in  eight  days,  whereas  the 
Russians  would  require  at  least  ten  or  twelve  to  arrive  at  the 
same  place,  Jerome  received  orders  to  push  on  more  rapidly, 
while  Schwartzenberg  was  to  establish  himself  on  the  enemy's 
flank  between  Bobrouisk  and  Pinsk.  The  Saxons  were 
deemed  sufficient  for  observing  the  enemy's  corps  remaining 
at  Volhynia, 

But,  in  so  vast  an  empire,  the  manœuvres  of  strategy  are 
less  certain  than  in  a  country  hemmed  in  by  seas  or  neutral 
territory  ;  practicable  roads  run  in  all  directions,  so  that  our 
best  founded  hopes  frequently  failed.  We  committed  some 
faults  in  this  operation  it  is  true,  but  then  there  were  a  thou- 
sand unforeseen  obstacles  which  seemed  to  spring  up  to  baffle 
our  calculations.  From  Minsk,  Davoust  might  hojje  to 
anticipate  Bagration  at  Bobrouisk  or  at  Glutzk.  The  first 
of  these  cities,  being  more  distant  from  Bagration,  was  the 
most  advantageous  direction.  But  it  was  a  fortress,  and 
although  singularly  situated,  it,  on  this  occasion,  jdayed  a 
most  important  part.  The  head  of  Bagration's  column 
reached  Glutzk  on  the  fifteenth  of  July  ;  Davoust  could  not 
anticipate  him  at  that  place  without  destroying  the  efficiency 
of  his  troops  ;  if  he  had  moved  on  without  hesitation  he 
might  readily  have  fallen  perpendicularly  upon  the  flank  of 
the  long  column  of  the  Russians,  and  it  is  impossible  to  say 
what  would  have  been  the  result.  But,  to  have  gained 
Glutzk,  Davoust  should  not  have  remained  a  single  day  at 
Minsk.  The  marshal,  however,  on  arriving  at  that  city 
learned  that  Bagration  had  rallied  the  light  corps  of  Dorokof 


356  LIFE     OF      N-APOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

in  the  direction  of  Kaidanow,  and  did  not  deem  it  prudent 
to  leave  Minsk  unprotected.  If  he  had  had  his  whole  five 
divisions,  he  would  undoubtedly  have  nmrched  to  Glutzk 
with  three,  leaving  the  other  two  in  echelon  on  Minsk  ;  but 
the  dispersion  of  our  forces,  which  were  sent  in  all  directions 
in  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  caused  the  failure  of  an  operation 
which  was  much  better  jilanned  than  executed. 

Napoleon  advances  on  Polotsk. — The  fifteen  days  which 
I  had  spent  at  Wilna,  waiting  for  the  result  of  my  opera- 
tions against  Bagration,  were,  therefore,  virtually  lost  ;  this 
delay,  however,  allowed  the  viceroy  and  the  Bavarians  to 
come  into  line.  The  former,  having  crossed  the  country 
between  Trocki  and  the  Niémen,  directed  his  march  on 
Vileika,  whence  he  took  the  road  to  Polotsk.  The  Bava- 
rians took  the  road  to  Gloubokoe.  The  manœuvres  against 
Bagration  no  longer  requiring  my  j)resence  at  Wilna,  I 
determined  to  take  command  myself  of  the  forces  which 
were  closing  in  on  the  Dwina.  I  consequently  left  Wilna 
on  the  sixteenth  of  July,  after  a  sojourn  which  some,  as  has 
already  been  said,  without  knowing  the  cause  of  this  delay, 
have  endeavored  to  contrast  with  my  activity  at  Ulm,  Abens- 
burg,  etc.  I  left  at  Wilna  the  Duke  of  Bassano,  the  minis- 
ter of  foreign  affairs,  with  the  diplomatic  agents  who  had 
followed  my  head-quarters.  He  was  to  watch  over  the  rela- 
tions with  our  allies,  and  the  Polish  authorities  ;  he  was 
also  to  serve  as  a  medium  of  communication  with  my  lieu- 
tenants who  were  still  in  rear,  and  to  give  to  the  administra- 
tion and  military  operations  all  the  vigor  that  could  be 
imparted  by  cabinet  orders.  If  some  of  my  plans  had  failed 
to  produce  the  expected  results,  I  now  hoped  to  indenniify 
myself  for  the  loss  of  time. 

Camp  of  Drissa. — The  camp  which  the  first  Russian  army 
occupied  at  Drissa  was  a  manifest  proof  that  their  generals 
did  not  understand  their  position,  and  a  still  more  positive 


Ch.  XVllJ.]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  357 

proof  that  the  pretended  project  of  Barclay  to  draw  us  into 
Russia  was  a  mere  romance.  My  sojourn  at  Wilna  had 
unfortunately  prevented  me  from  profiting  by  the  capital 
fault  of  their  operations.  In  limiting  themselves  to  the 
defense  of  the  single  road  from  Wilna  to  St.  Petersburg,  the 
Eussians  had  left  without  defense  the  roads  that  led  to  the 
very  heart  of  their  empire.  They  had  so  little  apprehension 
of  the  danger  of  their  eccentric  manoeuvre,  that  at  the  very 
moment  when  they  abandoned  the  centre  road  to  Witebesk 
and  Borisof,  they  directed  Prince  Bagration  to  join  them  by 
the  road  from  Slonini  to  Drissa,  by  a  long  march  whicli  could 
be  executed  only  through  the  midst  of  our  columns.  For- 
tunately for  him,  he  saw  from  the  first  the  impossibility  of 
obeying  this  order.  Not  having  succeeded  in  cutting  off  his 
forces,  I  now  resolved  to  jjrofit  by  the  double  fault  of  the 
enemy,  by  throwing  myself  in  mass  on  Polotsk,  After  hav- 
ing gained  the  extreme  left  of  their  principal  army  I  would 
fall  back  on  their  line,  which  had  been  forced  to  effect  a 
change  of  front  and  to  fight  with  the  sea  in  their  rear.  By 
gaining  a  single  battle  I  would  have  driven  them  back  on 
Courland,  forcing  them  to  cut  their  way  out,  to  lay  down 
their  arms,  or  be  driven  into  the  sea.  I  arrived  at  Gloubokoe 
on  the  eighteenth  of  July.  I  intended  to  march  immediately 
on  Polotsk  where  I  had  also  directed  the  King  of  Naples  to 
repair,  defiling  by  his  right  along  the  Dwina. 

Alexander  retires  from  Drissa  to  Moscow  and  St.  Peters- 
burg.— There  was  now  no  apparent  obstacle  to  the  entire 
success  of  my  projects.  It  seemed,  however,  throughout  the 
whole  of  this  war  that  all  my  operations  were  under  the 
spell  of  some  evil  genius,  for  new  obstacles,  entirely  without 
the  ordinary  calculations  of  probabilities,  were  continually 
springing  up  to  destroy  my  best  conceived  combinations. 
Could  I  foresee  that  the  Russian  army  would  not  remain 
three  days  in  a  camp  which  had  cost  them  several  months' 


358  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII 

■work  and  immense  sums  of  money  ?  Such,  however,  was 
the  fact.  The  Emperor  Alexander,  who  had  adopted  this 
camp  at  the  instance  of  a  general  ignorant  of  his  profession, 
now  2:)erceived  the  danger  of  his  position.  He  saw  that  two 
armies,  so  very  inferior  in  numbers  to  ours,  and  so  divided  as 
to  have  no  hope  of  a  union,  would  be  utterly  incompetent  to 
save  Ilussia.  It  now  appeared  evident  to  him  that  this  could 
only  be  effected  by  a  general  levy  of  the  whole  nation.  He 
ordered  Barclay  to  march  on  Smolensko,  and  to  do  every 
thing  in  his  power  to  effect  a  junction  with  Bagration.  The 
emperor  himself  first  repaired  to  Polotsk,  and  afterward 
went  to  Moscow  and  St.  Petersburg,  to  incite  the  nobility 
and  the  people  to  a  general  arming  in  defense  of  their  country. 
He  designated  positions  for  vast  intrenched  camps,  Avhere 
these  levies  were  to  be  assembled  and  organized.  Consider- 
able works  were  ordered  for  this  purpose  at  Nijeni-Nowogorod, 
on  the  confines  of  Europe. 

Barclay's  Operations  to  f?ain  Smolensk©.— In  accordance 
with  the  plans  formed  at  Drissa,  Barclay,  having  left  in  the 
environs  of  that  city  a  corps  of  twenty-five  thousand  men 
under  Count  Wittgenstein,  in  order  to  cover  the  direct  road 
to  St.  Petersburg,  began  his  march  to  Smolensko,  ascending 
the  left  bank  of  the  Dwina.  He  had  reached  Polotsk  when 
we  arrived  at  Groubukoe.  I,  nevertheless,  still  had  ho[)es  of 
being  able  to  turn  his  left  ;  the  least  delay  in  his  march 
would  enable  us  to  precede  him  to  Witepsk.  I,  theiefore, 
directed  my  march  on  that  city.  We  reached  the  Dwina  on 
the  twenty-fourth  of  July,  at  Bechenkowizi.  Finding  here 
that  the  enemy  had  already  passed  on  his  way  to  Witepsk, 
I  ascended  the  river  by  the  left  bank.  I  now  saw  little 
chance  of  interrupting  him,  and  became  fully  sensible  of  the 
losses  due  to  my  unfortunate  delay  at  Wilna.  Nevertheless, 
in  order  to  regain  Smolensko,  Barclay  was  obliged  to  pass  to 
the  left  bank  of  the  Dwina  so  as  to  reach  Witepsk  and  the 


Ch.  XYIII.]  INVASION    OF      RUSSIA  359 

road  to  Roudnia.  This  was  a  hazardous  operation,  for,  if 
we  should  arrive  in  time,  he  would  be  obliged  to  give  battle 
with  a  river  in  his  rear,  as  Benningsen  did  at  Friedland.  He, 
in  consequence,  hastened  to  direct  on  Bechenkowizi  an 
advanced  guard  of  about  twelve  thousand  men,  in  order  to 
retard  our  march  and  thus  gain  time  to  rally  the  corps  of 
General  Doctorof,  who,  being  the  rear  guard  of  his  army  on 
the  road  to  Polotsk,  was  stiH  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river. 

Combats  of  Ostrowno.— On  the  twenty-fifth  and  twenty- 
sixth,  Murat  had  some  sharp  engagements  with  the  enemy's 
rear-guard  near  Ostrowno.  Murat  was  destitute  of  infantry, 
while  the  woody  nature  of  the  country  favored  the  corps  of 
Ostermann  ;  some  brilliant  charges,  however,  were  made  to 
repel  the  attacks  of  the  Russian  columns.  On  the  arrival 
of  the  division  of  Delzons,  Ostermann  fell  back  in  good 
order.  Night  separated  the  combatants.  The  next  day 
Murat  renewed  the  attack  ;  being  seconded  by  the  viceroy, 
he  now  hoped  to  be  able  to  defeat  the  enemy's  troops  ;  but 
Barclay  had  reënforced  them  during  the  night  by  the  fresh 
corps  of  Konownitzin.  This  combat  was  still  more  warm 
than  the  preceding  ;  the  Russians  held  their  ground  firndy  ; 
in  attempting  to  turn  them,  our  left  was  assailed  by  their 
reserve  and  driven  back  ;  but  the  right,  under  Roussel,  hav- 
ing turned  the  enemy,  Konownitzin  retreated  in  good  order, 
and,  at  Komarki,  was  reënforced  by  Touczkof,  who  had  been 
sent  to  his  assistance.  These  new  troops  again  succeeded  in 
checking  the  ardor  of  our  advanced  guard.  Impatient  at  so 
many  checks,  I  put  myself  at  the  head  of  the  column  and 
threw  the  fourth  corps  across  the  wood.  The  enemy  retreated 
in  echelon  and  we  arrived  in  sight  of  Witepsk  without  fur- 
ther obstacle. 

Barclay  concentrated  his  army  near  Witepsk  behind  the 
river  Louchetza,  and  appointed  a  rendezvous  with  Bagration 
near  Orcha.     To  reach  that  city,  it  was  necessary  to  march 


360  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XVIU. 

to  the  soutli  by  Cabinowitchi  in  a  line  parallel  to  my  army 
and  with  their  flank  exposed.  The  Eussian  general  thought 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  execute  this  movement  with- 
out fighting,  and  prepared  to  give  us  battle  so  as  to  dispute 
the  passage  of  the  Louchetza.  Fortunately  f.)r  him  he 
learned  the  same  evening  that  Bagration,  not  being  able  to 
pierce  his  way  to  Mohilew,  had  marched  by  Mestilow  on 
Smolensko.  This  incident  saved  Barclay  a  probable  defeat, 
for  he  could  not  oppose  more  than  eighty  thousand  men  to 
my  army  of  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand.  I  myself 
m&de  a  reconnoisance  of  the  enemy's  position  behind  the 
Louchetza,  near  mid-day  of  the  twenty-seventh  ;  but,  as  it 
was  impolitic  to  risk  a  partial  engagement,  the  affair  was 
postponed  till  the  next  day  in  order  that  our  troops  might 
come  up.  But,  in  the  evening,  Barclay  received  imforma- 
tion  which  rendered  it  unnecessary  for  him  to  give  battle, 
and  he  decamped  during  the  night  on  Smolensko,  where  he 
was  certain  of  effecting  a  junction  with  Bagration.  His 
march  Avas  covered  by  Palden  with  the  elite  of  the  Bussian 
cavalry.  At  the  break  of  day  on  the  twenty-eighth  of  July, 
the  enemy  had  entirely  disappeared  and  we  entered  Witepsk, 
more  disgusted  than  ever  that  the  Russians  had  again  escaped 
us.  If  Barchiy  had  injudiciously  placed  his  army  on  the 
Niémen,  and  had  imprudently  directed  his  retreat  on  the 
Lower  Dwina,  he  had  certainly  manœuvred  with  sagacity 
after  leaving  Drissa. 

Operations  of  Bagration. — The  second  Russian  array  had 
also  continued  its  retreat  with  more  good  fortune  than  it  had 
reason  to  exjiect.  Davoust  transmitted  the  order  to  my 
brother,  in  which  he  was  directed  to  assume  the  command  ; 
Jerome  took  oifense  at  being  plact^d  under  the  orders  of 
another,  resigned  the  command  of  the  Westphalians  to  Gen- 
eral Tharreau,  directed  Poniatowski  to  obey  the  orders  of 
JJavoust,  and  left  the  army  on  the  sixteenth  of  July.     This 


Ch.  XVnr.]  INVASION    of     RUSSIA.  361 

foolish  anger  tended  for  a  moment  to  diminish  the  vigor  uf 
our  pursuit.  Nevertheless,  Davoust,  forced  to  act  on  Orcha 
on  the  left,  and  to  watch  the  Beresiua  on  the  right,  marched 
with  twenty  thousand  men  on  Mohilew,  calling  to  him  the 
corps  of  Poniatowski,  and  directing  the  Westphalians  to 
follow  alone  in  the  trail  of  the  enemy's  columns.  The  Eus- 
sian  general,  having  reached  Nowoy-Bichow,  on  the  Borysthc- 
nese,  hy  Bobrouisk,  had  the  choice  either  to  continue  his 
march  on  Mestilow  or  to  attack  Davoust.  He  had  been 
invited  to  direct  his  march  on  Orcha  ;  but  the  road  to  that 
city  passes  Mohilew,  and  if,  to  avoid  the  hostile  forces,  he 
had  deviated  from  the  direct  road,  Davoust  would  have 
preceded  him  at  Mestilow.  He  then  resolved  to  open  a 
passage  with  the  sword,  and  marched  direct  on  Mo- 
hilew. 

Affair  of  Hïoliilcw. — Considering  the  disposition  of  the 
forces  it  would  j'l'obably  have  been  more  wise  for  Davoust  to 
move  on  Orcha  ;  but  this  marshal  determined  to  give  the 
enemy  battle,  and  bravely  establish  himself  in  advance  of 
Mohilew  on  the  road  from  that  city  to  Staro-Bichow,  at  the 
risk  of  being  crushed.  Fortunately  Prince  Bagration,  who 
attacked  him  on  the  twenty-third,  brought  only  one  of  his 
co^ys  d'armée  into  action,  the  other  being  still  in  rear.  The 
combat  Avas  a  warm  one.  The  position  of  Dav(Hist,  very 
strong  in  front,  was  susceptible  of  b^'ing  turned  by  his  right. 
The  enemy,  fearing,  probably,  to  expose  his  communications, 
preferred  to  take  the  bull  by  the  horns.  He  was  repelled 
with  considerable  loss.  Discouraged  by  this  check,  Bagration 
fell  back  on  Nowoy-Bichow  where  he  crossed  the  Borysthe- 
nese  on  the  twenty-sixth,  ajid  continued  his  march  by  Mesti- 
low on  Smolensko.  Davoust  deemed  himself  fortunate  in 
being  able  to  sustain  his  i^osition  at  Mohilew,  and  did  not 
venture  to  throw  himself  alone  on  the  left  of  the  Borysthe- 
nese.     The  two  Russian  armies  had  no  further  obstacles  to 


362  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XVIIL 

prevent  their  junction,  which  was  effected  on  the  third  of 
August,  at  Smolensko. 

Halt  at  XVitepsk. — The  month  of  July  had  been  extre-mely 
rainy.  My  troops  had  suffered  much  from  had  weather 
during  their  march  from  the  Niémen  to  the  Dwiua  and  the 
Borysthenese.  Our  scanty  suppKes  and  coarse  food  had  pro- 
pagated diseases  among  the  soldiers  ;  our  iuagazine&  were 
still  on  their  way  from  Konigsberg  to  Kowno  ;  we  were 
greatly  in  want  of  flour  and  the  means  of  grinding  it  ;  the 
soldiers  were  obliged  to  subsist  on  boiled  rye  which  produced 
horrible  dysenteries.  I  ordered  portable  hand-mills  to  be 
forwarded  from  Paris  ;  but  these  could  not  arrive  before 
Avinter.  In  the  mean  time  half  of  our  troops  were  in  the 
same  situation  as  those  of  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  in  Cham- 
pagne. It  was  important  to  give  them  some  repose.  Hav- 
ing no  farther  hopes  of  cutting  off  Barclay,  I  halted  at 
Witepsk,  and  my  army,  reënforced  by  the  junction  of  the 
corps  of  Davoust,  Poniatowski,  and  the  Westphalians,  was 
cantoned  with  its  left  at  Sourage  on  the  Dwina,  the  right  at 
Mohilew  on  the  Borysthenese,  and  the  advanced  guard  at 
Doubrowna. 

Operations  of  tlic  Wings  of  the  Army.— In  opening  the 
campaign  I  had  supposed  that  our  success  in  the  centre 
would  involve  the  retreat  of  the  enemy's  Avings.  The  Rus- 
sians, however,  had  persisted  in  holding  firmly  their  ground 
on  the  two  extremities  of  the  line.  Under  the  circumstances 
this  was  natural.  Kiga  and  the  vicinity  of  the  Baltic  on 
Pievel  secured  the  retreat  of  their  right.  Their  left,  superior 
to  us  in  Volhynia,  had  its  rear  free  to  Odessa,  and  was  ex- 
pecting to  be  reënforced  by  the  entire  army  of  Moldavia, 
which  Tschichagof  had  commanded  since  the  departure  of 
Kutusof.  We  had  not  estimated  this  army  at  more  than 
half  its  real  strength,  which  was  not  less  than  forty  thousand 
men.    I  had  detached  against  it  only  the  corps  of  the  Saxons, 


Cu.  XTIIL]  INVASION    OF     RUSSIA.  363 

intending  to  reënforce  them  by  tlio  Poles  as  soon  as  Schwarl- 
zeuberg  rejoined  my  anny.  The  Poles,  after  assisting  Da- 
voust  in  the  pursuit  of  Bagration,  were  to  i-eturn  into  Vol- 
hynia  by  Mozyr,  and,  threatening  the  retreat  of  Tormasof 
"with  an  army  reënforced  by  the  insurrection  of  tlie  province, 
tliej'  vvould  easily  free  our  right  from  all  apprehension  m  that 
direction.  The  delay  of  Schwartzenberg,  and  the  operations 
in  the  centre,  prevented  the  execution  of  this  project,  Avhich 
misfortune  was  not  the  lenst  fatal  one  in  this  campaign. 

Tormassof  defeats  the  Saxons.— On  the  march  of  the 
Westphalians  and  Schwartzenberg,  Tormassof  took  the  offen- 
sive on  the  rear  of  Jerome,  by  the  orders  of  the  emperor 
Alexander,  and  conformably  to  the  plan  of  operations,  in 
case  of  the  invasion  of  Lithuania.  The  Saxons,  not  bein^ 
in  condition  to  oppose  an  efficient  resistance,  were  attacked 
b}''  Torniiissof  at  the  head  of  thirty-five  thousand  men,  and 
an  entire  brigade  at  Kobrin  was  taken  prisoners  on  the 
twenty-third  of  July.  Reynier  called  loudly  for  aid,  and 
Schwartzenberg  was  detached  to  his  assistance.  This  prince 
left  Nishnije  on  the  first  of  August  by  Slonim  where  he  met 
Reynier,  who  had  easily  effected  his  retreat. 

Operations  of  Oiidinoi. — My  left  wing  was  not  more  for- 
tunate :  in  marching  on  Witepsk,  I  had  left  Oudinot  at 
Polotsk  with  twenty-seven  or  twenty-eight  thousand  men 
to  secure  my  base  against  Wittgenstein,  whom  Barclay  had 
left  to  cover  the  road  to  St.  Petersburg  with  twenty-five 
thousand  Russians.  Oudinot  advanced,  on  the  thirtieth  of 
July,  on  the  road  to  Sebeje  with  two  divisions,  leaving  the 
third  in  echelons  on  the  Drissa.  Wittgenstein  not  findino- 
himself  threatened  by  Macdonald  in  the  direction  of  Dona- 
berg,  at  the  same  time  had  taken  the  offensive  against  the 
second  corps.  The  rencontre  took  place  ;;t  Klitistitzi.  Oudi- 
not was  driven  back  on  the  Drissa,  wlieie  he  rallied  his 
forces.     The  Russians  ventured  to  cross  this  river,  on  the 


364  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

first  of  August,  unJ  paid  for  their  imprudence  with  the  loss 
of  a  thousand  men.  Oudinot  now  committed  the  same  error, 
by  pursuing  the  enemy  across  the  river  with  the  division  of 
Verdier  ;  he  was  driven  back  with  loss.  He  returned  to  Po- 
lotsk, on  the  second  of  August,  after  two  warm  engagements 
in  which  his  momentary  success  scarcely  compensated  for  his 
losses.  Deeming  this  marshal  too  weak  to  oppose  Wittgen- 
stein, I  reënforced  him  with  the  corjjs  of  Bavarians,  which 
famine  and  sickness  had  already  reduced  to  twelve  thousand 
combatants. 

Turkey,  Sweden,  and  England. — In  addition  to  the  ill- 
success  of  my  military  })rojects,  I  was  at  this  time  annoyed 
by  the  news  of  unexpected  and  most  vexatious  political 
events,  which  were  calculated  to  have  no  little  influence  on 
the  results  of  the  war.  While  I  \v:is  at  Witepsk  I  learned 
that  the  treaty  of  peace  between  Russia  and  the  Turks  had 
been  ratified.  This  was  a  most  extraordinary  error  on  the 
part  of  the  Turks,  and  one  which  I  might  have  prevented, 
had  I  foreseen  it.  The  gold  and  intrigues  which  had  gained 
the  vizir  at  Bucharest,  also  triumphed  over  the  scruples  of 
the  divan,  which  had  at  first  hesitated  to  ratify  the  treaty. 
The  Sultan  had  decided  the  question  on  the  fourteenth  of 
July  ;  afterwards  seeing  his  error  he  caused  the  vizir  and 
the  Moruzzi  to  be  decapitated  ;  but  the  evil  was  none  the 
less  irreparable  for  us.  I  also  at  this  time  received  a  copy 
of  the  treaty,  which  had  been  signed  on  the  twenty-fourth  of 
March,  between  Russia  and  Sweden.  This  had  been  kejit  a 
profound  secret  for  two  months,  (till  the  twenty-ninth  of 
May),  after  it  had  been  signed.  Bernadotte  was  still  offering 
to  form  an  alliance  with  me  to  make  war  against  Russia. 
About  the  same  time,  (the  eighteenth  of  July),  Russia  had 
signed  at  Orebro  a  treaty  of  alliance  and  subsidy  with  Eng- 
land :  the  latter  paid  a  subsidy  of  eighteen  millions,  and  as 
the  invasion  of  the  French  endangered  the  Russian  fleet  if  it 


Ch.  XVIII.]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  365 

should  ])o  frozen  up  iii  the  Gulf,  it  was  stipulated  that  it 
should  he  placed  in  depot  in  one  of  the  ports  of  Great 
Britain. 

Council  of  War  at  Witcpsk. — The  Emperor  Alexander 
had  gone  to  Aho  in  Finland  to  confer  with  Bernadotte  on 
the  conditions  of  a  more  close  alliance.  He  then  returned  to 
Moscow  to  incite  the  people  to  a  levy  en  masse.  All  these 
circumstances  were  of  a  nature  to  convince  me  of  the  neces- 
sity of  some  more  decisive  movement.  The  importance  of 
the  crisis  induced  me  to  call  a  kind  of  council  of  war,  in 
which  the  opinions  of  my  generals  were  consulted.  This  was 
the  first  council  of  the  kind  which  I  had  held  since  the  battle 
of  Castiglione.  At  Essling  I  had  discussed  certain  questions 
with  Massena  and  Davoust,  but  had  not  formally  consulted 
them  in  council.  I  never  repelled  the  advice  of  individuals  ; 
hut  I  attached  very  little  importance  to  the  debates  of  coun- 
cils. Nor  did  I  on  this  occasion  derive  much  profit  from  the 
discussions  of  my  generals.  Some  wished  to  halt  on  the 
Dwina  and  the  Borysthenese  ;  others  deemed  it  more  wise 
to  continue  our  operations,  I  was  also  of  this  opinion.  To 
take  a  position  between  two  rivers  which  would  soon  be 
frozen  over,  and  expose  us  to  the  harassing  attacks  of  the 
enemy's  light  troops  was  not  a  kind  of  warfare  which  suited 
my  army.  It  was  necessary  to  conquer  a  peace  :  this  was 
the  only  favorable  issue  which  we  could  hope,  and  tliis  could 
be  attained  only  at  Moscow.  At  any  rate  the  capture  of 
Smolensko  was  necessary  before  my  ulterior  operations  could 
be  formed. 

Barclay  takes  the  OffensivCi — The  junction  of  the  Eussian 
armies  near  Smolensko  had  encouraged  Barclay  to  undertake 
an  offensive  movement.  The  project  was  not  without  merit, 
but  was  poorly  executed.  Leaving  Smolensko  on  the  seventh 
of  Auo-ust  for  Roudnia  their  advanced  guard  of  ten  thousand 
men  surprised  our  cavalry  near  Inkowo.     Sebastiani  saved 


366  LIFE     OF     NArOLEON.  [Cai.  XVIII. 

liimsclf  Ly  ti  firm  stand  and  a  well-ordered  retreat.  The 
Russians  made  no  further  serious  attacks  ;  and  it  was  well 
for  them  that  they  did  not  ;  for  a  jiartial  engagement  might 
have  brought  on  a  general  battle,  as  at  Friedland,  which  was 
of  all  things  what  I  most  desirrd. 

Napoleon  marches  on  Suiolensko.— On  the  fourteenth  of 
August,  I  crossed  the  Borystheneso  at  Passasna  and 
Khomino,  and  marched  on  Krasnoi.  The  corps  which 
had  been  cantoned  at  Orcha  and  Mohilew,  crossed  the  river 
at  those  jdaces,  and  also  marched  on  Krasnoi.  I  proposed 
to  move  rapidly  on  Smolensko,  surprise  that  place,  and  take 
in  reverse  the  enemy's  troops  which  had  ventured  to  threaten 
mo  at  Roudnia.  The  Russian  armies,  being  thus  turned  by 
their  left  would  be  compromised,  cut  off  from  Moscow,  and 
thrown  back  on  the  Lower  Dwina.  This  was  the  third  grand 
manœuvre  of  the  campaign,  and  was  the  last  on  our  side. 

A  detachment  of  eight  or  nine  thousand  men,  which  the 
Russians  had  left  in  observation  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Borystheneso,  Avas  driven  out  of  Krasnoi  by  our  advanced 
guard  and  hotly  pursued  toward  Smolensko  by  my  numerous 
cavalry.  But  these  bravo  men  succeeded  in  reaching  Smo- 
lensko without  being  seriously  cut  up,  although  they  had 
been  obliged  to  leave  a  part  of  their  cannon,  near  a  thousand 
killed,  and  many  wounded. 

Battles  of  Smolensko.— The  city  of  Smolensko,  situated 
in  amphitheatre  on  both  banks  of  the  Dnie})er,  presents  a 
fine  appearance.  Its  enciente,  which  enclosed  twenty  thou- 
sand inhabitants,  was  large  enough  to  contain  eighty  thou- 
sand ;  it  was  surrounded  by  a  brick  wall  of  extraordi- 
nary thickness  and  flanked  by  towers.  The  citadel,  Avhich 
formed  a  regular  pentagon,  was  the  weakest  side,  for  the 
parapets,  which  were  not  revetted,  had  so  fallen  down  as  to 
form  an  accessible  slope.  The  enciente  of  the  city,  on  the 
contrary,  being  surrounded  by  a  wall  twenty-five  feet  high 


Cu.  XVI  IL]  I  N  V  A  S I  O  N     0  F     RUSSIA.  367 

and  fifteen  feet  lliiek  betAveen  the  towers,  was  secure  from 
escalade  and  almost  impregnable  to  field  artillery.  The 
weak  2'i^rt  of  this  euciente  was  secured  by  these  same  towers 
which  were  only  three  or  four  feet  thick  and  exposed  to  be 
battered  in  breach  by  twelve  pounders.  A  few  yards  from 
the  place  were  deep  ravines  which  had  been  cut  out  by  the 
rains.  The  Russians  directed  their  defense  to  these  ravines 
on  the  weak  side  of  the  town,  rather  than  to  the  citadel  ; 
Generals  Rayewski  and  Paskiewicz,  defended  the  place  with 
twenty  thousand  men. 

Ney  reached  Smolensko  on  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth, 
at  the  head  of  my  advanced  guard.  I  followed  soon  after, 
and  having  made  a  reconnoisance  of  the  weak  point,  I 
directed  Ney  to  make  the  assault.  His  columns  advanced 
with  rareintrejiidity  ;  the  enemy  received  them  with  admirable 
coolness.  Twice  Ney's  brave  soldiers  penetrated  to  the  coun- 
terscarp of  the  citadel  ;  and  twice  were  they  driven  back  by 
the  reserves  of  Rayewski  and  Paskiewicz.  This  resistance 
gave  time  for  two  other  Russian  armies  to  come  to  their 
assistance  toward  noon  ;  my  corps  also  came  up  one  after 
another,  so  that  by  night  we  had  one  hundred  and  fifty  thou- 
sand men  bivouacked  under  the  walls  of  Smolensko.  Not 
having  succeeded  in  surprising  that  city,  I  now  hoped  to , 
surround  it.  I  directed  General  Guilleminot  to  find  a  pas- 
sage above,  in  order  to  throw  a  bridge  across  and  cut  the 
enemy  from  the  road  to  Moscow.  Junot,  with  the  West- 
phalians,  undertook  this  operation,  but  lost  his  way  and 
failed  of  success.  In  the  mean  lime  the  combat  was  con- 
tinued under  the  walls  of  Smolensko,  but  unfortunately  these 
operations  led  to  no  decisive  results.  Perhaps  it  would  have 
been  difiicult  to  force  a  passage,  on  account  of  the  vicinity 
of  Bagration's  army,  which  covered  the  road  to  Moscow  ; 
but  as  it  was  the  most  feasible  plan  that  presented  itself,  it 
was  necessary  to  make  the  attempt. 


368  LIFE     OF     N  A  r  O  L  E  O  1  :  .  [Ch.  XVIIT. 

The  affair  of  the  seventeenth,  was  warmly  contested.  The 
Russian  generals  deployed  their  forces  on  the  heights  to  the 
right  of  the  Borysthenese,  and  sent  into  the  city  a  fresh  corps 
of  thirty  thousand  men  to  relieve  Rayewski  ;  I  made  pre- 
parations to  receive  them  ;  but  seeing  that  they  were  not 
disposed  to  take  the  offensive,  I  ordered  an  attack.  Ney 
directed  the  attack  on  our  left  against  the  citadel,  Ponia- 
towski  on  our  right  ascended  the  Dnieper,  while  Davoust  at 
the  centre  assailed  the  faubourgs  of  Roslaw.  The  attack  on 
the  extremities  was  difficult,  exposed  as  our  men  were  to  the 
hundred  pieces  of  artillery  which  the  enemy  placed  along  the 
Dnieper.  Nevertheless,  Poniatowski,  under  the  protection 
of  our  counter-batteries,  succeeded  in  leaching  the  foot  of  a 
practicable  breach  in  the  walls,  and  Ney  was  again  on  the 
point  of  penetrating  the  citadel.  At  the  centre  we  succeeded, 
after  a  furious  combat,  in  dislodging  Doctorof  from  the  fau- 
bourgs ;  but  all  our  efforts  failed  against  the  body  of  the 
place  which  the  enemy  defended  with  great  obstinacy.  I 
directed  my  reserve  to  batter  in  breach  the  curtain,  but  it 
l)roved  a  useless  attempt,  our  balls  producing  no  effect  upon 
those  immense  Avails  of  brick.  The  only  means  of  effecting 
a  practicable  breach  was  to  concentrate  our  fire  upon  the 
two  round  towers  ;  but  we  were  then  ignorant  of  the  differ- 
ence in  the  thickness  of  the  walls. 

Barclay  evacuates  Smoleasko.— But  as  our  shells  had  set 
fire  to  a  pai't  of  the  town,  and  as  the  enemy  had  sustained 
considerable  losses  in  the  defense,  Barclay  determined  to 
evacuate  it  in  the  night,  leaving  Korf  to  cover  the  retreat, 
which  he  did  by  increasing  the  fire  which  had  been  kindled 
by  our  shells. 

General  Review  of  the  Results  of  the  fanipaiirn.— Our 
entrance  into  Smolensko  was  under  still  more  discouraging 
presages  than  that  into  Wilna,  notwithstanding  the  de- 
structive storms  with  which  the  latter   was    accompanied 


Ch.  XVIII.]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  369 

Our  array  had  expected  here  to  terminate  their  march,  and 
they  now  hoped  to  find  a  fertile  country  and  enjoy  some 
repose.  The  vulgar  look  upon  great  and  hazardous  enter- 
prises in  diffi-rent  lights.  My  troops,  astonished  at  the  extent 
and  difficulty  of  their  marches,  and  discouraged  by  constantly 
seeing  the  fruit  of  their  efforts  and  sacrifices  escape  them, 
began  to  look  with  disquietude  upon  the  distance  that 
separated  them  from  France.  As  I  had  given  them  to 
understand  that  this  would  be  my  sto])ping-place,  it  was 
natural  that  they  should  be  discouraged  at  seeing  no  jirospect 
of  their  efforts  terminating  here.  This  city,  towards  which 
I  had  directed  all  my  hopes,  and  which  the  Kussians  had 
I'egarded  as  the  palladium  of  the  empire,  was  now  one  vast 
funeral  pile  strewed  with  the  dead  and  dying,  one  half  of  the 
town  had  been  devastated  by  fire,  for  which  it  was  difficult 
to  assign  a  cause.  The  jjrincipal  inhabitants  had  fled  to 
«scape  the  ravages  of  war,  abandoning  their  effects  to  the 
imprudence  of  our  soldiers,  and  the  excesses  of  an  exasperated 
populace.  It  is  said  that  many  of  the  inhabitants  set  fire  to 
their  own  houses  during  the  excitement  of  the  assault.  A 
city,  carried,  as  it  were,  by  the  point  of  the  sword,  and 
abandoned  by  its  own  inhabitants,  cannot  escape  pillage,  and 
the  little  that  was  left  by  the  enemy  fell  a  prey  to  our  sol- 
diers, their  appetites  being  sharpened  by  long  privations.  A 
single  priest,  who  had  remained  behind  through  his  love  for 
his  flock,  showed  by  hia  ansv/ers  to  what  a  degree  the  people 
had  been  prejudiced  against  us,  painting  us  in  the  blackest 
colors.""'-"     All  the  religious  and  patriotic  passions  had  been 

*■  This  vonornblo  man  hnd  been  taup^ht  that  Napoleon  was  a  fiend  incarnate, 
recklessly  deluging  the  world  in  blood  and  woe.  He  was  brouglit  before  the 
emperor,  and  in  fearless  tones  he  rej^roaehed  Napoleon  with  the  destruction  of 
the  city. 

Napoleon  listened  to  him  attentively  and  respectfully. 

"But.'' said  he  to  him  at  last,  "has  your  church  been  burned?"  "No, 
^;.  e,"  the  priest  replied:  "God  will  be  more  powerful  than  you.  He  will 
VOL.  III. — 24. 

t 


370  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XVIII. 

excited  against  us,  and  it  was  easily  seen  that  to  the  priva- 
tions of  Lithuania  were  to  be  added  all  the  bitterness  and 
rage  of  a  national  war  ;  we  were  about  to  find  here  a  new 
Spain,  but  a  Spain  without  boundaries,  and  destitute  of 
cities,  provisions,  or  resources.  We  were  not  likely  to 
encounter  new  Saragossas  where  all  the  buildings  are  con- 
structed of  wood,  and  at  the  mercy  of  the  torch  or  the  shell  ; 
but  there  were  before  us  obstacles  of  another  kind  and  not 
less  formidable. 

My  heart  felt  oppressed  when  I  reflected  upon  the  interval 
which  separated  me  from  Moscow,  and  that  which  was  likely 
to  intervene  between  my  magazines  and  my  army,  which 
sickness  and  want  had  already  diminished  one-third.  Al- 
though I  had  so  often  announced  my  intention  of  halting 
here,  I  soon  saw  the  iuccnvenience  and  difficulty  of  doing  so. 
The  harvest  of  1811  had  been  light,  and  the  crops  of  1812, 
still  ungathered,  had  been  greatly  injured  and  neglected  by 
the  ravages  of  war,  and  the  flight  of  the  inhabitants.  More- 
over, to  subsist  two  hundred  thou...:!;]  men  in  a  depopulated 

protect  it,  for  I  have  opened  it  to  all  tlie  unfortunate  people  whom  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  city  has  deprived  of  a  home."  "You  are  right,"  rejoined  Napoleon, 
with  emotion.  ''  Yes!  God  will  watch  over  tlie  innocent  victims  of  war.  He 
will  reward  you  for  your  courage.  Go,  worthy  pnest,  return  to  j'our  post. 
Had  all  the  clergy  followed  your  example,  tlr::y  had  not  basely  betrayed  the 
mission  of  peace  they  have  received  from  Ilaiven.  If  they  had  not  deserted 
the  temples  which  their  presence  alone  rL'udjrs  sacred,  my  soldiers  would  have 
spared  your  holy  edifices.     We  are  all  Christians.     Your  God  is  our  God." 

Saying  this  Napoleon  sent  the  priest  back  to  hig  church  with  an  escort  and 
some  succors.  A  shriek  of  terror  arose  from  the  inmates  of  the  church  when 
they  saw  the  French  soldiers  entering.  But  the  priest  immediately  quieted 
their  alarm. 

"Be  not  afraid,"  said  he;  "I  have  sten  Napoleon.  I  have  spoken  to  him. 
Oh,  how  have  we  been  deceived,  my  children  !  TÎie  Emperor  of  France  is 
not  the  man  he  has  been  represented  to  you.  He  and  his  soldiers  worship  the 
same  God  that  we  do.  The  war  that  he  wages  is  not  religious  ;  it  is  a  political 
quarrel  with  our  emperor.  His  soldiers  fight  only  against  our  soldiers.  They 
do  not  slaughter,  as  we  have  been  told,  women  and  children."  The  priest 
then  commenced  a  hymn  of  thanksgiving,  in  which  they  all  joined  with  tear- 
ful eyca. 


Ch.  XYIII.]  invasion     of     RUSSIA.  371 

countiy,  and  in  the  face  of  a  numerous  and  well-supplied 
army,  is  not  without  difficulty  at  any  time.  To  retreat  was 
now  impossible  :  my  army  would  have  starved  in  crossing 
Lithuania,  or  have  been  swallowed  up  in  the  marshes  of 
Prépecz  ;  or,  if  directed  on  Warsaw,  my  retreat  would  have 
been  the  signal  for  the  desertion  of  my  allies,  and  the  attack 
of  my  enemies.  Prussia  would  have  risen  en  masse  ;  the 
North  of  Germany  would  have  followed  her  example  ;  my 
whole  edifice  would  have  fallen  without  ray  having,  as  it 
were,  once  drawn  the  sword  in  its  defense.  We  had  not 
undertaken  this  war  merely  to  march  to  Smolensko  and  then 
return  to  canton  Avithin  the  limits  of  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw, 
To  march  on  Moscow,  to  force  the  Russians  to  a  battle,  and 
to  dictate  peace  in  the  ancient  capital  of  the  Czars,  which 
■was  still  the  heart  of  the  grand  arteries  of  the  empire, — such 
was  the  only  means  of  safety  that  now  remained. 

I,  however,  still  encouraged  my  soldiers  with  the  hope  of 
a  near  termination  to  their  sufferings,  and  flattered  my  mar- 
shals with  the  idea  of  taking  up  their  winter  quarters 
between  Witepsk,  Smolensko  and  Mohilew  ;  and  I  ordered 
the  passage  of  the  Dnieper  merely  to  avoid  the  neighborhood 
of  the  enemy's  army  !  But  I  gave  some  of  my  confidential 
friends  to  understand  that  my  army  was  an  army  of  opera- 
tion, and  not  an  army  of  position  ;  that  its  composition, 
(being  made  up  of  twenty  different  peoples),  and  moral  char- 
acter required  that  I  should  maintain  an  active  offense  ; — in 
a  word,  that  I  had  no  other  course  than  to  march  upon  Mos- 
cow. Some  ultra  critics  and  detractors  have  pretended  to 
find  in  this  conduct  an  unjustifiable  deception  and  falsehood  ! 
As  if  a  general  was  under  obligations  to  make  known  his 
real  intentions  and  designs  ! 

My  marshals  were  divided  in  opinion  on  this  great  ques- 
tion. Murat,  who  had  at  first  accused  the  Russians  of  pusil- 
lanimity, now  trembled  at  the  danger  of  penetrating  so  far 


372  LIFE     or      NAPOLEON.  [Cii.  XVIII. 

into  the  interior  of  tlicir  country.  Others  contended  that 
we  could  hope  for  no  repose  till  we  had  gained  one  decisive 
battle.  1  was  also  of  this  opinion.  But  how  were  we  to 
obtain  this  battle  .^  Certainly  not  by  remaining  at  Smo- 
lenslio,  without  provisions  or  other  resources.  There  was  no 
third  choice  ;  we  must  march  upon  Moscow,  or  retreat  upon 
the  Niémen. 

I  was  not  sufficiently  presumptuous  to  suppose  there  were 
no  serious  difficulties  to  be  surmounted  in  selecting  a  ncAv 
objective  i)oiat  a  hundred  leagues  from  my  natural  base  of 
oijerations,  leaving  behind  me  Riga  and  Bobrouisk,  supported 
by  the  armies  of  AVittgenstein  and  Volhynia  ;  moreover,  the 
conclusion  of  peace  between  Eussia  and  the  Porte,  would 
enable  the  army  of  Moldavia  to  ascend  the  Dnieper.  But 
if  the  enemy  still  held  two  threatening  jioints  on  my  flank,  I 
could  oppose  to  them  the  armies  of  Macdonald,  St.  Cyr  and 
Schwartzenberg.  Belluno,  with  a  fine  reserve  of  thirty-two 
thousand  combatants,  was  on  the  Niémen,  ready  to  sustain 
my  right  on  the  Bug,  or  my  left  on  the  Dwina.  Not  only 
were  these  armies  superior  to  the  forces  which  the  enemy 
could  bring  against  them,  but  I  had  besides  fifty  thousand 
men  in  Prussia,  and  as  many  marching  from  the  interior, 
ready  to  reënforce  my  army  and  replace  any  losses  which  I 
miiiht  sustain  in  battle.  Never  had  I  taken  more  care  and 
foresight  in  jjreparing  the  means  of  securing  the  success  of  a 
great  enterprise  ;  Europe  seemed  to  have  placed  her  whole 
population  in  echelons  toward  the  pole.  Already  the  fine 
divisions  of  Loison  and  Durutte  were  guarding  Konigsberg 
and  Warsaw  ;  others  were  forming  on  the  Oder  ;  the  cohorts 
of  the  first  han  were  collecting  on  the  Elbe  ; — nothing  was 
neglected  to  secure  the  success  of  the  expedition. 

The  experience  of  ten  campaigns  had  taught  me  what  was 
the  most  decisive  point  ;  and  I  did  not  doubt  but  a  blow 
struck  at  the  heart  of  the  Russian  Empire  would  instantly 


Cn.  XVIII.]  INVASION    OF    RUSSIA.  373 

destroy  the  accessory  resistance  of  isolated  corps.  This  blow 
I  hoped  to  strike  as  soon  as  I  could  force  the  enemy  to  give 
me  battle.  I  had  a  diminished  force  it  is  true,  but  what 
remained  under  our  flags  was  the  very  elite  of  our  army. 

Ncy  crosses  the  Dnieper. — After  having  reconnoitered  the 
smoking  ruins  of  Smolcnsko,  its  extraordinary  enciento,  and 
its  ill-i)lanned  citadel,  I  pressed  forward  our  preparations  for 
the  j)assago  of  the  Dnieper,  the  enemy  having  burnt  the 
bridge.  Morand's  division  crossed  over  in  boats  to  protect 
the  passage  against  the  rear-guard  of  Barclay.  Ney  directed 
this  operation,  but,  notwithstanding  all  his  efforts,  it  was  not 
completed  till  the  niglit  of  the  cighteentli  and  nineteenth. 
In  the  mean  time  Juiiot,  at  the  head  of  the  eighth  corps, 
received  orders  to  pass  at  my  extreme  right  near  Proudi- 
chewo.  It  would  have  been  better  if  I  had  directed  the 
main  body  of  my  army  on  this  point,  as  it  was  the  most 
direct  line  for  reaching  the  position  of  the  enemy. 

Hazardous  March  of  Barclay.— Before  the  evacuation  of 
the  city,  the  army  of  Bagration  had  been  detached  on  Doro- 
gobuje,  in  order  to  jirevent  our  gaining  the  road  to  Moscow. 
Barclay  himself  first  took  the  road  to  St.  Petersbuig,  and 
then  by  a  circuitous  route  regained  that  leading  to  Moscow. 
thus  moving  upon  the  arc  of  a  circle  of  which  we  held  the 
chord.  The  alleged  motive  of  this  détour  was,  that  the 
direct  road  along  the  Dnieper,  was  exposed  to  our  batteries. 
This,  however,  was  choosing  the  greater  of  the  two  evils, 
and,  to  avoid  exposure  to  our  cannon,  risking  the  destruction 
of  their  entire  army.  If  I  had  known  this  in  time,  they 
would  have  paid  dearly  for  their  fault,  for  it  exposed  them 
in  a  worse  position  than  after  the  retreat  on  Drissa  and  the 
separation  of  their  two  armies. 

Pursuit  of  Ney  and  Murat.— Convinced  that  the  Russians 
were  not  disposed  to  give  us  battle,  I  satisfied  myself  with 
sending  in  pursuit  of    their  rear-guard,   Murat   and    Ney, 


374  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIIL 

seconded  Ly  Junot,  who  crossed  the  river  higher  up,  so  as  to 
manœuvre  on  their  left.  Key  crossed  the  Dnieper  at  four 
o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  nineteenth,  amid  the  flames 
of  the  faubourg  of  Smolensko.  The  army  of  Barclay  was 
first  seen  encamped  on  the  heights  of  the  road  to  St.  Peters- 
burg, and  liis  rear-guard  under  General  Korf  was  still  there. 
We  hoped  for  a  moment  to  cut  him  off  from  the  road  to 
Moscow,  and  drive  him  back  to  the  north  ;  but  some  of  the 
enemy's  troops  were  seen  in  that  direction,  Ney  and  Murat 
Avere  ordered  to  examine  these  two  roads.  Grouchy  at  first 
took  the  direction  of  Doukowtschina.  Our  columns  of  the 
left  now  observed  a  division  of  infantry  in  an  intermediate 
position  near  the  Stabna.  Ney  immediately  ordered  it  to  be 
attacked.  This  was  unfortunate  ;  for,  if  he  had  marched 
directly  to  Loubino  on  the  road  to  Moscow,  we  should  have 
reached  that  place  as  soon  as  the  enemy,  and  have  engaged 
the  Kussians  Avhile  they  were  making  an  extended  flank 
movement. 

Barclay  now  saw  the  perilous  nature  of  his  manceuvi'e, 
and  directed  Touczkof  to  march  with  a  division  of  infantry 
in  all  haste  to  the  assistance  of  the  Cossacks  who  covered  the 
road  to  Moscow  ;  he  placed  Prince  Eugene  of  Wurtemberg 
at  Gredeonowo,  to  flank  the  march  of  the  nearest  column, 
and  to  give  the  rear  guard  of  Korf  time  to  reach  Gorbou- 
nowo  and  Loubino.  The  first  column  of  the  array,  under 
Bagawouth,  was  also  directed  upon  the  same  j)oint.  It  was 
this  division  of  Eugene  that  Ney  first  encountered  and  vigor- 
ously attacked.  It  was  about  to  fall  under  our  blows,  when 
twenty  squadrons  came  to  its  assistance.  Kcenforced  still 
further  by  a  part  of  the  column  of  Korf,  it  succeeded  in 
reaching  Gorbounowo,  after  having  for  three  hours  lost  sight 
of  the  most  important  point  on  the  road  to  Moscow.  Ney 
followed  in  pursuit,  taking  five  or  six  hundred  prisoners  of 
the  rear-guard  of  Korf,  and  their  cannon  ;  it  was  relieved  by 


Cu.  XVIII.]  INVASION    OF     RUSSIA.  375 

Potemkin,  who  arrived  just  in  time  to  save  the  rear  of  their 
columns. 

Battle  of  Valoiitina. — In  the  mean  time  Touczkof  had 
reached  tlie  heiglits  of  Valoutina,  and  formed  a  junction  with 
the  Cossacks  of  Karpof  î^<^y,  who  had  been  drawn  too  far 
to  the  left  by  the  combats  of  Staba  and  Gedeonowo,  now 
received  orders  to  incline  further  to  the  right,  and  soon 
arrived  in  presence  of  the  enemy.  A  furious  combat  was 
engaged  near  Kosina.  As  so(m  as  I  learned  the  retreat  of 
the  Prince  of  Wurtemberg  and  Korf,  I  returned  to  Smo- 
lensko,  thinking  to  push  forward  Davoust  to  the  assistance 
of  Murat  and  Ney.  The  latter,  though  now  left  alone, 
nevertheless,  pressed  Touczkof  with  vigor  ;  but  this  general 
defended  his  ground  inch  by  inch  to  the  rear  of  the  creek  of 
Strachan,  where  the  corjis-cV armée  of  his  brother  and  the 
cavaliy  of  Orlof-Denisof  came  to  his  aid.*  The  Russians, 
feeling  that  the  safety  of  the  army  depended  upon  the  defense 
of  this  position,  fought  Avith  desperation.  An  hour  sooner, 
and  with  a  few  divisions  more,  Ney  would  have  cut  the 
enemy  in  two  and  decided  the  success  of  the  campaign.  It 
was,  however,  the  last  time  that  such  an  advantage  presented 
itself 

Far  from  exjjecting  so  serious  a  combat,  I  had  gone  back 
to  Smolensko,  when  Barclay  returned  with  his  third  and 
fourth  corps  of  infantry  and  his  first  corps  of  cavalry.  Ney 
did  every  thing  which  heroism  could  do  under  such  circum- 
stances, and  both  parties  may  well  boast  of  the  courage  dis- 
played on  that  occasion.  Murat  was  so  embarrassed  on  the 
right  and  left  by  the  wood  and  marshes,  that  he  could  not 
manoeuvre  his  cavalry  to  advantage.  Orlof-Denisof  showed, 
on  this  occasion,  as  much  firmness  as  the  king  of  Naples 
displayed  activity  and  bravery.     Not  being  able  to  penetrate 

*  Major  General  Touczkof  commanded  tho  rear-guard,   while  his  brother, 
Lieutenant  General  Touczliof,  commanded  the  tliird  corps-d'armée. 


376  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [J.;.  XVIil. 

ia  advance  of  Lciticliino  against  the  left  of  the  Russians, 
Murat  hoped  to  be  more  succcessful  with  the  troops  of  Junot, 
and  moved  in  that  direction.  He  first  charged  with  his 
advanced  guard,  then  returned  to  his  reserve  ;  bat  Junot 
remained  stationary  between  the  woods  and  the  Dnieper  only 
a  few  hundred  yards  from  the  enemy's  left  ;  he  seemed  para- 
lyzed by  the  delicate  nature  of  his  position,  or  what  is  more 
probable,  had  partially  lost  his  mind. 

The  division  of  Gudin,  of  Davoust's  corps,  which  had 
been  sent  to  the  assistance  of  Ney,  arrived  about  five  o'clock, 
and  the  marshal  immediately  renewed  his  efforts  to  carry  the 
heights  of  Kosina.  The  enemy  was  repulsed,  his  centre 
pierced,  and  his  whole  line  on  the  point  of  being  driven  into 
the  muddy  stream  of  Samile  when  Konownitzin,  arriving 
with  a  division  of  infantry,  several  battalions  of  grenadiers, 
and  three  thousand  horse,  restored  the  equilibrium.  Gudin 
being  killed  by  a  cannon  ball,  his  division  was  repelled  not- 
withstanding its  prodigies  of  valor. 

At  dark  the  Russian  corps  of  battle  was  rejoined  by  the 
columns  of  Bagawouth  and  Korf  ;  ignorant  of  this  circum- 
stance, our  people  renewed  their  efforts  to  carry  the  position. 
The  division  of  Gudin  crossed  the  Strachan,  and  crowned 
the  heights  ;  but  as  it  ];;;(!  fvllen  into  the  midst  of  the 
enemy's  columns,  it  was  driven  back,  notwithstanding  the 
most  glorious  efforts.  Night  separated  the  combatants  who 
disj^uted  the  honor  of  this  vast  field  of  carnage,  covered  with 
twelve  or  thirteen  thousand  killed  or  wounded,  of  which  each 
party  might  claim  an  equal  number.  To  this  deplorable  and 
almost  useless  loss  was  to  be  added  the  death  of  the  lamented 
Gudin.  This  brave  and  skillful  general,  who  had  well 
deserved  a  marshal's  baton,  perished  a  victim  to  the  fatality 
which  seemed  to  preside  over  the  fortunes  of  the  day. 
Although  this  affair  had  taken  place  contrary  to  my  expecta- 
tions, and  contrary  to  all  probabilities,  he  at   least  was  free 


Ciï.  XVriI  ]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  377 

from  reproach.  Notwithstanding  the  false  direction  of  oui- 
first  movements  we  could  have  gained  important  results,  if 
Junot  had  acted  with  vigor.  This  conduct  was  probably  a 
prelude  to  the  mental  alienation  with  which  ho  was  affected 
after  the  retreat.  His  character  from  this  time  seemed 
strange  and  changeable  ;  he  never  possessed  great  merit,  but 
heretofore  he  had  displayed  an  energy  almost  bordering  on 
rashness.  Murat  was  not  entirely  free  from  reproach  ;  his 
cavalry  might  have  acted  with  more  vigor  on  the  Cossacks 
of  Karpof  and  the  little  rear  guard  of  Touczkof  ;  he  should 
also  have  thrown  a  part  of  this  cavalry  with  Junot  on 
Proudichewo,  on  the  night  of  the  eighteenth. 

Retreat  of  the  Russians. — Learning  at  midnight,  on  the 
return  of  my  aid-de-camp,  Gourgaud,  the  state  of  the  battle 
which  my  generals  were  fighting  without  my  knowledge,  I 
immediately  mounted  my  horse,  and  at  three  o'clock  was  on 
the  field  of  combat.  But  everything  was  ours  and  the  enemy 
in  retreat.  Seeing  the  proofs  of  the  efforts  of  my  brave  men 
in  the  bloody  and  mangled  bodies  which  covered  the  field,  I 
lavished  on  them  praises  and  rewards,  and  returned  to  Smo- 
lensko,  my  heart  being  sad  at  having  allowed  so  fine  an 
opportunity  to  escape  me.  My  first  impulse  was  to  severely 
reprimand  Junot,  and  to  replace  him  in  the  command  by 
Rapp  ;  but  feelings  of  kindness  toward  this  old  companion 
in  arms  induced  me  to  forgive  him. 

The  king  of  Naples,  on  the  twentieth  of  August,  pursued 
the  enemy  on  Dorogobouje  ;  as  Ney's  corps  had  greatly  suf- 
fered in  the  battle,  and  as  its  chief  had  not  been  on  good 
terras  with  my  brother-in-law  since  their  quarrel  before  Ulm 
in  1805,  I  caused  it  to  be  replaced  by  the  corj)S  of  Davoust  ; 
unfortunately  Murat  was  on  no  better  terms  with  Davoust 
than  with  Ncy. 

Reflections  of  Napoleon  on  his  Position.— On  my  return 
to  Smolensko  from  the  camp  of  Ney,  on  the  twentieth,  my 


378  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON  [Cii.  XVIIL 

mind  was  filled  with  sadness.  The  useless  results  of  three 
bloody  battles,  the  ruins  of  Smolensko,  the  reduced  and  im- 
poverished state  of  our  battalions  and  our  squadrons, — wei'e 
all  calculated  to  produce  sad  and  melancholy  reflections.  To 
supply  the  wants  of  our  men,  I  ordered  administrative 
establishments  to  be  formed  ;  and  directed  an  intelligent 
officer  with  a  body  of  light  troops  to  explore  the  fertile  banks 
of  the  Kmora,  celebrated  for  its  mills  and  extensive  trade  in 
flour.  He  was  directed  to  collect  provisions  sufficient  for  the 
troops  on  the  return  of  our  columns,  which  had  to  make  but 
one  more  efiort  to  cover  their  asylum. 

Battle  of  CJorodcczuo. — After  my  arrival  at  Sraolensko 
the  afiairs  on  the  wings  of  my  army  took  a  more  favorable 
turn.  Conformably  to  ray  orders,  Schwartzenberg  had  been 
charged  with  the  general  command  in  the  south  against 
Tormassof,  whom  he  encountered  on  the  twelfth  of  August 
at  Grorodeczno.  The  Russian  general  had  so  scattered  his 
forces  that  he  had  not  more  than  twenty-five  thousand  men 
in  line,  while  the  Austrians  and  Saxons  numbered  about 
forty  thousand  combatants.  But  Schwartzenberg  failed  to 
profit  either  by  the  superiority  of  his  own  forces,  or  the  bad 
position  of  the  enemy  :  yielding  to  the  advice  of  Reynier  he 
manœuvred  to  turn  the  left  wing  of  the  Russians  with  his 
Saxons.  But  he  failed  to  sustain  them  with  sufficient  vigor, 
and  the  enemy  had  time  to  oppose  a  parallel  manœuvre, 
although  obliged  to  give  battle  with  his  left  completely 
turned.  Tormassof  escaped  with  considerable  loss,  and  con- 
tinued his  retreat  by  Kobrin  and  Kowel  on  Loutsk  behind 
the  Styr.  Schwartzenberg  and  Reynier  established  them- 
selves opposite  his  position  on  the  other  side  of  that  river. 

Affairs  of  Polotsk.— My  left  had  also  been  successful,  but 
had  derived  no  advantages  from  their  success.  Certain  of 
being  soon  reënforced  by  the  Bavarians,  Oudinot  had  again 
marched  on  Swolua  to  drive  the  enemy  from  the  Dwina,  and 


Cu.  XVIII.]  INVASION    OF    RUSSIA.  379 

prevent  liim  from  again  troubling  Polotsk.  This  was  mani- 
festly imprudent,  for  Wittgenstein  was  disposed  to  pursue 
the  offensive,  and  would  be  prepared  to  meet  him  before  the 
Bavarians  could  come  to  his  aid  ;  which  was  actually  the 
case.  The  advanced  guard  of  Oudinot,  being  attacked  on 
the  Swolna,  the  twelfth  of  August,  and  receiving  a  check, 
the  main  body  fell  back  on  the  plain  of  Polotsk,  and  formed 
a  junction  with  the  Bavarians.  Ignorant  of  this  recnforcc- 
ment,  WittgL'nstein  continued  to  advance,  and,  dejdoying  his 
twenty-four  thousand  men,  hoped  to  pierce  our  centre  by 
directing  his  principal  effort  along  the  ravine  of  the  Polota. 
The  combat  took  place  on  the  seventeenth,  but  had  no  other 
result  than  the  mutual  loss  of  two  thousand  men.  Oudinot 
being  woumled,  the  command  devolved  on  St,  Cyr. 

The  Russian  general  now  saw  tliat  he  had  to  contend  with 
a  superior  force,  but  fearing  to  fall  back  lest  his  retreat  might 
become  disastrous,  he  thought  to  im})ose  on  us  by  a  firm 
countenance.  St.  Cyr  determined  to  attack  him  the  next 
day,  and  concentrated  his  principal  efforts  towards  Spass 
against  tlie  Russian  left  and  centre.  The  Bavarians  and 
Legrand's  division,  concentrated  about  Spass,  overthrew 
every  opposition,  and  penetrated  to  Presmenistza,  notwith- 
standing the  strong  resistance  of  the  enemy,  and  the  destruc- 
tive fire  of  the  Russian  artillery.  AVittgenstein's  reserve 
finally  arrested  their  impetuous  advance,  while  the  audacious 
charges  of  his  cavalry  drove  ours  back  to  the  very  faubourg 
of  Polotsk  :  St.  Cyr  himself  was  obliged  to  take  shelter  in  a 
ravine.  His  reserves  finally  disengaged  his  cavalry,  and  the 
combat  ended  in  the  position  which  tlie  enemy's  reserve  had 
occupied  in  the  morning.  The  Russian  general  retired 
during  the  night  on  Gomselewo. 

Ten  pieces  of  artillery  and  a  thousand  prisoners  were  the 
only  trophies  of  this  battle  ;  our  inferiority  in  cavalry  liad 
prevented  us  from  profiting  by  our  success.     St.  Cyr  had  left 


380  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.   XYTTL 

Merle's  division  inactive  on  the  left  of  the  Pelota  ;  if  he 
had  directed  it  so  as  to  take  Wittgenstein's  line  in  reverse, 
the  victory  would  have  been  more  easily  gained  and  more 
complete.  Nevertheless  it  was  a  success,  and  the  baton  of 
marshal  was  given  to  St.  Cyr,  who  had  already  deserved  this 
honor.  The  brave  General  Deroy  had  been  slain  in  battle. 
I  assigned  his  family,  from  my  private  purse,  a  pension  of 
tv/enty  thousand  francs,  and  dotations  ;  thus,  at  the  same 
time  repaying  a  debt  of  gratitude  to  a  good  ally,  and  stimu- 
lating the  zeal  of  those  who  had.  reluctantly  espoused  our 
cause. 

Napoleon  dcterinmes  to  advance. — The  successes  of  Go- 
rodeczno  and  Polotsk,  had  given  temporary  security  to  my 
wings.  My  right,  however,  was  still  seriously  threatened  by 
the  army  of  Moldavia.  In  an  extensive  country  like  Russia 
where  there  is  so  great  a  space  for  the  manœuvres  of  armies, 
the  accessories  may  become  principals,  and  the  operations  of 
lateral  corps  may  seriously,  endanger  the  communications  of 
the  main  army  ;  and  especially  in  this  case,  as  Ave  had  but  a 
sino-le  line  of  communication  while  the  enemy  had  for  his 
base  the  whole  width  of  Europe  from  the  Baltic  to  the 
Black  Sea. 

The  tranquil  state  of  affairs  on  my  wings,  and  the  reports 
of  my  lieutenants,  now  determined  me  to  advance  ;  they 
announced  to  me  that  it  was  not  impossible  to  bring  the 
enemy  to  a  battle.  The  king  of  Naples  had  found  the  Rus- 
sians formed  behind  the  Loujea,  and  had  no  doubt  but  they 
wished  to  accept  battle.  Barclay  had,  in  fact,  that  inten- 
tion. Informed  of  this  circumstance  on  the  night  of  the 
twenty-fourth,  I  immediately  departed  at  the  head  of  my 
guards  who  marched  tv/.-lve  leagues  with  the  utmost  rapidity, 
in  hopes  of  finally  reaching  an  enemy  who  was  continually 
escaping  us,  as  if  by  enchantment.  Without  attempting  to 
turn  the  enemy's  j^osition^  Murat  had  thrown  the  cavalry  of 


Ch.  XVITI.]  invasion     of     RUSSIA, 


381 


Montbrun  against  his  left;  but  Davoiist,  being  weak  in 
infantry,  had  no  desire  for  a  general  engagement  against  an 
entire  army.  The  disagreement  of  my  generals  thus  pre- 
vented the  attack.  The  movement  of  Montbrun,  however, 
had  alarmed  the  Russian  generals,  who  were  fearful  of  being 
assailed  on  their  left  and  driven  back  on  the  Dnieper  ;  which 
certainly  would  have  been  the  case,  had  they  remained  in 
position.  Barclay,  therefore,  renounced  his  jjcrilous  plan, 
and  abandoned  Dorogobuje  just  as  I  was  coming  up  to  give 
him  battle. 

The  viceroy  followed  in  the  direction  of  St.  Petersburg  as 
far  as  Doukhowschina,  then  returned  into  line,  leaving  one 
division  at  Sourage,  where  General  Wintzingerode  with  a 
flying  corps,  was  threatening  our  communication  with 
Witepsk. 

When  I  reached  the  head-quarters  of  Murat  I  found  that 
the  enemy  had  disappeared  from  the  banks  of  the  Lougea, 
and  discord  reigning  in  our  camp.  Murat  complained  that 
Davoust  had  failed  to  engage  his  infantry,  and  the  marshal 
replied  that  false  representations  had  been  made  to  me.  I 
gave  Murat  the  direct  command  of  Campan's  division  which 
had  previously  been  refused  him.  As  it  was  supposed  that 
the  enemy  would  make  a  stand  on  the  Osma,  we  followed  in 
the  pursuit  ;  he  evacuated  Dorogobuje  and  reached  Wiasma. 
We  were  now  so  near  Moscow  that  there  was  no  further 
reason  for  hesitation.  We  were  still  distant  eight  days' 
march,  it  is  true,  but  what  was  a  march  of  eight  days  for 
men  who  had  come  from  the  extremities  of  Europe  ?  The 
motives  which  might  have  kept  us  at  Witepsk  or  Smolensko, 
had  disappeared,  for  we  had  already  passed  over  half  of  the 
distance  that  separated  us  from  Moscow.  To  diminish  the 
chances  of  this  advance,  I  had  directed  Belluno  to  advance 
from  the  Niémen,  so  as  to  replace  my  army  at  Smolenske. 
Augereau  was   to  carry  half  of  his  divisions  on  Konigsberg 


382  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XYIII. 

;ind  Warsaw.  Belluno's  reserve  of  thirty-tAvo  thousand 
men,  established  between  Eoslau  and  Witepsk,  might  either 
act  on  the  wings  or  reënforce  the  main  army,  as  circum- 
stances should  require. 

The  Russians,  however,  continued  their  retreat  on  Giatz. 
At  Posen  their  rear  guard  made  a  firm  stand  against  the 
forces  of  Murat  and  Davoust.  It  must,  however,  be  remem- 
bered that  the  generals  did  not  agree,  and  that  our  horses 
were  too  weak  to  oppose  the  cavalry  of  the  enemy.  With 
no  other  food  than  coarse  rye  straw,  they  had  been  compelled 
to  perform  the  most  difficult  and  harassing  duty.  Always 
acting  in  mass  on  the  great  roads,  and  checlcc^d  at  every 
stream,  wood,  bridge  or  defile,  our  squadrons,  exposed  to  the 
fire  of  the  enemy's  batteries,  were  obliged  to  hold  out  till  the 
infantry  could  come  to  their  assistance,  when  the  enemy 
would  retire.  Being  again  jiursued  by  our  horse,  he  would 
turn  upon  the  heads  of  columns,  till  they  were  disengaged 
by  the  infantry.  In  the  pursuit  of  an  enemy,  the  cavalry  is 
obliged  to  perform  the  most  incessant  and  fatiguing  duty. 

Character  of  the  Country.— But  the  ordinary  difficulties 
of  a  pursuit  were  here  greatly  augmented  by  the  hostile 
character  of  the  inhabitants.  After  leaving  Smolensko  we 
saw  alarming  symj)toms  that  the  war  was  becoming  national. 
The  most  formidable  army  can,  with  difiiculty,  sustain  itself 
when  the  whole  population  of  the  country  resolve  to  conquer 
or  die.  We  now  saw  no  more  Lithuanians,  immovable  spec- 
tators of  the  great  events  which  were  passing  around  them. 
The  entire  joopulation,  composed  of  real  Eussians,  deserted 
their  homes  at  our  approach.  Everywhere  on  our  march, 
Ave  found  the  villages  deserted  or  burned  ;  the  inhabitants 
formed  into  bands  to  cut  off  our  foraging  parties  ;  every 
thing  seemed  quiet,  but  every  where  our  stragglers  were  cut 
off  or  massacred.  The  city  of  Wiasma  was  burned,  with  its 
rich  magazines  ;  Giatz  experienced  the  same  fate  ;  and  if 


Cil.  XVIII.]  INVASION     OF    RUSSIA,  383 

any  thing  was  leftundestroyed,it  was  due  to  our  van -guards, 
who  frequently  fought  the  enemy  with  one  hand,  while  they 
extinguished  the  flames  of  their  burning  towns  with  the 
other. 

New  Generalissimo  of  the  Russian  Army. — At  Giatz  I 
learned  that  the  Russian  army  liad  changed  its  chief,  and 
was  now  preparing  to  give  me  battle.  Public  opinion  havino- 
attributed  the  misfortunes  of  the  war  to  a  bad  choice  of 
generals,  the  Emperor  Alexander  had  conferred  the  supreme 
command  upon  General  Kutusof,  the  conqueror  of  the  Turks. 
The  Prussian  Pfuhl  was  accused  of  being  the  cause  of  the 
first  misfortunes  of  the  campaign,  and  even  Barclay  was 
rejDroached  with  his  foreign  origin,  and  his  numerous  retreats 
rendered  him  an  object  of  suspicion  to  the  jiure  Muscovites. 
All  seemed  agreed  that  the  conqueror  of  Eoudschouck  and 
the  negotiator  of  Bucharest  was  capable  of  rescuing  them 
from  peril  :  in  their  opinion,  none  but  a  Russian  could  now 
save  the  country.  The  new  generalissimo  thought,  that  to 
preserve  his  re[)utation  in  the  army  and  with  the  jDCople  it 
would  be  necessary  to  give  us  battle  before  we  could  reach 
Moscow,  and  he  determined  to  make  a  stand  in  the  strons: 
position  which  he  occujiied  near  Borodino  in  front  of  Mojaisk, 
where  he  had  been  joined  by  ten  thousand  of  the  newly 
organized  militia  of  Moscow. 

Preparations  for  Battle.— The  two  armies  arrived  opposite 
each  other  the  fifth  of  September,  The  enemy  had  con- 
structed a  redoubt  in  front  of  his  left,  near  the  village  of 
Schwardino,  to  defend  the  access  to  the  most  exposed  part 
of  his  position.  As  it  was  important  to  carry  this  advanced 
post  before  assailing  the  main  position,  I  directed  it  to  be 
attacked  by  the  division  of  Campans,  who  carried  it  in  the 
most  brilliant  manner.  The  next  day  was  employed  in  re- 
connoitering  the  enemy's  line,  and  in  examining  the  ground 
on  which  we  were  to  operate.     On  both  sides  preparations 


384  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XYIU. 

were  making  for  a  decisive  battle.  Tlic  Paissians  mingled 
with  their  military  preparations  the  ceremonies  of  the  Greek 
Ciiurch,  and  invoked  divine  assistance  to  save  their  country. 
We  collected  our  scattered  forces,  concentrated  our  masses, 
and  prepared  our  arms  and  parks  of  artillery.  Our  numer- 
ical forces  were  nearly  equal,  being  about  one  hundred  and 
twenty-five  or  one  hundred  thirty  thousand  on  each  side. 
We  had  about  fifteen  thousand  veterans  against  an  equal 
number  of  Cossacks  and  militia,  but  they,  on  the  other  hand, 
fought  in  defense  of  a  city  and  in  a  fortified  position,  and  on 
ground  with  which  they  were  better  acquainted  than  our 
forces.  Three  flèches  covered  their  left  towaixls  Semenof- 
skoe,  a  large  bastioned  redoubt  was  traced  near  the  centre  on 
the  height  between  that  village  and  Borodino  ;  whilj  several 
redans  covered  the  right  towards  the  river  Moscowa  ;  they 
had  not  yet  had  time  to  palisade  these  works. 

The  battle  took  place  on  the  seventh.  I  have  fought  many 
battles  in  my  life,  but  I  have  never  seen  one  as  terrible  as 
this.  It  was  an  extraordinary  contest  in  several  respects  : — 
from  the  nature  of  the  enterprise  which  it  was  to  terminate, 
from  the  greatness  of  the  interests  which  were  involved,  and 
from  the  singular  circumstances  which  marked  the  shock  of 
such  immense  masses,  in  so  narrow  a  space. 

Position  of  the  Russians. —  The  enemy's  position  as  I 
reconnoitred  it,  was  as  follows  :  Barclay  with  three  corps  of 
infantry  and  one  of  cavalry,  formed  the  right  from  the  great 
bastioned  redoubt  to  the  Moscowa  ;  it  was  separated  into 
two  parts  by  the  ravine  of  Gorki.  Bagration,  with  the 
seventh  and  eighth  corps,  formed  thç  left  from  the  great 
redoubt  to  the  coppice-wood  between  Semenofskoe  and  Ous- 
tiza.  This  position  was  defective.  The  fault  was  attributed 
to  General  Benningsen  who  was  then  acting  as  chief  of  staff. 
He  had  directed  his  attention  too  much  to  the  right,  which 
I  had  no  interest  or  desire  to  attack.     Tho  left,  on  the  on- 


Ch.  XVIir.]  INVASION    OF     RUSSIA.  385 

trary,  was  not  so  well  placed,  although  covered  by  three 
flèches  ;  between  them  and  the  old  road  to  Moscow,  was 
an  interval  of  five  hundred  toises  secured  only  by  some 
chasseurs. 

Plan  of  Attackt — If  things  bad  remained  in  this  condition, 
it  was  not  difficult  to  anticipate  the  result.  But  in  the 
evening  the  Russian  generals  moved  the  entire  corps  of 
Toiiczkof  to  prolong  the  left  to  Oustiza,  on  the  old  road  to 
Moscow  ;  we,  however,  saw  only  its  advanced  j)Osts.  My 
dispositions  were  soon  arranged.  I  resolved  to  gain  the  old 
road  to  Moscow  by  my  extreme  right  under  Poniatowski,  to 
force  tbe  enemy's  left  with  Davoust  and  Ney,  and  thus  throw 
their  centre  and  right  into  the  Moscowa,  while  the  viceroy 
held  in  check  that  portion  of  their  line.  It  was  neai'ly  the 
same  disposition  of  our  masses  as  that  made  at  Friedland, 
except  that  in  that  battle  the  river  was  in  the  enemy's  rear, 
while  at  Borodino  the  Russians  had  in  their  rear  a  favor- 
able ground  for  retreat,  the  obstacle  being  on  their  extreme 
riglit. 

Unfortunately  all  my  plan  could  not  be  executed  as  I 
desired  ;  and  the  enemy  made  a  timely  modification  in  his 
dispositions.  I  also  changed  my  intention  respecting  the 
destination  of  the  viceroy,  to  whom  I  gave  a  more  active 
part,  directing  him  to  attack  the  centre  of  the  enemy,  and  at 
the  same  time  to  cover  with  his  left  the  great  road  from 
Giatz  to  Moscow.  For  this  jiurpose  I  reenforced  him  with 
two  divisions  of  Davoust's  corps.  But  this  marshal  wished 
me  to  leave  him  his  whole  five  divisions,  and  to  charge  him 
with  a  decisive  movement  by  the  old  road  and  the  coppic(>- 
wood  ;  thus  turning  the  position  of  the  Russians  before 
attacking  their  flcclies,  and  beginning  the  battle  by  establish- 
ing himself  perpendicularly  on  their  extremity.  The  idea 
was  excellent  ;  but  it  was  to  be  feared  that  the  Russians 
might  take  the  alarm  at  seeing  themselves  thus  threatened, 
VOL.  III. —  25. 


386  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

and  again  disappear  on  the  road  to  Mojaisk,  which  would 
have  indefinitely  postponed  the  decisive  battle  which  we  so 
much  desired.  I,  therefore,  preferred  to  attack  their  line  in 
echelons  by  the  right  ;  this  did  not  promise  so  easy  a  success, 
but  it  was  less  likely  to  cause  a  jiostjionement  of  the  battle. 
The  corps  of  Poniatovrski  was  sufficient  to  manœuvre  so  as 
to  turn  the  enemy's  left,  and  secure  our  superiority  in  that 
direction.  Having  formed  my  jilan,  I  disposed  my  masses  so 
as  not  to  attract  too  much  the  enemy's  attention.  Each  one 
received  his  special  instructions.  The  artillery  was  to  pre- 
pare its  fire  for  an  early  hour,  and  the  hundred  pieces  of 
Davoust,  Ney,  and  the  guard,  were  directed  to  advance  at 
the  break  of  day  so  as  to  destroy  with  their  shells  and  halls 
the  works  which  were  to  be  attacked  by  my  right. 

On  the  morning  of  the  seventh,  I  waited  with  anxiety  to 
L'arn  what  the  enemy  had  dona  duiing  the  night.  At  five 
o'clock,  Ney  informed  me  that  the  entire  army  of  the  Rus- 
sians were  still  in  position,  and  the  French  Achilles,  burning 
with  impatience,  asked  permission  to  begin  the  attack.  All 
now  flew  to  arms,  and  each  one  took  his  allotted  part  in  the 
great  contest  which  was  now  to  decide  the  fate  of  Europe. 
Our  batteries  advanced  into  line  so  as  to  be  within  reach  of 
those  of  the  enemy.  Campans,  who  had  given  so  fine  a  pre- 
lude to  the  battle,  by  taking  the  redoubt  of  Schevardino, 
was  now  to  begin  the  battle  by  carrying  tlie  flèche  which 
formed  the  extreme  right  of  the  Russians  ;  he  was  to  creep 
along  the  coppice-wood,  while  Dessaix  seconded  his  operation 
by  marching  through  the  woods.  Friant's  division  was  to 
remain  in  reserve.  As  soon  as  Davoust  became  master  of 
the  redoubt,  Ney  was  to  advance  in  echelons  on  Semenofskoe  ; 
hisdivisions,  having  suffered  much  at  Valoutina,  now  numbered 
scarcely  fifteen  thousand  combatants  ;  ten  thousand  Westphal- 
ians  were  to  reënforce  Ney's  corps  and  form  his  second  line. 
The  Young  and  Old  Guards  formed  the  third  and  fourth 


Ch.  XVIII.]  INVASION    OF     RUSSIA.  387 

lines.  Murat  divided  his  cavalry.  Montbrun's  corps  was 
opijosite  the  enemy's  centre  and  at  the  left  of  Ney  ;  Nan- 
souty  and  Latour-Maubouvg  placed  themselves  so  as  to  fol- 
low the  movement  of  our  right  ;  while  Grouchy  was  to 
assist  the  viceroy.  The  latter,  reënforced  by  the  divisions  of 
Morand  and  Gerard  from  Davoust's  corps,  was  to  attack  the 
village  of  Burodino  on  the  great  road  to  Moscow,  and  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Kolocza  ;  the  division  of  Delzons  was  to 
establish  itself  there,  while  the  three  others  were  to  cross  the 
Kolocza  on  three  bridges  constructed  for  that  purpose  in  the 
morning,  and  attack  the  grand  redoubt  of  the  centre. 

The  first  disposition  was  the  causo  of  the  undecisive  turn 
of  the  battle.  It  was  necessary  to  throw  Davoust  with  four 
of  his  divisions  into  tbegap  between  the  redoubt  of  the  left 
and  the  woods  of  Oustiza,  to  follow  up  his  movement  by 
Murat  with  his  cavalry,  and  support  him  by  Ney  and  the 
Westphalians  directed  on  Semenofskoe,  while  the  Young 
Guard  marched  in  echelons  at  the  centre  of  the  two  attacks, 
and  Poniatowski,  connected  with  Davoust,  turned  the  right 
of  Touczkof  in  the  woods  of  Oustiza.  In  this  way  W6 
would  have  broken  and  turned  the  enemy's  left  with  an 
irresistible  mass,  and  forced  a  change  of  front  parallel  to  the 
great  road  to  Moscow,  with  the  river  Moscowa  in  the  enemy's 
rear.  There  were  in  this  gap  only  four  feeble  regiments  of 
chasseurs  ambushed  in  the  coppice-wood,  so  that  the  success 
of  the  operation  was  scarcely  doubtful. 

Battle  of  Borodino,  or  of  the  Moscowa. — At  six  o'clock 
the  signal  of  attack  is  given.  The  artillery  directs  its  thun- 
ders upon  the  flèches.  Davoust  rushes  forward  Avith  his  two 
divisions.  The  brigade  of  Plausonne  on  Eugene's  left,  which 
was  merely  to  occupy  Borodino  and  remain  in  observation, 
carried  away  by  an  ill-directed  zeal,  goes  beyond  the  village 
and  debouches  against  the  entire  corps  of  Doctorof,  who 
drives  it  back  with  loss.     Plausonne  falls  a  victim  of  the 


388  LIFE    or     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

ardor  of  liis  battalions,  and  Delzons  at  last  succeeds  in  dis- 
puting Borodino  with  the  superior  forces  which  the  enemy- 
concentrated  on  that  point. 

In  attacking  with  the  first  echelon  Woronzof  s  division  of 
gi-enadiers  in  a  post  covered  by  intrenchments,  Davoust  is 
assailed  in  flank  by  the  chasseurs  just  mentioned,  and  suffers 
severely  ;  Campans'  division,  however,  carries  the  redan  of 
the  extreme  left  with  rare  courage.  This  brave  general  is 
wounded  ;  and  Davoust  himself  has  his  horse  killed  under 
him,  and  receives  a  severe  contusion.  Dessaix,  who  has 
replaced  Campans,  is  also  put  hors-de-combat.  Eapp  now 
takes  command  of  this  division,  which  has  three  times  lost 
its  chief.  Nor  have  the  Kussians  suffered  less  than  the 
French  ;  Woronzof  is  wounded  and  the  work  carried.  But 
our  success  is  not  of  long  duration.  The  enemy,  under  the 
protection  of  his  batteries,  advances  the  intiintry  of  his 
second  line  (Neweroswki's  division),  and  our  troops  are  com- 
pelled to  evacuate  the  work  which  tbey  had  but  just  carried. 
Bagration  now  sees  his  danger  and  calls  in  all  haste  Konow- 
nitzin's  division  from  the  corps  of  Touczkof.  A  division  of 
cuirassiers  and  a  brigade  of  the  Young  Guard  come  from  the 
reserve  to  sustain  the  threatened  flank. 

But  this  momentary  contre-temps  is  soon  repaired  ;  Ney, 
arriving  in  echelons,  rushes  at  the  head  of  Ledru's  division 
on  the  same  redoubt,  and  enters  it  on  the  left  at  the  same 
time  that  Camj)ans'  troops  return  by  the  right.  The  enemy 
still  holds  the  third  flèche,  which  Ney  and  Murat  attack  with 
the  division  of  Eazout.  These  troops  are  on  the  point  of 
carrying  the  work  when  they  are  charged  upon  by  the  Rus- 
sian cuirassiers.  There  is  a  moment  of  uncertainty  ;  at 
length  our  infantry  hold  firm,  and  give  the  cavalry  of  Bru- 
yères time  to  disengage  Razout's  division  which,  animated  by 
Murat,  rush  again  upon  the  intrenchments  and  carry  them. 

More  than  two  hours  have  been  consumed  in  these  attacks. 


Ch.  XVIII.]  INVASION    OF     KUSSIA.  389 

Kutiisof,  who  easily  discovered  our  heavy  masses  ready  to 
fall  upon  his  left,  had  time  to  direct  a  part  of  his  right  to 
sustain  the  threatened  point.  At  nine  o'clock  the  corps  of 
Bagawouth  sent  by  Barclay,  had  already  passed  the  heights 
of  Semenofskoe.  One  of  his  divisions  marches  to  Oustiza, 
and  the  other  throws  itself  into  the  coppice-wood. 

On  our  side,  Junot  had  just  deployed  in  rear  of  Ney,  and 
engaged  his  first  line,  when  the  impetuous  marshal  throws 
upon  the  enemy  the  right  of  his  own  troops.  To  act  still 
more  efficaciously,  by  turning  the  position  which  the  Russians 
disjîuted  with  so  much  obstinacy,  the  second  line  of  West- 
phalians  receive  orders  to  support  the  right  and  penetrate  the 
coppice-wood  between  Davoust  and  Poniatowski,  If  this 
movement  had  been  executed  an  hour  earlier,  it  would  have 
been  decisive  ;  but  now  Galitzin's  reserve  of  cavalry  had  time 
to  dispute  with  the  AVestphalians  the  plain  where  they  were 
to  debouch,  and  the  arrival  of  Bagawouth's  cor2)s  enabled 
Eugene  of  Wurtemberg's  division  to  drive  into  the  woods 
the  column  of  the  Westphalians.  Galitzin's  cavalry  profited 
by  this  opportunity  to  make  a  fine  charge  against  our  right. 
It  had  even  got  possession  of  a  battery  of  the  reserve,  when 
a  brave  infantry  regiment  of  Dessaix's  division,  (the  eleventh) 
debouched  from  the  woods,  took  these  audacious  cuirassiers 
in  reverse,  and  forced  them  to  charge  in  rear  in  order  to  open 
to  themselves  a  passage  by  which  to  escape,  thus  saving  our 
artillery. 

Bagration  now  felt  the  necessity  of  giving  the  reënforce- 
ments  drawn  from  the  right  time  to  reach  their  destination, 
thinking  that  the  battle  depended  upon  the  resistance  which 
he  might  oppose  to  us.  He  threw  himself  on  Ney  at  the 
head  of  a  division  of  grenadiers  of  the  prince  of  Mecklenburg, 
sustained  by  a  brigade  of  guards,  and  eight  regiments  of 
cuirassiers  ;  the  remains  of  the  commands  of  Woronzof 
and  Neweroswki,    supported  by  a  division  of  light  cavalry, 


390  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON,  [Cn.  XVIII. 

assisted  this  effort,  by  attacking  Davoust.  The  whole  line 
of  the  enemy  renewed  the  attack  ;  one  of  the  redouLts  was 
retaken,  and  Miirat  himself  was  forced  to  take  refuge  in  the 
division  of  Razout. 

Ney  now  advances  at  the  head  of  his  reserves  ;  Friant's 
division  receives  orders  to  support  the  left  of  Razout  by 
marching  on  the  village  of  Semenofskoe  ;  the  lost  redoubt  is 
retaken  ;  Friant  crosses  the  ravine  of  Semenofskoe,  and  car- 
ries the  village.  Konownitzin's  division,  which  has  just 
arrived  from  the  extreme  left,  now  checks  Friant,  and  obliges 
him  to  return  to  the  height  of  the  redoubts,  where  Ney  is 
still  advancing. 

Masters  of  the  flèches,  but  threatened  by  the  attitude  of 
Bagration,  who  continues  to  receive  reënforcements  from  the 
right,  Ney  and  Davoust  prepare  to  drive  him  behind  the 
ravine  of  Semenofskoe  ;  they  are  supported  by  all  the  dis- 
posable artillery,  and  the  viceroy  also  prepares  to  assist  them 
by  attacking  the  centre. 

Nothing  can  arrest  the  impetuosity  of  Ney  ;  Bagration, 
fearing  to  be  pierced,  throws  himself  at  the  head  of  his  lines, 
who  with  the  bayonet  hope  to  regain  the  offensive.  A  ter- 
rible melee  ensues  ;  Bagration  is  seriously  wounded,  and  also 
his  chief  of  staff,  St.  Priest  ;  the  Russian  troops,  deprived  of 
their  chiefs,  are  on  the  point  of  being  entirely  defeated,  when 
the  impassible  Konownitzin  takes  the  command,  rallies  them 
behind  the  ravine  of  Semenofskoe,  and,  imder  the  protection 
of  a  well-placed  artillery,  succeeds  in  arresting  the  advance 
of  our  columns. 

It  is  now  necessary  to  render  these  advantages  decisive  : 
Murat  throws  the  corps  of  Nansouty  and  Latour-Maubourg 
beyond  the  ravine  ;  the  first  falls  upon  the  extreme  left  of 
Konownitzin,  where  the  regiments  of  the  guards  of  Ismail 
and  Lithuania,  formed  into  squares,  receive  him  with  firm- 
ness, and  give  to   the  five  regiments  of  Russian  cuirassiers 


Ch.  XVIIL]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  391 

time  to  fall  upon  our  fatigued  squadrons,  and  to  drive  them 
back  behind  the  ravine.  Latour-Maubourg  was  equally  suc- 
cessful near  Semenofskoe,  where  the  infantry  of  Friant  and 
Ney  make  a  firm  stand.  The  enemy,  convinced  of  the  im- 
possibility of  retaking  these  positions,  nevertheless  remain  in 
heavy  masses  under  the  fire  of  our  artillery  with  an  admirable 
constancy.  It  was  easy  to  see  that  these  brave  men  had  re- 
solved not  to  survive  the  misfortunes  of  their  country. 

In  the  mean  time  the  viceroy,  after  having  been  held  in 
suspense  by  the  attack  of  Delzons'  division  on  Borodino,  by 
their  inconsiderate  passage  of  this  defile,  and  by  the  obstacles 
presented  by  the  Kolocza,  had  crossed  that  river  upon  four 
small  bridges  constructed  by  the  engineers.  Eugene  hastened 
to  oblique  to  the  right  in  order  to  carry  the  great  bustioned 
redoubt  w^hich  had  been  erected  between  Borodino  and  Seme- 
nofskoo  to  cover  the  enemy's  centre.  Morand's  division 
having  debouched  first  on  the  plateau,  threw  the  thirtietli 
regiment  on  this  redoubt,  and  advanced  with  a  deep  column 
to  second  the  attack.  These  brave  men  marched  steadily  to 
their  object  without  noticing  the  terrible  fire  of  the  enemy  ; 
they  penetrated  into  the  redoubt  notwithstanding  the  efforts 
of  the  first  line  of  Paskiewitsch  ;  but,  being  prepared  for  this 
event,  that  ofiicer  now  advances  at  the  head  of  his  second 
line,  upon  the  flank  of  our  deep  column,  and  also  charges  i  t 
with  his  first  line  fiiced  to  the  rear.  Jermolof  seconded  this 
attack  with  a  brigade  of  the  guards. 

Exposed  at  the  same  time  to  the  artillery  of  Doctorof,  and 
assailed  on  the  right  by  Wassiltschikof,  Morand  is  forced  to 
return  into  the  ravine.  Bonomi,  who  is  left  in  the  redoubt, 
is  too  weak  to  defend  it.  He  falls  pierced  with  wounds,  with 
a  jmrt  of  the  thirtieth  regiment  which  had  so  bravely  taken 
the  place.  These  two  efforts  on  the  left  not  being  properly 
sustained,  and  not  taking  place  at  the  same  time,  rather  tend 
to  encourage  the  Russians,  and  to  dampen  the  ardor  of  our 


392  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

troops.  The  offensive  movement  of  Jermolof,  Paskiewitsch, 
and  Wassiltschikof  is  near  causing  the  evacuation  of  Seme- 
nofskoe  ;  but  this  is  fortunately  arrested  by  the  batteries  of 
the  reserve  being  timely  placed  in  rear  of  that  village. 

In  the  mean  time  the  combat  was  continued  with  great 
success  on  the  old  road  to  Moscow.  I  had  expected  that 
Poniatowski  would  be  able  to  manoeuvre  without  great  diffi- 
culty so  as  to  turn  the  enemy  ;  he,  however,  encountered 
considerable  difficulties.  Favored  by  the  departure  of  Ko- 
nownitzin's  division,  and  by  the  efforts  of  the  Westphalians, 
he  charged  the  right  and  carried  the  little  hill  which  com- 
manded it  ;  Tousczkof  with  a  part  of  Bagawouth's  corps 
soon  retook  this  important  post,  and  paid  for  this  momentary 
success  with  his  life. 

The  vigorous  attacks  of  Ney,  and  the  admirable  charges 
of  our  cavalry,  had  now  produced  the  desired  effect.  Ney 
and  Davoust  had  solidly  established  themselves  on  these 
intrenched  heights  which  had  been  occupied  by  the  enemy's 
left  at  the  beginning  of  the  battle  :  but  ajiart  from  these 
advantages,  and  the  possession  of  the  smoking  ruins  of  Se- 
menofskoe,  we  had  no  trophies.  It  was  now  eleven  o'clock. 
Ney  loudly  called  for  reënforcements  to  complete  his  victory. 
It  seemed  to  him  more  easy  to  seek  new  victories,  than  to 
remain  exposed  to  the  fire  of  two  hundred  cannon  which  were 
sending  death  into  his  ranks.  Perhaps  the  favorable  moment 
had  already  passed,  for  the  enemy  had  not  only  drawn  Baga- 
wouth  from  the  banks  of  the  Moscowa  to  the  extreme  left, 
but  had  brought  up  the  fresh  corps  of  Ostermann  to  sus- 
tain the  centre  which  had  been  so  broken  by  the  attack  of 
Eugene. 

I,  however,  was  about  to  order  a  new  effort  to  be  made, 
with  the  assistance  of  two  divisions  of  the  guard,  and  three 
of  Eugene's  divisions,  when  a  tumultuous  cry  on  the  road  of 
Borodino  indicated  that  a  grand   attack  was  being  made 


Ch.  XVIII.] 


INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  393 


against  the  viceroy.  I,  therefore,  suspended  the  departure  of 
my  guard,  and  rejoiced  that  I  had  done  so  when  I  found  that 
Euo-ene  had  just  repassed  to  the  left  of  the  Kolocza  with  the 
Itahan  o-uard.  As  this  movement  threatened  our  line  of 
retreat,  I  resolved  to  wait  till  I  could  ascertain  mare  defini- 
tively the  state  of  affairs,  and  sent  Claparedc's  division  to  a 
position  where  they  might  he  able  to  act  as  occasion  should 
require.  I  soon  learned,  however,  that  it  was  a  mere  skir- 
mish of  cavalry  made  by  Ouvarofs  corps,  and  some  of  Pla- 
tof's  Cossacks  on  Ornano's  brigade,  and  the  division  of 
Delzons,  which  received  the  enemy  in  squares,  and  rendered 
ineffectual  their  ill-directed  efforts.  Nevertheless,  this  inci- 
dent kept  us  more  than  an  liour  in  suspense,  and  enabled  the 
enemy  in  the  interval  to  rectify  his  position,  so  that  it  in 
reality  contributed  not  a  little  to  the  ill-success  of  the 
battle. 

As  soon  as  I  was  assured  of  what  was  passing,  everything 
was  disposed  for  renewing  an  attack  upon  the  great  battery 
of  the  centre,  at  the  same  time  that  my  right  debouched  in 
advance  of  Semenofskoe.  The  Eussians  perceive  from  the 
dispositions  of  the  viceroy,  Murat,  and  Ney  the  storm  which 
is  o'athering,  and  relieve  the  broken  corps  of  Kajiifski  by  that 
of  Ostermann,  which  enters  into  the  first  line,  with  its  left 
in  the  direction  of  Semenofskoe,  and  its  right  resting  on  the 
great  road.  My  generals  mistake  this  manoeuvre  for  an 
offensive  operation  ;  Murat  and  Sorbier  concentrate  on  these 
columns  an  enormous  mass  of  artillery  which  causes  great 
havoc  in  their  ranks  :  but  they  remain  firm  and  immovable 
under  this  terrible  fire.  Their  whole  artillery  responds  to 
ours  ;  Doctorof,  Barclay,  and  Jermolof  direct  their  fire 
upon  the  divisions  of  the  viceroy,  which  shows  the  same 
firm  attitude.  The  fire  is  general  from  Borodino  to  Seme- 
nofskoe, and  even  to  the  woods.  Eight  hundred  pieces  of 
cannon  are  uttering  their  thunders  within  the  space  of  half 


394  LIFE     or     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

a  league,  and  scattering  death  iii  all  directions.  Never  was 
there  a  spsctacle  at  the  same  time  so  imposing  and  so  ter- 
rible. All  the  actors  in  this  grand  drama  proclaim  it,  with 
one  accord,  the  battle  cf  the  giants! 

At  the  moment  when  every  thing  is  ready  for  a  general 
attack,  Montbrun,  whose  corps  was  placed  directly  opposite 
the  enemy's  centre,  is  killed  by  a  cannon  ball  ;  I  order  Cau- 
laincourf^'  to  fly  to  his  place  and  charge  the  great  redoubt, 
which  the  viceroy  is  about  to  attaclv  with  the  divisions  of 
Morand,  Gerard  and  Broussier,  reënforced  by  the  legion  of 
Vistula.  It  is  now  two  o'clock.  The  enemy  lias  had  time 
to  complete  the  movement  of  Count  Ostermann  whom  Milor- 
dowitsch  has  brought  from  the  right  wing,  and  Vvdio  is  sus- 
tained by  the  second  and  third  corps  of  cavalry  ;  the  shock 
is  terrible. 

Caulaincourt,  notwithstanding  the  difficulties  encountered, 
executes  his  commission  with  great  courage.  After  having 
driven  off  a  part  of  the  enemy's  infantry,  he  rushes  on  the 
redoubt  in  spite  of  the  battahons  which  surround  it,  and 
penetrates  to  the  interior  Avith  the  fifth  cuirassiers.  But  he 
is  killed,  and  his  brave  men  exposed  to  the  fire  of  Oster- 
mann's  infantry,  and  the  old  Ilu!>sian  guard  in  rear  of  the 
work,  and  threatened  by  Korf  and  Pahlen's  cavalry,  are 
forced  to  reform  under  the  protection  of  the  infantry.  But 
a  few  moments  after,  the  columns  of  the  viceroy  again 
assailed  the  twice  conquered  redoubt,  now  occupied  by  Lich- 
atschei's  infantry  (of  Doctorof's  corps),  and  captured  the 
place  for  the  third  time,  taking  Lichatschef  jjrisoner.  lie 
was  about  to  throw  Grouchy's  corps  forward  upon  the  bat- 

*  This  was  Count  Augustus  Caulaincourt,  brother  of  the  Duko  of  Vicenza. 
He  was  the  first  to  surmount  the  parapet  of  tlie  redoubt.  At  that  moment  a 
musket  ball  struck  him  dead.  He  had  scarcely  left  the  side  of  the  emperor 
M'ith  orders  to  charge  the  redoubt,  when  intelligence  of  his  death  was  brouglit 
to  head-quarters,  wliere  his  brother,  the  duke,  was  talking  with  Napcleon.  The 
scene  was  most  affecting,  young  Caulaincourt  being  greatly  beloved  by  alL 


Cu.  XYIIL]  INVASION    OF     RUSSIA.  395 

talions  of  Doctorof,  when  tlio  Rite  of  the  enemy  s  cavuhy 
advanced  against  ours  and  held  them  in  check  long  enough 
to  allow  Koif  and  Pahlen's  corps  to  return  from  Caulain- 
court  to  their  assistance,  and  thus  caused  Grouchy  to  rejoin 
his  infantry. 

It  was  now  three  o'clock.  We  were  at  last  masters  of 
the  great  redoubt  of  the  centre  and  of  the  flèches  of  the  left  ; 
nevertheless,  the  Russians  formed  again  behind  the  two 
ravines  of  Goristskoe  and  Semenofskoe,  and  continued  an 
obstinate  resistance.  Wearied  with  the  carnage,  both  parties 
limited  themselves  to  a  cannonade  without  renewing  the 
attack. 

During  these  murderous  shocks  the  Poles  were  not  idle. 
Encouraged  by  the  success  of  Ney  and  Davoust,  Poniatowski 
had  again  attacked  the  little  hill  behind  Ouslitza  ;  seeing 
himself  also  threatened  by  the  AVestphalians,  Bagawouth, 
who  now  commanded  at  this  point,  deemed  it  prudent  to 
abandon  the  place  and  form  into  line  with  tbc  remains  of 
Bagration's  corps,  near  the  source  of  the  rivulet  of  Semen- 
ofskoe. The  battle  now  degenerated  into  a  cannonade  which 
continued  till  dark.  Convinced  that  the  Faissians  would 
retire  during  the  night  and  allow  me  to  advance  upon  Mos- 
cow without  risking  another  battle,  I  preferred  to  abide  by 
this  indecisive  victory,  rather  than  to  attempt  a  new  attack 
which  might,  in  our  jn-esent  situation,  lead  to  disastrous 
results.  Nor  was  I  mistaken  in  this  opinion  ;  for  Kutusof 
retired  before  day  and  took  the  road  to  Moscow  in  two 
columns  by  Mojaisk  and  the  old  road. 

Remarks  on  this  Battle. — Such  were  the  principal  events 
of  this  great  battle,  upon  which  so  much  has  been  written, 
and  upon  which  critics  are  so  ill  agreed.  The  truth  is,  my 
plan  was  wisely  conceived,  but  not  well  executed.  There  are 
some  battles  where  success  depends  upon  the  first  shock  ;  in 
others  the  opportune  moment  for  striking  the  decisive  blow 


396  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XYIII. 

does  not  occur  till  near  the  close  of  the  day  ;  this  depends 
upon  the  respective  positions  of  the  contending  parties. 
Thus,  at  Waterloo,  the  decisive  moment  for  Wellington  was 
at  the  approach  of  Blucher  ;  at  Marengo  the  decisive 
moment  for  me  was  the  return  of  Dessaix  from  Kivalta  ; 
and  for  the  opposite  parties  in  these  two  battles  it  was  early 
in  the  day.  If  we  apply  this  general  jjrinciple  to  the  battle 
of  Borodino,  it  is  not  difficult  to  judge  of  it  understandingly. 
We  ought  to  have  struck  the  decisive  blow  in  the  first  attack, 
without  allowing  Bagawouth  and  Ostermann  time  to  rein- 
force the  threatened  point. 

It  has  been  shown  in  our  recital,  that  we  carried  the  great 
redoubt  of  the  centre  and  the  flèches  of  the  left,  after  a 
reënforcement  of  forty  thousand  men  and  four  hundred 
pieces  of  cannon  had  been  carried  upon  the  decisive  point. 
This  fact  is  sufficient  in  itself  to  ja-ove  that  the  success 
would  have  been  more  complete,  if,  in  the  morning,  we  had 
thrown  Ney  and  the  Westphalians  on  the  flèches  and  the 
road  to  Moscow,  his  right  being  connected  with  Poniatowski. 
We  carried  these  positions  when  the  thing  was  more  difficult 
and  less  decisive.  The  viceroy,  weakened  by  the  departure 
of  one  of  Davoust's  divisions,  might  have  formed  into  line 
to  keep  the  enemy  in  check  and  cannonade  his  centre  so  as 
to  effect  a  diversion,  without  making  an  offensive  movement, 
as  that  would  have  been  useless  after  our  success  on  the 
left. 

In  reply  to  the  reproach  which  has  sometimes  been  made 
against  me  for  not  having  sent  to  Ney  the  Young  Guard  at 
eleven  o'clock,  it  may  be  said  that  although  it  would  have 
been  better  to  have  done  so,  nevertheless,  under  the  circum- 
stances, my  refusal  can  not  justly  be  regarded  as  a  fault  ; 
for  at  that  time  the  enemy  still  exhibited  a  firm  attitude, 
and  all  our  battles  with  the  Russians  had  been  long,  obstinate, 
and  bloody  ;  I  thought  they  had  more  fresh  troops  coming 


Ch.  XTIII.]  invasion      of    RUSSIA.  397 

from  their  right,  and  Avas  ignorant  that  their  guards  were  all 
engaged  ;  it  would  have  been  improper  in  me  to  have 
engaged  my  final  reserve  before  they  did  theirs.  It  is  not  at 
a  distance  of  eight  hundred  leagues  from  the  base  of  opera- 
tions that  one  can  venture  upon  such  a  manœuvre.  It  was 
for  the  want  of  a  good  reserve  that  Charles  XII.  was  forced 
to  fly  alone  into  Turkey  after  the  battle  of  Pultowa.  After 
having  reconnoitred  the  decisive  point,  I  was  about  to  throw 
uj)on  it  Mortier  with  the  Young  Guard,  when  the  great  noise 
attending  the  combat  of  cavahy  on  my  left,  caused  me  to 
suspend  the  execution  of  an  attack  which  would  undoubtedly 
have  decided  the  victory.  In  judging  of  this  battle  from 
what  actually  occurred  in  the  two  armies,  rather  than  from 
what  was  known  to  me  at  the  time,  it  may  be  said  that  there 
was  an  evident  fault  in  attacking  the  redoubt  of  the  centre 
at  ten  o'clock,  with  the  single  division  of  Morand.  If  the 
viceroy  had  then  assailed  it,  as  he  did  at  two  o'clock,  with 
all  his  forces  united,  and  I  had  at  the  same  moment  thrown 
the  Young  Guard  to  the  support  of  Ney  on  Semenofskoe,  the 
victory  would  have  been  certain  and  complete  by  eleven 
o'clock  in  the  morning.  As,  for  the  reasons  already  given, 
this  opportunity  was  allowed  to  pass,  the  next  favorable 
moment  was  at  three  o'clock,  after  the  taking  of  the  great 
central  redoubt.  At  that  time  the  troops  of  Bagration  were 
almost  destroyed,  and  those  of  Doctorof  greatly  broken  in 
the  contest  with  the  viceroy  and  Grouchy,  so  that  Oster- 
mann's  corps  and  two  regiments  of  the  guard  were  the  only 
ones  which  had  not  severely  suffered. 

Bagawouth,  and  the  remains  of  Touczkof,  were  scarcely 
able  to  oppose  the  Westphalians  and  Poniatowski.  If  I  had 
presented  my  guards  to  the  right  of  Semenofskoe  between 
the  village  and  the  source  of  the  brook,  the  Russians  would 
certainly  have  been  beaten  and  forced  to  fight  in  retreat. 
But  I  was  ignorant  of  the  state  of  things  in   the  enemy's 


398  LIFE     or     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

araiy  ;  my  own  troops  were  dislodged  ;  my  cavalry  had 
severely  suffered  ;  and  I  supposed  the  enemy's  reserve  still 
untouched  ;  whereas  all  were  engaged  excejjt  the  militia  of 
Moscow.  All  this  was  known  after  the  hattle,  and  it  is  very 
easy  to  find  fault  after  the  thing  has  taken  place,  and  all  the 
circumstances  are  known. 

It  is  in  this  way  that  critics  have  reproached  Frederick 
with  not  having  destroyed  the  army  of  Soltikof  at  Kuners- 
dorf,  a  battle  Avhich  very  much  resembles  that  of  Borodino. 
Surprised  on  the  left  by  the  king  of  Prussia,  the  Russians 
held  so  firm  in  the  ravine  of  Kuhgrund  that  the  right  wing 
and  Laudon  had  time  to  come  up  and  gain  the  victory.  I 
had,  over  Frederick,  the  advantage  of  a  strong  reserve  and  a 
numerical  superiority,  and,  therefore,  I  gained  the  battle, 
while  that  great  king  suffered  a  total  defeat. 

Always  ready  to  do  homage  to  truth,  I  confess  that  there 
is  not  to  be  found  in  this  battle  the  same  vigor  that  marked 
our  victories  at  Austerlitz,  Friedland,  Abensburg,  Eivuli,  and 
Jena.  Writers  who  did  not  understand  the  reasons  of  my 
circumspection,  have  attributed  it  to  a  malady  with  which  I 
was  several  times  attacked.  If  it  is  true  that  I  was  suffer- 
ing from  illness,  I  nevertheless  had  all  my  faculties  and  knew 
very  well  what  I  had  to  do.  My  plan  was  a  simple  one — to 
turn  the  left  of  the  Russians,  and  all  my  orders  were  directed 
to  that  object  ;  and  it  certainly  required  no  great  exertion 
of  mind  to  tell  the  viceroy  when  to  attack,  and  Mortier  when 
to  assist  Ney. 

My  great  circumspection  in  this  battle  was  very  natural, 
and  caused  by  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  our  situation. 
On  the  one  side  was  an  army  which  had  marched  eight  hun- 
dred leagues,  suffering  every  privation,  composed  of  twenty 
different  nations,  and  exposed  to  all  the  unfavorable  chances 
of  a  reverse  ;  on  the  other  side,  an  army,  homogeneous,  dis- 
cijjlined,  animated  by  religious  enthusiasm,  and  resolved  to 


Cn.  XVIIL]  INVASION    OF      RUSSIA  399 

conquer  or  die  ;  showing  in  their  long  and  difficult  retreat 
proofs  of  their  devotion  and  of  the  excellent  spirit  which 
animated  them.  All  the  battles  which  I  had  fought  v/ith  it, 
for  the  last  ten  years,  had  been  strongly  disputed  ;  and  could 
we  expect  a  weaker  effort  in  their  own  territory  and  almost 
under  the  walls  of  that  city  to  which  they  attached  the  des- 
tinies of  their  empire  ?  If  we  found  here  the  same  Russians 
as  at  Eylau  and  Heilsberg,  but  more  deejily  interested  than 
there,  and  more  than  ever  resolved  on  victory  ;  what  was  to 
become  of  my  army  in  case  of  the  slightest  reverse  ?  Such 
were  the  motives  which  here  influenced  my  mind,  which 
compelled  mo  to  avoid  every  hazardous  manœuvre  ;  and 
which  diminished  the  vigor  of  my  operations.  A  victory, 
however  incomplete,  would  lead  me  to  Moscow  ;  it  was  there 
that  I  hoped  to  reap  the  results  of  the  war.  As  soon  as  we 
Avere  masters  of  the  enemy's  positions  on  the  left,  I  was  cer- 
that  the  enemy  wouVd  retreat  during  the  night  ;  why  then 
should  I  willingly  expose  myself  to  the  consequences  of  the 
defeat  of  Pultowa  ? 

This  memorable  and  bloody  battle  which  we  had  so  ar- 
dently desired,  was  far  from  accomplishing  my  object.  I  had 
hoped  to  fight  it  in  Lithuania,  and  to  make  it  decisive  ;  but 
I  had  found  it  two  hundred  leagues  in  the  interior,  and 
gained  no  other  trophies  than  a  field  covered  with  the  dead 
and  wounded. 

The  losses  on  both  sides  had  amounted  to  eighty  thousand 
men  Iwrs-de-comhat  ;  from  twelve  to  fifteen  thousand 
wounded  Russians  regained  Moscow,  where  the  most  part 
became  a  j^rey  to  the  flames.  The  wounded  French  were 
also  carried  there  ;  and  almost  all  perished  in  the  hospitals 
or  during  the  retreat.  The  generals  wounded  on  the  side  of 
the  I'rench  were  Nansouty,  Grouchy,  Latour-Maubourg, 
Rapp,  Campans,  Friant,  Bonamy,  Morand,  Lahoussaye  ; 
and  of  the   Russians,    Galitzin,    Charles   of   Mechlenburg, 


400  LIFE     or     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

Gortschakof,  Woronzof,  St.  Priest,  Kretof,  Bachmetof,  Yer- 
molof  and  Likacslief. 

Shades  of  the  brave  men  who  fell  on  this  memorable  day, 
posterity  will  erect  fur  you  immortal  monuments  !  Mont- 
brun,  Caulaincourt,  Plansonne,  Romenof,  Bonamy,  Marion, 
Compere,  Huart  ;  more  fortunate  than  your  associates,  you 
have  falkii  when  your  glory  w^as  at  its  apogee,  and  when 
your  country  was  mistress  of  half  of  Europe  !  Less  favored 
by  fortune,  the  Russian  generals  Bagration,  Kaisarof,  Toucz- 
kof,  fell  carrying  with  them  the  grief  of  seeing  their  country 
invaded  and  threatened  with  impending  ruin  !  But  their 
regrets  were  of  short  duration  ;  for  the  empire  of  the  Czars 
soon  emerged  from  this  contest  with  glory.* 

Napoleon  caters  Moscow. — On  the  retreat  of  the  enemy 
from  Burodino,  he  was  pursued  by  my  advanced  guard  on 
the  road  to  Moscow.  A  warm  engagement  near  Mojaisk 
made  me  think  it  possible  that  we  might  have  another  battle 
before   we  reached  Moscow  ;  the  enemy,  in  fact,  had  some 


*  In  speaking  of  the  battle  of  Borodino,  Napoleon  said,  at  St.  Helena  : 
"  The  Russian  soldiers  are  brave,  and  their  whole  army  was  assembled  at  the 
Moskowa.  They  reckoned  one  hundred  aud  seventy  thousand  men.  including 
those  in  Moscow.  Kutusof  had  an  excellent  position,  and  occupied  it  to  the 
best  advantage. 

"  Every  thing  was  in  his  favor — superiority  of  infantry,  of  cavalry,  and  of 
artillery,  a  first  rate  position,  and  a  great  number  of  redoubts — and  yet  he  was 
beaten. 

"  Ye  intrepid  heroes,  Murat,  Ney,  Poniatowski,  to  you  belong  the  glory. 
What  noble  and  brilliant  actions  will  history  have  to  record  1  She  will  tell 
how  our  intrepid  cuirassiers  forced  the  redoubts,  and  sabered  the  cannoneers 
at  their  pieces. 

"  She  will  recount  the  heroic  devotion  of  Montbrun  and  of  Caulaincourt  who 
expired  in  the  midst  of  their  glory.  She  will  tell  what  was  done  by  our  can- 
noneers, exposed  upon  the  open  plain,  against  batteries  more  numerous  and 
covered  by  good  parapets;  aud  she  will  make  mention  also  of  those  brave 
foot  soldiers,  who,  at  the  most  critical  moment,  instead  of  requiring  encourage- 
ment from  their  general,  exclaimed,  'Have  i:o  fear;  your  soldiers  have  all 
sworn  to  conquer  to-day.  and  they  will  conquer?' 

"  What  parallels  to  such  glorious  deeds  can  future  ages  produce  ?  Or  will 
falsehood  aud  calumny  prevail ?' 


Ch.  XVIIL]  invasion    of    RUSSIA.  401 

intention  of  making  a  stand  at  Fili  in  advance  of  their  capi- 
tal, but  changed  their  minds,  and  General  Melorodowitsch 
merely  went  through  the  forms  of  a  negotiation.  I  entered 
the  capital  on  the  fourteenth  of  September. 

Built,  like  Eome,  on  seven  hills,  Moscow  presents  a  most 
picturesque  appearance.  It  is  necessaiy  to  have  seen  this 
great  city,  half  Oriental  and  half  European,  with  its  two 
hundred  churches  and  its  thousand  steeples  of  diiferent  colors, 
to  form  any  idea  of  our  feelings  on  first  discovering  it  from 
the  heights  of  Fili.  I  had  placed  great  hopes  on  the  occu- 
pation of  this  city  whose  nobility  had  been  represented  to 
me  as  dissatisfied  with  their  government,  and  disposed  to 
join  our  party.  I  hoped  to  incite  this  nobility  against  the 
throne,  or,  if  they  were  still  hostile,  to  create  a  democratic 
interest  against  the  oligarchy.  In  this  I  was  doubly  deceived, 
for  both  the  middle  class  and  the  nobility,  were  still  more 
exasperated  against  me  than  against  their  own  court,  and 
rallied  to  the  support  of  the  throne.  From  the  re])r(  scnta- 
tion  which  I  had  received,  I  expected,  on  reaching  Moscow, 
to  meet  some  dei)utation  from  a  city  so  influential  in  the 
interior  of  the  empire,  and  was  proportionately  astonished 
when  I  learned  that  my  advanced  guard  had  found  the  place 
almost  entirely  deserted,  and  that  even  the  municipal 
authorities  had  disappeared, 

I  entered  the  city  with  great  pomp,  but  amid  an  ominous 
silence.  Alighting  at  the  Kremlin,  the  antique  palace  of  the 
Czars,  so  celebrated  for  its  historical  associations,  and  so 
extraordinary  for  its  architecture,  half  Oriental  and  half 
Sclavonic,  I  felt  no  less  emotions  on  seeing  the  throne  of 
Peter  the  Great  than  in  visiting,  in  1806,  the  cabinet  of  Fred- 
erick at  Potsdam.  The  delightful  view  from  the  fine  balcony 
of  this  palace  added  to  these  emotions  ;  but  my  attention 
was  called  from  the  reflections  to  which  these  scenes  naturally 

gave  rise,  to  the  pressing  cares  of  our  present  situation. 
VOL.  Ill, — 26. 


402  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XYIII. 

My  first  care  was  the  maintenance  of  order  by  assigning 
quarters  to  the  several  corps-cV armée,  where  they  might 
establish  themselves  and  supply  their  most  jiressing  wants. 
Commandants  were  appointed  for  each  of  these  quarters. 
Order  has  always  been  maintained  in  all  the  capitals  which 
we  have  conquered,  so  long  as  there  remained  any  municipal 
authorities  or  inhabitants  to  guard  their  effects.  Even  at 
Madrid  my  entry  was  marked  by  no  excesses.  But  here  a 
half-famished  soldiery,  finding  every  thing  abandonedj 
regarded  Moscow  rather  as  a  vast  camp  deserted  by  the 
enemy,  and  every  one  felt  entitled  to  appropriate  to  himself 
what  he  pleased.  Every  precaution  was  taken  to  guard  the 
public  depots  and  great  establishments  ;  but  there  were  a 
thousand  private  shops  which  had  been  stripped  by  their 
owners  of  their  most  valuable  contents  and  abandoned  ;  and 
our  soldiers,  as  they  could  not  expect  their  regular  supplies, 
until  we  could  organize  the  commissariat,  regarded  these 
house  and  cellars  as  subject  only  to  their  mercy. 

The  Russiaus  bura  the  City. — To  these  scenes  of  violence 
succeeded  burnings  which  soon  increased  in  number.  I  at 
first  attributed  it  to  the  imprudence  of  our  soldiers  in  kin- 
dling fires  in  the  middle  of  the  houses,  and  directed  severe 
j)unishments  to  be  inflicted.  But  the  ravage  of  the  fire  con- 
tinually increased  ;  and  it  was  soon  found  that  the  project 
had  been  premeditated  by  our  enemies,  and  was  the  result 
of  a  resolution  at  the  same  time  heroic  and  cruel.  On  the 
third  day  Moscow  was  an  ocean  of  flame,  and  the  spectacle 
from  the  balcony  of  the  Kremlin  was  worthy  of  Nero  burn- 
ing Kome.  But  for  me,  who  could  not  share  the  feelings  of 
that  monster,  it  was  a  sad  and  sorrowful  sight  and  filled  my 
heart  with  grief. 

My  troops  were  ordered  to  use  their  best  endeavors  to 
check  the  flames  ;  but  all  their  efforts  were  in  vain  ;  the 
(  iigines  had  been  removed  by  the  Governor  Eostopschin,  who 


Cil.  XVIII.]  INVASION    OF    RUSSIA.  403 

was  the  principal  author  of  the  Lurning,  and  the  houses, 
three-quarters  of  which  were  of  wood,  were  actually  fired  by- 
disguised  soldiers  of  the  city  police.  In  two  days  between 
seven  and  eight  thousand  houses  became  a  prey  to  the  flames. 
The  Kremlin,  surrounded  by  high  walls,  for  a  time  seemed 
safe,  but  the  burning  brands  which  were  flying  about  in  every 
direction,  caused  fears  for  the  arsenal  and  our  parks  ;  at 
len<''th  the  whirl-winds  of  smoke  and  fire  rendered  a  longer 
sojourn  in  this  place  impossible,  and  it  was  Avith  the  greatest 
difficulty  that  I  effected  my  escape  from  this  fiery  furnace, 
and  took  refuge  in  the  castle  of  Petrowski.* 


*  Thiers  thus  describes  the  burning  of  Moscow  : 

"The  French  army  hoped,  therefore,  to  enjoy  comfort  in  Moscow,  to  obtain, 
probably,  peace  by  means  of  its  possession,  and  at  least  good  winter  canton- 
ments, in  case  the  war  should  bo  prolonged.  But  on  the  afternoon  they  had 
entered,  columns  of  flames  arose  from  a  vast  building  containing  vast  quanti- 
ties of  spirits,  and  just  as  our  soldiers  had  almost  succeeded  in  mastering  ihe 
fire  m  this  spot,  a  violent  conflagration  suddenly  burst  forth  iu  a  collection  of 
buildings  called  the  Bazaar,  situated  to  the  north-east  of  the  Kremlin,  and  con- 
taining the  richest  magazines,  abounding  in  stores  of  the  exquisite  tissues  of 
India  and  Persia,  the  rarities  of  Europe,  colonial  produce,  and  precious  wines. 
The  troops  of  the  guard  immediately  hastened  up  and  attempted  to  subdue  tho 
flames,  but  their  energetic  eflbrts  were  unfortunately  unsuccessful,  and  the  im- 
mense riches  of  the  establishment  fell  a  prey  to  the  fire,  with  the  exception  of 
some  portions  which  our  men  were  able  to  snatch  from  the  devouring  element. 
This  fresh  accident  was  again  attributed  to  natural  causes,  and  considered  as 
easily  explicable  in  the  tumult  of  an  evacuation. 

"During  the  night  of  the  fifteenth  of  September,  however,  a  sudden  change 
came  over  the  scene  ;  for  then,  as  though  every  species  of  misfortune  were  to 
fall  at  the  same  moment  on  the  ancient  Muscovite  capital,  the  equinoctial  gales 
suddenly  arose  with  the  extreme  violence  usual  to  the  season,  and  in  countries 
where  wide  spread  plains  ofifer  no  resistance  to  the  storm.  This  wind,  blowmg 
first  from  the  east,  carried  the  fire  to  the  west  into  the  streets  comprised 
between  the  Iver  and  Smolensko  routes,  which  were  the  most  beautiful  and 
tho  richest  in  all  Moscow.  "Within  some  hours  the  fire,  spreading  with  fright- 
ful rapidity,  and  throwing  out  long  arrows  of  flame,  spread  to  the  other  west- 
ward quarters.  And  soon  rockets  were  observed  in  the  air,  and  wretches  were 
seized  in  the  act  of  spreading  the  conflagration.  Interrogated  under  threat  of 
instant  death  they  revealed  the  friglitful  secret,  the  order  given  by  Count  Ros- 
topschin  for  the  burning  of  the  city  of  Moscow,  as  though  it  had  been  a  simple 
village  on  the  Moscow  route.  This  information  filled  the  wholu  army  with 
consternation.     Napoleon  ordered  that  military  commissions  should  be  formed 


404  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

This  catastrophe  entirely  changed  the  face  of  affaiis  ;  but 
it  was  not,  as  some  have  supposed,  a  certain  cause  of  my 
ruin  and  the  salvation  of  Russia,     On  the  coutraiy,  if  I  had 

in  each  quarter  of  the  city  for  the  purpose  of  judging,  shooting,  and  hanging, 
incendaries  taken  in  the  act  ;  and  that  all  the  available  trooms  should  be  em- 
ployed in  Lxtinguishing  the  flames.  Immediate  recourse  was  had  to  the 
pumps,  but  it  was  found  they  had  been  removed;  and  this  latter  circumstance 
would  have  proved,  if  indeed  any  doubt  on  the  matter  had  remained,  the  ter- 
rible determination  with  which  Moscow  had  been  given  to  the  flames. 

"In  the  mean  time,  the  wind,  increasing  in  violence  every  moment, rendered 
the  efforts  of  the  whole  army  ineffectual,  and  suddenly  changing  with  the 
abruptness  peculiar  to  equinoctial  gales,  from  the  east  to  the  north-west,  it  car- 
ried the  torrent  of  flame  into  quarters  which  the  hands  of  the  incendiaries  had 
not  yet  been  able  to  fire.  And  after  having  blown  during  some  liours  from  the 
north-west,  the  wind  once  more  changed  its  direction  and  blew  from  the  south- 
west, as  though  it  had  a  cruel  pleasure  in  spreading  ruin  and  death  over  the 
unhappy  city,  or  rather,  over  our  army. 

"  By  this  change  of  the  wind  to  the  south-west,  the  Kremlin  was  placed  in 
extreme  peril. 

"  More  than  four  hundred  ammunition  waggons  were  in  the  court  of  the 
Kremlin,  and  the  arsenal  contained  some  four  hundred  thousand  pounds  of 
powder.  There  was  imminent  danger,  therefore,  that  Napoleon  with  his 
guard,  and  the  palace  of  the  Czars,  might  be  blown  up  into  the  air. 

"  The  olBcers  who  surrounded  him,  and  the  artillerymen  who  knew  that  his 
death  would  bo  their  own,  thronged  about  him  with  entreaties  that  he  would 
retire  from  so  dangerous  a  position. 

"  The  peril  was  most  threatening  ;  and  even  the  old  artillerymen  of  the 
guard,  although  accustomed  to  such  cannonades  as  that  of  Borodino,  almost 
lost  their  sang-froid. 

"  General  Lariboisière  at  length  approached  Napoleon,  and  with  the  authority 
he  had  by  virtue  of  his  age  and  his  devotion,  entreated  tluit  the  troops  might 
be  permitted  to  save  themselves  without  having  their  embarrassment  increased 
by  the  excitement  caused  by  the  presence  of  their  emperor.  Several  officers, 
moreover,  who  had  been  sent  into  the  adjacent  quarters  to  make  inquiries, 
reported  that  it  was  scarcely  possible  to  traverse  the  burning  streets,  and  that 
to  depart  immediately  was  the  only  means  of  escaping  from  being  buried  under 
the  ruins  of  the  doomed  city. 

"Napoleon,  therefore,  followed  by  some  of  his  lieutenants,  descended  from 
the  Kremlin  to  the  quay  of  the  Moskowa,  where  he  found  his  horses  ready  for 
him,  and  had  much  difficulty  in  threading  the  streets,  which,  toward  the  north- 
west, in  which  direction  he  proceeded,  were  already  in  flames.  The  terrified 
army  set  out  from  Moscow  ;  the  divisions  of  Prince  Eugene  and  Marslial  Ney, 
fell  back  upon  the  Twenigorod  and  St.  Petersburg  roads.  Those  of  Marshal 
Davoust  foil  back  upon  the  Smolensko  route,  and  with  the  exception  of  the 
guard,  whicli  was  left  around  the  Kremlin,  to  dispute  its  possession  with  the 
flames,  our  troops  drew  back  in  horror  from  before  the  fire,  which,  after  flaming 


Ch.  XVIII.]  INVASION     OF    RUSSIA.  405 

been  less  tenacious  in  my  projects,  I  should  have  regarded  so 
desperate  a  resolution  as  a  proof  that  the  Russian  govern- 
ment and  nation  Avould  not  treat,  and  as  a  happy  warning-  to 

up  to  heaven,  darted  back  toward  them  as  though  it  wished  to  devour  them. 
The  few  iuhubitaiits  who  had  remained  in  Moscow,  and  had  hitherto  lain  con- 
cealed in  their  dwellings,  now  fled,  carrying  away  such  of  their  possessions  as 
they  valued  most  highly,  uttering  lamentable  cries  of  distress,  and  in  many  in- 
stances, filling  victiiiis  to  the  brigands  whom  Rostopschin  had  let  loose,  and 
who  now  exulted  iu  the  midst  of  the  conflagration,  as  the  Genius  of  Evil  in  the 
midst  of  Chaos. 

"  Kapoleon  took  up  his  quarters  at  the  chateau  of  Petrowskoio,  a  league's 
distance  fi  om  Moscow  on  the  St.  Petersburg  route,  in  the  centre  of  the  canton- 
ments of  the  troops  under  Prince  Eugene,  awaiting  there  the  subsidence  of  the 
conflagration,  which  had  now  reached  such  a  height,  that  it  was  beyond  human 
130wer  either  to  increase  or  extinguish  it. 

»As  a  final  misfortune,  the  wind  changed  on  the  following  day,  from  south- 
west to  direct  west,  and  the  torrents  of  flame  were  carried  toward  the  eastern 
quarters  of  the  city,  the  streets  Messnitskaia  and  Bassmanaia,  and  the  Summer- 
palace.  As  the  conflagration  reached  ils  terriljle  height,  frightful  craslies  were 
heard  every  moment  ;  roofs  crashing  inwards,  and  stately  façades  crumbling 
headlong  into  the  streets,  as  their  supports  became  consumed  in  the  flames. 

"  The  sky  was  scarcely  visible  through  the  thick  cloud  of  smoke  which  over- 
shadowed it,  and  the  sun  was  only  apparent  as  a  blood-red  globe.  For  three 
successive  days,  the  sixteenth,  the  seventeenth,  and  the  eighteenth  of  Septem- 
ber, this  terrific  scene  continued,  and  in  uuabated  intensity. 

"At  length,  after  having  devoured  four-fifths  of  the  city,  the  fire  ceased, 
gradually  quenched  by  the  rain,  which,  as  is  usually  the  case,  succeeded  the 
violence  of  the  equinoctial  gales.  As  the  flames  subsided,  only  the  spectre  as 
it  were,  of  what  had  once  been  a  magnificent  city,  was  visible  ;  and,  indeed, 
the  Krsmlm,  and  about  a  fifth  part  of  the  city  were  alone  saved  ;  their  preser- 
vation being  chiefly  due  to  the  exertions  of  the  Imperial  Guard. 

"  As  the  nihabitants  of  iloscow  themselves  entered  the  ruins  seeking  what 
property  still  remained  in  them  undestroyed,  it  was  scarcely  possible  to  prevent 
our  soldiers  from  acting  in  the  same  manner,  and  accordingly  searching  among 
the  crumbling  edifices,  they  speedily  penetrated  to  the  cellars  and  found  there 
quantities  of  provisions  still  m  great  part  uninjured  by  the  fire,  and  in  an 
abundance,  which  was  due  to  the  custom  prevailing  in  the  country,  on  account 
of  the  length  of  the  winters,  of  storing  up  provisions  for  many  months. 

"  In  many  of  the  houses,  also,  which  the  fire  had  injured  sufficientlj'  to  ren- 
der their  pillage  excusable  witliout  actually  destroying  tliem,  were  fjund  the 
most  exquisite  articles  of  luxury,  furs,  and  plate,  which  latter  spoil  the  troops, 
in  their  improvidence,  preferred  to  cither  food  or  clothing,  and  superb  porcelain, 
which  in  tlieir  ignorance  they  despised  or  idly  destroyed. 

"  It  was  a  lamentable  and  grotesque  spectacle  which  was  now  presented,  a.s 
the  crowd  of  our  troops  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  city  thronged  the  smoi<ing 
embers  of  the  splendid  city,  1  lugliing  at  the  singular  costumes  in  which  they 


406  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON  [Ch.  XVIII. 

retreat  before  winter.  In  not  doing  so  I  committed  the 
greatest  error  of  my  whole  life.  If  the  Russians  had  not 
destroyed  their  city  till  the  end  of  October,  the  effect  might 
have  been  decisive,  but  executed  about  the  middle  of  Sep- 
tember, it  was  calculated  to  save  me  and  might  have  become 
a  useless  sacrifice.  What  would  have  been  the  result,  if, 
taking  warning  by  this  barbarous  act,  I  h;id  the  next  d;iy 
taken  the  road  to  Kalouga  "^  Although  the  fire  had  des- 
troyed two-thirds  of  our  resources,  we  still  had  a  good  deal 
left  ;  but  we  were  mostly  destitute  of  forage  for  our  animals. 
We  attempted  to  reorganize  the  Eussian  authorities,  but  the 
employes  failed  to  perform  their  duties,  and  the  subaltern 
agents,  instead  of  rendering  us  any  assistance,  required  us  to 
furnish  them  with  supplies.  Here  war  could  not  support 
war  ! 

NapoIcoH  projects  a  March  on  St.  Pctersliiirg.— I  care- 
fully weighed  all  the  consequences  of  this  great  catastrojjhe  ; 
and  I  saw  that  peace  alone  could  rescue  us  from  the  gulf 
into  which  a  fatal  destiny  had  plunged  us.  Four  different 
projects  presented  themselves  to  my  choice  ;  to  pass  the  win- 
had  robed  themselves,  bearing  in  their  hands  articles  of  the  utmost  value,  sel- 
ling them  for  the  most  insigniticant  prices  to  those  capable  of  appreciating  their 
value,  or  dasliing  them  to  pieces  in  pure  wantonness.  And  this  wild  and  mel- 
ancholy scene,  in  which  intoxication  was  also  a  great  element,  for  quantities 
of  liquors  had  been  discovered  in  the  cellars,  was  rendered  still  more  sad  by 
the  return  of  the  unfortunate  inhabitants  who  had  fled  at  the  moment  of  tlie 
evacuation  or  the  breaking  out  of  the  fire,  and  who  now  returned,  for  the  most 
part,  to  weep  over  the  ruins  of  then-  dwelhngs,  or  to  dispute  with  an  unbridled 
mob,  the  fragments  still  remaming  of  tlieir  possessions.  Their  only  shelter  the 
huts  they  could  con.struct  of  the  ruins  which  lay  around  them,  their  only  beds 
the  cinders  of  their  former  dwellings,  they  had  no  other  food  but  what  they 
might  be  able  to  beg  from  our  troops. 

'•  Thus  gradually  and  mournfully,  the  population  of  Moscow  returned  ;  and 
with  them,  came  back,  equally  in  search  of  their  former  habitations,  and  utter- 
ing the  most  dismal  croakings,  the  clouds  of  crows  and  ravens  whsm  the 
flames  had  driven  away.  And  of  this  horrible  scene,  the  chiefest  horror  of  all 
remains  to  be  told  ;  the  Russians  had  left  fifteen  thousand  wounded  in  'Mos- 
cow, and  incanable  of  escaping,  they  had  perished,  victims  of  Rostopschin's 
barbarous  patriotism." 


Cn.  XVIIL]  INVASION    OF    RUSSIA.  407 

ter  at  Moscow  ;  to  retire  to  the  south  on  the  Wolhynia  ;  or 
by  Kalouga  on  Smolensko  and  Wihia,  or  finally,  to  march  to 
the  north  on  St.  Petersburg.  It  was  possible  that,  threat- 
ened in  his  last  capital,  the  Emperor  Alexander  would  treat 
for  peace.  If  not,  we  would  take  Wittgenstein  in  reverse 
and  force  him  to  fall  back  on  the  Ingria,  thus  enabling  Bel- 
luno,  St.  Cjv  and  Macdonald,  to  advance  on  Pskow  and  form 
a  junction  Avith  the  main  army.  After  more  mature  consid- 
eration, and  after  weighing  the  chances  of  being  attacked  in 
rear  by  the  Russian  army  and  thrown  into  the  marshes  of 
the  Ingria,  I  determined  only  to  make  a  demonstration  on 
St.  Petersburg,  and  if  the  em[)eror  would  not  treat,  to  retire 
upon  the  plateaus  of  Waldai  and  Nowogorod  on  the  Dwina 
by  Sebeje.  But  my  generals  so  strongly  opposed  this  pro- 
ject, as  being  exceedingly  dangerous,  that  I  determined  to 
remain  where  I  was,  till  I  could  learn  the  eifect  produced  by 
the  battle  of  Borodino  and  the  burning  of  Moscow  on  the 
cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg.  The  fire  having  subsided,  I 
returned  to  the  smoking  ruins  of  Moscow  on  the  nineteenth, 
to  wait  for  news  from  Kutusof  and  Alexander. 

It  would  now  be  difiScult  to  say  what  would  have  been  the 
consequences  of  the  adoption  of  my  project  of  marching  on 
St.  Petersburg.  If  it  had  been  executed  immediately,  the 
movement  might  have  conducted  us  to  Nowogorod  by  the 
middle  of  October  ;  and  Belluno  and  St.  Cyr  might  have 
efiected  their  junction.  But  by  following  in  our  rear  and 
harassing  us  with  partial  combats,  Kutusof,  after  efiecting  a 
junction  with  Wittgenstein  and  the  corps  of  Riga,  and  being 
reënforced  by  new  levies,  might  have  forced  us  to  retreat  by 
Vitepsk  on  Wilna,  and  by  taking  a  parallel  route  he  would 
have  rendered  our  retreat  no  less  disastrous  than  that  by 
Smolensko. 

The  only  wise  course  now  to  be  pursued,  was  to  march 
without  delay  on  Volokolamsk  and  Toropets,  and  to  take  the 


408  LIFE     or    NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

direct  road  to  Witepsk,  or  to  march  immediately  against 
Kutusof,  give  liim  battle,  destroy  the  manufactory  of  arms 
at  Toula,  and  return  by  Kalouga  and  Roslaw  on  Smolensko. 
No  other  operation  could  save  us  from  ruin. 

Upon  cool  reflection  and  a  full  knowledge  of  the  condition 
of  affairs  in  Russia,  I  am  convinced  that  a  movement  to  the 
south  was  preferable  to  one  on  St.  Petersburg.  The  Em- 
peror Alexander  had  resolved  not  to  treat,  so  long  as  an 
enemy  was  on  the  Russian  soil  ;  and  from  the  important 
change  which,  after  the  camp  of  Drissa,  he  had  effected  in 
the  personnel  of  his  staff,  and  the  sujierior  military  know- 
ledge which  was  thus  introduced  into  that  body,  I  now  have 
reason  to  believe  that  they  would  have  abundantly  profited 
by  any  movement  of  ours  into  so  difScult  and  dangerous  a 
country  as  that  in  the  direction  of  St.  Petersburg.  It  is 
probable,  therefore,  that  the  project  would  have  proved 
exceedingly  disastrous,  had  I  persisted  in  its  execution. 

Movement  of  the  Russian  Army  on  Taroutina.  —  But 
let  us  leave  these  discussions,  and  return  to  the  ashes  of  Mos- 
cow. As  has  already  been  said,  I  again  took  up  my  quar- 
ters amidst  the  ruins  of  that  city  on  the  nineteenth. 
Although  the  destruction  of  this  capital  was  calculated  to 
absorb  all  my  attention,  I  did  not  entirely  lose  sight  of  the 
Russian  army,  the  rear-guard  of  which  Murat  had  pursued 
on  the  road  to  Razan.  The  fatigue  which  the  remainder  of 
my  troops  had  sustained  rendered  it  necessary  to  give  them  a 
little  repose.  Our  situation  was  becoming  complicated. 
Moscow  like  all  large  capitals,  w^as  the  centre  from  which 
twenty  difierent  roads  diverged  like  the  radii  of  a  circle  ; 
detachments  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  showed  themselves 
toward  Klin  on  the  road  to  St.  Petersburg.  Others  guarded 
the  roads  to  Jaroslaw,  Wladimir,  Podolsk,  and  Toula,  This 
rendered  it  difficult  to  obtain  any  correct  information  of  the 
enemy's   movements  :    especially   as  our   own    cavalry   was 


Ch.  XYIII.]  invasion    of    RUSSIA.  409 

greatly  broken  down,  while  that  of  the  Eussians  was  much 
better  supplied  with  forage.  Eight  entire  days  passed  before 
I  could  learn  any  thing  positive.  Murat  then  announced  to 
me  that  the  Kussian  army  had  deceived  us,  and  after  having 
followed  for  a  time  the  road  from  Kazan  to  the  east,  it  had 
returned  on  tlie  Pakra  to  reach  Toula  or  Kalouga.  I  im- 
mediately dispatched  Bessicres  in  that  direction.  I  was  pre- 
paring to  march,  on  the  twenty-eighth  of  September,  by 
Podolsk  to  turn  the  right  of  the  Russians  and  throw  them 
back  upon  the  Dnieper,  when  Murat  announced  that  they 
had  again  retired.  Our  troops  received  a  counter  order,  and 
I  resolved  to  wait  till  I  could  see  more  clearly  into  the  state 
of  our  affairs  and  the  projects  of  the  enemy  ;  fifteen  days 
were  thus  unfortunately  lost. 

Kutusof  thus  gained  time  to  establish  himself  in  the  posi- 
tion which  he  had  taken  at  Taroutina  behind  the  Nara,  a 
point  between  Toula  and  Kalouga,  on  the  old  road  leading 
to  the  latter  city.  He  thus  covered  the  fine  armories  of 
Toula,  and  the  fertile  and  populous  provinces  of  the  south, 
and  at  the  same  time  was  near  enough  to  the  road  to  Smolensko 
to  threaten  our  only  line  of  communication  I  was  impatient 
to  learn  the  effect  of  the  battle  of  Borodino  and  the  burning 
of  Moscow,  on  the  Emperor  Alexander  and  the  court  of  St. 
Petersburg.  I  still  retained  some  hopes  of  effecting  an 
arrangement.  The  circumstances  attending  these  two  events 
v/ere  not,  in  truth,  very  encouraging  ;  but  as  the  Russian 
army  had  suffered  such  terrible  losses,  I  thought  it  not 
improbable  that  the  emperor  would  be  glad  to  terminate  the 
war  upon  honorable  terms.  The  Russian  army  is  excellent, 
but  if  once  broken  it  would  be  no  easy  matter  to  immediately 
build  it  up  again. 

A  conversation  which  I  had  with  a  Russian  gentleman, 
employed  in  the  civil  government,  induced  me  to  intrust  to 
him  a  letter  to  the  Emperor  Alexander.     M.  Jacoblef  left, 


410  LIFE     DF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

on  the  twenty-fourth  of  September,  with  tbis  confidential 
overture.  It  required  eight  days  for  an  answer  ;  but  as  ten 
days  had  ah-eady  elapsed  I  determined,  on  the  fourth  of 
October,  to  send  my  aid-de-carap,  Lauriston,  to  the  head- 
quarters of  Kutusof  ;  he  was  the  bearer  of  a  letter  for  the 
emperor,  in  which  I  proposed  to  enter  into  negotiations,  and, 
as  a  prelude,  to  form  an  armistice.  The  same  proposition 
was  sent  to  Kutusof  who  replied  that  he  had  no  power  to 
negotiate,  but  had  forwarded  my  letter  by  Prince  Volkonski. 
In  the  mean  time  the  greater  part  of  my  army  was  cantoned 
at  Moscow  and  in  its  environs,  while  a  strong  vanguard,  under 
the  orders  of  the  King  of  Naples,  was  established  opposite 
the  Russians  near  Winkowo. 

Embarrassments  of  Napoleon's  Position» — We  had  already 
been  twenty  days  at  Moscow,  and  still  no  propositions  for  an 
accommodation  ;  I,  however,  still  flattered  myself  that  we 
should  receive  them,  although  I  must  now  confess  that  there 
was  little  or  no  ground  for  such  hopes.  The  fact  is,  I  dis- 
liked to  look  behind  me  and  to  submit  to  the  idea  of  a  retreat. 

The  retreat  on  Smolensko  was  difficult  ;  the  roads  were 
bad,  and  we  were  in  want  of  provisions  of  which  the  country 
was  destitute.  Nevertheless,  it  was  possible,  if  undertaken 
before  winter  set  in,  and  before  the  enemy  received  his  reën- 
forcements. 

The  retreat  on  Kiew  was  apparently  more  advantageous  ; 
it  led  through  a  rich  country  where  our  army  could  obtain 
supplies,  and  would  enable  us  to  effect  a  junction  with 
Schwartzenberg  ;  I  might  then  base  myself  on  Tomosa,  Lub- 
lin, and  Warsaw.  But  to  do  this  I  must  rely  on  Austria  ; 
and  God  only  knew  whether  or  not  she  would  then  have 
done  what  she  did,  with  less  security,  in  1813,  by  attacking 
me  at  Dresden.  Besides,  the  road  by  Kiew  was  then  occu- 
pied by  Tomasof,  Tchichagof  and  Sacken,  while  our  great 
depots  were  at  Kowno,  Wilna,  and  Minsk. 


Ch.  XVIIL] 


INVASION     OF     RUSSIA,  411 


I  have  already  spoken  of  a  third  alternative, — that  of 
operating  at  the  north  on  the  borders  of  Twer  and  Pskow, 
and  thence  moving  on  the  road  from  Nevel  to  Polotsk, 
so  as  to  join  Belluno  and  Oudinot  This  course  would 
save  me  the  danger  of  a  retreat  parallel  to  the  enemj', 
and  of  being  anticipated  at  Smolensko,  and  would  take  me 
to  the  Lower  Niémen,  where  were  my  depots  of  provisions  ; 
but  this  line  took  me  too  far  towards  the  Baltic,  and,  more- 
over, exposed  me  to  the  chances  of  being  anticipated  by  the 
enemy  at  Witepsk  or  Gloubokoie. 

But  I  could  not  bear  to  think  of  retreating  at  all.  Since 
the  battle  of  Castiglionc,  I  had  but  twice  retired  before  the 
enemy — after  Essling  and  Eylau, — but  then  it  was  merely 
to  gather  strength  for  a  new  advance.  At  Moscow,  however, 
the  circumstances  were  totally  different,  and  I  felt  that  the 
least  retrograde  movement  might  endanger  the  very  existence 
of  my  empire.  Although  Austria  had  given  me  one  of  her 
archduchesses  in  marriage,  I  knew  very  well  that  that  bond  of 
connection,  although  good  under  ordinary  circumstances, 
would  be  of  no  avail  in  a  case  like  the  present,  I  understood 
the  public  spirit  of  Prussia  and  Vienna,  for  I  myself  had 
given  it  birth. 

If  my  army  had  half  melted  away  during  the  long  days 
and  fine  weather  of  July  and  August,  and  during  a  trium- 
phal march,  what  would  become  of  it  in  retreating  over  the 
same  road  in  the  muds  of  autumn  and  the  frosts  of  winter, 
and  during  the  long  nights  and  tempestuous  weather  which 
rendered  bivouacs  fatal  even  to  the  most  robust .?  Where 
could  I  repose  my  suffering  troops,  and  where  find  a  refuge 
for  the  sick  and  stragglers  .?*  Where  were  the  horses  to 
transport  our  provisions  and  artillery,  and  to  oppose  the 
cavalry  of  the  enemy  .^  This  enemy  could  collect  in  the 
country,  where  we  could  find  nothing,  sufficient  flour  for  the 
supply  of  men  who,  even  in  time  of  peace,  are  accustomed 


412  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XYIIL 

to  little  else  ;  and  his  horses,  raised  in  the  steppes  and  accus- 
tomed to  pass  half  of  their  lives  in  bivouac,  both  in  sum- 
mer and  winter,  subsist  on  the  bark  and  branches  of  trees. 
The  fatigues  and  privations  which  killed  our  horses,  were 
only  the  ordinary  regimen  of  these  wild  coursers.  What 
could  I  do  on  the  Borysthenese,  or  the  Niémen,  with  a 
broken  army,  with  my  artillery  scattered,  and  my  cavalry 
half  dismounted,  with  a  million  of  enemies  on  my  rear  and 
the  whole  Eassian  army  before  me  ? 

I  should  not  have  hesitated  what  to  do,  if  my  army  had 
been  composed  entirely  of  Frenchmen  ;  but  these  formed 
scarcely  one-half  of  my  forces.  The  remainder  were  Prus- 
sians, Austrians,  etc.,  whose  attachment  to  my  cause  was 
more  than  suspected.  Many  times,  in  reflecting  upon  these 
things,  did  I  regret  not  having  followed  the  judicious  advice 
of  the  officer  who  told  me  at  Berlin,  that  I  w^ould  lose  my 
army,  if  I  ever  engaged  in  a  great  war  at  the  North,  without 
basing  myself  on  Prussia,  and  without  attaching  her  to  our 
cause  by  advantageous  concessions. 

But  as  it  is  necessary  in  such  cases  to  choose  the  least  objec- 
tionable of  the  projects  presented,  and  as  the  retreat  on  Kiow 
offered  more  favorable  chances  than  any  other,  I  was  inclined 
to  adopt  it  ;  but  a  fatal  confidence  in  my  fortune  induced 
me  to  defer  its  execution  until  the  return  of  the  courier  from 
St.  Petersburg.  As  any  one  easily  persuades  himself  into 
believing  what  he  most  desires,  I  still  hoped  that  the  Em- 
peror Alexander  would  take  advantage  of  the  present  occa- 
sion to  enter  into  negotiations.  But  I  had  mistaken  his 
character. 

Time  passed  on;  yet  no  response  came  from  St.  Petei's- 
burg.  To  the  inquietude  of  my  situation  was  added  the 
unfavorable  news  which  I  received  from  Si)ain  and  from  the 
wings  of  my  army.  Wellington,  after  his  victory  of  Sala- 
manca, had  entered  Madrid,  and  the  flames  of  war  had  burst 


Ch.  XVIIL]  INVASION    OF    RUSSIA.  413 

forth  with  more  vigor  than  ever.  The  army  of  Moklavia 
had  been  directed  against  Schwartzenberg  ;  Admiral  Tchich- 
agof  had  repUiced  Tomasof  in  the  general  comm;md,  aiul 
now  sought  laurels  on  land  Avhich  he  could  not  find  in  the 
ungrateful  service  of  the  sea.  Not  being  able  to  oppose  a 
force  of  one  hundred  and  two  battalions  and  one  hundred 
twenty  squadrons,  in  all  not  less  than  seventy  thousand  men, 
Prince  Schwartzenberg  had  fallen  back  behind  the  Bug. 
Warsaw  was  again  alarmed  and  Wilna  seriously  threatened. 
On  the  other  side,  Steingle's  corps,  returning  from  Finland, 
had  embarked  in  Livonia  and  thus  given  the  enemy  a  supe- 
riority over  Macdonald.  If  Steingle  should  join  Wittgenstein, 
(whose  army  had  already  been  reënforced  by  the  cohorts  of 
the  militia  of  St.  Petersburg),  it  would  increase  his  force  to 
seventy-live  battalions  and  thirty-eight  squadrons,  whereas, 
with  one-half  of  that  number  he  had  maintained  a  threaten- 
ing attitude  during  the  whole  campaign.  To  dispel  this 
double  storm,  Belluno  and  Baraguay-d'Hilliers  were  at  Smo- 
lensko  ;  Duruth's  fine  division  at  Warsaw  ;  and  I  had  solic- 
ited the  Emperor  of  Austria  to  send  reënforcements  to 
Schwartzenberg,  and  had  asked  Prussia  to  send  another  divi- 
sion to  Macdonald. 

In  the  mean  time  I  was  waiting,  with  apparent  calmness, 
for  an  answer  from  St.  Petersburg.  I  affected  the  intention 
of  passing  the  winter  at  Moscow,  and  even  joked  with  one 
of  my  generals  about  his  fears  of  the  cold,  asking  him 
"  where  now  is  the  cold  weather  from  which  you  have  antici- 
pated so  many  difficulties  .^"  In  fact,  until  the  thirteenth 
of  October,  we  had  the  finest  weather  possible  ;  it  seemed 
expressly  designed  to  lull  us  into  a  fatal  security.  But  I 
must  confess,  now  that  I  look  upon  things  with  a  vision  not 
distorted  by  surrounding  objects,  that  the  position  of  the 
enemy  at  Taroutina  ought  to  have  more  fully  ojjened  my  eyes 
to  the  impending  danger.     This  position  not  only  covered  the 


414  -LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

best  provinces  of  the  empire  and  secured  to  the  army  nume- 
rous reënforcements,  but  it  Avas  actually  offensive,  threaten- 
ing our  communications.  Our  victorious  position  and  the 
calm  which  reigned  around  me  contributed  to  the  illusion. 
We  were  at  Moscow,  as  if  at  the  gates  of  France  ;  estafettes 
succeeded  each  other  daily  and  the  mails  arrived  with  the 
utmost  regularity  ;  the  dispatches  of  my  ministers,  and 
Council  of  State,  were  laid  before  me  as  usual  ;  from  the 
Kremlin,  1  directed  the  minutest  affairs  of  my  empire,  and 
no  Frenchman  suffered  in  his  interests  from  an  absence  which 
seemed  calculated  to  completely  stop  the  ordinary  course  of 
events.  It  is  true  that  some  of  the  enemy's  partisans  had 
appeared  on  the  road  to  Mojaisk,  but  strong  columns  of  the 
cavalry  of  the  guard  soon  swept  them  away.  The  boldest 
of  these  partisans,  were  Davidof,  Seslavin,  and  Fiquener  ; 
the  first  was  a  poet,  witty  and  amiable,  and  an  intelligent 
officer  ;  the  second,  active  and  audacious  ;  the  third,  a  Ger- 
man by  birtli,  but  a  true  Tartar  in  character.  Seconded  by 
the  inhabitants  of  the  country,  they  attacked  our  lines  of 
communication  and  carried  away  our  outposts  ;  but  they 
were  yet  too  circumspect  to  approach  near  our  cantonments 
around  Moscow.  But  they  gradually  became  more  bold. 
Every  day  our  foraging  parties  lost  some  of  their  men  in 
engagements  with  the  armed  peasants,  militia,  or  Cossacks, 
and  sometimes  even  large  detachments  were  captured  by  the 
enemy's  light  cavalry. 


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